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ABSTRACT 
Since the end of the 2nd world War, we have witnessed a 
tremendous amount of world trade expansion. This has been in 
part caused by the favourable international trading environment 
provided by the public good, the GATT, aided by"the politico- 
economic hegemony of the United States of America. Korea took 
advantage of this favourable situation by pursuing an economic 
development strategy of export-led growth. As the US hegemony 
began to decline, the formation of a multipolar system based 
upon regional blocs, has given a new dimension to Korea's 
international trade. 
In EU-ROK economic relations, regionalism and globalization 
of world trade has brought Korea both challenges and 
opportunities. The case study of Korea's leading electronics 
firms clearly suggests the requirement for the maintenance of a 
physical presence through FDI to conduct business successfully 
in the European market. The new international, politico-economic 
order obliges firms outside a regional body to locate marketing, 
manufacturing or even product development within the territories 
of a regional economic group to avoid NTBS such as anti-dumping. 
Economic interaction between the European Union, a giant of 
regionalism with potential economic power and the Republic of 
Korea, a forerunner among newly industrialized nations, highly 
vulnerable to outer setting, seems to be regulated by rules and 
norms, like the pendulum moving between the two extremes of 
protectionism and a free, liberal trading environment. The study 
attempts to show that Korea's exports to the EU market will 
increase more and more as the pendulum moves toward the free 
trade logic based upon multilateralism. 
In order accurately to analyse the EU-Korean economic 
relationship, a better understanding of regionalism and 
globalization of World trade should be added to the existing 
literature on the international political economy(Realism, 
Liberalism, Marxism). The general assumption of the study is 
based upon economic liberalism which puts much focus on economic 
efficiency. As a model of deep economic integration, whether the 
European Union is strongly committed to multilateralism or 
resorts to protectionist trade regimes such as anti-dumping, 
quantitative restrictions, or local content rules, will be a 
major determinant of EU-Korea trade interaction in the future because Korea will continually pursue economic development with 
export-oriented characteristics. 
The maximization of EU-ROK economic exchanges will be 
achieved only when the world trading system is committed to 
multilateralism under the WTO in general, and the EU's pursuit 
of open regionalism to reduce NTBs against the ROK in 
particular. Of course, Korea should make reciprocal efforts further to liberalize and deregulate its trade regimes by 
opening more markets to foreign products. Korea's active pursuit 
of globalization and localization strategies to penetrate into the EU market is a prerequisite for a continuous rapid growth of the Korean economy. 
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CHAPTER ONE. THE CHANGING INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL ECONOMY 
OF TRADE 
1.1 Introduction 
The period since the end of the second World War has been 
marked by the rapid expansion of world trade. ' The Republic of 
Korea(ROK)2 has been one of the main beneficiaries of the 
subsequent expansion in international trade. Aided by the 
politico-economic hegemony of the United States of America(USA) 
and the postwar framework for international trade, the General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade(GATT) has provided the ROK with 
a public good', enabling her to secure the rapid economic 
development with a strategy of export-led growth. ` However, 
regionalization and globalization of the world economy, 
caused by the political redefinition of the US's hegemonic role, 
'. Beginning in the early 1950s, the major trading nations 
of the world recorded sustained economic growth over a twenty- 
year period, with an average growth record of 4.9 percent from 
1950-1970, and in excess of 5 percent to 1973. During the period 
1973-1980, the average annual growth rate fell to 2.9 percent. 
During the 1960s, 1970s and 1980s, Korea grew much more rapidly 
than other countries, averaging 9 percent annually. See more 
statistics in Table 2.6: Growth in the Volume of World GDP and 
Merchandise. 
2. I shall use the Republic of Korea (ROK)as the official 
name of South Korea. However, to avoid excessive repetition, I 
shall use "South Korea" and "Korea" to describe the ROK. 
3. The specific definition of a public good is based upon 
the characteristics that consumption of the good by one person 
does not reduce the chances of others consuming the good; and 
that can be prevented from consuming the good. 
`. with regard to detailed statistics and policies of the 
ROK government economic performance since the early 1960s, the 
sub-chapter 4.1, Korea's Industrialization Pattern and Its 
Participation into the World Economic Structure, provides more 
comprehensive information. 
1 
has created more opportunity for uncertainty and protectionist 
pressures in the world market, which. has imposed more 
constraints and restrictions upon the ROK's export-promotion 
strategies. The European Union(EU)5 is the foremost example of 
a pattern of political and economic development based upon 
integration and regionalization, whose trade policies pose a 
threat to the ROK's future economic development. 
The changed world order has compelled Korean firms to 
establish a physical presence inside the EU6 to conduct business 
5. The term, European Union has been used since the 1991 
Intergovernmental Conference on political union, officially by 
all the members since by the ratification of the Maastricht 
Treaty. Although it was not until January 1994 that the European 
Union started to exist to replace the European Community, I 
shall use the term European Union(EU) consistently in referring 
to both the pre-and post-1994 situation; the term "European 
Community" will only be used in quotations and in the 
bibliography. To avoid excessive repetition, however, I shall 
also use the expressions, "European Communities" and "Europe" to 
describe the EU. 
6. Several factors, including the success of the Single 
Market programme and the collapse of communism increased the 
momentum for integration as the European Community entered the 
1990s. The member states opened negotiations to complete 
economic and monetary union, to reform EC institutions, and 
expand community competence in foreign and security policy. 
Final negotiations took place in December 1991 in Maastricht, 
The Netherlands, and the Maastricht Treaty was signed there on 
7 February 1992. A debate then opened in Europe over the merits 
of further integration. Public dissatisfaction with the complex 
treaty combined with a currency crisis and a severe economic 
recession to sap popular and elite enthusiasm for the European 
project. Nevertheless, all twelve countries finally ratified 
the treaty, which came into force in late 1993. The completion 
of the agreed agenda is in process and some sensitive sectors 
are on the agenda. The expansion of the Community competence in 
the area of economic and monetary union and foreign and security 
Policy needs to be adjusted once more at the 1996 
Intergovernmental Conference(IGC) on the review of the 
Maastricht Treaty. Quoted in Brent F. Nelsen & Alexander C-G. 
Stubb (eds. ), The European Union: Readings on the Theory and 
Practice of European Integration, Boulder, Colorado: Lynne 
Rienner Publishers, Inc., 1994, p. 65. 
2 
successfully in the European market. Regionalism has obliged 
firms outside a specific regional body to locate marketing, 
manufacturing or even product development within the territories 
of a regional economic group. The ROK needs a creative and 
constructive response to the EU's challenges. Two of the ROK's 
major firms' responses to the regionalism of the EU will serve 
to illustrate the new challenges and responses which have been 
created by regionalization and globalization of world trade in 
general, and the EU's trade regimes in particular. The ROK's 
future economic relationship with the EU will depend heavily on 
the extent of the EU's and the ROK's commitment to 
multilateralism in trade relationships, and the extent to which 
the EU will resort to mercantilism in its trade policy, 
supported by policy measures such as anti-dumping, quantitative 
restrictions, voluntary export restraint(VER), and local content 
rules. The rapid pace of innovation in the international 
economy, such as new information technologies is destroying old 
companies and creating new ones. In response to regional 
groupings and to develop new markets, multinational companies 
are accelerating the globalization process. 7 This thesis 
provides an analysis of the dynamics of the relationship between 
globalization and regionalism in world trade and the 
implications for the development of the South Korean economy. 
This theme is explored through an analysis of South Korean- 
European Union trade relations with specific reference to the 
7. Kenichi Ohmae elaborates on a borderless world, with 
much focus on the information age, by saying that we are moving into a single, information-driven economy. See "Thinkers of The 
Nineties" by Bryan Appleyard in Independent, Monday 11 December 
1995, p. 13. 
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electronics sector. The following case studies of Samsung 
Electronics and Lucky-Goldstar(LG) Electronics seek to make an 
important contribution to our understanding of the political 
economy of multinational business responses to the 
regionalization and globalization of world trade. 
This thesis aims to provide a more comprehensive 
understanding of the ROK-EU economic relationship by employing 
different levels of analyses. Traditional analysis of trade 
relations has been based upon national and international 
political economy. In order to provide a more informative 
analysis, the new international economic environment demands 
that analysis focus upon the developing levels of regionalism 
and globalism. The three traditional schools of International 
relations theory (Realism, Liberalism, and Marxism) only 
partially explain important aspects in the world contemporary 
trading system. Due to its complexity, the EU-ROK bilateral 
economic relationship has to be explored at a number of levels. 
Globalism and regionalism can not be properly explained by the 
traditional theoretical literature. Only when the development of 
the globalization and regionalization of the world economy is 
understood, can one understand the extent of the challenges 
facing governments and major companies alike. The threats to 
multi lateral ism' in trade relations posed by aggressive 
This is a cognitive dimension of international trade in which each state trades with many other states. Its opposite dimension is unilateralism or bilateralism. The advantage of multilateral trade is that it enables the total volume of trade to be greater than with bilateral trade. The GATT has been the engine of multilateral trade through tariff reduction and quotas abolition. A detailed definition and conceptualization of multi lateral ism must include three properties. James A. Caporaso argues in his article, "International Relations Theory and Multi lateral ism, " in John Gerald Ruggie (ed. ), Multilateralism 
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unilateralism or bilateralism'0 have major implications for the 
ROK's Economy. " The postwar GATT regimes which helped to 
encourage the rapid expansion of international trade suggest 
that multilateral trade regimes in the international dimension 
offer an effective approach for promoting economic welfare 
within and between national economies. The system of 
Matters: The Theory and Praxis of an Institutional Reform, New 
York: Columbia University Press, 1993, that these are 
indivisibility, generalized principles of conduct, and diffuse 
reciprocity. He argues that these three properties should be 
treated as a coherent ensemble which is itself indivisible, 
rather than as additive, detachable indicators of 
multilateralism. Indivisibility could be defined as the scope 
over which costs and benefits are spread. The practical 
application of this property means shared costs and benefits of 
world community members. The past world economic recession is a 
good example, whereby no nation could be excluded from the 
economic costs. James also defines the generalized principles of 
conduct as usually coming in the form of norms. This practically 
reduces individual preferences, situational exigencies, and any 
priorities, differentiating relations case by case to maximize 
short-sighted sectoral national interests. In order for all 
nations in the world community to stick to multilateral ism, 
international actors, mainly nation states, should have a 
perception that they would benefit in the long run and over 
many issues rather every time, on every issue, based upon the 
concept of diffuse reciprocity, not on specific reciprocity. 
10. It is an attempt by two countries to balance their trade 
flows instead of seeking to balance their trade with the world 
as a whole(multilateralism). 
". Protectionism is a policy to favour the adoption of 
tariffs, quotas, and other restrictive measures to make domestic 
products competitive with foreign imports. The term is often 
used pejoratively, because the adopted policy is usually intended to defend a particular interest. It is considered as being to the detriment of a nation as a whole in economic theory. On the contrary, economic liberalism is based upon free 
trade in which trade takes place without the imposition of tariffs or quotas on imports by any individual nation. The theory of international trade advocate this as maximum advantage to the world, but such an ideal situation has never existed. 
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multilateral trade has been recognized by such scholars as James 
A. Caporaso as the most desirable overall regime for 
international trade. The recently agreed multilateral framework 
for world trade created by the completion of the Uruguay Round 
of the GATT has raised the possibility of a conflict between 
global and regional frameworks for trade. This study also aims 
at demonstrating that the EU adherence to multilateral trade 
disciplines will best promote Korea's exports into the EU. From 
the ROK's perspective, based upon the concept of reciprocity12, 
Korea must open its domestic market in order to be able to 
promote its agenda for the progressive liberalization of world 
markets. The EU's full commitment to multilateralism and its 
consequent pressure to persuade the ROK to stick to 
multilateral ism by opening more Korean markets, will also favour 
the EU's exporters. 
What we need is a methodology that considers domestic and 
system level variables simultaneously, rather than sequentially, 
and specifies whatever interactions there may be among all 
relevant variables in a rigorous manner. " The level of analysis 
12. This is a bilateral form of tariff agreement in which 
nations agree to extend to each other any reductions in import tariffs made by one of them, usually within certain limits and 
over a certain range of goods. Reciprocity is one way of 
encouraging free trade. 
Benjamin J. Cohen, "The Political Economy of International Trade, " in Kendall W. Stiles and Tsuneo Akaha 
(eds. ), International Political Economy, New York: Harper 
Collins Publishers, 1991, p. 183. 
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matters here, because the comprehensive description of EU-Korean 
economic interaction requires the combination of many levels of 
analysis. 
1.2 Redefinition of US leadership and Divergent 
Views on International political Economy 
The USA has been the dominant economic power during the 
twentieth century. " However, Michael Albert diagnoses the end 
of the Cold War as a context in which a new form of competition 
has arisen between capitalisms. This competition of capitalisms 
between those based upon the neo-American model and those based 
upon the Rhine model, Albert argues, is very central to future 
trade relations. "" The neo-American model is more concerned with 
individual achievement and short-term profit; on the other hand, 
in the Rhine model, collective achievement and public consensus 
are regarded as the keys to long-term success. 16 The outcome 
of the competition between these rival capitalisms will 
14. Lester Thurow, Head to Head: The Coming Economic Battle 
Among Japan, Europe, and America, London: Nicholas Brealey 
Publishing, 1993, chap. l. 
15. An article, "Stakeholder Capitalism, " The Economist, 
February 10th-16th 1996, p. 23-25, states that "the models of 
what are popularly known as shareholder and stakeholder 
capitalism are each something of a caricature; but the 
caricature is not wildly misleading. In America and Britain, 
many voices now assert that stakeholder capitalism is the more 
attractive. President Clinton and the Labour Party leader, Tony 
Blair, have both called on companies to behave with greater 
social responsibility. " 
16. Michael Albert, Capitalism Against Capitalism, London: 
Whurr Publishers, 1993, pp. 1-19. 
7 
determine the future of the world trading system. " 
In the analysis of the new order through the major actors, 
there are now three relatively equal contenders- Japan with the 
"four tigers"(South Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Singapore), 
the European Union, centred around its most powerful country, 
Germany, and the United States. According to Lester Thurow's 
new game perception, the breakdown of the Cold War has produced 
drastic changes with the creation of multipolarity followed by 
the political redefinition of the US hegemony in the world 
economy. Lester Thurow argues that the success of the market 
economies in Japan, Germany and the four tigers in East Asia has 
shaken the world economic order framed around the US, moving 
toward a tripolar structure built upon Japan, the EU and the US. 
There will be new rules for international economic competition 
different from the GATT-Bretton Woods System, which was mainly 
designed to help the industrial nations regain their economic 
vitality after the destruction of the War. The GATT system, 
17. Lester Thurow introduces another analysis of competition in his book, Head to Head: The Coming Economic Battle Among 
Japan, Europe and, America(pp. 30-35), between two different forms of capitalism identified by George C. Lodge, a Harvard 
Business School professor. George's version is the competition between the Anglo-Saxon British-American form of capitalism and 
the Communitarian German and Japanese variants of capitalism. The essential difference between the two forms of capitalism is 
their stress on communitarian versus individualistic values as the route to economic success- the "I" of America or of the United Kingdom versus "Das Volk" and "Japan Inc. " In the Anglo- Saxon variant of capitalism, the individual is supposed to have 
a personal economic--strategy for success, and the business firm is supposed to have an economic strategy that is a reflection of the wishes of its individual shareholders to maximize profits. In communitarian capitalism, individual and firm strategies also 
exist, but on a different basis. The individual does not play 
as an individual. By joining a team or group, then, he becomes 
successful as part of that team. Consequently, the key decision in an individual's personal strategy is to join the right team. 
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which provided rules, procedures and institutions and values 
designed for a Cold War structure, does not work efficiently in 
a multipolar world. 
A new system of quasi-trading blocs is emerging-'a Despite 
Thurow's very dynamic analysis of the world transformation, it 
will take considerable time fully to shift from the GATT system 
to a new type of system in the future. One of the hidden 
factors in the change has probably been technological 
improvements, which have greatly reduced the costs of 
transportation and communication, making multinationals active 
pushers for globalization. 
Stephen D. Krasner points to two factors, indicating some 
possible uncertain development deviating from multilateral 
international trade order. These are, firstly, the decline of 
US power and secondly, interest group conflicts, especially 
those generated by the pattern of Japanese economic interaction 
with other major industrialized nations. The US was the only 
hegemonic power in the non-Communist World after the 1945. 
Consequently, the postwar world order reflected American values 
and preferences under the name of multilateral liberalism. The 
United States liberal democratic philosophy, with highly 
individualistic orientation and the principle of market economy, 
has been in contest with the former Soviet Communism 
characterized by totalitarianism. The top priority of American 
policy makers was naturally to frustrate the Soviet Union and 
the expansion of Communism. At that time, the major concern of 
18. Ibid., pp. 15-16. 
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the American leaders was not the immediate economic interest, 
instead, it has traditionally been the long-term strategy to 
block Communism. 
In the same context, Robert Bates19 also identifies the US 
as the only hegemonic power in non-Communist World after the 
War; the US was never hesitant to make short-term economic 
sacrifices to win fierce competition against the Soviet Union 
and Communism. The role of the US helped enhance the 
development of an open, liberal, multilateral international 
economic order. Supported by this order, other liberal nations 
could save the costs of managing the uncertainty. 
The transfer from a hegemonic era to a multipolar one 
suggests some conflict areas in the pursuit of each nation's 
interests. The declining power of the US has contributed to the 
instability of the liberal international economic regime. 
William S. Borden's summary of American policy in Europe in 
the 1950s and 1960s is that it continued to be directed by a 
larger grand target - the deterrence of the Communist 
expansion - specific U. S. economic interests have been 
relatively ignored. 20 The US supported the Treaty of Rome 
which created the European Economic Community. They encouraged 
cooperation among other industrial states as a hegemonic 
power. The decline of the US as an economic superpower reflects 
19. Robert Bates, et. al., "Risk and Trade Regimes: Another Exploration, " International Organization, Vol. 45. No. 1, 
Winter, 1991, pp. 1-10. 
2O. William S. Borden, The Pacific Alliance: The United 
States Foreign Economic Policy and Japanese Trade Recovery, 1947-1955, Madison: Univ. of Wisconsin Press, 1984, p. 26, pp. 35-55. 
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the vulnerability of the world trading system to protectionism. 
The replacement of one hegemonic nation by three major 
multipolar actors (the US, Japan, and the EU) in terms of 
politics and economy, inevitably calls for the 
restructuring of the international economic regime. 
While the general principles and commitments of American 
policy makers have not changed, both internal and external 
pressures have led to the adoption of new policies based upon 
specific reciprocity. 22 For instance, the changed structure of 
the international political economy forced trade legislation, 
the Act of 1974, the Trade Act of 1979, the Omnibus Trade and 
Competitiveness Act of 1988, to be more concerned with specific 
American interests than the stability of the global economic 
system as a whole. Specific policies have diverged from the 
norms of diffuse reciprocity, openness, and non-discrimination. 
To serve specific interests, policy makers employ protectionist 
measures. The US adoption of aggressive unilateralism under the 
Super 301 Act is a manifest violation of multilateralism under 
the authority of the WTO. The core argument of the Super 301 Act 
is simple in that the precondition of free trade is fair trade. 
The fairness is measured by the degree of market openness to US 
products. This reflects the shift in US foreign trade policy 
from the role of public good provider as the world leader in the 
past to the today's US interest-oriented commercial policy from 
22 See Robert Keohane, "Reciprocity in International 
Relations, " International organization, Vol. 40, No. 1, Winter, 
1986, PP. 1-27. It is a GATT principle applying to trade policy 
according to which countries must, in international tariff negotiations, reciprocate, i. e. offer tariff concessions in return for receiving tariff concessions. 
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the US perspective. " 
Robert Keohane2' explains the major reasons for regionalism 
in Europe. The major reason for the internal market of the EU 
was the functional incentives created by growing economic 
interdependence. The level of interdependence has become so 
great that unilateralism is no longer an effective policy 
option. The member nations of the EU have had to focus on 
promoting their international competitiveness, a demand prompted 
in part by the Japanese, American and the Asian Newly 
Industrializing Economies'(NIEs) threats. 25 
The world's three major trading regimes account for more 
than 80 percent of the world GDP. The European Union is the most 
institutionalized form of regional bloc. The role of the state 
has been changed in the economic dimension. Contemporary 
Political economy suggests a number of theoretical and 
philosophical reasons why we need to understand the importance 
of political and economic actions beyond the nation state. 
American specialists in international politics for the two 
decades following World War II, saw the Cold War and the defence 
of the non-Communist world as the primary focus of US foreign 
relations. Consequently, they relied on paradigms in which 
". DongAh Daily News Publication, The United States of 
America: the Light and Shadow of a Superpower, Seoul, Korea, January 1996, pp. 204-7. (In Korean. ) 
2`. Robert Keohane & Stanley Hoffman (eds. ), The European 
Community: Decision-making and Institutional Change, Boulder, Co: Westview Press, 1991, pp. 15-35. 
25 - The Asian Newly Industrializing Economies are referred to as the four tigers; ( South Korea, Singapore, Hong Kong, and Taiwan) throughout the study. 
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security and power relations among states were deemed central to 
world politics. The dominant paradigm led to a focus upon the 
state as the sole or the primary actors in world politics. 26 In 
the conceptual framework of international politics, only the 
state received much attention in studies of international 
politics. 
Table 1.1 : Regional Shares of World output and trade in 
1990 
Region Share of world GDP(%) Share of World exports 
in 1990 in 1990 
Western Europe 34 46 
Eastern Europe 4 
Total Europe 38 51 
North America 30 18 
Latin America 4 3 
Total America 34 21 
Asia 25 21 
Japan 14 8 
Australia 2 1 
Developing Asia 9 12 
Africa 2 3 
Middle East 2 3 
Total World 100 100 
Note: Eastern Europe includes the Soviet Union 
North America includes Mexico 
Exports and Imports in terms of merchandise 
Sources : Quoted in Kim Anderson & Richard Blackhurst (eds. ), 
Regional Integration and the Global Trading System, 
London: Harvester Wheatheaf, 1993, pp. 6-7. 
Changes in international economic relations confronting 
American decision-makers over the past two decades have prompted 
24. Hans Morganthau, Politics Among Nations, 4th ed., New 
York: Knof, 1967, pp. 25-26. 
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numerous efforts at reconceptualizing relations in ways that 
capture international political and economic behavior better 
than the power and security focus of political realism. 
Such paradigms place economics alongside military security 
as key political issues. Multinational firms, international 
banks, transnational policy networks of like-minded technocrats, 
international economic institutions, and economic classes, in 
addition to states, are analysed as key actors in international 
relations. The logic of market uniting countries in a global 
division of labour competes with the logic of power and the 
security dilemma in ordering relations within and among states. 
The interdependence among nations in the world is so deep that 
it would be a rather difficult task for us to say which policies 
are most appropriate for resolving conflicts of interests among 
states and other actors. 27 The increased sensitivity in economic 
interdependence among virtually all states compels us to assess 
the political implications of international economic 
transactions everywhere 2$ 
The ever-deepening interdependence of the world economy is 
a natural process of world economic integration. Ernst Haas 
defined integration as "the process whereby political actors in 
several distinct national settings are persuaded to shift their 
loyalties, expectations and political activities toward a new 
and larger center whose institutions pocess or demand 
27. Robert S. Walters and David H. Blake, The Politics of Global Economic Relations, Englewood Cliffs, N. J.: Prentice Hall, 
Inc., 1992, pp. 3-5. 
48. Roy H. Ginsberg, Foreign Policy Actions of the European 
Community, London: Adamantine Press Ltd., 1989, P. 11. 
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jurisdiction over the preexisting national states". 29 To use 
Haas's version of integration to explain economic integration, 
it could be defined as the process whereby politico-economic 
actors in the worldwide dimension are creating common rules for 
universal economic relations. The GATT may no longer be 
performing the major function of arbiter for unfair trade 
practices . 3" Lester Thurow has analysed this transformation by 
the ever-increasing competition among capitalist nations since 
a economic competition between communism and capitalism ended. 31 
The economic superiority of the US shifted to equality, with the 
sharp decline of the US' share of the World GNP from more than 
half of the world total in the 1940s to 22-23 percent of the 
total during the early 1990s. This implies that the unipolarity 
of US dominance will not work in a multipolar system any longer. 
In response, trade is managed by government and non-tariff 
barriers are rising in the formulation and implementation of US 
trade regimes. 
Z9. Ernst Haas, The Uniting of Europe: Political, Social, 
and Economic Forces, Stanford, California: Stanford Univ. Press, 
1958, pp. 7-15. 
'o. On the detailed debate between regionalism and 
multi lateral ism, see Ross Garnaut, Peter Drysdale and John 
Kunkel (eds. ), Asia Pacific Regionalism: Readings in 
International Relations, Sydney: Harper Educational, 1994. In 
the book, Bhagwati concludes on the issue by saying that the 
revival of regionalism is unfortunate; Paul Krugman thinks more 
research is required to reach a clearer conclusion on the 
welfare effects of "regional trading blocs as Soogil Young's 
argument that regional trading arrangements are building blocs 
towards an integrated global system is hardly based on 
convincing ground, in that for East Asians, their economic 
dynamism has depended very much on international trade, and they feel they have been left without a bloc of their own. 
31. Lester Thurow, op. cit. p. 32. 
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Economic relations are now being played out simultaneously 
at the bilateral, sub-regional, and international levels. 
Consequently, the priority must be to reduce the contradictions 
among these various levels. The WTO is expected to strengthen 
the international levels. Despite such a mechanism, our fear 
lies in the trend toward sub-regional and regional priorities. 
Heightened economic protectionism with neo-mercantilist 
practices will remain extensive in the prevalent mood of 
unfairness; thus, managed trade will persist. 32 
Lester Thurow has described the shift of competition from 
niche competition to head-to-head competition. What was an era 
of niche competition in the last half of the twentieth century 
will become an era of head-to-head competition, he argues, in 
the first half of the twenty-first century. He analyses the 
niche competition as a win-win structure whereby everyone has a 
place where they can excel; while head to head competition is 
win-lose. Some will win; some will lose. During the last half 
century, military needs prevented economic conflicts from 
getting out of hand. From now on, economic cooperation will 
have to stand on its own, and economic arrangements will not be 
held together with military glue. The economic game of the 
twenty first century will be cooperative as well as 
competitive. 33 
". Robert A. Scalapino, "New World Economic Order and Korea's International Role, " in Jang-Son Suh (ed. ), Koreas New 
International Economic Diplomacy and Globalization Policy, Seoul: Korea Institute for International Economic Policy, 1993, 
p. 3. 
33. Lester Thurow, op. cit., p. 31. 
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Admitting the multipolarity of the international economic 
system, Hans-Eckart Scharrer3` questions the existing blocs' 
role as constructive or stumbling to wider forms of multilateral 
trade forum. It remains to be seen how the WTO will function in 
the resurgence of new protectionism. The GATT principles of non- 
discrimination, transparency and reciprocity have been much 
abused by the disguised forms of trade barriers such as VERs, 
price undertakings, anti-dumping, or export subsidies. The neo- 
nmercantilist approach in trade is caused by the lack of 
competitiveness. According to the report of the President's 
Commission on Industrial Competitiveness35, competitiveness is 
defined as "the degree to which a nation can, under free and 
fair market conditions, produce goods and services that meet the 
test of international markets while simultaneously maintaining 
or expanding the real income of its citizens. " Trade frictions 
are based upon variations in competitiveness. As the major 
underlying reasons of competitiveness, Jeffrey A. Hart argues 
that some state-societal arrangements are conducive to the 
creation and diffusion of new technologies. 36 The most 
34 . Hans-Eckart Scharrer, "Existing Economic Blocs: A Building Block or Stumbling Block to Wider Forms of Multilateral 
Trade Forum? " in Jang-Won, Suh (ed. ). Korea's New International 
Economic Diplomacy and Globalization Policy, Seoul: Korea Institute for International Economic Policy, 1993, p. 53. 
35 . Report of the President's commission on Industrial Competitiveness, Global Competition: The New Reality, Vol. 2, 
Washington. D. C.: US Government Printing Office, 1985. p. 6.; and Stephen S. Cohen and John Zysman, Manufacturing Matters: The Myth of the Post-Industrial Economy, New York: Basic Books, 
1987, p. 60. 
36 Jeffrey A. Hart, Rival Capitalists: International 
Competitiveness in the United States, Japan, and Western Europe, Ithaca and London : Cornell University Press, 1992, p. 5. 
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significant microlevel of analysis to interpret regionalization 
and globalization of the world economy. is the concept of 
competitiveness. Increasing trade balances and world export 
shares, high rates of productivity growth, rapidly growing real 
wages and so on, are all related to increasing international 
competitiveness. 37 
Meeting the test of an international market means the 
ability to design, produce, and distribute goods and services at 
costs that are globally competitive. 38 Factor costs and the 
application of the latest technologies are central. There is 
also the question of whether market conditions are not 
discriminatory. If they are not, then some countries will appear 
to be internationally competitive when they are not, because 
their domestic markets are sheltered or their firms are 
receiving large subsidies. " The question of real incomes 
matters. If a country is experiencing a large increase in 
exports but real incomes are declining, workers and other 
citizens may be subsidizing the nation's competitiveness. Any 
nation can adopt labour market policies that reduce real wages 
so as to improve its position in world trade, but this practice 
does not involve genuine competitiveness. " All the measures to 
increase competitiveness or to protect competitiveness are tied 
37. Ibid., pp. 7-9. 
3B. Ibid., p. 6. - 
Jeffrey Hart suggests that for a lengthy discussion of the variables that explain competitiveness, we see Michael Porter, The Competitive Advantage of Nations, New York: Free 
Press, 1990, Chap. 3. 
ao. Ibid., p. 61. 
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to the current shape of the international politico-economic 
order. 
To counter the argument on the significance of 
competitiveness, Paul Krugman points out the danger of being 
obsessed with the concept of competitiveness. He argues that 
thinking and speaking in terms of competitiveness poses three 
real dangers. Firstly, it could result in the wasteful spending 
of government money, supposedly to enhance competitiveness. 
Secondly, it could lead to protectionism and trade wars. Most 
importantly, it could result in bad public policy on a spectrum 
of important issues. " According to him, an obsession with 
competitiveness will lead to trade conflict, perhaps even to a 
world trade war. In the historic wave of regionalization 41 of 
the world economy, if there exist any benefits of regionalism, 
it is natural to seize them. In this vein, James Goldsmith" 
41. Paul Krugman, "Competitiveness: A Dangerous Obsession, " 
Foreign Affairs, March/April 1994, Vol. 73, No. 2, pp. 41-45. 
`2. The intensified regionalism of the EU is proved by the 
statistics that trade among member states of the EU has gained 
at the expense of external trade flows, and this applies to both 
exports and imports. In 1958, the ratio between internal and 
external exports was approximately three fifths (internal and 
external exports accounted for 37 and 63 percent respectively). 
By 1992, the ration had been reversed in favour of internal 
exports with internal exports contributing three fifths of total 
exports. The balance between internal and external imports 
changed in the same direction and by about the same magnitude. 
In 1958, imports from third countries were nearly twice as large 
as imports from within the Union (65 and 35 percent 
respectively); by 1992 internal imports were 50 percent larger 
than the external imports (59 and 41 percent respectively). 
Quoted in Klaus Heidensohn, Europe and World Trade, London and 
New York: Pinter, 1995, p10. 
". James Goldsmith, The Trap, London: Macmillan, 1994, 
PP. 27-29. 
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is a unique critic on world free trade. On the question: Who 
will be the losers and who will be the winners under a system of 
global free trade?, he answers that the losers will be those 
people who become unemployed as a result of production being 
moved to low-cost areas. There will also be those who lose their 
jobs because their employers do not move offshore and are not 
able to compete with cheap imported products. The winners are 
multinationals able to benefit from an abundant supply of very 
cheap labour. They will be the companies who move their 
production offshore to low-cost areas; the companies who can pay 
lower salaries at home; and those who have capital to invest 
where labor is cheapest, and who as a result will receive larger 
dividends. He predicts that the wounds caused by this 
globalization will be very deep and brutal. Transnational 
corporations with the ability to move production at will, 
anywhere in the world, are systematically benefitting from lower 
wages. Specialization based upon the concept of comparative 
advantage is rejected by his emphasis that multilateral free 
trade is flawed as a stepping stone to a better system. He 
argues that the effects of regional free trade are greater and 
better than those of global free trade. 
David Morris also strongly disputes the supposed benefit of 
free trade. 44 As an example, Morris pays attention to inequality 
in world living standards which international trade has 
". David Morris, "Free Trade: The Great Destroyer, " in 
Ralph Raider et al., The Case against Free Trade: GATT, NAFTA, 
and the Globalization of Corporate Power, SanFrancisco and 
Berkeley, CA: Earth Island Press and North Atlantic Books, 1993, 
pp. 144-5. 
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exacerbated. 45 Globalism, David Morris argues, is both a cause 
and an effect of inequality. He further stipulates that 
"inequality within one country is a cause of globalism because 
it reduces the number of people with sufficient purchasing 
power. Consequently, a producer must sell to wealthy people in 
many countries to achieve the scale of production necessary to 
produce goods at a relatively low cost. Inequality is an effect 
of globalism because export industries employ few workers who 
earn disproportionately high wages, and because developed 
countries tend to take out more capital from Third World 
countries than they invest in them. " Under the same assumption, 
Wendell Berry opposes the Uruguay Round of the GATT. `6 Apart 
from the corporate ambition to gather wealth and power of the 
world into fewer and fewer hands, he argues that "the intended 
effect of the GATT would be to centralize control of all prices 
and standards, thus being a license issued to a privileged few 
for an all-out economic assault on the lands and peoples of the 
world. " 
In a similar vein, an assertion on regionalism different 
from the original argument is made by ion Whalley and P. J. 
Lloyd. They argue that the spread of regionalism has not 
`5. According to Swiss economist Paul Bairoch, GNP Per 
Capita in 1750 was approximately the same in the developed areas 
as in the underdeveloped ones; in the 1930s it became 4 to 1 in 
favour of the developed nations, and today, it is 8 to 1. 
Quoted in Ibid., p. 144. 
". Wendell Berry, "A bad big idea, " in Ralph Nader et al., 
The Case against Free Trade: GATT, NAFTA and the Globalization 
of Corporate Power, SanFrancisco and Berkeley, CA: Earth England Press and North Atlantic Books, 1993, p. 160. 
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distorted the traditional international trade flow. " Their 
major conclusion is that the major trading nations, disappointed 
by the multilateral process, intensify efforts for trade 
liberalization within regions, thus contributing to the increase 
of international trade. 
1.3 Theoretical Review of International Political Economy 
Literature 
Political economy has been traditionally focused upon the 
state as the key actor in international economic relations. The 
schools of Liberal ism`s, Realism49 and Marxism, 5° therefore, 
". John Whalley, "The UR and the GATT: Whether the Global 
System? " in <PAFTAD 20> Pacific Dynamism and the International 
Economic System, Seminar Papers, The Institute for International 
Economics, Washington D. C., September, 1992, pp. 10-20. 
10, On the literature of liberalism, see Bruno S. Frey, 
International Political Economics, Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1984; 
James Alt and Alex Chrystal, Political Economics, Brighton: 
Wheatsheaf Books, 1983; Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, 
Power and Interdependence, Boston: Mass., Little Brown, 1977. 
4-9. On the classical literature of realism, see Niccolo 
Machiavelli, The Prince and discourses, translated by L. Ricci 
and C. E. Detmold, New York: Modern Library, 198; Thomas Hobbes, 
Leviathan, ed. C. B. Macpherson, Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 
1968; Friedrich List, The National System of Political Economy, 
New York: Kelley, 1966; Robert Gilpin, The Political Economy of 
International Relations, Princeton NJ: Princeton University 
Press, 1987. 
50. See Brewer, Marxist Theories of Imperialism, London: 
Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1980; Stephen Hymer, "International 
Politics and International Economics: A Radical Approach, " in 
Jeffrey A. Frieden and David A. Lake, International Political 
Economy: Perspectives on Global Power and Wealth, New York: St. 
Martin's Press, 1987, pp. 31-46; Robert W. Cox, Production, Power 
and World Order: Social Forces in the Making of History, New 
York, Columbia University Press, 1987; and particularly on world 
system theory, see Immanuel Wallerstein, The Capitalist World Economy, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979. 
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each have difficulty in understanding the role played by non- 
state actors. For trade policy-makers, multinationals present 
a problem because whilst the companies are the major 
beneficiaries and the major forces behind international trade 
and the demand for ever-greater globalization and globalization 
of trade, it is politicians and governments that are responsible 
for negotiating trade policies. "' The drive of the ROK 
government towards liberalization, deregulation and 
globalization is a good indication-albeit in a different 
framework, of the resurgence of neo-classical views in economic- 
policy making. 52 However, it is true that still the power of 
states determines the character of the international system. 
State preferences are decided at the point of maximizing their 
aggregate economic utility. Though neo-classical economic 
theory insists upon the maximum benefits of free trade, the 
reality is different from theoretical assumptions. The EU, 
composed of complex national interests, co-ordinated mechanism, 
relying heavily on politically and economically complicated 
mechanism of collaboration in policy making, has characteristics 
V. It is also governments that have to deal with the 
social and political consequences of trade relations. 
Government, inter alia, face the problem that regulation of international markets has not kept pace with the growth of world 
trade with the result that politicians have little effective 
leverage or control over the activities of the multinationals, the most important actors in world trade. 
sz 
. Stephen D. Krasner, "State Power and the Structure of International Trade, " World Politics, Vol. XXVIII, No. 3,1976, 
PP. 317-47. 
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of protectionism. 53 A complex web of favourable and restrictive 
interactions among the nations and large multinational 
corporations is shaping the international trade flow. In this 
sense, neo-liberal institutionalist5' emphasise that the role 
of the international regimes is still premature, albeit 
theoretically valid, because the nation seems to be the most 
powerful actor to influence the international flow of trade. In 
an attempt to more accurately match the reality, however, the 
neo-realist argument on the power and structure of the nation 
state should be complemented by the role of the international 
regimes and institutions advocated by the neo-liberal 
institutionalists. It is also undeniable that the role of the 
nation is more and more diminished as the role of international 
cooperation regimes is fostered by the rapid development of 
multinationals and information and communication technologies. 
In order correctly to analyse the globalization and 
regionalization of the world political economy and its impact 
upon the ROK-EU economic exchanges, several factors should be 
g'. According to Klaus Heidensohn in his book, Europe and 
World Trade, 1995, p. 150, what has affected all Third World 
nations including the ROK, has been the trade diverting effects 
that have been the outcome of Europe's departure from the 
principles of multilateralism (trade liberalization and non- discrimination of trade partners). The pyramid of privileges that characterizes the EU's trade agreements with countries of 
the South has inevitably implied that some developing nations 
have more easy access to Europe's domestic market than others. The new non-tariff based protectionism (MFA, VRA, rules of 
origin, anti-dumping actions, etc. ) and the Common Agricultural Policy(CAP) measures, however, have not had the same impact on 
all the countries of the "South"; Europe's protectionism has been discriminatory rather than uniform. 
54. See, R. J. Barry Jones, Interdependence on trial: Studies 
in the Theory and Reality of Contemporary Interdependence, New York: St. Martin's Press, 1985; Robert O. Keohane, 
"International Institutions: Two Approaches, " International 
Studies Quarterly, Vol. 32, "No. 4, December 1988, pp. 379-96; 
Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, "Power and Interdependence Revisited, " International Organization, Vol. 41, No. 4, Autumn 
1987, pp. 725-53. 
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considered. Firstly, our focus must be on the international 
economy as a system. To use Edward Mansfield's argument, a 
systemic approach to international political economy centres on 
the trade policies of hegemony as well as other aspects of the 
distribution of power and political military alliances. 55 
Mansfield points out that systemic explanations in international 
political economy posit that the constraints imposed and the 
opportunities fostered by aspects of "the international system 
are the most salient determinants of the patterns of global 
economic outcomes. " Though systemic theory puts much emphasis on 
the systemic f actors, we must not ignore the effects of domestic 
institutions, special interest groups and other domestic 
political influences on international trade. " The political 
economy of EU trade regimes is heavily influenced by such 
domestic considerations. 
To explain the complexity of the international economy, it 
is clear that the effects of both international and domestic 
politics should be combined. 
Table 1.2 conceptualizes the traditional international 
relations theory. The traditional approach using the Realist 
concepts of power and self-interest gives some insights into 
55. Edward D. Mansfield, "Effects of International Politics 
on Regionalism in International Trade, " in Kym Anderson & 
Richard Blackhurst (eds. ), Regional Integration and Global 
Trading System, New York and London: Harvester & Wheatsheaf, 
1993, pp. 199-200. 
56. See more R. E. Baldwin, The Political Economy of US 
Import Policy, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1985; and P. J. 
Katzenstein, Small States in World Markets, Ithaca: Cornell 
University Press, 1986; and S. P. Magee and W. A. Brock and L. 
Young, Black Hole Tariffs and Endogenous Theory: Political 
Economy in General Equilibrium, New York: Cambridge University 
Press, 1989. u...,. _ýý 
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explaining the nature of the international economy. The 
increasing number of international institutions, such as the 
World Trade Organization (WTO), International Monetary Fund 
(IMF), World Bank (WB) and International Bank for Reconstruction 
and Development (IBRD) and so on, also function to influence 
trade flows. To understand the trade relationship between the EU 
and the ROK, a integrated approach must be used. Transnational 
actors and processes have displaced the nation-centric view of 
international relations. 
Table 1.2: Alternative Images of International 
Relations: Underlying Assumptions 
Realism Pluralism(Liberalism) Globalism(Marxism) 
Analytic 1. State is 1. State and 1. Classes, states 
Units the principal nonstate actors and societies and 
actor are important non-state actors 
operate as part of 
world capitalist 
system 
View of 2. State 
Actors is unitary 
actor 
2. State is 
desegregated 
into components 
2. International Relations 
viewed from 
historical perspective 
development of 
world capitalism 
Behavioural 3. State is 3. For optimal 3. Dominance pattern 
Dynamic rational actor outcomes; in societies 
conflict, bargaining 
coalition and compromise 
involved 
Issues 4. National 4. Multiple agenda 4. Economic Factors 
security utmost socioeconomic are most important 
concern welfare 
Source: Paul R. Viotti & Mark V. Kauppi, International Relations Theory. 
Realism, Pluralism, Globalism, 2nd ed., New York and Toronto: Macmillai 
Publishing company, 1993, p. 10. 
* Pluralism and Globalism could be identified as Liberalism and Marxist 
of IPE respectively. 
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The national concern for welfare and other domestic 
objectives and the explicit linkages of economics and politics 
determine the dynamics of trade relations. Halford J. 
Mackinder57 has predicted this development by saying that 
statesmen will respond to this new competitive challenge by 
concentrating their attention on " the struggle for relative 
efficiency. 1158 The distribution of wealth, the scourge of 
unemployment, and rampant inflation are now understood in the 
framework of the state decision-making perspectives. Robert 
Gilpin" claims that an understanding of the issues of trade 
policy, monetary affairs, and economic development requires the 
integration of the theoretical insights of the disciplines of 
economics and political science. Too often policy issues are 
analysed as if the realms of economics and politics could be 
isolated from one another. We need to focus our attention on the 
conflicts, tensions, and continuing interactions between 
economics and politics. The original spirit of the Bretton Woods 
system for trade liberalization, stability of currencies, and 
the expansion of global economic interdependence has, in no 
small measure, been dampened by the emergence of regionalism and 
protectionism. The liberal conception of international economic 
57. Halford J. Mackinder, "The Geographical Pivot of 
History", Democratic Ideas and Reality, New York: W. W Norton, 
1962, pp. 242-43. 
58. The struggle for relative efficiency means that policy 
makers try to seek best or, if impossible, the second best 
option in adopting policies to pursue national interests. 
59. Robert Gilpin, The Political Economy of International 
Relations, Princeton, N. J.: Princeton University Press, 1987, 
p. 3. 
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relations has been undermined since the mid-1970s. The stability 
and confidence of the US hegemony in the various areas in which 
the US was able and willing to exert its influence after the 
calamitous insulation of the inter-war period has been 
relatively weakened. " The international public good for trade 
was provided by the US. 
In the neo-realist group, Kenneth Waltz" has argued that 
as nations in a self-system are concerned with relative gain, 
not with absolute gain and subordinate economic considerations 
to political interests, even the prospect of large absolute 
gains for both parties does not elicit their cooperation. The 
general insistence of the neo-realists is that, when nations are 
in an anarchic condition, because they are preoccupied with 
their survival, taking on a defensive position, it is hard for 
them to cooperate with others. "' The core of the neo-realist 
assertions is the theory of hegemonic stability. The 
predominant leader of the international system is not concerned 
with relative gains, but with providing collective good for the 
whole system. 
On the other hand, neo-liberals argue that nations are 
eager to reap gains from cooperation and participation in 
60 Stanley Hoffmann, op. cit., p. 164. 
61 . Kenneth Waltz, Theory of International Politics, Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley, 1979, pp. 1-5. 
62. Joseph Grieco used the term, "defensive positionality" 
in his Cooperation Among Nations, Ithaca: Cornell Univ. Press, 
1990. 
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defensive cooperation. 63 Robert Keohane has defined the core 
concept of the Neo-liberal institutionalist approach by arguing 
that variations in the institutionalization of world politics 
exert significant impacts on government behaviour to determine 
patterns of cooperations and discords among them. When we come 
to understand that International Political Economy is the study 
of the interplay of economics and politics in the world arena, 
in the most general sense, the economy is defined as the system 
of producing, distributing, and using wealth; politics is the 
set of institutions and rules by which social and economic 
interactions are governed. " The above definition of the 
International Political Economy suggests the nuance and 
complexity of actual theoretical approaches as we recognize that 
the foreign economic polices of all nations are constrained by 
both international and domestic, and both political and economic 
factors-65 An analysis of ROK-EU economic relationships will 
not be complete without adding the new international phenomenon 
of regionalism and globalism. 
The traditional approach to International Political Economy 
has been two dimensional: international-domestic and state- 
market. The realist observers put more emphasis on the role of 
63. Duncan Snidal, "International Cooperation Among Relative 
Gains Maximizers, " International States Quarterly, Vol. 35. No. 4, 
December 1991, p. 401. 
`". Jeffry A. Frieden and David A. Lake, "Introduction: International Politics and International Economics, " in 
International Political Economy: Perspectives in Global Power 
and Wealth, Third ed., edited by the same authors, London and New York: Routledge, p. 1-3. 
65. Ibid., p. 9. 
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national powers. The core argument of this school6' is that 
international society is in a anarchic situation. The lack of 
overarching authority makes the inter-state relation 
conflictual, though states cooperate to secure their common 
interests in maintaining order. Realism is simply understood as 
a paradigm in which economic power is a necessary component of 
state power and economic factors are subordinate to national and 
international political demands, hence, the history of the 
global economy is one of the rise and fall of great powers. The 
argument of Kenneth N. Waltz as a representative of the Neo- 
realist school emphasizes that the most important factors in the 
world-system are states and that states with differential power 
capabilities act rationally to enhance their power and 
resources . 67 
Stephen Krasner as a typical scholar of this school claims68 
that nation states are mainly concerned with gaining more power 
and resources. The condition of international anarchy makes the 
nations struggle for power. International trade is only 
". For further literature review of this school . see Richard K. Ashley, "Political Realism and Human Interests, " 
International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 25, No. 2, June 1981, 
PP"204-36; David A. Baldwin, "Power and World Politics, " World 
Politics, Vol. 31, No. 2, January 1979, pp. 161-94; Hedley Bull, 
The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics, New 
York: Columbia University Press, 1977; John H. Herz, "Political 
Realism Revisited, " International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 25, 
No. 2, June 1981, pp. 182-241. 
67. Kenneth N. Waltz, Theory of International Politics, 
Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wessly, 1979. 
6B. Stephen D. Krasner, Defending the National Interests: 
Raw Materials Investments and U. S Foreign Policy, Princeton, N. J.: Princeton University Press, 1978. 
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understood as a subordinate domain to achieve certain political 
goal. The most common and significant assumption of this school 
is that national interests are basically in conflict. 
The trade policy dimension of this school of thought is the 
concept of strategic industries. Such industries can produce the 
best conditions for autonomy of a state and economic sovereignty 
in the short and long-term prospects. The logic of politics 
dominates the logic of economic efficiency. Protectionism is 
justified in case national security and economic sovereignty are 
eroded in competition with foreign products. More protection 
will be afforded to strategically valuable sectors. The theory 
of hegemonic stability and game-theory belong to this school. Of 
the two, the theory of hegemonic stability is utilized here in 
order to emphasize that a sharp increase in world trade friction 
is the by-product of the decline of the US hegemony. The role of 
stabilizer played by the US has began to decline and created the 
need for some alternative form of governance to enforce the 
rules of the game. Charles Kindleberger, Robert Gilpin, and 
Stephen Krasner all agree that resurgence of regionalism is 
closely related to the decline of American economic 
leadership. 69 
This paradigm is very helpful in analysing the 
mercantilist trade regimes of the EU and the role of the state 
in shaping commercial policy. The association and cooperation 
agreements of the EU with developing nations, like the Lome 
69. See Charles P. Kindleberger, The World in Depression, 
1929-1939, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1973. 
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Convention is a typical example of the reflection of the realist 
paradigm. Anti-dumping legislation and7° VERS are a reflection 
of this strategic trade policy. The EU-Korea economic 
relationship is still strongly regulated and controlled by the 
nation states of the EU and Korea's government intervention. 
Realists also argue that the use of force or coercion by other 
nation states is always possible; thus, nation-states are 
ultimately dependent upon their own resources for protection. 
For realists, politics is by and large a zero-sum game and by 
necessity conflictual and they regard nation-states as rational 
actors in the same context that liberalism assumes individuals 
are rational. This means that politics determines economics as 
liberalism defines the clear autonomy of economics and politics 
with its own sphere. Marxists maintains that economics 
determines politics. 
Roger Tooze has an appropriate comparative approach to 
70. In Renato Ruggiero, director-general of the World Trade 
Organization's report, he emphasized the need for further WTO 
work on regionalism to ensure that burgeoning regional trade 
arrangements do not handicap the development of multilateral 
rules. The report also shows that anti-dumping and 
countervailing duty actions continue to play a prominent role in the trade regimes of the European Union and the US. This is 
seen as a worrying trend by many trade analysts who regard such 
measures as a backdoor form of protection for uncompetitive domestic companies. The EU leads the field on anti-dumping 
actions, initiating 37, followed by the US with 30, Mexico 18 
and Brazil 12. Of the 805 measures in force on June 30 1995,60 
percent were maintained by the US and the EU with the principal targets being China(27 actions), followed by companies from the EU(17) and South Korea(10)QuoOed in Frances Williams, "WTO chief tries to avoid confrontation, " Financial Times, Thursday December 14 1995, p. 7. 
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represent the liberalist view in conceptualization. " In 
comparison with the realist paradigm, the liberal paradigm" 
basically puts harmony at the core of international economic 
relations. They are the group who advocate free trade and free 
markets. The core content of liberalism is found in the unit of 
analysis. To the realist, the basic unit of analysis is the 
state; to liberals the basic unit of analysis is the individual 
or firm. While realism puts emphasis on competition among 
states, economic liberalism has focused on competition between 
firms. The market principle decides the result of the trade 
game. However, this school accepts a case for some state 
intervention to repair market imperfections. The theory of 
public choice" sees the determination of national policies in 
71. Roger Tooze, "Conceptualizing the Global Economy, " in 
Anthony G. McGrew & Paul G. Lewiset et al. Global Politics: 
Globalization and Nation-State, Cambridge, UK: Polity Press, 
1993, pp. 234-236. See Kendall W. Stiles and Tsuneo Akaha, 
International Political Economy, New York: Harper Collins 
Publishers, 1991, pp. 3-49; Stephen Gill and David Law, The 
Global Political Economy: Perspectives, Problems and Policies, 
New York: Harvester, 1988, pp. 25-68; Henk Overbeek (ed. ), 
Restructuring the Hegemony in the Global Political Economy: the 
Rise of Transnational Nationalism in the 1980s, London and New 
York: Routledge, 1993, pp. 1-28. 
72. For more complete understanding of this school, see 
Edward Morse, Modernization and Transformation of International 
Relations, New York: Free Press, 1976; George Modelski (ed. ), 
Transnational Corporations and World Order, Sanfrancisco: W. H. 
Freeman and Co. 1979; Stanley Michalak, " Theoretical 
Perspectives for Understanding International Interdependence, " 
World Politics, Vol. 32, No. 1, October 1979, pp. 136-50; Stephen 
D. Krasner (ed. ), International Regimes, London and Ithaca, NY: 
Cornell University Press, 1983; Richard Cooper, Economic Policy 
in an interdependent World, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1986. 
". For a more theoretical review of the public choice 
model, see Robert T. Kudrle, "The several faces of The 
Multinational Corporation: Political Reaction and Policy ý Response, " in W. Ladd Hollis and F. LaMond Tullis (eds. ), An 
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terms of supply and demand. " 
The Liberals' argument emphasizes how both the market and 
politics are functioning in an environment in which all can be 
made better off by entering into voluntary exchanges with 
others. If there are no impediments to trade among individuals, 
liberals reason that everyone can be made as well-off as 
possible given existing stocks of goods and services. ' In the 
international dimension, liberals believe that a fundamental 
harmony of interests exists between as well as within countries. 
They, thus, argue that states manage international trade in the 
same ways that they manage their domestic economies. They 
should establish rules and regulations by the name of 
"international regimes" to govern exchanges between different 
national currencies and to ensure that no country or domestic 
group is damaged by "unfair international competition". For the 
globalization of the world economy, liberals place emphasis on 
the increasing role of international regimes. "' 
Economic liberalism can be regarded as a criticism of state 
planning and excessive government intervention. The main ground 
of criticism is that they are inefficient, and reduce individual 
freedom to threaten liberal democracy. As a typical tool of 
International Political Economy, Boulder, Col.: Westview Press, 
1985, pp. 175-97. 
". Ian McLean, Public Choice: An Introduction, Oxford: 
Basil Blackwell, 1987. 
's. Jeffry A. Frieden and David A. Lake, op. cit., p. 10. 
76. Ibid., p. 11. 
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liberalism, free trade is advocated. Anne O. Krueger refers to 
the four positive components of free trade: a)comparative 
advantage in complex nature of modern industry; b)the 
recognition that the protection of some sector inevitably 
disadvantages others; c)free trade strengthens competitiveness 
for dynamic efficiency; d)free trade is a consistent policy for 
domestic and global welfare. " The interdependence of the world 
economy would be more enhanced by liberalism than by state 
intervention. In the process of deregulation and liberalization 
in Korea's economic policy-making, " the concept of economic 
efficiency is expected to play a bigger role than in the past as 
government-business linkage is being slowly dismantled. " Roger 
". Anne O. Krueger, "Free Trade is the Best Policy, " in 
Robert Z. Lawrence and Charles L. Schultze, An American Trade 
Strategy; Options for the 1990s, Washington D. C.: The Brookings 
Institution, 1990, p. 68. 
'8. South Korea is a society in which Confucian traditions 
run deep. And its dramatic economic ascent started under a 
government that was both highly authoritarian and 
unapologetically interventionist. But the idea that the South 
Korean elite was an incorrupt Confucians would have caused a hollow laugh in South Korea as long as ten years ago. The 
current slush fund scandal of the former President, Roh Tae Woo is an indication of people's awareness of the malfunctioning of 
special-interest lobbying by South Korea's Chabols, which have 
been charged with helping to fill a presidential slush fund. 
Liberalization and deregulation of the Korean economic policy- 
making is likely to be more enhanced by the scandal of Roh Tae Woo's corruptly amassing a fortune of over $300m. By this 
scandal, it was proved that the Chabols or South Korean Conglomerates have become far too powerful for the good of the 
country. It was their intimate relations with the government, backed by cheap loans, that allowed these businesses to become the power-house of South Korea's rapid economic growth. Quoted in The Economist, December 9th-15th 1995, p. 12,72. 
". The Korean government's top economic policy priority in 1996 explains the need for more liberalization and globalization by reducing the role of government in controlling Chabols or Korean Conglomerates. The key policy goals for '96 are: 1) 
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Roger Tooze describes this: 
"Within a national economy, individuals following their 
own self-interest will, within the framework of a free market 
and assuming a particular form of state, collectively increase the amount of wealth available to their society, and in this 
way convert individual selfishness into the general good. 
Moreover, the principles of a free market also translate into 
a political structure which emphasizes the individual and individual freedoms. This principle, translated to economic 
relations among nations, means that trade based on free trade is harmonious, both nationally and internationally. Hence by 
extension the greater the amount of trade, the greater the 
economic specialization and the greater the wealth generated. The global economy is therefore a natural unit as it provides the greater opportunities for efficiency gains through global 
production for a global market. More than this, the creation 
of high levels of interdependence not only ties states together in a beneficial way, and hence further reduces the 
causes of conflict, but also begins to break down the realist 
state by setting up communities of interest that are transnational. Within the global economy the key actors are firms and households, who form a complex and expanding web of harmonious relationship mediated through the market. Government has the key but limited function of providing function of security and maintaining law and order domestically and globally... 1180 
Marxists believe that classes are the dominant actors in 
the political economy. 81 Jeffrey and David maintain that 
Continued pursuit of price stability and attainment of an economic soft-landing; 2) Easing of industrial bipolarization and support for the restructuring of small and medium enterprises; 3) Continued push for economic deregulation and improvement of the business environment; 4) Promotion of the public's quality of life and expansion of welfare aid to the underprivileged; 5) Seeking to globalize the Korean economy continuously in response to the nation's entry into the OECD. 
8o" Ibid., P. 234. 
81. In order to extend the knowledge of this school, see Terry Boswell and Immanuel Wallerstein (eds. ), Revolution in the World System, Westport, CT: Greenwood, 1989; Christopher Chase- Dunn, Global Formation: Structures of the World Economy, Oxford: Blackwell, 1989; Robert Cox, Power, Production and World Order, New York: Columbia University Press, 1987; Frank F. Klink, "Rationalizing 
Core-Periphery Relations: The Analytical 
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specifically, Marxists identify two economically-determined 
aggregations of individuals, or classes, as central: the owners 
of the means of production and labour, or the workers. They 
assume that each class acts in its own economic interest, that 
is, to maximize the economic well-being of the class as a whole. 
The basis of the capitalist economy is the exploitation of 
labour by capital. Marxists see the political economy as 
necessarily conflictual, since the relationship between 
capitalists and workers is essentially antagonistic. Present 
Marxists of the International political Economy82 are primarily 
concerned with two issues. The first is the fate of labor in a 
world of increasingly internationalized capital. The growth of 
multinational corporations and the rise of globally integrated 
financial markets appear to have weakened the economic and 
Foundations of Structural Inequality in World Politics, " International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 34, No. 2, June 1990, 
PP. 183-209; Thomas Richard Shannon, An Introduction to the World 
System Perspectives, Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1989. 
82. Like their neo-realist and liberal-pluralist 
counterparts, neo-Marxists also share the belief that the global 
system is highly ordered. But, unlike neo-realists, they do not 
conceive of that order as based on the structure of military 
Power; nor do they accept that it is sustained by webs of interdependence 
as do liberal-pluralists. Rather, neo-Marxist 
analyses assert that the prevailing world order is a capitalist 
order based upon a global structure of production and exchange established by transnational corporations. One of the dominant 
characteristics of this order is the structural differentiation 
of the world into core, peripheral, and semi-peripheral centres of economic power: in simple terms, the division between North, South and the Eastern bloc. This structure is mirrored internally within states in the polarization between those sectors of national society integrated into the transnational capitalist system and those sectors which are marginalized. Thus, the expansion of transnational capitalism contributes directly to the combined processes of global integration and national disintegration. Quoted in Anthony G. McGrew & Paul G. Lewis et al, Global Politics, Cambridge: Polity Press, 1993, 
P. 21. 
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Political power of labour. The second one is the concern with 
0 
10 
the poverty and continuous underdevelopment of the Third 
83 World. 
Frieden and Lake argue84 that Marxists think development 
is blocked by domestic ruling-classes who pursue their own 
narrow interests at the expense of national economic progress. 
Other Marxists extend class analysis to the level of 
International Political Economy by the theory of dependency. 
According to this school, the global system is stratified into 
a wealthy area, the "core" or first World and a region of 
oppression and poverty, the "periphery" or Third World. They 
elaborate that international capitalism exploits the periphery 
and benefits the core, just as capitalists exploit workers 
Within a single country. They elaborate on the mechanism of 
exploitation through multinational corporations, international 
financial markets and organizations, or trade. The framework of 
dominance-dependence is not suitable for the EU-ROK dimension. 
Korea has successfully managed her economy and has reached US 
$10,000 per capita GNP. Korea is among the list of the EU 
competitors as Korea's exports have flooded into the EU markets 
since the 1980s. 
Traditional International Political Economy literature 
------------- 
81. For other reviews of the theory, see A. Brewer, Marxist Theories of Imperialism, London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1980; Immanuel Wallerstein, The Capitalist World Economy, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979; Robert W. Cox, Production, Power and world order: Social Forces in the Making of History, New York: Columbia University, 1987. 
84. Jeffrey A. Frieden and David A. Lake, op. cit., p. 12. 
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does not fully explore the new resurgence of regionalism and 
globalism. Analysis of the EU-ROK bilateral economic 
relationship will not be complete without adding this new 
phenomenon. This is more transparent when we recognize the fact 
that contemporary International Political Economy is 
characterized by the hugely expanded role of multinational 
production, more frequent cross-border financial flows and the 
expansion of international trade. 
As the intervening variables to support globalization of 
the world trade and regionalism, newly created international 
regimes help to change a traditional society into a transformed 
one. Information technology and the development of communication 
need to be considered as the major contributors to the 
revolutionary restructuring of the world. Information and 
communication technology is not simply an innovative factor, 
according to Silvia Ostry. 85 It is, rather, a techno-economic 
paradigm, affecting all sectors of industry and the organization 
and structure of firms, providing the means for globalization of 
the industry. In recognition of the new techno-economic 
Paradigm, V. K. Aggarwal86 has also suggested the need to 
provide a tool to understand trade relations among a number of 
8s. Silvia Ostry, Government and Corporations in a Shrinking World: Trade & Innovation Policies in the United States, Europe 
& Japan, London and New York: Council on Foreign Relations Press, 1990, p. 79. 
86 " V. K. Aggarwal, Liberal Protectionism: The International Politics of Organized Textile Trade, Berkeley, Cali. : University of California Press, 1985, p. 20. 
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constitutive elements relevant to trade order. In E. B. Haas°' 
and John Ruggie's interpretation, the post-second World War era 
is interpreted as "the era of convergence centering around the 
notion of 'embedded liberalism' in which trading parties engage 
in open trade with the permission of some state intervention, 
reflecting their domestic, economic and political interests, " 
though John Ruggie points to the fragility of the consensus 
breakdown. In similar context, Robert Gilpin" refers to 
sectoral protectionism, benign mercantilism based upon organized 
trade, which might supply a potential mode of reconciling 
domestic and international demands on policy-makers. 
Ruggie's 'embedded liberalism', as constituting the 
underlying principles and norms of the Postwar international 
economic exchange, is rejected by neo-classical economists. 
Aggarwal, Keohane and Yoffie's89 contention is that 
protectionism sometimes disappears; thus, international regimes 
such as the WTO permit states to raise tariffs or use quotas. 
Other trade theorists suggest that the optimal outcome for 
individual 
state welfare may not be unilateral liberalization; 
instead, they see certain national advantages through the 
B' E. B. Haas, "Why Collaborate?, Issue-Linkage and International Regimes, " World Politics, Vol. 32, No. 3, pp. 357- 405; John Ruggie, "International Regimes Transactions, and Change: Embedded Liberalism in the Postwar Economic Power, " in S. D. Krasner (ed. ), International Regimes, Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1983. 
88. Robert Gilpin, op. cit., pp. 3-4. 
89 Aggarwal, Keohane and Yoffie, "The Dynamics of Negotiated Protectionism", American Political Science Review, Vol. 81, No. 1,1987, pp. 345-66. 
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manipulation of trade, thus justifying protectionism-90 
With regard to the stabilization of the world trading 
system, R. Z. Lawrence is concerned with the potential stability 
of trading blocs as an alternative to multilateralism. R. Z. 
Lawrence argues that blocs may not be such a problem for liberal 
trade, particularly if they do not create a large amount of 
trade diversion. 91 Robert Gilpin argues that blocs may prove 
to be a more viable liberalizing alternative in the absence of 
a single hegemon that is willing to make necessary sacrifices to 
provide public goods of an international trade regime. 92 
In order for their arguments to be valid, the regional 
blocs must be open to external trade, not closed. it is not 
wrong to argue that all the major blocs such as North Atlantic 
Free Trade Area(NAFTA), EU and possibly an East Asian Bloc in 
the future, would have been tilting toward closed regionalism if 
it had not been for the success of the Uruguay Round 
negotiations. The increasing challenge against the liberal 
trading order is likely to be tackled by export promotion and 
liberalization, promoting world economic integration. In the 
economic dimension they relate to the spirit of economic 
partnership built upon the principle of free trade opposing any 
'o. See T. Matthew and J. Ravenhill, "Strategic Trade Policy: The East Asian Experience", Working paper, 1993/2, 
Department of International Relations, Australian National University, Canberra, 1993. 
91. R. Z. Lawrence, "Emerging Regional Arrangements: Building Blocs or Stumbling Blocs?, " Finance and the International Economy, Vol. 5, oxford: Oxford University Press, 
1991. 
92. Robert Gilpin, op. cit., p. 3-5. 
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protectionist tendencies. Any group of countries pursuing and 
living up to these values and principles will contribute to the 
welfare promotion of mankind by the profit maximization of world 
trade. " 
In building a consensus for world trade with universal 
values, the institutional role of regimes is vital. Robert 
Keohane" elaborates on the benefits of regimes in reducing 
transaction costs, particularly in providing information to 
participants and lowering costs associated with negotiating 
individual accords. Aggarwal also suggests that regimes might 
be led to bring lower levels of arrangements into conformity 
with higher level accords dealing with broader issues or to 
control the behaviour of the actors, both internationally and 
domestically, by way of a rule-based system, not by way of 
Power-capabilities. "' By adoption of the rule-based system in 
the WTO, it is expected that a more favourable international 
trading environment for ROK-EU trade relations will be 
93. According to logic the EU should go towards open 
regionalism. The meta-regime should go towards liberalism and 
pluralism for the increase of economic interaction between the EU and Korea. These macro-environmental factors will lie behind this writing as a kind of wind to accelerate trade promotion. In the opposite case, closed regionalism, unilateralism and bilateralism, trade will be impeded. 
". See Robert Keohane, After Hegemony: Cooperation and 
Discord in the World Political Economy, Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1984. 
95. V. K. Aggarwal, "The Unraveling of the Multi-Fiber 
Arrangement: an Examination of Regime Change", International 
Organization, Vol. 37, No. 4, pp. 617-46. 
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developed. " 
Stanley Hoffman97 adds one more clue, as a neo-liberal 
institutionalist who argues for the continuation of 
institutional functions because of the important functions that 
they serve for national actors. The neo-liberal perspective 
suggests that the GATT functioned well and the WTO as an 
institution is expected to function very importantly for 
national actors with more regulatory powers. They are more 
optimistic about the role of the multilateral trading order, but 
could also be consistent in dealing with regional blocs. In 
addition to the traditional, theoretical and practical factors 
to be considered, it is expected that we could see increasing 
conflict about the underlying principles and norms of the 
international regimes. 
Vindo K. Aggarwal's belief" is that market sharing 
arrangements will be continuously negotiated among blocs. His 
question is whether the EU will become highly protectionist or 
96. The prospect is not so optimistic since the launching 
of the WTO when we see some worrisome treads in the development of aggressive unilateralism and managed trade. A typical case is US tariff threats to Japanese cars. The US imposition of 
punitive import duties (100 percent) on Japanese luxury cars is 
a clear breach of the WTO rules. In response to this US 
announcement, Japanese car makers said they were determined not to bow to US pressure to buy more US car parts, with the implication that Japan would retaliate by other means. This kind of unilateralism and bilateralism is a clear sign of the violation of multilateralim. See "Japanese defiant over US car tariffs,,, Financial Times Wednesday May 17 1995, p. 7. 
". Stanley Hoffman, "Back to the Future, Part II: 
International Relations Theory and Post-Cold War Europe", International Security, Vol. 15, No. 2,1990, pp. 191-92. 
93. Vindo K. Aggarwal, "The Future of Liberal Trading Order", in Richard Leaver & James L. Richardson (eds. ), Charting the Post-Cold War Order, Boulder: Westview Press, 1994, p. 145. 
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whether the US or Japan will develop strong blocs to favour 
protectionism. Also, Aggarwal's prediction on the regional blocs 
is that the pressure to resist them will come from the 
continuing evolution of corporations across regions and the 
quick spread of technologies. Democratization will be the order 
of the day, associated with rising protectionist pressures from 
displaced workers and uncompetitive firms. This factor, 
specially, drives interest groups to play upon the cognitive 
dissensus to secure policies that immediately benefit them. On 
the contrary, optimism about the future of the trading order 
stems from changes in technology and organizations as well as 
from a continuing evolution in the internationalization of 
tastes. 
A multiplicity of factors are interworking along with world 
structural changes to determine the competitiveness of industry 
in the EU and ROK, which ultimately determines the trade 
relation and pattern between the two entities. The 
tripartitioning of the world's leading economies presents 
challenges and opportunities for trade exchanges between the EU 
and the ROK. 
1.4 The Definition and Development of Globalization and Regionalization in World Trade 
1.4.1 Globalization 
As a typical example of a leading industry for growth in 
the world, multinational electronics firms have been leading the 
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increase of trade exchanges between the EU and the ROK. 99 The 
1970s has witnessed the rapid emergence of a trend of 
internationalization. New technologies, in particular, in the 
area of information and communication, have created new 
products, transformed production processes, globalized product 
marketing, internationalized financial markets, and stimulated 
international investments and international trade in both goods 
and services. This development is often referred to as the 
globalization of the world economy. 
Charles Oman111° defines globalization as "the growth of 
the economic activity spanning politically defined national and 
regional boundaries. " It finds expression in the increased 
movements across the boundaries of goods and services via trade 
and investment, and often of people, via migration. It is 
usually driven by the actions of individual economic actors 
firms, banks, people usually in pursuit of profit, and often 
spurred by the pressure of competition. Thus, it is 
characterized as a centrifugal process, as a process of economic 
outreach. Perceptions of globalization today reflect a 
juxtaposition of at least four phenomena. 101 These include the 
decline of US postwar economic hegemony and political 
99. For further reference, see Raymond Veron, Storm over the Multinationals: The real Issues, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1977, 
P. 31; Alfred D. Chandler, Jr., Scale and Scope: The Dynamics of 
Industrial Capitalism, Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard 
University Press, 1990, pp. 606-607. 
1O°. Charles Oman, Globalization and Regionalization: The 
Challenge for Developing Countries, Paris: OECD Development 
Centre, 1994, pp. 27-36. 
1°1 Ibid., pp. 12-15. 
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leadership, along with the end of the Cold War and the implosion 
of the Soviet Union that have ended bi-polarity. A second is the 
rapid growth of the global financial market since the late 
1970s, facilitated by the deregulation of financial markets on 
the one hand and the new information technologies on the other. 
A third phenomenon is the globalization of corporate activity, 
both in manufacturing and in services. A fourth phenomenon is 
the rather sudden emergence in the late 1980s of broad public 
concern over such environmental threats as ozone depletion and 
global warming. From a policy perspective, it is more usefully 
understood as a microeconomic phenomenon, one that is driven by 
the strategies and behaviour of firms. While government 
deregulation, the advent and spread of the new information 
technologies, and the globalization of financial markets have 
been playing central roles in facilitating and spurring 
globalization since the 1970s, the globalization of today is the 
international diffusion of the new system of corporate and 
inter-firm organization variously referred to as "flexible" or 
"lean" production, or "the new competition. "1°2 
Susan Stranger°' has suggested that the perceptive aspect 
of globalization is a most important factor. We live and work 
in a world-wide context, instead of in a local, national one. 
We spend much of our time attending and preparing bilateral and 
international 
meetings. Managers and experts of all kinds are 
lot Ibid., p. 13. 
103. Susan Strange, "The Limits of Politics, "Government and opposition", Vol. 30, No. 3,1995, pp. 293-95. 
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engaged in multinational businesses. To quantify this 
development is not easy. There are some supporting economic 
indicators of this universal perceptual change. Strange 
specifically refers to the rapid growth of the business 
conference, travel and transnational communications. 
In international trade statistics, in the mid-1980s, the 
estimated volume of international production exceeded the volume 
of inter-state exports. The proportion of production of goods 
and services controlled by foreign-based firms is growing as 
local firms are merged or closed down. Strange gives a second 
definition of globalization as the partial erasure of the 
distinctions separating national currency areas and national 
systems of financial regulations. 104 The increased mobility of 
capital and other factors of production; and the improved 
quality and lower relative cost of international transport and 
communication, add to the comprehensive interpretation of the 
definition of globalization. The improved quality, speed and 
lower relative cost of transport and communications are other 
aspects of globalization which have been a necessary condition 
for the expansion of international trade and for the large and 
more important growth of international production. This has 
"'. The change in the structure of national financial 
systems is well noted by L. Paul, "Capital Mobility, State Autonomy and Political Legitimacy", Journal of International 
Affairs, Columbia University, winter 1995, pp. 369-88, quoted in 
Susan Strange, "The Limits of Politics". He notes that four 
changes in the financial structure weaken the protective barriers around national financial systems. They are a) the 
reduction of direct controls and taxes on capital movements; b) the liberalization of long-standing regulatory restrictions 
within national financial markets; c) the expansion of lightly 
regulated offshore financial markets; and d )the introduction of 
new technologies in the process of financial intermediation. 
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gradually resulted in greater inter-dependence among national 
economies. Following this process, the advanced industrial 
economies such as the Organization for Economic Cooperation and 
Development (OECD), could extend their economic norms and values 
to a dominant position in the world economic game. The power of 
money and technology have caused a growing number of countries 
in the world to aspire to the same, economic, social and 
political values as the advanced nations enjoy-"' 
Deepened inter-dependence calls for closer consultation and 
coordination if conflicts are to be avoided. The policy 
decisions of large corporations and national economic policies 
decisions are now more likely to have results transcending 
national boundaries. 
1.4.2 Regionalization 
As a potentially contradictory development to globalism, 
Guy de Jonquieres1O6 has conceptualized "regionalism" in terms 
of "economies everywhere being exposed more widely to 
competition from the rest of the world, they urge to club 
together with their neighbours to become ever stronger. " Only 
competitive economies benefit from a multilateral framework. 
Uncompetitive economies suffer from conflicts of economic wars. 
According to the World Trade Organization (WTO), at least 100 
such groupings had been formed by the end of the 1994, nearly a 
third of them in the previous five years, which means that 
105 Annual Report of the OECD, Paris, 1992, p. 7. 
1°6 , Guy de Jonquieres, "regionalism, " Financial Times, Frid October 6 1995, p. 21. 
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almost all the WTO's more than 120 members are linked by at 
least one such arrangement. 
The central question lies in whether regional arrangements 
benefit the global economy by expanding trade, or harm it by 
erecting barriers which obstruct trade with the rest of the 
world. The ROK is not a member of a constitutionally 
institutionalized regional grouping such as the NAFTA and the 
EU, though it is an active organizer of the Asia Pacific 
Economic Council (APEC). Renato Ruggiero, the WTO Director- 
General, has expressed concern that any move by the USA and the 
EU to construct a transatlantic free trade area could prove 
divisive and would risk antagonizing the rest of the world. Guy 
de Jonquieres has identified the general division of two trends: 
exports sold within the region rose from 64 per cent to 72 per 
cent of the Western European total between 1963 and 1992, while 
the share of exports to Asia and North America fell slightly to 
about 7.5 per cent in each case. By contrast, Japan and other 
eastern economies, such as Hong Kong, Taiwan, Singapore, and the 
ROK have enjoyed dynamic export-led growth without the benefit 
of any regional trade arrangements and by focusing on markets 
much further afield. For them, at least, staying outside bigger 
groupings has proven a resoundingly successful policy. 
Charles Oman further argues that regionalization has been 
enhanced in recent years by the apparent decline of US postwar 
economic hegemony, the remarkable success of Japan, and some of 
the leading European economies, notably Germany, in catching up 
with the United States in terms of technological prowess as well 
as income levels, and the end of the bi-polar world that came 
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with the end of the Cold War and the implosion of the Soviet 
Union. 101 Most important has been the acceleration since the 
mid 1980s of moves towards the formation or strengthening of de 
jure and/or de facto regional economic groupings in Europe, 
North America and Pacific Asia, equally marked by the recent 
renewal of strong interests among developing nations to 
strengthen regional ties among themselves. Regionalization can 
be a powerful collective policy instrument for states to 
disrupt, weaken or dilute the rigidifying, growth-retarding 
Powers of such domestically entrenched groups by radically 
enlarging the domestic market and stimulating competition. 
Regionalization can thus be a response to globalization, and at 
the same time stimulate the microeconomic forces that drive 
globalization. Regionalization and globalization can thus be, 
and often are, mutually reinforcing1O8. 
Multinational firms and competitive economies accelerate 
globalization within a multilateral framework while interest 
groups of uncompetitive economies foster regional groupings to 
seek sectoral interests. Put into a specific definition, 
regionalization is usually fostered by increased competition 
abroad. Enhanced competition abroad prompts the government and 
business sectors to strengthen the home base of industries by 
enlarging the domestic market through economic cooperation and 
integration with adjacent nations. Regional groupings will give 
the member nations economies of scale and reduce the cost burden 
107. Charles Oman, op. cit, pp. 14-15. 
108 
" Ibid. , P. 16. 
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of research and development for developing new technologies. A 
major underlying assertion of this argument is that 
regionalization endangers the natural flow of international 
trade. The cost of adjustments in the process of 
regionalization is usually transferred to outsiders through 
restrictions of non-member nations' exports into a certain 
regional body. Richard S. Belous and Rebecca S. Hartley oppose 
a bilateral agreement or a regional trading bloc that emphasizes 
the exclusion of others. -109 Regionalism can not be compared to 
multilateralism, which is open to all who are willing to follow 
the basic rules agreed upon. 
There are also different arguments about the impact of 
regionalism. WTO report11° insists that the rapid growth of 
worldwide regional economic groupings has not so far impeded the 
development of freer world trade and has sometimes helped to 
promote it. This report further claims that there have been no 
fortress-type regional arrangements among WTO members; thus, 
there exists no possibility that discriminatory trade blocs may 
be emerging in North America, Western Europe and the Asia- 
Pacific region. An empirical survey of the EU trade regimes 
will refute this argument to prove that the assertion is 
incorrect, especially when it is viewed from the perspective of 
the developing nations. The full compliance of the regional 
groupings with multilateralism embodied in the articles of the 
119 Richard S. Belous & Rebecca S. Hartley (eds. ), The Growth of the Regional Trading Blocs in the Global Economy, Washington D. C.: National Planning Association, 1990, p. 20. 
Financial Times, Thursday, April 27 1995. 
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WTO, has never been achieved. An interesting conclusion is that 
the WTO has doubts about the economic value of non-reciprocal 
agreements, such as the EU's preferential trade links with the 
African, Caribbean and Pacific countries because, such 
arrangements provide limited economic gains and can have 
protectionist consequences, because they enable strong economies 
to restrict imports from weaker ones in sensitive sectors, such 
as agriculture and textiles, which is a clear violation of 
multilateralism. 
Renato Ruggiero, *the WTO director-general, recently argued 
that it risked antagonizing developing nations, which could view 
it as an exclusionist move. -"- According to a WTO Secretariat 
Report, the proportion of world trade conducted within regions 
has risen from 40.6 per cent in 1958 to 50.4 per cent in 1993. 
The EU intra-regional trade has increased faster than trade with 
third parties, though EU trade with third parties has continued 
to expand according to the gradual demand of members' economic 
growth. Looking at the picture in specific sectors and taking 
into account the vague interpretation and application of the 
rules embodied in the principles of the GATT, it is not 
difficult to find that the EU exhibits protectionist trends as 
viewed from the perspective of developing nations. Two 
contrasting views coexist on the damaging role of regionalism. 
Closed regionalism hampers the natural flow of trade, but open 
regionalism such as the APEC could be an accelerating factor to 
liberalize world trade for the world free trading system. An 
111. Financial Times Thursday, April 27 1995. 
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OECD report112 reflects the reality of regional groupings 
in 
economic cooperation. It says that future international economic 
relations will be power-based rather than rule-based. An 
economic bloc is stronger than a single nation. It is also 
anticipated that increased global competition is accelerating 
regionalization, making Korea more constrained in its export 
promotion as an outsider of tight blocs such as the NAFTA and 
the EU. 
The World economy is becoming more and more globalized and 
regionalized as we enter the latter part of the 1990s. 113 
Robert Z Lawrence114 has analysed the rapid expansion of 
globalization by focusing on an environment in which relatively 
small differences in institutional practices and shifts in 
relative competitiveness could cause a large impact on 
international trade and flows. Lawrence further argues that 
globalization has generated at least two quite different policy 
responses in the trading system. First, the globalization of 
world trade has even led economic policy makers to put forward 
an idea that the EU and the USA could form a North Atlantic Free 
Trade Area. The possibility of creating the North Atlantic Free 
Trade Area was discussed by the US President, Bill Clinton, and 
112. OECD, Long-Term Prospects for the World Economy, Paris: 
OECD Publication, 1992, p. 117. 
113 Stanley Hoffman, "The Crisis of Liberal 
Internationalism", Foreign Affairs, No. 98, Spring 1995, pp. 164- 
65. 
11` Robert Z Lawrence, scenarios for the World Trading 
System and Their Implications for Developing Countries, OECD 
Development Center Technical Papers No. 47, OECD, 1991, pp. 13- 
17. 
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Britain's Prime Minister, John Major, at a meeting in Washington 
in April 1995; and Germany's Foreign Minister, Klaus Kinkel 
urged that the idea should be studied further. -"5 This idea 
was suggested more officially at the Conservative Blackpool 
party conference held from the 9th to the 13th October 1995. 
Traditionally, international trading rules have put much 
emphasis on the removal of national barriers and the elimination 
Of policies which discriminate against foreign products and 
firms. This call for deeper integration implies that we should 
seek to revise those policies and practices which may 
inadvertently discriminate against outsiders. The journey 
towards a fully integrated world trading system will be a very 
long process. If regionalism is to be adopted as a transitional 
stage, it must, nevertheless, be a open one, especially on the 
strict condition that even the transitional period is regulated 
by multilateral rules. "" The problem lies in the non- 
enforcement of GATT principles regarding regional integration. 
Regionalization is in part a response to globalization; 
with which it is mutually reinforcing. It takes the form of 
preferential trade agreements in which participants do not have 
a common external trade policy or a customs union in which the 
tying of currencies, the harmonization of some domestic policies 
or the mutual recognition of standards and regulations. In some 
"s "Warning on EU-US Free Trade Area", The Financial Times, 24 April 1995, p. 6. 
116 Center for International Economics, Western Trade Blocs: Game, set or match for Asia-Pacific and the World Economy, Canberra, Australia, 1990, p. 3. 
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cases, it can take the form of fully-fledged economic, monetary, 
and even political union. The orientation of three major 
regions' regional integration has drawn much attention. In 
general, NAFTA will be trade liberalizing, despite some clearly 
restrictive or discriminatory features; East Asia promotes 
multilateralism with open characteristics, and the EU is 
characterized by managed liberalization. "' 
Anderson and Blackhurst further note that "one of the 
driving forces behind the spread of regionalism is the erosion 
of the guarantees of markets access in the major industrial 
nations, 'lthat is to improve the security of the access to their 
major markets. -28 In some sense the regionalism of the EU's 
trade policy fosters the globalization of Korean firms to secure 
Korea's manufactured exports to the EU. Emerging as a 
particularly important feature today is far-reaching change as 
the predominant force of industrial organization. One of the 
effects of globalization is to reduce economic distance among 
countries and regions, as well as among the economic actors 
themselves. Another is to reduce the effective policy 
sovereignty of national governments vis-a-vis other governments 
but also vis-a-vis the market internally as well as 
internationally. Both these effects contribute to a perceived 
association between globalization and increased international 
------------- 
11' See Kym Anderson and Richard Blackhurst (eds. ), Regional Integration and Global Trading System, New York: Harvester, 1993, p. 7. 
""a " Ibid. P. 12 . 
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interdependence. 119 These two intervening variables have great 
influence on Korea's exports into the EU. The increase of global 
interdependence, decrease of national policy sovereignty and 
increased uncertainty and policy sovereignty of a firm, are 
results of globalization. Among the results of globalization, 
the increase of uncertainty and instability fosters the trend of 
regionalization with a closed regional orientation, which is 
partially reflected in the trade regimes of the EU. 
1.5 Empirical Evidence of Regionalism and Globalism in the 
World 
The emergence of the three regional blocs has taken very 
different forms. The development process of the EU is unique, 
different from the NAFTA and APEC in that the EU aims at 
reaching monetary and political Union. The development of trade 
policy between the EU and South Korea has been chosen because 
the EU represents the most developed process of regional 
integration. 120 
As active pushers of globalism, multinational firms have 
demanded a stable trading environment. Charles Kindleberger 
argues that a world stabilizer was needed to restore and 
maintain a stable international economy. 2.21 In the bipolar 
world structure, only hegemonic power made it possible for the 
capitalist economies to have an open and stable international 
11°. Ibid., p. 33. 
120. See Chapter 2. The History of the EU's Trade Policy, on the uniqueness of the EU development process. 
121 Charles Kindleberger, The World in Depression 1929- 
1939, Berkeley: Univ. of California Press, 1973, pp. 290-310. 
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economic system. 222 Due to the hegemonic leadership of the US, 
the successful operation of the GATT contributed to a tremendous 
expansion in total trade volume. 12' 
As the most important player, the multinationals have been 
major actors in this process. Joan Edelman Spero12` describes 
certain characteristics common to many multinationals: 
"A multinational firm is a firm with foreign subsidiaries that 
extend the firm's production and marketing beyond the 
boundaries of any one country. Multinational corporations are 
not simply large corporations that market their products 
abroad; they are firms that have sent abroad a package of 
capital, technology, managerial talent, and marketing skills 
to carry out production in foreign countries. In many cases, 
the multinational's production is truly worldwide, with 
different stages of production carried out in different 
countries. Marketing is also often international. Goods 
produced in one or more countries are sold throughout the 
world. Finally, multinational corporations tend to have 
foreign subsidiaries in many countries. Raymond Veron defined 
a multinational corporation as one with investments in six or 
more foreign countries and found that such firms accounted 
for 80 percent of all foreign subsidiaries of major U. S. 
corporations" 
. 12S 
122 Robert Keohane termed the theory "the theory of 
hegemonic stability in "The theory of hegemonic Stability" and 
changes in International Economic Regimes, 1967-1977, " in Ole R, 
Holsti, Randolph M. Silverson, and Alexander L. George (eds. ), 
Change in the International System, Boulder: Westview Press, 
1980. Ch. 6. 
123. The 7th Tokyo Round (1973-1979), reduced the average tariff rate to 4.7 percent. Jackson defines the tariff average with tariffs on non-primary products of industrial countries. In John H. Jackson, The World Trading System: Law and Policies 
of International Economic Relations, Cambridge: MIT Press, 1989, 
PP. 50-55. 
1". Joan Edelman Spero, The Politics of International 
Economic Relations, Fourth Ed., London: Routledge, 1994, pp. 103- 
104 
. 
1'V . Raymond Veron, Sovereignty at Bay: The Multinational Spread of U. S Enterprises, New York: Basic Books, 1971 , p. 11, quoted in Ibid., p. 140. 
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The definition above clearly suggests the need for a 
multilateral framework for the multinationals to expand their 
businesses. 
1.5.1 The Uruguay Round of the GATT 
The Uruguay Round of the GATT started at Punta del Este, 
Uruguay in September 1986.126 Its main objective was further 
to liberalize world trade by reducing tariff and other non- 
tariff barriers. The range of negotiation was so complex that 
the result would have a great impact on the political and 
economic order. The product of 2500 days' negotiation was a 550 
page final agreement by 117 nations, as a epoch-making event in 
the world trading system. 
According to the practical aims of the Uruguay Round, the 
outcomes are categorized as follows: 1) further reduction in 
tariff; 2) prevention of further proliferation of non-tariff 
barriers; 3) reform in agricultural trade agreement. 1.27 The 
failure of the Uruguay Round of the GATT would have exacerbated 
trade frictions. 128 Jagdish Bhagwati129 terms the negotiation 
126 The major motivation was the sharp increase of non- tariff barriers in the international trading system. The initiation of the UR has been described by GATT as the most 
comprehensive and ambitious yet undertaken. It encompassed the fifteen negotiating topics, including such new areas as intellectual property, foreign investment and services, as well 
as old, unresolved ones like safeguards and agriculture. 
127, On the detailed purpose of the UR, see GATT, Ministerial Declaration on the Uruguay Round, Geneva, 20 September, 1986. 
128. Official Publication of the EC, The Uruguay Round, Global Agreement, Global Benefit, Luxembourg, 1994. 
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mechanism of the GATT as "a contractorian institution". 
Multilateral trade negotiations have given an opportunity for 
member nations to put forward their claims and requests against 
the relevant trading partners and seek settlement by means of 
concessional exchanges. 
Table 1.3: The Fifteen Uruguay Round Negotiating Groups 
Group Declared Aims 
1" Tariffs Reduce or eliminate 
2. Non-tariff measures Reduce or eliminate 3. Tropical Products Fully liberalize, including processed 
forms, receive special attention 
4. Natural resource- Fully liberalize including processed 
based products forms 
5. Textile and Clothing Formulate modalities permitting 
eventual integration into the GATT 
6. Agriculture Increase Liberalization 
Strengthen GATT rules and disciplines, 
and make them more operationally 
effective 7. GATT articles Review as requested 
8. Safeguards Clarify and reinforce GATT 
disciplines 
9. MTN agreements and Improve, clarify, or expand 
arrangements 
10. Subsidies and Improve GATT disciplines 
Countervailing 
measures 
11. Dispute Settlement Improve and Strengthen rules and 
procedures, develop adequate 
arrangement monitoring 
12. Trade-related ClarifyGATT 
intellectual Elaborate new rules and provisions 
property right 13. Trade-related 
investment measures Elaborate further provisions 
necessary 14. Functioning of the Enhance GATT surveillance of national 
GATT System trade policies 
Increase ministerial involvement 
15. Services Establish a multilateral framework of 
principles and rules 
Source: GATT, The Uruguay Round 
129. Jagdish Bhagwati, Protectionism, Cambridge: MIT press, 
1988, pp. 35-36. 
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The life of a system is determined by practicing the agreed 
rules of its signatories. The function of the GATT has been 
limited. This incompleteness gave strong impetus to the 
successful conclusion of the Uruguay Round. i'° 
Bernard Hoekman131 elaborates that the concept of 
reciprocity was used in the Uruguay Round. Tariff cuts are to 
be negotiated through bargaining, reflecting a balance of 
recognized benefits at the margin rather than via negotiations 
resulting in a perceived full equality of market access and 
reverse market access. 13' To protect nations against unfair 
trade practices, safeguard and anti-dumping measures were also 
recognized as key instruments, and were to be refined to 
increase their efficiency and guarantee fair application. 
without abuse. '" 
The limitations of the GATT have been recognized in the 
changing international economic environment. The rise in non- 
tariff barriers has been a matter of great concern among the 
13o World Development Report 1987, pp. 134-36. It well 
summarizes the brief history of the Rounds. Negotiations are 
usually done through the succession of the Rounds. In the case 
of the EC, the individual members are members of the GATT. But the negotiation representative is the European Commission as a 
whole. As the number of the negotiating parties increases, each 
round has taken longer and longer to complete. 
131 Bernard Hoekman, "Determining the Need for Issue Linkages in Multilateral Trade Negotiations", International Organization, vol. 43, No. 4, Autumn 1989, pp. 694-95. 
132. Bhagwati, "op. cit., pp. 35-38. 
133. EC Official Publication Office, The Uruguay Round, 
1994, Brussels, p. 9. There have been various estimates of the potential economic gains of the Uruguay Round, starting from an extra ECU 180 billion of global income a year. In 
addition to that, a global public procurement market worth ECU 346 billion will be opened up for external tender by the Round. 
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GATT contracting parties. The sharp rise in abuse was a major 
motivation for the initiation of the Uruguay Round-134 The 
Uruguay Round tried to achieve more transparency against 
protectionism in the areas of import-licensing procedures, rules 
of origin, customs valuation, and pre-shipment inspection. The 
term "safeguard" is usually used to include a variety of 
measures for emergency and anti-unfair trade purposes, thus 
including the GATT Article XIX[see Appendix] safeguards, anti- 
dumping and countervailing duty actions and so-called grey-area 
measures which are not subject to GATT rules such as VERs. 135 
The two principal measures allowed in the Uruguay Round are 
safeguard clauses to protect domestic industries from sudden, 
unexpected surges in imports and anti-dumping measures to deter 
resort to unfair trading practices. The gradual phasing out of 
all grey-area measures such as VER and OMA was agreed. The 
safeguard Committee will survey and monitor all measures taken 
and ensure that they are in conformity with the agreements. 131, 
The importance of service well reflects that trade in services 
now accounts for 20 percent of global trade. Updating the trade 
regimes of the GATT to include services seem, in some sense, to 
be urgent viewed from the size of the trade in service 
134 Center for International Economics, Western Trade 
Blocs: Game, Set or Match for Asia-Pacific and the World Economy?, Canberra, Australia, 1990, p. 18-19. 
'. The definition of the term "safeguard" was quoted in Jeffrey Schott, Uruguay Round, pp. 18-19. 
136. Patrick Meserlin, " Anti -dumping",, in T. Bark & W. Chae (eds. ), Uruguay Round: Unresolved Issues and Prospects, Seoul, 
Korea Institute for International Economic Policy, 1991. 
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sectors. 137 The Uruguay Round prevents countries from 
resorting to unfair practices in trade from expanding and 
continuing to use them. With increased certainty and expected 
predictions, members of the WTO will benefit. "' 
The IMF report says that developing nations will suffer 
from the costs of transition: the decline of benefit from 
preference schemes, under which industrialized countries allow 
specified imports with little or no duties, and also high food 
costs . 139 As M. Camps and W. Diebold" argue that 
it is right 
1" Mario Kakabadse, International Trade in Services: 
Prospects for Liberalization in the 1990s, London: Froom Helm, 
1987, pp. 61-65. 
138. The Financial Times, 18 November, 1994, says that 
Market liberalization agreed in the Uruguay Round could benefit 
all countries and reduce trade conflicts and protectionism. The IMF claimed that given the fairly long implementation period, 
any transition costs are likely to be felt gradually, providing time to exploit opportunities opened up by the Round. 
i39. The IMF says that preliminary analysis suggests that 
erosion of preference margins is small. The main beneficiaries have been the more advanced developing nations, which have more to gain from tariff cuts and liberalization of agricultural, textile and apparel trade. However, some nations notably in North Africa and the Caribbean, which rely overwhelmingly on 
preferences on industrial products, could be adversely affected. Although developing nations importing much of their food might be hurt by higher prices, the farm sector in other countries 
could thrive as world market distortions are reduced. Countries 
protecting their farmers may simply replace their quotas with 
Prohibitive tariffs, the report notes, and anti-dumping measures could still be used for protection. Still, the achievement in 
market liberalization, strengthening of rules and institutions 
and extension of discipline to new areas will be far reaching the report said. Equally important, it has expressed the 
environmental issues conducive to tackling future challenges in trade policy. 
140. M. Camps and W. Diebold, Jr. , The New Multilateralism: Can the World Trading System be Saved, New York: Council on 
Foreign Relations, 1983. p. 83. Quoted in Ii Young Chung, Korea in a Turbulent World: Challenges of the New International 
Political, Economic Order and Policy Responses, Seoul: The Sejong Institute, 1992, pp. 107-108. 
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that the GATT as an institution should become the centre of the 
system. 
1.5.2 The Creation of the WTO 
The WTO is the legal and institutional foundation of the 
multilateral trading system, and as such will guide the 
principal to provide the principle contractual obligations 
determining how governments frame and implement domestic trade 
legislation and regulations. Moreover, it is the platform on 
which trade relations among countries evolve through collective 
debate, negotiation and adjudication. "' Out of all the 
measures agreed in the Uruguay Round, the most significant was 
the decision to create the WTO, a more comprehensive and 
powerful successor to the GATT. Reflecting this mood, Peter 
Sutherland, head of the GATT, in completion of the Uruguay Round 
deal in late 1993, hailed the accord as a defining moment in 
1" Reference is from computer internet information 
service. The WTO section writes: The WTO was established on 1 January 1995. Governments had conducted the UR on December 15, 1993 and Ministers had given their political backing to the 
results by signing the Final Act at a meeting in Marrakesh, Morocco in April 1994. The Marrakesh Declaration of 15 April 
1994, affirmed that the results of the UR would strengthen the 
world economy and lead to more free trade, investment, 
employment and income growth throughout the world. The WTO is the embodiment of the UR results and the successor to the GATT. Out of potential membership of 152 nations and territories, 76 
governments became members of the WTO on its first day, with 
some 50 other governments at various stages of completing their domestic ratification procedures, and the remainder engaged in 
negotiating their terms of entry. Not only does the WTO have a 
potentially larger membership than GATT (128 by the end of 1994), it also has a much broader scope in terms of the 
commercial activity and trade policies to which it applies. The GATT applied only to trade in merchandise goods; the WTO covers trade in goods, services and "trade in ideas" or intellectual 
property. 
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history which set the stage for further big advances in trade 
liberalization. 1.42 
1.5.3 The European Union 
By the early 1980s around the time when industrialized 
countries forced reciprocal opening upon their trading partners, 
the concept "defensive" changed to "offensive"; it was the 
offensive policy of forced opening. Avinash Dixitl" insists 
that the violation of the rules of the game of free trade can be 
resolved by the concept of deterrent or compellent threat. The 
emphasis of deterrent or compellent threat is focused on the 
negative aspects of reciprocity in the name of maintenance and 
Protection of the international free trade system. When the 
concept of reciprocity did fulfil its original purpose, regional 
solutions must have been another threat. 
Table 1.4: Regional Shares of World Output and Trade 1958 
and 1990 
share of world share of world merchandise 
World GDP(%) exports plus imports(%) 
1958 1990 1958 1990 
Western Europe 26 34 40 46 
North America 
plus Mexico 46 30 20 18 
Asia 11 25 14 21 
Source: Kym Anderson & Richard Blackhurst, op. cit., p. 7. 
Despite the rhetoric that the underlying philosophy and 
142 Financial Times Special, World Economy and Finance: International Financial Institutions under Scrutiny, Friday October 6 1995, p. 10, article on WTO by Guy de Jonquieres. 
14. Avinash Dixit, "How should the U. S Respond to other 
countries" Trade Policies? ", in Robert M. Stern (ed. ), U. S. 
Trade Policies in a Changing World Economy, Cambridge: The MIT Press, 1987, pp. 270-85. 
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motivation of EU integration was to overcome internal weakness 
and constraints, and to defeat Europessimism and Eurosclerosis 
by generating efficiency gains for the European economy through 
the creation of a large, unified market for improving the 
international competitiveness of European producers, the Single 
European Market(SEM) and the Maastricht Treaty of 1991 for the 
creation of the EU raise the fear of a fortress Europe. 
The analysis of Han-Eckart Scharer"" is clear and 
transparent in capturing the negative implications of European 
Economic integration. He particularly pinpoints the sharp rise 
of protectionist instruments since 1982. The trade policy 
instruments of the community against unfair trade practices have 
been tightened. '45 For example, in 1982 a revised Common 
Import Regulation (Reg. 288/32) was adopted, in 1984 a tightened 
Anti-dumping and Antisubsidies Regulation (Reg. 2176/84) was 
Passed, ""' and in the same year the so-called New Trade Policy 
Instrument (Reg. 2641/84) was enacted, the EU's equivalent to 
Section 301 of the US Trade Act which applies to all practices 
not hitherto covered. In 1987, the Antidumping and 
Antisubsidies Regulation was again changed to prevent evasion of 
penalty duties through so-called screwdriver factories 
' Hans-Eckart Scharrer, "Existing Economic Blocs: A Building Block or a Stumbling Block to Wider Forms of Multilateral Trade Forum? ", in Jang-Won Such (ed. ), Korea's New International Economic Diplomacy and Globalization Policy, Seoul: KIEP, pp. 45-46. 
145Ibid., p. 46. 
146 
" New Council Regulations on protection against dumped imports from countries not members of the European Community and dumped or subsidized imports from countries not members of the EC are (EC)No 3283/94, (EC)No 1251/95 and (EC)No 522/94. 
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(Reg. 2423/88). Council Regulation (EC) No 3286/94 of 22 December 
1994 laying down community procedures in the field of the common 
commercial policy aims at ensuring the exercise of the 
Community's rights under international trade rules, in 
particular those established under the auspices of the WTO. The 
above are just a few of the examples of how the EU restrictive 
trade attitude via-a-vis non-members has hardened. The 1980s 
witnessed the EC trade policy shift from tariff to non-tariff 
barriers (NTBs) and a shift from common policy making to more 
national discretion. More specifically, this new protectionist 
tilt, however, does not affect all extra-regional suppliers. EC 
protectionist measures have become more selective and 
discriminatory among products and countries of origin, 
particularly targeting the Asian Newly Industrialized 
Economies(ANIEs) exporting items such as colour TVs, VCRs and 
computers, which posed stiff competition to EC products. '" 
In the case of the EU, rising protectionist tendencies can 
be detected in the strict and even arbitrary use of anti-dumping 
rules, increased, application of safeguard measures, implicit and 
explicit subsidies to the firms in the EU. '48 Also, structural 
adjustment problems coming from the deepening of the integration 
process and likely demands for protection coming from new member 
states cast dark clouds upon hopes of a more open EU 
i". Sun-Taik Han, European Integration: The Impact On 
Asian Newly Industrializing Economies, Paris: OECD Publication, 
1992, P. 27. 
1`8 For more detailed proof, see chapter 4. on major trade regimes of the EU. 
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attitude. l" Managed liberalization is an unsatisfactory 
substitute for a genuine one, but poorer liberalization, because 
it attenuates competition in precisely those sectors in need of 
enhanced efficiency. 15° 
1.5.4 NAFTA 
NAFTA, initiated in 1988, is the second regional group 
established in the name of free trade. This eliminates trade 
restrictions among the US, Canada and Mexico with a high 
restriction of labour movement. No common external tariff and 
coordination mechanism of macro-economic policy exists in this 
region. For the US, the NAFTA is used as a bargaining lever as 
the decline of the US hegemony reflects the diminishing faith in 
multilateralism under the umbrella of the GATT. It creates an 
economic bloc of 360 million people, enhancing the bargaining 
leverage of the NAFTA with other major trading partners. 
Dr. Arthur Dunkel, director general of the GATT, warned 
that it would be dangerous to assume that the goal of global 
free trade has been irreversibly achieved . 151- Looking at the 
background from which the above emphasis was derived, the 
increasing concern of the US about trade imbalances has 
unleashed various bilateral trade measures such as the Super 
149. Han, Sun-Taik, op. cit., pp. 30-31. 
lso L. Alan Winters, "Expanding EC membership and 
association accords: recent experience and future prospects, " in KYm Anderson and Richard Blackhurst (eds. ), Regional Integration 
and Global Trading System, London and New York: Harvester/Wheatsheaf, 1993, p. 123. 
lsl The Times, Friday March 4,1994. 
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301 provisions. The US has increasingly made frequent use of 
VERs and anti-dumping measures. Multilateral trade 
liberalization is undercut by the recent rise in the 
respectability of "managed trade" and "strategic trade policy", 
arguments that address not only declining industries but also 
high-tech industries. Then, a possible creation of an American 
free trade area may shift the attention of the involved 
countries away from the multilateral trade talks under the 
guidance of the GATT, because they will be benefitted much more 
by the trade diverting effects of such a bloc. 
In response to the SEM and growing regionalism in Europe, 
the US reacted first by resorting to the multilateral framework 
of the Uruguay Round of the GATT. The market accessibility of 
the EU seemed dark since the Single European Market. Amid the 
process of directly influencing on the legislative process of 
the Community, the US actively found a regional solution. This 
regional approach took a relatively short time in the conclusion 
of the Canada-U. S. Free Trade Agreement (CUSTA) in 1988 and 
subsequently on December 17,1992 the North American Free Trade 
Agreement (NAFTA) was signed by the US, Mexico and Canada. 
Completion of the Uruguay Round is an obvious critical step 
that would do much to limit the potential trade and investment 
diversion resulting from NAFTA. 152 Richard S. Belous and 
Rebecca S. Hartley analyse the primary force of regionalism 
through their argument that regionalism provides more 
152. Murray Smith, "The North American Free Trade Agreement: 
global Impacts, " in Kym Anderson and Richard Blackhurst (eds. ), Regional Integration and Global Trading System, New York and London: Harvester/Wheatsheaf, 1993, pp. 100-101. 
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predictable and controllable adjustment costs and easier 
harmonization of the technical problems relevant to non-tariff 
barriers. 153 In reality, multilateralism, unilateralism, 
bilateralism, and regionalism co-exist. Among several options, 
the Policy makers choose the most suitable one, case by case, 
depending on the situation, to maximize national benefits. 
As a major clue to explain the changes in the US trade 
policy, Jeffrey Schott argues that the US decided to change its 
Policy orientation from internationalism to regionalism due to 
its disappointment with the GATT dispute settlement 
procedures . 2-54 Gary Clyde Hufbauer and Jeffrey J. Schott-'1-5 
also elaborate that with the successful conclusion of the 
Uruguay Round, the EU and the NAFTA should continue to be 
outward-oriented. The success of the Uruguay Round will 
stabilize the complementary relationship between 
multilateralism and regionalism. Economic regionalism can be 
interpreted as the promotion by the government of international 
economic linkages with countries that are geographically 
Proximate. 156 
15' Richard S. Belous and Rebecca S. Hartley (eds. ), The Growth of the Regional Trading Blocs in the Global Economy, Washington D. C.: National Planning Association, 1990, p. 132. 
15`. Jeffrey I. Schott, "More Trade Area? " No. 27, May 1989, Institute for International Economics, Washington D. C, 
P. 42. 
155 Gary Clyde Hufbauer & Jeffrey J. Schott, NAFTA, an Assessment, W. D. C: Institute for International Economics, 1993, PP. 116-117. 
156. Robert C. Hine, "Regionalism and the integration of the 
World economy", Journal of Common Market Studies, Volume XXX, No. 2, June, 1992, P. 115. 
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1.5.5 APEC 
According to Bollard and Mayes, the relative weak trend of 
regionalism in the Asian-Pacific finds some roots in 1) previous 
strong extra-regional trade ties, 2) a lack of perceived need 
coming from rapid growth of Pacific Rim countries' trade, 3) the 
diverse nature and interests of those countries, especially 
because of the Communist/non-Communist division of Asia. 
For historical reasons, East Asian countries like China, 
Korea and Taiwan are very reluctant to develop trade preferences 
with Japan. ls' The comparatively weak linkages in Asia do not 
actually produce any substantial disadvantages to those nations 
in the region. If a disadvantageous situation were to develop 
in the future, pressures would grow on Japan, which is now 
emphasizing closer political and commercial ties with its Asian 
partners, to participate in an intra-Asian trade group. Other 
regions' growing discrimination against the Asian region would 
intensify the need for a more institutionalized form of regional 
economic cooperation. As of now, three signs are detected. The 
first one is the continuing development of APEC. '58 The second 
is' . Ibi d., p. 117. 
158 In the Osaka APEC Summit Meeting on the 19th November 1995, Asia-Pacific leaders took a major stride towards making real their vision of free trade for the region by the early 21st 
century. They took the action agenda for achieving the Bogor 
commitment to axe all trade and investment barriers in APEC by 2020. The action agenda is composed of three major pillars- trade and investment liberalization, their facilitation, and 
economic and technical cooperation. The nine principles of the Action Agenda are 1) comprehensiveness; 2) WTO-consistency; 3) Comparability; 4) Non-discrimination; 5) Transparency; 6) Standstill in levels of protection; 7) Simultaneous start, continuous process and differentiated time tables; 8) 
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one is the increased role of Japan in the ASEAN region as a core 
nation. The third development is to be recognized in the 
intensified discussion on forming a Northeast Asia Economic 
Circle. In the East Asian region, the state has little role in 
driving economic integration. Instead, the activities of the 
private sector have stimulated economic integration. 
1.6 The Growing EU-ROK Partnership under the WTO 
The growing importance of the ROK to the EU is illustrated 
by the fact that South Korea ranks as the 16th largest main 
trade partner to the EU, with an import volume of 7,724,166,000 
ECU and exports of 7,671,000,000 ECU, accounting for 1.6 percent 
of the EU's total combined exports and imports. 159 1993 
statistics compare the amount of imports and exports among 
Japan, US and EU. In import dimension, Korea's import from 
Japan recorded 17,093,000 ECU, 23.3 percent of Korea's total 
imports ; from the US, it was 15,310,000 ECU, a 21.3 percent, and 
from the EU, 8,526,000 ECU, 11.8 percent. In the export 
dimension, the US recorded the largest with a figure of 
15,489,000 ECU, 21.7 percent, while Japan recorded 9,876,000 
ECU, 13.8 percent and the EU, 7,647,000 ECU, 10.7 percent. 
Korea is one of the major export-import nations in world 
trade, ranking as the 11th largest trading entity by export- 
import volume. We can not think of Korea's economic development 
separately from international interdependence. David 
Flexibility; 9) Cooperation. The Bogor declaration was adopted in Bogor, an Indonesian city. 
159 Eurostat, January, 1995. 
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Handerson160 points at the inter-connectedness of the world 
economy. The EU is the largest trading identity, with an 
approximate share of 20 percent in world exports and 20 percent 
of world imports, excluding intra-EU trade. Korea's efforts 
to 
diversify exporting market are naturally aimed at penetrating 
the EU market. Korea had a share of 2.9 percent in world exports 
and 2.9 percent in world imports respectively 
Table 1.5 : Trend in World Trade, Pe 
World Trade (Export and 
World 100 1989 1990 1991 
EU Export 19.3 20.3 20.4 
Import 20.0 21.7 22.8 
in 1993. 
rcentage Share of 
Import) unit: % 
1992 1993 
20.6 20.0 
22.1 19.2 
EFTA Export 8.0 8.7 8.4 8.2 7.4 
Import 7.9 8.5 8.9 7.6 7.6 
US Export 15.4 15.1 16.4 16.3 16.3 
Import 20.0 19.1 19.0 19.4 20.4 
Japan Export 11.7 11.0 12.2 12.4 12.7 
Import 8.6 8.7 8.8 8.2 8.2 
Canada Export 5.1 4.9 4.9 4.9 5.0 
Import 5.2 4.8 4.9 4.8 5.0 
China Export 2.2 2.5 2.8 3.1 3.2 
Import 2.4 1.9 2.4 2.9 3.5 
South Korea Export 2.6 2.5 2.8 2.7 2.9 
Import 2.4 2.6 3.1 2.8 2.9 
Singapore Export 1.9 2.0 2.3 2.3 2.6 
Import 2.0 2.2 2.5 2.5 2.9 
Source: Eurostat, January 1995. 
The figures suggest that the EU can not ignore the 
importance of the ROK, and in a larger context, the dynamic 
160 See David Henderson, "International Economic 
Cooperation Revisited, "Government and Opposition, Vol. 28. No. 1, 
Winter 1993. 
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market of East Asia in any future EU economic growth strategy. 
Table 1.5 shows the extent of Korea's dependence upon 
international trade. As the internationalization of 
transnational capital fosters the globalization of world trade, 
as an important variable impacting on a patterns of trade, it is 
worth looking at Korea's investment in the EU, indicated in 
table 1.6. Investment in Europe almost doubled in just three 
years, from US $153,697,00 in 1990 to US $346,023,000 in 1993. 
This is a good reflection of the increasing importance of the EU 
markets as Korea is diversifying its exporting markets from Asia 
and North America to other promising regions. 
Table 1.6 : Korea's Permitted Overseas Direct Investment by 
Region: Total (unit: Projects, US $1,000) 
region year 1967-77 1980 1990 1993 
Asia 74(projects) 13 303 861 
54,119(amount) 4,262 761,867 953,870 
Middle East 9 8 2 6 
4,128 9,890 564 6,996 
North America 76 14 112 86 
18,751 4,768 595,730 419,596 
Latin America 15 1 39 34 
1,824 400 54,317 47,882 
Europe 32 6 37 48 
4,650 764 153,697 346,223 
Africa 15 0 5 6 
15,662 0 16,659 84,486 
Oceania 4 3 19 10 
1,911 2,700 41,958 30,276 
Total 225 45 517 1,051 
100,735 22,784 1,624,792 1,889,129 
Source: The Bank of Korea, Overseas Direct Investment Statistics 
Yearbook, 1994, p. 14. 
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Won-Dong Cho16' has attempted to define future economic 
cooperation between the ROK and EU with the concept of 
complementarity. He suggests that Korea and the EU stand to gain 
a great deal from economic cooperation. 
Korea regards the EU as an increasingly valuable and 
reliable partner in its search to diversify its trade and 
increase its technological prowess. The EU could also benefit 
from the expansion of trade with Korea because the ROK is more 
and more gaining global economic importance as the third largest 
economy in the Asian Region after Japan and the People's 
Republic of China (the PRC). 
In the same context, Bak-Soo Kim argues that regardless of 
the challenges that the ROK is currently facing within the EU 
market, its potential will be developed with the implications 
that the ROK-EU trade is possibly developing toward intra- 
industry trade to demonstrate the most rapid growth in world 
trade. 162 
The EU's position with regard to the ROK is illuminated by 
the view of the EC Council of Ministers, expressed in a 
communication by the EC Commission about "Relations between the 
EC and Korea: Toward a Growing Partnership. " The EC Council 
161. Won-Dong Cho, "Trade Issues between Korea and the EC: 
Observation based on the Case Study, " in Bak-Soo Kim (ed. ), The 
Asian Dimension of EC Integration-Problems and Prospects, Seoul, Korea: Korean Institute For International Economic Policy, 
PP. 73-74. He is a Deputy Director at the International 
Economics Division, the Economic Planning Board, Korea. 
16'. Bak-Soo Kim, "Changes in Trade Structure between the EC 
and Korea, " in Bak-Soo Kim (ed. ), The Asian Dimension of EC 
Integration-Problems and Prospects, Seoul, Korea: Korea Institute for International Economic Policy, pp. 119-20. 
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recognized that the degree of mutual economic interaction 
between the two should be further expanded to reflect the 
importance of both sides in world trade. It was further 
confirmed in the Euro-Asian Summit in Bangkok by means of a 
political and economic co-operation agreement signed by the EU 
and South Korea, which should assist Korea's application to join 
the OECD. 163 Optimism about ROK-EU bilateral trade relations 
is also shared by Joyce Tan and Jacques Pelkmans16'. Growing of 
bilateral trade could be expected to be high in the future. Paul 
Van den Bempt assumes that international relations may develop 
smoothly and Korea's economy can benefit from this peaceful 
development in searching for new markets such as the EU. 16S 
However, contrary to the above arguments, Rolf J. 
Langhammerl66 has warned the ROK of the possibility of the EU's 
increased protectionism. His opinion is that the EC, by its 
nature and history, is a trade-discriminating arrangement and 
163, Peter Montagnon, "EU deal may aid Korean bid to join 
OECD", Financial Times, Weekend March 2/3,1996, p. 3. 
164. Joyce Tan and Jacques Pelkmans, "Bilateral Trade Relations Between Korea and the EC, " in Chung-Ki Min (ed. ), The Economic Cooperation between the EC and Korea: Problems and Prospects, Papers and Discussions from the Joint KIEP/FES Conference, Seoul: Korea Institute for International Economic Policy, p. 120. 
16s. Paul Van den Bempt, "The European Community After 1992: Implications for Korean Economy", in Yung Chung (ed. ), Korea in 
a Turbulent World: Challenges of the New International Political Economic Order and Policy Responses, Seoul, Korea: The Sejong Institute, 1992, p. 350. 
166. Rolf J. Langhammer, "European Economic Integration and its Impact on Future Economic Relations with Korea: Where do we 
go in the 1990s? ", in Soogil Young and Moonsoo Kang (eds. ). The Single European Market and Its Implications for Korea as an NIE, Papers and Discussions from a Joint KDI/FES Conference, Seoul: Korea Development Institute, 1991, pp. 236-54. 
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this situation will continue beyond the 1990s. Despite the 
success of the Uruguay Round, discrimination against non-members 
in merchandise trade is predicted to continue to exist. With the 
same somewhat negative tone, Ji-hong Kim maintains that 
reciprocity by sector in the EC would undermine multilateral 
trade liberalization, and Korea is among the most likely targets 
of discrimination by the EC. 167 
Korea's investment in the European region has been 
increasing, reflecting the importance of the EU to the future 
exports of Korean products. Based upon the number of projects, 
the Bank of Korea official statistics show the regional 
proportion: the Asian region, 1,659(60.2%), North America, 
553(20.1%), and Europe, 194(7.0%). Europe's share of the total 
is expected to be ever-more expanding. East Asia may be among 
the most likely candidates for trade friction with the EU. 
Among the East Asian nations, the ROK seems to be one 
of the prime targets . 168 
This is implied in the EC Commission's White Paper on 
Completing the Internal Market. '" Regarding external trade 
relation, it only makes reference to trade with non-members as 
16'. Ji-hong Kim, "The structure of Korea's Trade with the 
EC Countries", in Soogil Young and Moonsoo Kang (eds. ), The 
Single European Market and Its Implications for Korea as an NIE, 
Papers and Discussions from a Joint KDI/FES Conference, Seoul: 
KDI, 1991, pp. 201-36. 
168. Ji-Hong Kim, "The Structure of Korea's Trade with the 
EC Countries", in Soogil Young and Moonsoo Kang, The Single 
European Market and Its Implication for Korea as an ANTE, Seoul, Korea: Korea Development Institute, 1991, p. 211. 
169. 
Commission of the European Communities, 1985. 
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follows: " the commercial identity of the community must be 
consolidated so that our trading partners will not be given the 
benefit of a wider market without themselves making similar 
concession" (Paragraph 19). Social and political pressures to 
reduce the growth of competitive imports is likely to have a 
protectionist impact on the sectoral trade policy of the member 
nations against the ROK. 
1.7 Concise Overview of Chapters 
In the second Chapter, the development of the EU with 
regard to trade is surveyed. The historical development of the 
EU from its birth in the immediate postwar years to the creation 
of the Single European Market (SEM) is unique in that there are 
many different political frameworks to govern the market and the 
development of trade as are shown in NAFTA and APEC. A major 
concern is how the EU's trade policy has developed over the 
postwar decades, and how developments have influenced South 
Korea's access to the European market. 
In Chapter Three, as a more specific elaboration of the EU 
trade regimes, the study attempts to highlight the contradictory 
dimension of the EU's Non-Tariff Barriers (NTBs) in the postwar 
period. It also tries to address the way in which the NTBs have 
affected South Korea by presenting many relevant examples of how 
specific measures and changes of the trade policies have 
affected Korea's exports into the EU market. The postwar 
industrial policy of South Korea is surveyed with specific 
emphasis on the relationship between the state and large 
companies, that is Chabols or Korean conglomerates. While it has 
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been possible for South Korea to make the most of the Bretton 
Woods system since 1945, the external pressures for Korea's 
trade liberalization and deregulation force the Korean 
government to actively pursue multilateralism under the WTO. 
Chapter four tries to address two points. The first one is 
the role of the Korean government in the process of its active 
participation to the world economy. In the rapid 
industrialization process, manufacturing industry has played a 
key role in achieving a Korean miracle. It is also vital to 
admit the importance of exports, especially manufactured 
exports, which means South Korea has been heavily dependent upon 
access to foreign markets for its development. The role of 
government was a prerequisite to the successful management of 
the Korean economy. However, the changing international trading 
environment characterized by regionalism and protectionism, 
forces the Korean government to comply more actively with the 
EU's demand for more market opening. 
In Chapter Five, the main emphasis is on the general 
evolution of the EU-Korean relationship with the EU's new 
perspectives on Korea and increasing partnership despite trade 
friction between the two. The general pattern of economic 
exchanges between the two is summarized by the rapid expansion 
of Korea's exports to the EU and the EU's reciprocal demand for 
more opening of the Korean market. 
Chapter Six deals mainly with the general background of the 
Uruguay Round and its subsequent conclusion. It also examines 
the implications for the theme of how the EU-ROK economic 
relationship has been affected by the conclusion of the Uruguay 
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Round in general, and how the development of Korean exports has 
been affected by previous rounds. 
Chapter Seven presents a case study to test the impact of 
regionalism and globalization on a specific industry; three 
characteristics of the Korean electronics industry development 
in the postwar period are explored. The key points of the 
chapter are the increased dependence of the industry upon export 
markets including the EU, the dependence of the industry upon 
licensed technology from overseas, and the active role of the 
government in assisting the development of technology and policy 
guidelines. 
Chapter Eight attempts to show how significant it has been 
for South Korean electronics firms to have dealt with the world 
trend of regionalism of the EU and globalization in general. By 
examining the specific development of Samsung Electronics and LG 
Electronics and how they have been affected by the changing 
trade policies in the world dimension, the implications of 
regionalism and globalization are tested. 
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CHAPTER TWO. THE HISTORY OF THE EUROPEAN UNION'S TRADE POLICY 
This chapter attempts to provide an analysis of the history 
of the development of the EU's trade policy with regard to the 
ROK's exports into the EU market. To understand the political 
economy of the EU commercial policy with implications for the 
ROK, it is essential to consider the unique historical setting 
of the birth of the EU. The need to make the European Community 
capital-competitive at the global scale has been the overarching 
aim and the organizing force behind the most significant shifts 
in EC Policies. '" 
2.1 The Unique Supranational Characters of the EU and Its Aim of 
Political Integration 
The historical evolution of the EU has been unique. The 
creation of the European community was revolutionary in that 
member states had to concede national sovereignty. Uniquely 
amongst European and international organizations, it has 
supranational characteristics. Simon Bulmer finds supranational 
factors overwhelmingly in the institutional arrangements 
concerning the economic pillar of activity, the EC. 1'1 It is 
supranational in that it has its own body of law directly to 
influence the member states, and the law takes precedence over 
national law. The autonomy of institutions from member states is 
very different from the situation of NAFTA and APEC. According 
---------------- - 
170. Allan M, Williams, The European community , Cambridge: Basil Blackwell, 1991, P. 112. 
1'l. Simon Bulmer, "History and Institutions of the European Union, if in M. J. Artis and N. Lee (eds. ), The Economics of the European Union: Policy and Analysis, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996, p. 6. 
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to Simon Bulmer, the most prominent instances are: the European 
Commission to serve as an executive civil service; a 
parliamentary assembly, which has been directly elected since 
1979; and a European Court of Justice to make rulings on matters 
of law. Balanced against these three are two powerful 
institutions to represent the interests of the member 
governments, namely the Council of Ministers; and the European 
Council 
. 1'2 
Simon Bulmer distinguishes the uniqueness of the EC from 
other international economic organizations. He says that this 
is reflected in the way that economic integration has been a 
continuing process of evolving goals from the first steps 
undertaken with the European Coal and Steel Community(ECSC) to 
the Treaty on European Union(TEU) and beyond. Economic 
integration has never been an end in itself. It has always 
served as a means towards the end of political integration. 
NAFTA was initiated in a different context. Regional free 
trade was seen as a primary means to revitalize the economy. 173 
Political integration was never dreamt of. APEC's main purpose 
is to expand multilateralism by pursuing open regionalism. P. 
Drysdalel" has analysed the key structural difference between 
12 The Council of Ministers is composed of national 
ministers; The European Council is comprised of heads of member 
governments or state. 
1,73 Helen Milner, "Regional Economic Cooperation, global 
markets and domestic politics: a comparison of NAFTA and the 
Maastricht Treaty", Journal of European Public Policy, 2: 3 
September 1995, p. 348. 
174" P. Drysdale, International Economic Pluralism: Economic 
Policy in East Asia and the Pacific, New York: Columbia University Press, 1988. 
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Europe and other regions of North America and Asian Pacific. The 
relative similarity of the Western European economies allowed an 
intensified regional body to be formed relatively easily, 
because the gains have been able to come mainly from intra- 
industry trade specialization. In contrast, the interests of 
Western Pacific nations will continue to be served best by a 
strong, open, global trading system. 
The evolution of European community integration was also 
motivated by the nations' wish to avoid armed conflicts, 
particularly between France and Germany. Economy serves higher 
objectives . 2,72' The immediate economic objective 
is to raise the 
prosperity of all the participating states. The farther- 
reaching objective is one of peace; namely, to lessen the 
chance of armed conflicts among the participating nations. 
Empirical supportl'6 exists for the statement that economic 
integration 
reduces conflicts between nations. 177 
Historically, the evolution of the EU has occurred over a 
much longer period than that of NAFTA and APEC. In a move to 
counter Soviet expansionism, regional integration in Europe 
enabled the Western Europe to be more solidified among members, 
aided by the US Marshall Plan. The notable economic progress 
"S. Willem, Molle, The Economics of European Integration, Aldershot: Dartmouth, 1990, p. 55. 
1'6" Polacheck, using data for 30 countries in the 1958-1967 period, showed that doubling trade between two countries leads to a 20 percent decline in the frequency of hostilities. Hirsh(1981) suggests that countries feel obliged to adopt a peaceful attitude when a "balance of prosperity" is created instead of a "balance of deterrence. " quoted in Ibid, pp. 31-39. 
17 Ibid. 9. ", P. 
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made by the six members during the first decade of the EEC's 
existence was facilitated in large part by the fact that major 
community developments served the interests of both its core 
members, France and Germany. 
Specifically in the Common Commercial Policy(CCP) 
dimension, since 25th March, 1957, Article 110 of the Treaty of 
Rome establishing the European Economic Community has been the 
cornerstone for the signatories of the six founding members to 
create a customs union or common market. It encompasses 
harmonized policies in the sectors of agriculture, energy, 
transport, competition, and problems of regional development 
issues. The agenda in the EC encompassed monetary union along 
with the creation of a single internal market in which capital 
and labour would also be able to move freely within Community 
territories, thus paving the way for the ultimate political 
union. l'a Before the creation of the EEC in the European 
postwar economic integration, six European states- France, 
Italy, West Germany, Belgium, the Netherlands and Luxembourg- 
created the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) in 1951. 
The limited integration of the Coal and Steel sector, however, 
was not a sufficient condition to seek greater European unity. 
After the failure of a European defence community and European 
Political community formation, the six signed the EEC and 
178. Dominick Salvatore (ed. ), National Trade Policies: 
Studies in Comparative Economic Policies, Vol. 2, Amsterdam, New 
York, and Oxford: North-Holland, 1992, p. 30. 
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EURATOM in 1957.1'9 
2.2 Historical Development of the EU Common Trade Policy 
A common trade policy is an essential characteristic of a 
customs union. The basic features of the CCP18° are incorporated 
in Articles 110-6 of the Treaty of Rome with two major 
propositions: a)member states aim to contribute to the 
harmonious development of world trade; the progressive abolition 
of restrictions and the lowering of trade barriers (Article 
110); b)the CCP was based upon uniform principles with respect 
to tariffs, the conclusion of trade agreements, liberalization 
of export policy, anti-dumping measures and subsidies (Article 
113). Article 113 also provides the basis for exclusive 
Community competence in trade policy, decisions by majority 
voting and for a substantive executive and negotiating role of 
the Commission. The Court of Justice enhances the CCP by the 
mechanism that wherever a common policy is developed 
internally, the external aspects of that policy are 
17 " Dennis Swann(ed. ), The Single European Market and Beyond: A Study of the Single European Act, London and New York: Routledge, 1992, p. 6. 
180. Dermot McAleese suggests that for a growing descriptive 
and analytical literature of the Community's external trade 
Policy, see Sir L. Fielding, Europe as a global partner, UACES 
Occasional Paper 7, University Association for Contemporary 
European Studies, 1991; D. McAleese " External Trade Policy, " in 
A. El-Agraa(ed. ), The Economics of European Community, Third 
Ed., London: Philip Allan, 1990; W. Molle, The Economics of 
European Integration, Aldershot: Dartmouth, 1990; J. Pelkmans, 
"Completing the EC internal market: an update and problems 
ahead, " in N. Wagner (ed. ), ASEAN and the EC: The Impact of the 
1992, Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1991; L. Tsoukalis, The New European Economy: The Politics and Economics 
of Integration, oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991. 
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automatically a matter of community competence. l°1 
The EEC Treaty'82 was technically based on a common market 
which provided for the elimination of trade barriers within the 
Community and the establishment of a common external tariff 
(CET) against the rest of the world. The EEC Treaty also 
provided for a common market permitting the free movement of 
capital and labour within the Community territories. Customs 
duties and quantitative restrictions on intra-area trade were 
progressively reduced and eliminated in July 1968, one and a 
half years ahead of schedule. 18' Though such measures as the 
Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) were the major feature of the 
EEC, Common External Tariff (CET) and a number of common 
commercial policy instruments such as EC-wide quantitative 
restrictions and legislation dealing with unfair trade practices 
abroad are the issues most directly relevant to the ROK-EC trade 
relationship. The Treaty of Rome provided the Community 
institutions with powers to control NTBs to dismantle 
quantitative restrictions or quotas on goods sold to each other 
181. Dermot McAleese, "The Community's External Trade 
Policy, " in David G. Mayes(ed. ). The External Implications of 
European Integration, London and New York: Harvester/Wheatsheaf, 
1993, pp. 32-35. 
182. The EEC Treaty was one of EC three Communities: the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC), governed by the Treaty 
of Paris, and the European Economic Treaty (EEC) and the 
European Atomic Energy Community (EURATOM), governed by the 
treaties of Rome. The institutions of the three Communities were 
merged in 1965 and are henceforth referred to as the European Community(EC). 
18' Margaret Kelly, et al., Issues and Development in 
International Trade Policy, IMF Occasional Paper No. 63, p. 88. 
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to create internal free trade. 184 The freedom to supply goods 
and services was to be accompanied by the free and undistorted 
movement of factors of production. Within a twelve-year 
transition period to end on 31 December 1969, the'completion of 
the common market was expected, but many NTBs and other 
unfavourable factors inhibited and distorted the flow of factors 
needed to accomplish the common market. The ingredients of the 
CCP of the EEC have flowed quite logically from its economic 
reason d'etre and its broader political aspirations as 
follows: 18S a) A Common Customs Tariff whose level has been 
negotiable with other members of the GATT; b) A common 
classification of goods for customs purposes, with supporting 
common rules for customs valuation, rules for suspending or 
reducing customs duties, rules of origin, and rules whose 
Purpose- as defined in Article 113 of the Treaty186-is to ensure 
that "uniform principles" should be applied, in the same way, in 
all EEC member countries in their trade relations with nonmember 
states; The article in question lists some of the issues where 
such uniform principles or rules should apply, encompassing 
tariff amendments, export policy, the negotiation of 
international tariff or trade agreements, existing import 
quotas, protective commercial measures such as antidumping 
184 Dennis Swann, 1992, op. cit., p. 6-7. 
185 Dominick Salvatore (ed. ), 1992, op. cit., p. 35-36. 
1°6 Based upon this article, the EEC entered into a whole series of international agreements governing particular sectors of international trade or trade with specific countries or groups of countries and members of other regional trade groupings. 
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cases, and subsidies-187 
Common Customs Tariff reduction agreements were reached 
during the Dillion Round lasting from May 1961 to March 1962- 
the average level of the CCT was reduced from 12.5 percent 
in 
1958 to 11.7 percent in 1963. The next GATT Kennedy Round which 
opened in May 1964 reached an agreement in May 1967, providing 
for tariff cuts averaging 32 percent for the EEC. '88 Article 113 
of the Treaty of Rome requires that the CCP should be 
administered according to uniform principles in the fields of 
import quotas, safeguards, and anti-dumping measures and export 
credits. leg 
By 1968, the EC had achieved the abolition of internal 
customs duties and the application of a common external tariff. 
Moreover, a common agricultural policy (CAP) was achieved in 
Parallel, based on prices and preferential treatment. '" The 
gradual subordination of national sovereignties to Brussels 
began to be opposed by nationalists. The prospect of a federal 
political union triggered a revival of nationalism, or at least 
tactical national rhetoric. This was primarily expressed as a 
concern for the protection of national sovereignty, especially 
in relation to the pursuit of independent foreign, security and 
187 Norman Scott, "The commercial policy of the European Economic Community", in Dominick Salvatore (ed. ), op. Cit., 
P. 35. 
188 Ibid., p. 36. 
189. Ibid., p. 38. 
190 David Arter, The Politics of European Integration in the 20th Century, England: Darthmouth Publishing Co., 1993, pp. 35-80. 
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defence policies-"' 
Political and economic union means that there is to be free 
movement of people, goods, services, and capital within the 
member states in the same context as there is between England 
and Scotland. In order to achieve all these aims the Rome 
Treaty created a series of interacting institutions. The 
European Commission is responsible for all three Communities 
whose function is to initiate policy proposals and help to 
administer agreed policies. The key role of the Commission is 
to administer competition rules as they apply to cartels and 
dominant firms, state aids, public purchasing and the like. 1-92 
Dennis Swann argues that the Council of Ministers is the most 
important institution as the EC's law-maker since, it could 
alone put the official stamp on draft regulations and draft 
directives emanating from the Commission. Other Community 
institutions are a Parliamentary Assembly, a Court of Justice, 
and Economic and Social Committee. '93 After the transitional 
period which lasted until 1969, the original six members 
in due 
191. Ibid., p. 207. 
192 Dennis Swann, 1992, op. cit., p. 10. 
193 The European Parliament and Economic and Social 
Committee were basically consultative as the treaty stipulates that on many issues the Council of Ministers would not be acting lawfully in the absence of consultation with them. Another important power of the European Parliament is the authority to dismiss the whole Commission. The major tasks of the Court of Justice were to determine if the member states had fulfilled treaty obligations; to review the legality of Council or Commission acts; to review any failure to act by the Council of Ministers or Commission where the treaty required; and to give 
preliminary rulings on points of Community law at the request of 
national courts of member states. Quoted in ibid., p. 10. 
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time increased to nine in 1973 when Denmark, the Irish Republic 
and the United Kingdom joined. In 1981,1986 and 1995, 
respectively the number rose to 10 with the accession of Greece; 
to twelve with the additional membership of Spain and Portugal; 
and finally to 15 when Finland, Sweden and Austria joined the 
EU. 
The most important development in the post-1969 period was 
the EEC Commission's proposal for a Community industrial 
policy. 194 The Treaty of Rome did not provide any basis for an 
active industrial policy, leaving this to competitive and market 
forces. In 1971 one important development in the EC was the 
Commission's proposal to collaborate in research and 
technological development. The next year's Paris Summit paved 
the way for ground-breaking development by the heads of 
government who called for an environment action programme with 
a more vigorous approach to social issues. The attempt to build 
EMU by 1980 was, also, foreshadowed by the Hague Summit of 1969. 
The intergovernmental approach to develop European Monetary 
System (EMS) in 1979 has been a limited step to monetary 
union. 1° Economic union must come before political union of 
any kind; a single market can only be truly created when the 
four freedoms are in place. 196 The Single European Act (SEA) of 
19. Dennis Swann, Competition and Industrial Policy in the 
European Community, London: Methuen, 1983, pp. 138-61. 
195Dennis Swann, 1992, op. cit., pp. 59-64,189-200. 
196 Manzoor G. K. and Ishani, Solicitor, The European Community, London: Fourmat Publishing, 1992, pp. 183-84. 
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1986197 gave the EC further policy competence, especially in the 
environmental issues, and brought closer together the economic 
foreign policies of the EC state. From 1990 to 1991, the EC 
pursued the dual quests of political union and economic and 
monetary union, culminating in two parallel intergovernmental 
conferences in Maastricht. 
By 1992, not only the East and Central European states but 
also the richer non-EC countries such as Sweden and Austria were 
in line for closer links with the EC, and at the beginning of 
1995, the richest three nations, Austria, Sweden and Finland 
became full members of the EU. 198 More co-operative effort 
created by the governments would be a landmark in the rise of 
the European Community. '" At the Maastricht European council on 
10 December 1991, the heads of state and government of the 
twelve EC countries adopted the content of the Treaty of 
Political Union, with the final document being signed on 7 
February 1992. This established a European Union that would 
envelop the European Community and supplement it with the 
policies and forms of co-operation established by the treaty. 
Integration makes the world smaller. The formation of the 
European Community and the policies it has followed, have 
affected the economic political and security policies of all 
19. On the detailed impact of the SEM on the ROK, see 
Chapter Three. 
198. Clive Archer and Fiona Butter, The European Community: 
Structure and Process, London: Pinter Publishers, 1992, p. 5. 
199. 
Ibid, p. 5. 
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countries in Europe and the world. 200 
2.3 External Impact of the EU Trade Regimes on the ROK 
The external relations of the EC have been affected both by 
internal changes in the EC itself and by developments outside 
it. 201 With regard to internal changes, one way to measure the 
progress of integration is by quantities traded or exchanged. 
For goods and services this is done in practice by measuring the 
extent to which the production of one country is consumed in 
another . 202 General world economic integration has been more and 
more intensively achieved. The progress of integration in the EC 
has been much faster; ` and this strongly indicates that the 
economic integration of the EC serves the national interests. 
Whether or not the primary motivation for the EC integration was 
to avoid the war between France and West Germany, the real 
purpose of integration has already been achieved and progress is 
being made towards a higher goal. 
In harmonization and co-ordination, progress is likely to 
be slower than in liberalization and deregulation. That is the 
200. T. Hitiris, European Community Economics, London: 
Harvester & Wheafsheaf, 1988, p. 33- 
201 A. M. El-Agraa (ed. ), Economics of the European 
Community, Third Ed., London and New York: Philip Allan, 1990, 
p. 436. 
202 . Ibid., p. 472. 
203. Looking, for example, at the ratio between internal and 
external exports published by Eurostat 1993, in 1958, it was 
approximately three fifths (internal and external exports 
accounted for 37 and 63 percent respectively. By 1992, the 
ratio had been reversed in favour of internal exports with internal exports contributing three fifths of total EU exports. 
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integration process toward full economic union. 201 Economic 
integration favours integration in other areas from political 
motives. According to the stages of economic integration", the 
EU has been on the road to the Common Market. 
20' Ibid., p. 12. 
205. a. Free Trade Area (FTA) - all such trade impediments as import duties and quantitative restrictions are abolished among 
partners. 
b. Customs Union (CU)- as in the FTA, all obstacles to 
the free traffic of goods among partner countries are removed. Moreover, one common external tariff is agreed upon. 
C. Common Market (CM)- it is first of all a customs 
union. Moreover, production factors, that is, labour and 
capital, may move freely within the CM. Combination of common 
policies and national policies is possible. 
d. Economic Union (EU)- it implies not only a common 
market but also a high degree of co-ordination or even 
unification of the most important areas of economic policy, 
market regulation as well as macro-economic and monetary 
policies and income redistribution policies. Not only is a 
common trade policy pursued toward third countries, but external 
policies concerning production factors and economic sectors are 
also developed. 
e. Monetary Union (MU)- it is a form of co-operation 
which on top of a common market(notably free movement of a 
capital) creates either irrevocably fixed exchange rates and full convertibility of the currencies of the member states, or 
one common currency circulating in all member states. Such a 
union implies quite a high degree of integration of macro- 
economic and budget policies. 
f. Economic Union and Monetary Union (EMU)- combines the characteristics of both. In view of the close interweaving 
of monetary and macro policies, integration evolves mostly 
simultaneously for both policy fields. 
g. Full Economic Union (FEU)- it implies the complete 
unification of the economies involved, and a common policy for 
many important matters. The situation is then virtually the 
same as that within one country. Given the many areas integrated, political integration is often implied. -Williem Molle, 
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Table 2.1: Key Stages in the Development of the European 
Union 
Year Key Developments 
1951 Treaty of Paris is signed, bringing the ECSC into effect 
from 23 July 1952. Membership comprised Belgium, the 
Federal Republic of Germany, France, Italy, Luxembourg, and 
the Netherlands. 
1957 Treaty of Rome is signed, bringing into effect the EEC and 
the European Atomic Energy Community(EURATOM) from 1 January 
1958. 
1965 Merger treaty is signed, with the effect of merging the 
principle institutions of the three communities from 1967. 
Henceforth the three communities are known collectively as 
the EC 
1973 Denmark, the Irish Republic, and the UK join the EC on 1 
January. 
1981 Greece joins the EC on 1 January 1986 Spain and Portugal join the EC on 1 July. The Single 
European Act is signed, coming into effect on 1 July 1987, 
and introduces the first systematic revisions to the 
founding treaties. 
1992 Treaty on European Union is signed following broad 
agreement in December 1991 at a meeting in Maastricht in 
the Netherlands. It entails systematic revisions to, and 
extension of, existing treaties. Following ratification, 
the TEU came into effect on 1 November 1993. Within the 
EU, the EC represents one "pillar" of activities: the 
others relate to foreign and security policy; and Justice 
and home affairs. 
Source: M. J. Artis and N. Lee (eds. ), The Economics of the European Union: Policy and Analysis, oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994, 
p. 7. 
From the viewpoint of the degree of policy integration2o6, 
206 a. Information- partners agree to inform one another about the aims and instruments of the policies they pursue. 
b. Consultation- Partners agree that they are obliged not only to inform but also to seek the opinion and advice of others about the policies they intend to execute. 
c. Co-ordination - it commits partners to agreement on the actions needed to accomplish a coherent policy for the group. Co-ordination often means the adaptation of regulation to make sure that they are consistent internationally. It may involve the harmonization of national laws and administrative rules. 
d. Unification- either the abolition of national 
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the EU seems to be in a stage of complex co-existence between 
consultation, co-ordination and unification. 
A wide variety of economic and financial issues can no 
longer be limited to, and indeed in some respects, do not even 
bear much relationship to, national boundaries and are 
increasingly vulnerable to outside events. Countries are 
increasingly unable to act in isolation. They must consult, 
cooperate, and, some would argue, integrate with one another in 
the interests of international and national economic stability 
and growth . '°' 
The EU common commerical policy (CCP) governs market access 
to manufactured exports from the ROK. Thus, it is important to 
describe the way in which the various EU policy instruments 
operate to restrict market access from the ROK's exports. From 
the Treaty of Paris for the ECSE to the Treaty on European 
Union, historical and institutional development has accompanied 
the appropriate development of commerical regimes. Out of the 
seven conspicuous developments in the EU, the Treaty of Rome to 
create the European Economic Community (EEC)"' was the 
instruments or the adoption of identical instruments for all 
partners. Here, the national competence to choose instruments is abolished. - Willem Molle, The Economics of European Integration, p. 14. 
207. Neill Nugent, The Government and Politics of the 
European Community, London: Macmillan Educations LTD, 1989, pp. 
24-25. 
208 The EEC Treaty that took effect on January 1,1958 
provided for the elimination of trade barriers within the 
Community and the establishment of a common external tariff 
against the rest of the world. Besides establishing customs 
union, the treaty provided for a common market permitting the free movement of capital and labour within the community. Customs duties and quantitative restrictions on intra-trade were 
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cornerstone to the formulation and implementation of the CCP. 
Table 2.1 above shows some details of significant development. 
The EU's trade policy objectives are covered by articles 
110 to 116 of the Treaty of Rome. Article 110 of the 1958 Treaty 
describes the trade policy objectives as follows: 209 
By establishing a customs union between themselves 
Member States aim to contribute, in the common interest, to 
the harmonious development of world trade, the progressive 
abolition of restrictions on international trade and the 
lowering of customs barriers. The common commerical policy 
shall take into account the favourable effect which the 
abolition of customs duties between Member States may have on 
the increase in the competitive strength of undertakings in 
those states. 
The dual characteristics of the CCP are expressed in 
Article 110. The EU is first of all committed to a free, 
multilateral trading system. Apart from the support for the 
GATT principle, Article 110 also embodies a second principal 
policy of the formation of a customs union resulting in a common 
market to discriminate against non-members. ` Another 
progressively reduced and were eliminated in July 1968. 
2°'. Klaus Heidensohn, Europe and World Trade, London and 
New York: Pinter, 1995, p. 51- 
21* - Klaus Heidensohn clearly analyses the twofold dimension of Article 110, specifically on the formation of the Customs Union. He says that the establishment of customs unions and free trade areas is not against GATT rules; the General Agreement makes provision for the creation of trading blocs such 
as the EU. However, despite its validity of a customs union or 
free trade area to facilitate trade between the constituent territories and not to raise barriers to the trade of other 
contracting parties with such territories' (GATT Article XXIV), 
customs unions, while not illegal under GATT rules, are clearly 
against the spirit of free multilateral trade. Their existence departs from the MFN principle to be embodied in Article I of GATT: 
any advantage, favour, privilege or immunity granted by any 
contracting party to any product originating in or designed for any other country shall be accorded immediately and 
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dimension of the communities' external trade policy is aimed at 
helping the development and industrialization of the Third 
World. The major beneficiaries of Article 131 of the Treaty of 
Rome211 are nations and territories which, for historical 
reasons, have special linkages with members. A typical example 
of this mechanism is GSP. 212 The review of institutional actors 
influencing trade regimes since the Treaty of Rome is 
meaningful. The major frame of trade policy mechanism has 
remained unchanged, except for minor adjustments. 
The Treaty of Rome under Article 4213 provides for the 
operation of the EEC by four principal bodies: the Commission; 
the Council; the Court of Justice; and the Assembly, now the 
unconditionally to the like product originating in or destined 
for the territories of all contracting parties. 
Quoted in Ibid., p. 51. 
211 Article 131- The member states hereby agree to bring into association with the Community the non-European countries 
and territories which have special relations with Belgium, 
France, Italy and the Netherlands. These countries and 
territories, hereinafter referred to as "the countries and territories", are listed in Annex IV to this Treaty. The purpose 
of this association shall be to promote the economic and social development of the countries and territories and to establish 
close economic relations between them and the Community as a 
whole. In conformity with the principles stated in the Preamble to this Treaty, this association shall in the first place permit the furthering of the interests and prosperity of the inhabitants of these countries and territories in such a manner 
as to lead them to the economic, social and cultural development 
which they expect. 
212. Ibid.,, p. 51. 
21'. Article 4- 1. The achievement of the tasks entrusted to the Community shall be ensured by: an Assembly, a Council, a 
Commission, and a Court of Justice. Each of these institutions 
shall act within the limits of the powers conferred upon it by this Treaty. 2. The Council and the Commission shall be assisted by an economic and social committee acting in a consultative 
capacity. 
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European Parliament. 214 All decisions in general are taken by 
the Council of Ministers. Apart from some limited cases, the 
Council can only decide on the basis of a Commission proposal. 
The Commission is the engine of the EU policy. It is also 
custodian of the Treaty and the executive arm of the 
Community 
. 215 The duty of the Commission, as laid down in 
Article 155 of the Treaty, is to observe the Treaty's 
provisions; propose new or modified policies; and carrying out 
certain sectors of EEC policy, with regard to agriculture, 
trade, and the implementation of the single market. "' 
Though the shape and implementation of commercial policy 
has been managed by the commission since the inception of the 
EEC and it has expanded its influence over the past three 
decades, the main decision-making power is in the hands of the 
Council of Ministers. Each member state has one member, with the 
ministerial composition of the Council varying depending on the 
discussion subjects such as foreign affairs, trade, transport 
214 . Dominick Salvatore (ed). National Trade Policies: Studies in Comparative Economic Policies, Vol. 2, Amsterdam, New 
York, Oxford: North-Holland, 1992, p. 33. 
215 . This draws heavily from European Economy, No 52,1993. 
216. The commission consists of a president and seventeen 
commissioners, appointed by member governments for a renewable term of four years, two from each large country and one from 
each of the others. The commission staff is organized into twenty-three directorates-general, two of which have particular 
responsibilities for trade. Directorate-general I(DGI) has 
responsibility for external relations. It is subdivided into 
eleven directorates, seven of which deal with trade with particular groups of countries; the others are concerned with trade matters in GATT and OECD, with agricultural trade, industrial trade including textiles and steel, and trade policy issues or instruments such as safeguards and anti-dumping measures. Director-General VIII is responsible for development 
assistance and therefore also deals with trade-related matters. 
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etc.. Generally, commission proposals pass through a decision- 
making process with member states, coordinated by the Committee 
of Permanent Representatives(COREPER), and simultaneously the 
Council consults the European Parliament and, where appropriate, 
the Economic and Social Committee. Council decisions are taken 
by a simple or a qualified majority vote except for certain 
cases where the need for unanimity is laid down. When the 
Council has defined the general policy orientation and the basic 
regulation has been agreed upon, the commission is responsible 
for working out its provisions for its management and for 
surveillance of Community rules. Trade policy decisions are 
decided by the express use of majority voting. 
In the case of dealings with third nations such as the ROK, 
a Council decision is required to enter into a negotiation, 
usually on the basis of a negotiating directive. Coordination 
during the negotiation is assured by the Article 113 Committee 
which gives advice to the commission as negotiator. Final 
important decisions on commercial relation with the ROK are, 
thus, determined at the meetings of the Council, where, aided by 
its secretariat, policy issues are selected and national 
Positions are adjusted. EU summit meetings at head of government 
level, in which the president of the commission also is a 
member, discuss major initiatives and policy guidelines. 217 
Compared with the commission's strong influence in commercial 
policy, the Court of Justice and the European Parliament have a 
217 These meetings take place twice a year. Each nation hosts them in turn, during the each nation presides the Council. The host nation presides over the Council. 
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minimum role. 218 The decision making mechanism of the EU is a 
complex set of checks and balances; therefore decisions are 
often the result of internal negotiation and compromises. =19 
Economic stagnation, increasing unemployment, and loss of 
competitiveness during the first half of the 1980s created the 
need for the Community to remove the remaining physical, 
technical and fiscal barriers between Member States. A 
comprehensive and ambitious approach was launched to revitalize 
the integration process. The Single European Act (SEA) came into 
effect on 1 July 1987. According to the SEA, the range of 
common EC policies and objectives was extended, and 
institutional changes were made to ensure better functioning of 
the Community. For example, through Article 18 of SEA, a new 
Article 100a was inserted in the EEC Treaty to establish 
qualified majority voting for Council decisions on the internal 
market. Among many measurers, what concerned the ROK was the 
necessary completion of the Community's common commercial policy 
218. The Court of Justice adjudicates in case there is a breach of Community law and can impose fines. The European Parliament can intervene in commercial policy matters only in 
case the EC has a special relationship with a new member country 
or when the question of future membership arises. 
21'. In the decision-making process, the commission is first 
responsible for analysing the facts, e. g. injury, and for 
proposing the appropriate measure. Internal argument and disagreement could happen at this stage about the analysis and 
solution. At the next stage, the pattern often repeats as some form of consultation or other advisory process takes place with the Member states. What makes the decision process more 
complicated than that of a state is the fact that different 
governmental positions have to be taken into account, in 
addition to the normally opposing views of different sectors of industry and of consumers. Divergent views also emerge in the third stage. The EU decisions tend to be the product of several internal processes of reconciling divergent views to reflect the 
middle-ground of compromise. 
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and the elimination of the remaining national quantitative 
restrictions to bring a significant liberalization for third 
country imports. The harmonization of different national 
standards, legal regulations and testing and 'certification 
requirements is crucial both to the completion of the single 
market and to the realization of its full economic benefits. The 
opening of a public procurement market in pursuing similar 
liberalization efforts at the international level in the context 
of a multilateral government procurement code, provides major 
trade opportunities for producers inside as well as outside the 
EU. The creation of a single financial market with the 
generation of new trade opportunities through the liberalization 
and deregulation of these services markets provides more easy 
access to the EU for non-members. "' 
After the Maastricht Treaty, the sections of the EEC Treaty 
concerning the common commercial policy were slightly revised 
under the agreed rules. Out of the Articles 110 to 116 of the 
EEC Treaty concerned with commercial policies, Articles 111,114 
and 116 were dropped while Articles 110 and 112 remained 
unchanged[see appendix]. Without changing the substance of 
Articles 113 on content and instruments of commercial policy and 
115 on deflection of trade, partial redrafting was done. 
The institutional actors shape commercial policy by means 
of various instruments. Despite frequent amendments of the 
regulation contents, the main restrictive instruments concerning 
the ROK's exports are the common Customs Tariff (Council 
'2O. This is only relevant part of the SEA to the ROK business activities. 
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Regulation No 2886/89), the Common Rule for Import (No 288/82), 
the Common Procedures for the Administration of Quantitative 
Restrictions (Regulation No 1023/70), and the New Commercial 
Policy Instrument (Regulation No 2641/84)221, Common Rules for 
exports (Regulation No 2603/69). 222 Council Regulation No 
3283/94 and No 3284/94 of 22 December 1994 on protection against 
dumped and subsidized imports from non-members of the EU and No 
3285/94 on the common rules for imports serve as new legal 
devices for the commercial regime. Especially under the auspices 
of the WTO, Council Regulation No 3286/94[see Appendix] which 
laid down Community procedures in the field of the common 
commercial policy, serves to ensure the exercise of the 
Community's rights under international trade rules. 223 
In EU-ROK economic relations, the instruments affecting the 
ROK's exports of manufactured and semi-manufactured goods are 
221 In December 1994, the New Trade Barriers 
Regulation(TBR) replaced the 1984 New Commercial Policy Instrument, specifying internal procedures for actions against 
objectionable or illicit trade practices abroad, including 
certain areas of services and intellectual property. The 
actions must be authorized under international dispute 
settlement provisions. The new commercial policy instrument 
essentially provided the EU with a mechanism for counteraction in the case of illicit commercial practices affecting either the Communities' imports or exports from the EU to the rest of the 
world; broadly speaking, it corresponds to Section 301 of the US Trade Act. 
'22. The EU system of commercial defence was reorganized in December 1994. New regulations for anti-dumping, countervailing 
and safeguard measures incorporate the relevant WTO provisions, 
with some additions or modifications. While safeguard actions 
remain subject to member States' qualified majority approval in the Council, the threshold for definitive anti-dumping and 
countervailing duties was reduced to a simple majority vote, 
easing access to these instruments. 
22' " Official Journal of the European Communities, L 349, V01.37,31 December 1994. 
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very important. When the common customs Tariff (CCT), as the 
main trade policy instrument was introduced in the mid-1960s, 
the average level of the duty was 12.5 percent. It was reduced 
after the Tokyo Round to 6 percent. All imports into the EU are 
subject to duty or duty-free entry in accordance with their 
classification in the EU Harmonized Tariff Schedule, comprising 
some 9,500 lines. The weighted average of tariffs on all EC 
imports was 5.7 percent at the outset of the Uruguay Round and 
the unweighted average came to 6.5 percent. Tariffs for 
industrial products are lower and more evenly spread across 
tariff items than agricultural products. Nearly all EC imports, 
of which of 99 percent are from MFN sources, enter under bound 
or partially bound tariffs. After the Uruguay Round, CCT as a 
trade barrier lost its relative significance. 
In the major EC trade arrangements with the developing 
countries, the Generalized System of Preference (GSP )22' has 
been applied to the ROK. Under this scheme, the Community 
waives customs duties on imports of manufactures from developing 
countries, with the exception of so-called sensitive products, 
as well as reducing duties on imports of agricultural and food 
products which do not conflict with the Common Agricultural 
Policy (CAP). The ROK has benefitted under this scheme. 
224 An international agreement negotiated under the 
auspices of GATT, providing for temporary and non-reciprocal duty preference accorded by the developed to the developing 
nations. A ten-year waiver from the GATT most-favoured 
provision was granted in 1971 to permit the implementation of the GSP. The waiver was not renewed because of the 1979 GATT decision on "Differential and More Favourable Treatment, Reciprocity and Fuller Participation of Developing Countries" 
resulting from the Tokyo Round(the enabling clause). 
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Eurostat statistics show that during 1992, the ROK benefitted in 
the ratio of 86.8 percent, amounting to US$ 8.32 billions, out 
of the total amount, US$9.587 billions, of the total amount of 
from the ROK. Actually, the practical application of non-tariff 
was only applied to 21 percent, equivalent to US$ 2.13 
billions. 225 However, in recent years, as the forerunner of the 
ANIEs, the ROK has been priority listed for exclusion from this 
scheme. The principle that the EC grants unilaterally, i. e. 
Without any formal agreement and without involving reciprocity, 
a series of generalized duty reductions for imports originating 
from developing nations, has not been available to the ROK since 
1988.226 In 1992 the ROK regained GSP favour from the EU. The 
Commission adopted a new guideline for the period of ten years 
(1995-2004) on 1 June 1994. From the year 1995, the new 
guideline excludes larger a proportion of manufactured goods, 
accounting for 92 percent of the GSP. According to the 
regulation of graduation system, highly-developed countries will 
be excluded in the foreseeable future. 
The core legislative mechanism on the tariff and 
statistical nomenclature and on the Common Customs Tariff is 
225 KOTRA, The EU Marketing Strategy in the WTO Trading Environment, KOTRA Material 94-30,1994, pp. 111-113. In Korean. 
226. There are two significant exceptions to this principle: Korea and Taiwan. Korea, although a former GSP beneficiary, was in 1988 explicitly and on a temporary basis, suspended from enjoying preference under the system. Taiwan, which does not belong to the UN, has never been granted GSP status. The ROK has regained the preference for the time being, but again, the Commission intends to withdraw the privilege from the ROK. 
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Commission Regulation (EEC) No 2886/89227 amending Annex I to 
Council Regulation (EEC) No 2658/87.228 of course, there have 
been many amendments since the first introduction. The original 
regulation on the Common Customs Tariff was Regulation (EEC) No 
950/68, which was later amended to Regulation (EEC) No 1/73 of 
19 December 1972, with regard to the Treaty establishing the 
European Economic Community, and in particular Articles 28 and 
113.229 What matters much more in the ROK's access to the EU 
market is non-tariff barriers. The above institutional legal 
frameworks in the form of Regulations are major instruments to 
employ non-tariff measures to curb imports which it is 
considered are being traded on unfair terms or are harmful to 
the EU's domestic producers. As the main EU import regulations, 
Council Regulation No 288/82 covers the core elements, although 
it has been amended many times. ='° The regulation starts from 
227. Klaus Heidensohn in his book, Europe and World Trade, 
1995, p. 53, well summarizes the importance of the Council Regulation No. 2886/89 which covers what represents the centre- 
Piece of the CCP, namely the Common Customs Tariff (CCT) levied 
on imports into the communities. The CCT is composed of more 
than 9,000 tariff lines with either conventional tariff rates (applicable to all imports from countries which quality for MFN treatment) or autonomous levies (applicable to items such as a 
wide range of food products for which no conventional rates 
exist). 
228. See Commission Regulation (EEC) No 2886/89 of 2 August 
1989, amending Annex I to Council Regulation (EEC) No 2658/87 on 
the tariff and statistical nomenclature and on the Common Customs Tariff, Official Journal of European Communities, 2.10.89. 
'29. Official Journal of European Communities, No L1, 1.1.73. 
23o See original text of the Council Regulation(EEC) No 288/82 of 5 February 1982 on common rules for imports, Official Journal of the European Communities, No L 35,9.2.82. 
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the general premise of unrestricted market access. What 
crucially concerns the ROK is the enumeration of specific 
exceptions to allow for the maintenance of surveillance measures 
or of quantitative restrictions. This provides the legal basis 
for introducing surveillance measures or imposing quantitative 
restraints (safeguard) in specified circumstances. 231 The 
regulation is applicable to all kinds of products except 
agricultural products. Multi-fibre Agreement (MFA)"' products 
and ECSC products are included. Several import arrangements for 
products from State-trading countries are regulated by No 
1765/8223 and No 3420/83. "` Surveillance measures and 
quantitative restrictions - the so-called residual restrictions, 
were reduced in scope by amendments in 1989. 
The commission plays a central role in beginning 
investigations on safeguard measures, to determine whether 
justification is valid in light of the available information. So 
231 . An advisory committee is set up for consultations between Member states and the Commission on possible actions. The Commission is the competent body for initiating investigations on a safeguard measures on the justification of 
available information. 
quotas for trade in textiles and 232 " System of bilateral clothing regulating exports from countries of the "South" and transition economies to the industrialized world. 
233 
" See original text of Council Regulation (EEC) No 1765/82 of 30 June 1982 on common rules for imports from state- trading countries, Official Journal of the European Communities, No L 195,5.7.82. 
234 Trade relations with Central and East European 
countries are regulated by new cooperation or association 
agreements. See original text of the council Regulation(EEC) No 3420/83 of 14 November 1983 on import arrangements for products originating in State-trading countries, not liberalized at Community level, Official Journal of European Communities, No L346,8.12.83. 
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far, the investigation has usually been undertaken at the 
request of member states. The introduction of surveillance 
measures235 is usually determined in terms of the effects of 
increased imports on production and employment in the industries 
affected by import penetration. Article 9236 of Regulation No 
288/82 has specifications on information. In an emergency 
situation, Articles 15 and 16 of Regulation 288/82237 serve as 
the legal basis for the Commission to take immediate action to 
impose quantitative restrictions to prevent substantial injury. 
Article 16 of Regulation No 288/82, further enables the 
Commission to propose that the Council introduce safeguard 
measures through a qualified majority voting mechanism. In this 
situation, actions may take the form of any proper measures such 
as the negotiation of restraint arrangements with the exporting 
country. Since its inception in 1982, the Commission has taken 
protective measures frequently under the Regulation. Measures 
may also be applied to imports from certain nations for certain 
regions of the Community. 238 The compatibility of these 
measures with the multilateral framework of the GATT Article 
238" These apply in the case of imports threatening to cause injury to EC producers and if the Community's interests so 
require. According to regulation No 288/82, surveillance 
measures lapse at the end of the second half of calendar year 
after their introduction, in the absence of specific provision. 
In certain cases, after notification to the Commission, Member States may take surveillance measures at the national level. 
236 See original text of Article 9 of the Regulation in Official Journal of European Communities, No L 35,9.2.82. 
27. See Ibid. 
238. Commission Regulation No 561/88 provides a legal basis 
for taking protective measures in favour of certain regions, and 
against certain trading partners. 
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XIX: l is significant for the ROK's trade with the EU. 239 
Another important Council Regulation for the ROK exports into 
the EU is No 1023/70 which lays down procedures for the 
establishment and the administration of import and export 
quotas. Quota volumes and criteria for their distribution among 
member states are set by the Council, by qualified majority. 
"' 
One significant development reflecting the trend of neo- 
mercantilism was the adoption of the new commerical Policy 
Instrument (Regulation No 2641/84). 241 Its introduction enabled 
the EU to respond to unfair trade practices abroad which 
adversely affect its exports. The situation applied where the EU 
members believed that their access to the market of another 
country had been unfairly reduced as a result of trade 
practices. Frank Schoneveld has analysed the European 
Community's reaction to the illicit commerical trade practices 
of other countries. 242 He argues that the EC introduced 
239, Differences are found between the two measures: Article XIX: 1 of the GATT stipulates that, "a contracting party is only 
entitled to suspend obligations if a product is being imported in such increased quantities and under such conditions as to 
cause or threaten to cause injury"; while Article 15: 1 of Regulation No 288/82 mentions imports "in such greatly increased quantities and /or on such terms or conditions as to 
cause or threaten substantial injury to Community producers.. " 
240 Since 27 September 1988 ruling by the Court of 
Justice(Case 51/87), the national allocation of quotas is not 
compatible with the principle of free competition in the Common Market. It is no more applicable. 
=41 See specifically paragraph 7 of the Preamble to the Regulation; Official Journal of European Communities, L 252, 20.9.84. 
242 Frank Schoneveld, " The European Community Reaction to the "Illicit', Commercial Trade Practices of Other Countries, " Journal of World Trade, pp. 17-34. 
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Regulation 2641/84 with a view to strengthening the common 
commercial policy with regard, in particular, to protection 
against illicit commercial practices in international trade, 
after the EC realized that measures to protect trade such as 
dumping, subsidy and safeguard measures, were not able to cope 
with all the illicit and unfair trade. 2" The primary aim was 
better to ensure that the Community takes action as promptly and 
efficiently as possible against its trading partners' illicit 
actions. 
With the adoption of 1984 Regulation No 2641/84, the EC 
thenz'* came to be equipped with a New Commercial Policy 
Instrument with a procedural mechanism which may be applied a) 
to respond to any illicit commercial practices and to remove the 
injury or b) to exercise the community's rights with regard to 
third nations. 245 When the EU's system of commercial defence 
was reorganized in December 1994, the New Trade Barriers 
Regulation replaced it. 246 
2". Ibid., p. 17. 
2". For the sake of readers' convenience, when referring to the historical development of a certain event before the Maastricht Treaty to create the EU, 7 February 1992,2 will use the term EC, which comprises three communities: the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC), governed by the Treaty of Paris, and the European Economic Community (EEC) and the European Atomic Energy Community (EURATOM), governed by the treaties of Rome. The institutions of the three Communities 
were merged in 1965 and are henceforth referred to as the EC. 
245 It allows for imposition of any commercial policy 
measure compatible with the Community's international 
obligations and procedures. 
246. see Klaus Heidensohn, op. cit., pp. 54-61. 
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As important trade-related measures, quantitative 
restrictions have been applied against third nations. In order 
to achieve uniformity of its trade regime, the community has 
followed a policy based on the progressive elimination of those 
quantitative restrictions authorized under Article 115 of EEC 
Treaty. The completion of the internal market has major 
implications for the maintenance of national quantitative 
restrictions. Article 115 of the Rome Treaty is incompatible 
with the objective of eliminating all barriers to the free 
circulations of goods in single market. It has not been 
implementable from 1 January 1993, with the abolition of 
internal barriers. 
As a specific action under the Common Rule for Import 
(Council Regulation No 288/82), Safeguard actions are taken by 
the Commission. The requirement for imposition of quantitative 
restrictions is assessed by an increase in the import volume, 
the extent of the price-undercutting and the subsequent impact 
on the EU producers. 2" As a frequently used tool to initiate 
Voluntary Export Restraint (VER), proceedings under Council 
Regulation No. 288/82 may lead to export restraint arrangements. 
When the investigation is terminated and prior to taking 
safeguard actions, the exporting partner is notified of the 
findings and is given the opportunity to seek a proper restraint 
247 Article XI of quantitative restrictions Exception is authorized Safeguard measures can be i injured or threatened with 
the GATT prohibits the use of 
as a trade policy instrument. 
under Article XIX of the GATT. 
. mposed when an 
industry is seriously 
injury by foreign imports. 
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arrangement. Member States are then asked to approve the 
envisaged solution. 248 
What specially concerns the ROK in its exports to the EU is 
quantitative restrictions which usually take the form of 
Voluntary Exports Restraints (VERS) and Orderly Marketing 
Arrangements (OMAS ). 2`9 In VER, the exporting country 
voluntarily agrees to restrict its exports to a certain amount 
or to a maximum rate of growth. The restrained partner could 
benefit by selling its remaining exports at higher prices than 
before. The Commission is responsible for the quota negotiation 
and some are community-wide. National quotas still exist. In 
some sensitive sectors, new quantitative restrictions have been 
introduced by national governments in the form of VERS. To 
prevent imports entering through other member states, through 
invoking Article 115 of the Rome Treaty, the EU attempts to 
reduce trade deflection by authorizing member states which have 
restrictions on particular goods imported from outside the 
community to prevent these goods from being imported from 
another member state. 25° 
24$" Restraints are usually agreed for a three-year period, 
with digressive application over time. Main product areas 
concerned include textiles, steel, machinery, consumer 
electronics, and motor vehicles. Protective actions under 
regulation 288/82 tend to be confined to a fixed number of 
member states, but in 1990 EC-wide measures were introduced for the first time. 
2". To distinguish between the two is a legal and technical 
matter. VERs are usually negotiated directly with the foreign export industry whereas oMAs are negotiated between two governments. 
25°. Alan Mattthews, op. cit., p. 75. 
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Regulation No. 2641/84 provides common rules for exports. 
It was later amended to Council Regulation (EEC) No 3918/91 of 
19 December 1991.251 The principle of unrestricted trade is the 
starting point. The regulation, however, authorizes the 
Commission to introduce export authorization schemes if and when 
there is a shortage of essential commodities, in addition to the 
Commission's authority to limit exports from certain regions 
within and to certain destinations out of the EU 
territories. 252 Such action may be initiated by the Commission 
at the request of a Member State. Any action is required to be 
consulted in an advisory committee and has to be approved by the 
Council by qualified majority. Council Regulation No 2423/88 
authorizes the EU to take anti-dumping or anti-subsidy 
actions. 253 It was adopted in accordance with existing 
international obligations, from Article VI [see Appendix] of the 
GATT and 1979 Anti-Dumping Code. Complaints about dumped or 
subsidized imports can be lodged either directly with the 
Commission or via Member States. After consultation within the 
advisory committee with representatives of Member States under 
the chairmanship of the Commission, the Commission carries out 
211. Official Journal of the European Communities, No L372, 31.12.91. 
2s'. Klaus Heidensohn, op. cit., 1995, p. 54. 
253. As the trade protection mechanism of the EU Commercial Policy, the Regulations on Anti-Dumping measures dealing with 
all the issues are summarized in official Journal of European Communities, Directory of Community Legislation in Force and Other Acts of Community Institutions, Vol. 1, Luxembourg, 1995 
PP. 844-53. 
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the investigation under its own responsibility, once the 
initiation of the proceedings is determined. "' 
In a similar vein, subsidized exports can be subject to the 
imposition of countervailing duties. In each case, evidence is 
required that the import causes or threatens to cause economic 
difficulties for the industry in the importing nation. Firms or 
industries, as well as governments, can make a direct request 
for an investigation to the Commission, which is empowered to 
take decisions, though these may subsequently be reversed by the 
Council. 255 To prevent the circumvention of definitive duties by 
assembly operations, the EU anti-dumping instrument is concerned 
with screwdriver plant operations for the assembly of imported 
parts and components. In some conditions, it can be extended to 
products whose production and assembly have been carried out 
within the EU territory with imported inputs. The value of 
inputs used from the country of exportation must exceed 60 
percent. A confidential study for the OECD recently concluded 
254 The Council Regulation No 2423/88 stipulates that the investigation shall normally be concluded within one year; it shall normally cover a period of not less than six months immediately prior to its initiation. In accordance with the GATT provisions, both the imposition of provisional duties and 
of definitive duties are contingent upon the establishment of dumping either by a preliminary examination or a final finding and of injury caused thereby. The initiative may be taken by 
any natural or legal person or any association acting on behalf of an EC industry. After the Uruguay Round was concluded 
successfully, the period of investigation and penalty was reduced. The introduction of definitive duties is decided by the Council upon the proposal of the commission by qualified majority voting. As a rule, the Commission imposes provisional duty only after a finding of dumping and injury, if no price undertaking is agreed. 
255 - Alan Matthews, EC Trade Policy and the Third World, Dublin, Ireland: Gill and Macmillan, 1991, p. 74. 
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that few exports subject to dumping actions by the EU and the 
US, threatened competition in the importing countries. Despite 
such criticisms, the EU's regime still has staunch defenders, 
particularly among southern member states. Opponents say that 
penalties undermine trade liberalization, hurt consumers and 
shelter inefficient producers. 256 Despite this negative opinion, 
this instrument has been frequently employed against the ROK's 
exports into the EU along with the VER. Chapter. 3 shows detailed 
statistics on typical restrictive instruments. 
On the nature of the EU trade regimes, Eliot Zupnick2S 
points out clearly the priority of the political logic over the 
logic of economics based upon the efficient resource allocation 
philosophy. 
Table 2.2: EU Gains in Export Volume Market Shares and Price 
Competitiveness, 1973-1990 
1981/1973 1990/1982 
Gains(+) Losses(-) in market shares +0.2 -4.0 Gains(+) Losses(-) in price 
competitiveness +2.8 -5.7 
Source: Commission of the European Communities, "The European Community as a World Trade Partner, " European Economy, 58, Luxembourg, OOPEC, 1993, p. 13. 
It is also proved in that the EU trade policy toward the 
non-member nations is firmly based upon the US, Japan, and the 
ANIE's challenge to erode international competitiveness of the 
EU. One of the explanatory factors behind the accelerated 
256. Guy de Jonquieres and Emma Tucker, "Pressure builds for EU to dump its dumping policy, " in Financial Times, Thursday October 19 1995, p. 7. 
25'. Eliot Zupnick, "EC-US and the 1992: A Prelude to Trade Wars?,,, European Affairs, No. 2.1992. 
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market integration process in the 1980s, was external pressure 
from the above-mentioned competitors. 
The deteriorating competitiveness of the member nations 
gave them more pressure to legitimize the internal market 
programme. Short-sighted interest groups seem to be gaining the 
upper hand when the trade policy of the EU is formulated, 
pressured by the major industrial organizations of the 
Union. 258 This is clearly shown in its adoption of contingent 
trade regimes. 259 The theoretical perspective of the EU trade 
Policy helps to explain why EU protectionism is maintained at 
the present level or is even on the rise due to the 
implementation of the market programme. Emphasis lies in that 
the norms which will eventually gain grounds in the 
international trade policy will be focusing on special 
interests. While a broad perspective on world affair or the 
general interests is necessary, it will not be easy to achieve 
completely liberal trade regimes in practice. 26° 
The political economy of a trade policy assumes the 
Political system to be asymmetrical in the sense that many 
collective or political decisions benefit only limited 
Privileged groups, while the costs are dispersed among a great 
258 "The end of special interests? ", in a OLE NORgaard, Thomas Pedersen and Nikolaj Petersen (eds. ), The European Community in the World Politics, London: Pinter Publishers, 
1993, Pp. 69-70. 
259 
, This usually refers to trade regimes such as anti- dumping and countervailing duty, which impede trade flows. 
260. Nations usually employ a strategic trade policy with Protectionist measures used to help the expansion of those domestic industries for which growing world markets are expected. 
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number of individuals. It is also in the same context that the 
political economy of the EU trade policy has been controlled by 
primarily economic factors first as unemployment and recession, 
usually caused by low competitiveness of the industry. 
Table 2.3: Imports fr om Preferential Sources, 1977-79, and 
1991( %) 
Preferential Sources 1977-1979 1991 Change 
EFTA Countries 17.3 23.1 +5.8 
Mediterranean Cs 5.3 4.9 -0.9 
Lome Cs 7.1 3.9 -3.2 
Other GSP beneficiaries 33.6 19.7 -13.9 
Other Sources 36.8 48.4 +11.6 
Total Imports 100 100 
Source : EC Commission 
Furthermore, interest groups have lobbied for the adoption 
of protectionist regimes against non-member nations' products. 
Import-restrictions under article 115261 are normally 
261. Article 115 of the EEC Treaty: In order to ensure that 
the execution of measures of commercial policy taken in 
accordance with this Treaty by and Member State is not 
obstructed by deflection of trade, or where differences between 
such members lead to economic difficulties in one or more of the 
member states, the commission shall recommend the methods for 
the requisite cooperation between Member States. Failing this, the commission shall authorize Member States to take the 
necessary protective measures, the conditions and details of 
which it shall determine. 
In case of urgency during the transitional period, Member 
States may themselves take the necessary measures and shall 
notify them to the other Member States and to the commission, 
which may decide that the States concerned shall amend or 
abolish such measures. 
In the selection of such measures, priority shall be given to those which cause the least disturbance to the functioning of the common market and which take into account the need to 
expedite, as far as possible, the introduction of the common 
customs tariffs. 
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implemented on the initiative of well-organized national 
interest groups who seek protection against competitors from 
third countries. 
Deeper integration has decreased the GSP nations' 
proportion of the EU total exports. In addition to the gradual 
erosion of the GSP scheme to the ROK, in the 1990s, 
environmental concern will be a major leverage to be used for 
protectionism. Peter Nedergaad262, discussing the source of 
increase in EU protectionism, argued that it stems from another 
factor of the internal market programme. The liberalization of 
the service market is the another source of protectionism. 
Table 2.4: The Traditional Hierarchy of EC Trade Relations 
Trade Relationship Countries involved Trade conditions 
for Exports to the EU 
Customs Union EC All products and services 
Free Trade Area EFTA All products except 
agricultural goods 
Mixed Mediterranean Cs All products except some 
agricultural goods and 
textiles 
One Way Preference 
-Lome Convention ACP Cs All manufactured goods 
and some agricultural goods 
One Way Preferences 
-GSP Other third Cs Manufactured Products 
within quotas Most Favoured Nation 
Clause Non-European 
Ad hoc 
developed Cs GATT rules 
State Trading 
Cs Quotas 
*Cs means Countries 
Source: EC Commission, Quoted in Ole Norgaard, et al. (eds. ), The EC in World Politics, London and New York: Pinter Publishers, 1993, pp. 61-2. 
26' Peter Nedergaad, op. cit., pp. 60-61. 
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Exposure to intensified competition in the banking, 
insurance or transport areas lead relevant interest groups to 
ask for compensation in the form of extra-EU protection. That 
kind of compensation will damage third country competitors. 
The concept of GSP has to be changed to accommodate the 
drive for liberalization. Despite the preferential treatment of 
developing nations by the EU, developing nations have been 
exposed to discriminatory measures. Laursen's summary is that 
the effects of GSP have been modest: 263 
1) GSP in itself has been unambitious; 
2) EC version has so many exceptions; 
3) protectionist pressures from producers within the EC are 
responsible for underutilization of the GSP; 
4) GSP only deals with tariff-reductions, despite non- 
tariff barriers are much more important; 
5) other partners such as the Lome nations, 
the Mediterranean nations, have been much more 
privileged than GSP countries in Asia and 
America; 
The ROK, which is on the verge of becoming a member of the 
OECD group in 1996, has been benefitted by the GSP scheme. The 
future benefit is expected to be eroded to a considerable degree 
by the adoption of the new guidelines in the EU. The ROK belongs 
to a priority category to be reviewed as a newly industrialized 
nation. Special interest groups in the EU would constantly use 
EU leverage against the general interests of the world. 
263 Finn Laursen, "The EC, GATT, and the Uruguay Round", 
in Leon Hurwitz and Christeian Lequesne (eds. ), The State of 
European Community: Policies, Institutions and Debates in the 
Transition Years, Boulder Colorado: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 
1991. 
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2.4 Conclusion: Unique Development of the EU CCP 
The emergence of a tri-polar world reflects the end of the 
bipolar world and it is the result of the decline of US postwar 
economic hegemony, accompanied by the remarkable success of 
Japan. The visible acceleration in recent years of the formation 
or deepening of regional groupings in Europe, North America and 
Pacific Asia, has been motivated by different political settings 
and their subsequent requirements. As a remarkable deepening of 
the EC, the Single European Act (SEA) was signed in February 
1986 and came into effect on 1 July 1987. Since the Treaty of 
Rome, it amounted to the first comprehensive revision of the 
treaties with motivations as follows: 264 
a) a recognition of the need to overcome the Eurosclerosis 
that had characterized the EC economy compared with its 
global competitors; 
b) a wish to provide a stimulus to the European economy by 
means of the liberalization associated with the 
completion of the internal market; 
c) a wish to bring the treaties into line with actual 
practice in the EC; 
d) a wish to relaunch supranational integration because of 
the realization that decisional weakness had impeded 
he collective interest; and 
e) a recognition of the need to make the EC more 
politically responsive if the Iberian enlargement were 
not to create political sclerosis. 
In the gradual evolution towards the TEU, the regionalism 
of the EU has been basically unique compared to those of NAFTA 
and APEC, in that the EU has been aiming at reaching a 
supranational body; political union. Out of the several 
motivations to initiate the SEA, a wish to relaunch 
supranational integration because of the realization that 
26'. M. J. Artis and N. Lee (eds. ), The Economics of the 
European Union: Policy and Analysis, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994, p. 21. 
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decisional weakness had impeded the collective interests, 
deserves particular attention. The logic behind the Single 
Market Programme, in particular, is one of strengthening the 
forces of competition in Europe, including a weakening or 
dilution of the rigidifying and growth-retarding effects of 
nationally entrenched oligopolies, rent seekers and 
"distributional cartels" as well as the harmonization of 
standards and other forms of deep integration. ""' Such 
integration involves harmonization of numerous policies and 
standards at the domestic level. 
The reasons for regional formation of the NAFTA were quite 
different from the EC's birth: 
a) to strengthen the competitiveness of the 
three economies, possibly four economies including Chile 
in the foreseeable future; 
b) to secure the predictability of access to one another's 
markets; 
C) ironically to stimulate other nations to seek 
aggressively the multilateral system by seeking 
conclusion in the negotiations of the Uruguay Round; 
Regionalization in North America is centrifugal, centring 
around the US. Considerable de facto economic integration, 
thus, precedes the major recent de jure regional arrangements 
involving the US- namely the 1988 Canada-US Free Trade 
Agreement, the 1992 North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). 
That such de facto integration precedes the US moves toward 
greater de jure regionalization stands in contrast to the 
pattern in Europe, where de facto integration has already 
'6s. Charles Oman, Globalization and Regionalization: The 
Challenge for Developing Countries, Paris: OECD Development 
Centre, 1994, p. 60. 
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followed the de jure arrangement, starting in the 1950s. The EU 
is comprised of nations with similar levels of development, 
while NAFTA is the first reciprocal free-trade agreement between 
a developed and a developing nation. The uniqueness of the EU 
consists in the fact that the EU integration today is a deep 
policy integration, while the same can not be said of the 
NAFTA. 266 
In comparison with the EC, NAFTA was in part a leverage to 
promote both economic growth and political stability in Mexico 
from the position of the US. 267 In Paul Krugman's analysis, the 
Mexican government needs NAFTA, and the US has a strong interest 
in helping that government. "' Mexico's willingness to 
negotiate confirmed its recent commitment- to market 
principles. 269 Another aim of the US has been to project Mexico 
as a role-model for other developing countries, particularly but 
not only in Latin America, both in terms of its far-reaching 
domestic and trade policy reforms, and its willingness to 
include services, the promotion of intellectual rights, and the 
reduction of investment barriers in a trade agreement with the 
266" 
Ibid. , p. 67. 
267. Jeffrey P. Bialos & Deborah E. Siegel, "Dispute 
Resolution Under the NAFTA: The Newer and Improved Model", The 
International Lawyer, Vol. 27, No. 3,1993, pp-590-91- 
261 . Paul Krugman, "The Uncomfortable Truth about NAFTA: Its Foreign Policy, Stupid, " Foreign Affairs, November/December 
1993, Vo1.72, No. 5, pp. 18-19. 
269 
" See more Drusilla K. Brown, Alan V. Deardorff, and Robert M. Stern, "A North American Free Trade Agreement: 
Analytical Issues and a Computational Assessment", The World 
Economy, January 1992, pp. 15-29; Gary Clyde Hufbauer and Jeffrey 
J. Schott, NAFTA: An Assessment, Washington, DC: Institute For 
International Economics, February 1993. 
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US. 27° As a response to the EU and NAFTA, the East Asian 
nations were particularly concerned about the possible threat of 
the collapse of the multilateral trade order. The recent Bogor 
declaration in Indonesia on the formation of the APEC free trade 
zone among 18 members reflects their concern on this trend. 271 
Fortunately, a major impetus for the excluded nations to join a 
group of certain regional bodies, rather stems from their desire 
to safeguard their ability to continue to pursue outward- 
oriented development strategies, which is a indication for the 
further liberalization of world trade. The kind of influences 
which institutions and political forces have over the 
integration agreements, is important for open trade. " 
270 NAFTA provides the model for economic cooperation 
between developed and developing nations; its encouragement of 
global as well as regional trade liberalization; its precedent- 
setting and far-reaching regime for protection if intellectual 
property rights; its closer linkage between trade, labour, and 
environmental issues. 
271. They committed themselves to the goal of free trade and 
investment in the Pacific by the year 2020- an objective which, 
if met, would make APEC a trading area dwarfing the EC and NAFTA 
combined by bringing together 2.2 billion consumers and 
producers in countries that already account for 41 percent of 
global commerce. C. Fred Bergsten, Director of Washington's 
Institute for International Economics and Chairman of Eminent 
Persons Group that helped set APEC's agenda crowed, "This is the biggest trade initiative in history. It is half the world 
deciding to eliminate its trade barriers. " Quoted in Anthony 
Spaeth with the title, "Dressed for Success-Meeting in Indonesia, 
APEC's leaders adopt a sweeping endorsement of free trade, " in 
Time, November 28,1994. 
Kym Anderson & Richard Blackhurst, Regional Integration 
and Global Trading System, Exeter: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1993, 
pp. 4-5. 
Anderson and Blackhurst summarizes that: 
Theorists of economic integration typically rank them as 
follows; Preferential Trade Agreements or arrangement or areas 
(PTAS); free trade areas or agreements; customs unions (CUs), 
which are FTAs, but with same external trade measures for all 
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Table 2.5 below shows the nature of regional blocs in 
comparison with the GATT. Basically, regional blocs are 
discriminatory and inward-oriented. In order for a regional bloc 
to be open, the exclusive psychology must be changed into an 
inclusive mentality with more multilateral features. The 
principles and characteristics of the GATT have been weakened 
since the EU and NAFTA gained their importance in the world 
economy. The weakening of multilateralism poses the danger of 
regional blocs falling into the trap of more discrimination. 
The spread of regionalism is in large degree caused by the 
feeling of uncertainty that guaranteed market-access into a 
group of major advanced nations is not stable. Expanded use of 
contingent protection272 measures is also one of the major 
hidden reasons for countries forming or joining regional bodies. 
The historical background to the birth of the EC and the 
creation of the EU has been distinguished by supranational 
institutionalization, whereas the NAFTA and APEC are, rather a 
responsive move against protectionism and regionalism. 
As we see in table 2.6, when the ratio of liberalization 
was extraordinarily high in the years of 1950-1973, conspicuous 
increase of trade exchange was recorded. 
Table 2.5: A Comparison of Principles and Characteristics 
of the GATT and the Regional Trading Bloc Model 
member states; common markets (CMs), which allows free movement 
of factors as well as products between member states; and 
economic unions (EUs), involving not only common factor market 
and trade policies but also harmonization of other micro-and 
macro-economic policies. 
2'2. Use of administrative procedures, e. g., in anti-dumping 
and countervailing duty investigations in a manner that impedes 
trade flows. 
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Principles and Characteristics 
Of GATT Of Regional Trading Bloc 
(1) Trade is based on the Prin- (1) Based on the principle 
-ciple of non-discrimination discrimination 
(2) All members are bound to (2) Nations within the bloc 
grant as favourable treatment share special preferences 
to each other as they give not granted to nations 
to any other member, i. e., outside the bloc 
most-favoured nation status 
(3) To the maximum extent (3) Protection is often provided 
Possible, protection should be through quantitative 
provided only through tariffs restrictions as well as 
tariffs 
(4)Basic ideas include economic (4) Economic nationalism or liberalism, multilateralism, regionalism, bilateralism 
and free trade based upon and trade often based on 
comparative advantage strategic trade theory 
and neomercantilism 
(5)The system is designed as a (5) The bloc may not be open 
community open to all who are to those who wish to join 
willing to follow membership and are willing to follow 
rules membership rules 
(6)The goal is to build a (6) The bloc may function as 
unified and integrated an exclusive club that 
global system generates a "them versus 
Usti 
psychology 
(7)Under Article XXIV, 
three part of test is is provided to determine if 
a regional bloc is 
consistent with the GATT long run. 
(7) In the view of some system 
advocates, blocs are 
a way of building a 
stronger multilateral 
system in the 
Source: Richard S. Belous and Rebecca S. Hartley (eds. ), The Growth of the Regional Trading Blocs in the Global Economy, 
Washington D. C.: National Planning Association, 1990, p. X. 
This tremendous increase was mainly caused by substantial 
reductions of tariff, the removal of the prewar and wartime 
quantitative reductions in Western Europe, a partial freeing of 
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capital movement including foreign direct investment flows and 
the establishment of an effective system of multilateral 
exchanges and payments with full convertability of the major 
currencies. Liberalization was achieved via all the available 
routes- unilateral, regional and multilateral. "" 
From the viewpoint of regional bodies with openness, the 
new WTO system will be supportive, rather than competing. It is 
also true that a historical survey on whether the post-war 
integration has supported the multilateral trading system 
conforming to the rules and procedures laid down in the GATT, 
shows some less favourable results. This means that some 
regional agreements contain features working directly against 
the goal of increased international integration. "" Table 
27. Richard Blackhurst and David Handerson, op. cit., p. 
413. 
2". See GATT document C/M 253, p. 25. 
The chairman of the working party on the Canada-U. S Free 
Trade Agreement Conclusion to the GATT council in November 1991 by observing that: 
Over fifty previous working parties on individual customs 
union or free trade areas had been unable to reach unanimous 
conclusions as to the GATT consistency of those agreements. On the other hand, no such agreements has been disapproved 
explicitly... one might question what points was there in 
establishing a working party if on-one expected it to reach 
consensus-findings in respect of specific provisions of such 
agreements, or to recommend to the participants how to meet 
certain benchmarks. ' It might not be irrelevant that the working 
party on the Agreement under consideration commenced work only 
after a delay of more than two years. As further agreements 
came along, there might be a risk that they would be treated increasingly superficially and that contracting parties would lose- if they had not already done so- the ability to distinguish between agreements of greater or less GATT- 
consistency. 
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2.6: Growth in the Volumes of World GDP and 
Merchandise 
Exports (annual average percentage rate of change), 
1870-1987 
Year (1870-1900) 1900-13 1913-50 1950-73 1973-87 
GDP (2.9) 2.5 2.0 4.8 3.3 
Merchandise (3.8) 4.3 0.6 7.6 4.5 
Exports 
Source: A. Madison, The World Economy in the 20th Century, 
Paris: OECD, 1989. 
Regarding the continued importance of extra-regional trade, 
it is not likely that we would witness the creation of three 
well-arranged and inward-looking trading blocs in the new 
international economic order under the WTO. The reason is that 
extra-trade is still very important for the welfare-improvement 
of Europe, North America, and Asia; inward-oriented trade 
regimes are unlikely to be equally efficient. In conclusion, the 
emergence of a tripolar world raises vital questions: whether 
regionalism can either contribute to or be detrimental to a 
multilateral trading system. 
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CHAPTER THREE. MAJOR SPECIFIC TRADE REGIMES OF THE EU AND 
THE ROK'S INDUSTRIAL POLICY 
As an extension of Chapter Two, this chapter further 
specifically elaborates on the historical development of typical 
EEC/EC/EU trade regimes with particular focus on NTBs in the 
Postwar period and how they have affected South Korea, giving 
many relevant examples of how specific measures and changes in 
policy have affected South Korea. In contrast to the EU side, 
the development of postwar industrial policy in South Korea is 
surveyed in the latter half of the chapter. South Korea's 
industrial policy is surveyed with specific emphasis on the 
relationship between the state and large companies, and the fact 
that while in the past the industrialization of South Korea did 
not operate under conditions of open market access to the South 
Korean market, the Korean government's recent active efforts 
towards trade liberalization and deregulation contribute to 
multilateralism under the WTO. 
3.1 Specific Evolution of the EU Trade Policy with 
Implications for the ROK's Exports 
3.1.1 Trade Regimes of the EU in the GATT Framework 
The external trade of the EU accounts for one-fifth of 
world trade. However, the Common Commercial Policy (CCP) 
receives comparatively little attention. The principles of the 
CCP are put into effect by means of certain trade policy 
instruments. One instrument has already been mentioned, namely, 
the conclusion of regional trade and cooperation agreements. 
The EU has signed such agreements with EFTA, COMECON, ASEAN, 
ACP, the Gulf States and Mediterranean countries. Another 
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instrument is the Common External Tariff (CET) which applies to 
all imports entering the community. 
Table 3.1: Shares of World Merchandise Exports excluding EU- 
internal Trade: Leading Exporters, 1992 
European Union 20.0 % 
USA 15.8 
Asian NICs(4) 12.1 
Japan 12.0 
EFTA 7.9 
Canada 4.7 
China 3.0 
Rest of the World 26.5 
Note: ROK is one of the NICs 
Source: GATT, International Trade Statistics, 1993. 
The third instrument is the special tariff preferences 
provided to LDCs under the generalized system of preferences 
(GSP). Finally, non-tariff barriers (NTBs) are applied. 275 
The intention of the founding fathers of the EC was clearly 
towards a liberal trading order. Article 110276 of the Treaty 
of Rome refers to the progressive abolition of restrictions on 
international trade. There is some ambiguity as to precisely 
what national powers have been transferred to the EU in relation 
to trade. The European court of justice has decided that wide 
275 All M. El-Agraa (ed. ), The Economics of the European 
Community, London: Philip Allen, p. 423. 
276 see CHAPTER 4-Commercial Policy 
Article 110 - By establishing a customs union between themselves Member States aim to contribute, in the common interest, to the harmonious development of world trade, the 
progressive abolition of restrictions on international trade and the lowering of customs barriers. 
The common commercial policy shall take into account the favourable effect which the abolition of customs duties between Member States may have on the increase in the competitive strength of undertakings in those States. 
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interpretation of Article 1132" is justified in order to allow 
the EU to control external trade. 
As a typical example of managed trade in relation to the 
Multi-Fibre Agreements (MFA), quotas have been allocated by the 
Commission to individual member states - this causes some 
disruption of the internal community market. 278 The external 
relations of the EU are likely to be affected by the internal 
changes in the EU itself and by developments outside it. Asian 
Newly Industrializing Economies (ANIEs)27 were very much 
concerned about enlargement, mainly because it was likely to 
result in a tougher CCP with more restrictions on successful 
exporters and greater use of safeguard clauses. The adjustment 
"'. Article 113: 
1. After the transitional period had ended, the common 
commercial policy shall be based on uniform principles, 
particularly in regard to changes in tariff rates, the 
conclusion of tariff and the trade agreements, the achievement 
of uniformity in measures of liberalization, export policy and 
measures to protect trade such as those to be taken in case of dumping or subsidies. 
2. The Commission shall submit proposals to the Council for implementing the common commercial policy. 
3. Where agreements with third countries need to be 
negotiated, the Commission shall make recommendations to the Council, which shall authorize the Commission to open the necessary negotiations. 
The commission shall conduct these negotiations in 
consultation with a special committee appointed by the Council to assist the Commission in this task and within the framework 
of such directives as the Council may issue to it. 
4. In exercising the powers conferred upon it by this Article, the council shall act by a qualified majority. 
278. Ibid. P. 423. 
2" ANIE in this study refers mainly to South Korea, Taiwan, Singapore, and Hong Kong. 
129 
to the Mediterranean enlargement and the accession of Greece 
in 
1981 was followed by Spain and Portugal in 1986, which created 
a trade diversion. 290 
The Single European Act (SEA) provides another dimension 
for the changes of trade policy. Our major concern lies 
in 
whether the requirement for the amendment of measures will 
be 
oriented in the direction of strong protection to create a 
Fortress Europe, or whether they will be amended to strengthen 
the EU's stance in support of a liberal trading order. If 
completion of the internal market succeeds in activating the 
economy of the member states, harmonization for external 
competition will be easier. Henderson281 pointed out that the 
completion of the market will itself involve adjustment costs 
and member states may wish to minimize further dislocation. 
In the Uruguay Round negotiations, the EU favoured the 
280. Han, Sun-Taik divided the period in his research work, European Integration: The impact on Asian Newly Industrializing Economies, Paris: OECD Development Centre, 1992, pp. 14-15, into two: first phase, 1959-72 and second phase, 1973-85. The first phase covers the period from the creation of the EC by the 6 countries to its expansion to 9 countries. It was during this period that the removal of intra-regional tariffs and the establishment of common external tariffs were initiated and completed in 1960 and 1968, respectively. The second phase 
covers, from 1973 to 1985, the period between the initial 
enlargement of the EC, up to the signing of the SEA to launch the third phase. Han's estimation of the impact of the first and second phase of integration on ANIE's exports is revealed in table below. 
Normalized-Share Approach Modified-Balassa Approach 
Ist Phase -US$350 million -US$3528 million 2nd Phase +US$3470 million +US$5940 million 
281. D. Handerson, 2992: the External Dimension, Group of Thirty, New York, 1989, quoted in AM E1-Agraa op. cit., p. 439. 
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strengthening of the GATT structure and disciplines. With regard 
to the GATT-sensitive reform issues, the NIEs and Japan opposed 
the position of the EU, that selective safeguard action should 
be permitted against individual country exports in cases of 
damage to domestic industry. The removal of tariffs were 
favoured by the EU, on the other hand, sticking to the position 
that NTBs are to be dependent upon reciprocal action on the part 
of trading partners. 382 The EU's basic position could be 
summarized as one of balance and genuine progress in 
liberalization, which has been the EU's general attitude in 
other trade negotiations. 
The EU, comprising fifteen industrialized countries and 
incorporating 380 million people within its borders, constitutes 
the largest trading bloc in the world. 
Table 3.2: The EC in world trade 1987 
US$ billion 
Value of Exports from 
EC (12) 391 20.2 
United States 244 12.6 
Japan 229 11.9 
Other developed Countries319 16.5 
Developing Countries 490 25.4 
State-trading areas 258 13.3 Total 1.931 100.0 
Source: GATT International Trade 87-88, Geneva, 1988. 
The figures in table 3.2., above, proves the fact that the 
foreign trade policy of the EU has a big influence on the 
282. Reciprocity in the GATT principle applies to trade 
policy according to which countries must, in international tariff negotiations, reciprocate, i. e. offer tariff concessions in return for receiving tariff concessions. The reciprocal 
market opening of the EU to the trading partners causes trade friction. 
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international trading system. Even though the EU's trade policy 
is based upon liberal principles, third countries, including 
South Korea, are uneasy about the trade regimes as reflected in 
the EU's agricultural protection and preferential agreements and 
NTBs, which are major sources of friction with third countries, 
and the EU's position on the selective application of 
quantitative restrictions. 
The EU's trade policy is likely to change as it comes under 
considerable internal and external pressure. The gradual 
reduction of the CET is a good example of the success of the 
CCP. Stronger negotiating power was developed, with a more 
positive approach to the LDCs and active participation in the 
GATT rounds. However, the application of the CCP is not still 
unified, in that national quotas continue to exist. In case of 
export subsidies, no common position of the EU is secured. In 
addition to that, the EU's external policy decisions are usually 
dictated by individual national interests, with no special 
target. The concept of reciprocity28' is to be more stressed 
for the EU to move towards a more liberal and ordered 
international trading environment. 
Despite the more liberal rhetoric, protectionism continues 
to exert an influence on the CCP. The process has been 
283 The Economist, 8 July 1989, draws up the following 
glossary of meanings: 
1) Overall reciprocity: is GATT wisdom. All nations open up a little in different ways, but without matching them sector for sector or nation for nation. 
2) Sectoral reciprocity: This is based upon the logic: "You 
can sell widgets on my market only if I can sell widgets on your market. ', 
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described as one of conservative resistence. 28" With many 
third countries entering into the international trading system, 
equipped with much developed economic capacity, conservative 
resistence is likely to remain. The increasing adoption of 
Voluntary Export Restraints (VER), undermines the CCP to the 
extent to which commercial policy ceases to be common at all. 
The trade policy of the EU, especially on trade with developing 
countries, is excessively complex. The community repeatedly 
claims to adhere, scrupulously, to GATT rules but at the same 
time its commercial policy measures have a complex preferential 
bias, for it is not still fully operational at the Community 
level-2" Article 18 of the Treaty of the Rome, clarifies that 
the Member State's readiness to contribute to the development of 
international trade and the lowering of barriers to trade is 
conditional upon reciprocity and mutual advantage of the 
agreements entered. 286 
Though there exists a general EEC framework of preventing 
protectionism from spreading and helping the growth of the 
developing nations in the world market, social and political 
pressures to reduce the growth of competitive imports have had 
a protectionist impact on sectoral trade policy positions of the 
Community, especially regarding Japan and the ANIEs, including 
"`. M. W. Corden, Trade Policy and Macroeconomic Balance in the World Economy, IMF Working Paper, 1988. 
285 Jacques Pelkmans, "The EC's Trade Policy Toward 
Developing Countries", in Christopher Stevens and Joan Verloren Van de Maat, Europe and the International Division of Labour, London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1987, p. 15- 
286 . Ibid., p. 16. 
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the R0K28' 
The traditional arguments for the logic of interventionist 
trade policy288 in developed countries are as follows: 
a. The need to preserve and encourage mature industries 
such as steel and shipbuilding; 
b. The need to promote and secure sectors that are 
strategic for growth, such as high-technology 
industries; 
C. The need to accommodate the special characteristics of 
disadvantaged sectors, such as agriculture; 
d. The need to protect sectors important for national 
security and defence; 
On the other hand, the non-traditional argument for 
protection are as follows: 
a. persistent trade imbalances leading to 
macroeconomic problems; 
b. protection of labour and the high social and 
budgetary cost of unemployment; 
c. exchange rate changes causing exchange rate 
instability; 
d. unfair trade practices of other countries; 
e. strategic trade policy; 
The traditional and non-traditional arguments are combined 
to adopt protectionist measures in a particular situation. The 
EU is not exceptional. There are various kinds of protection 
such as direct tariffs on imports and non-tariff measures, by 
which is meant quantitative restrictions, subsidies, government 
procurement practices and technical barriers to trade. In 
another dimension, a system of multiple exchange rates with 
higher rates on imports and low rates on exports, which is 
similar to a system of tariffs on import and subsidies on 
export, could be functioning as a device for protection. 
2". Ibid., p. 18. 
288"T. Hitiris, op. cit., pp. 202-203. 
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If governments use a whole range of interventionist 
policies such as grants and loans for industrial developments, 
promotion of research and development, regional subsidization, 
and public procurement and preferential allocation of defence 
contracts, it will have far-reaching implications for foreign 
trade, for it produces trade protection, and as a result it will 
bring domestic production effects. Nowadays a new trend of 
protectionism through the mechanism of trade limitation 
agreement such as Orderly Marketing Arrangement (OMAS) and 
Voluntary Export Restraint (VERS) prevails. This means 
proliferation of non-tariff trade barriers in the form of 
quantitative restrictions, subsidization and discriminatory 
administrative measures. Dumping, which aims at profit 
maximization by price discrimination, is beneficial to the 
consumers of the importing country, but harmful to the consumers 
of the exporting country. Dumping is usually controlled by 
anti-dumping measures by the importing countries. "' 
However, for the maximization of international trade 
exchanges, the principle of the GATT is a good guideline in that 
it is a reciprocal and generally advantageous agreement. The 
GATT is based on three main principles: "' 
1. Transparency- Trade liberalization through the reduction 
of customs tariffs and the general elimination of 
289. See, Brian Hindley, "Trade Policy of the European Community", in P. Minsford (ed. ), The Cost of Europe, Manchester 
and New York: Manchester University Press, 1992; R. C. Hine, The 
Political Economy of European Trade, Brighton, Wheatsheaf, 1985. 
290 Although all the 38 GATT Articles are important it 
could be argued that three key principles characterizes GATT's 
overall operation: 1) Non-discrimination; 2) Reciprocity; 3) Transparency. 
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quantitative restrictions and other non-tariff barriers 
to trade; 
2. Multilateral Approach to trade liberalization- non- 
discrimination in trade through the application of the 
most favoured nation(MFN) clause, with derogations and 
flexibility necessary to accommodate regional economic 
integration and more favourable treatment for developing 
countries. 
3. Reciprocity-although this is not specifically referred 
to in any of the articles of the text of the GATT, it 
appears to have established itself as a prominent 
operating procedure. Trading nations, on the whole, can 
only be expected to liberalize trade by reducing tariffs 
provided their trading partners reciprocate. "' 
When third countries take any responses against the 
protectionist trend coming from regional economic integration, 
such responses are categorized generally as follows: 
1. Seek improvement 
2. Retaliate against adverse effects 
3. Adopt alternative regional trading arrangements 
4. Try to extend the European approach multilaterally 
5. Try to establish bilateral agreements 
6. Change unilaterally to get the best out of the 
external environment 
The most difficult thing generally faced by third countries 
is the fact that European integration is not simply a matter of 
the formation or extension of a trading area, or even the 
development of a wider set of non-discriminatory economic 
arrangements. More extensive social and political agreements 
are involved in the integration. In the case of the Maastricht 
Treaty, some of the changes relate to improved methods of 
decision-making; more effective enforcement of decisions, and a 
great role for direct democracy through the European Parliament 
(EP), which makes the appropriate response by the third 
countries much more difficult. 
291. Klaus Heidensohn, op. cit., 1995, p. 151. 
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Given the situation that world trade has not been as 
liberal and multilateral as it should have been, a considerable 
increase of protectionism has developed since the mid-1970s. 
International organizations like the GATT, the OECD, the World 
Bank (WB) and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) have 
repeatedly warned against increasing protectionism and its 
negative effects on the world economy. 292 According to the IMF, 
there has been an increased tendency in industrial countries to 
broaden and sharpen trade legislation, particularly in order to 
deal with unfair foreign competition. Examples are the 1984 
Trade and Tariff act of the USA and the New Commercial Policy 
instrument adopted by the European Community in September 
1984.293 
On the evolution of trade policies towards developing 
countries, the OECD observed, also after implementation of the 
Tokyo Round, that tariffs confronting developing countries' 
exports of manufactures to the industrial countries remained 
above those applying to intra-OECD exports. Moreover, non- 
tariff barriers facing major developing countries' export 
products also spread and tightened in the 1980s. The second 
renewal of the MFA in 1982 and new or strengthened quantitative 
2112 L. B. M. Mennes Jacob Kol, "Introduction: Trade Policies 
and Their Effects", in L. B. M. Mennes & Jacob Kohl, European 
Trade Policies and the Developing World, London: Croom Helm, 1988, PP. 1-3. 
293 On the detailed positions of the developing nations 
against protectionism, see Federal Trust, The European Community 
and the Developing Countries, London: Federal Trust, 1988; 
L. B. M. Mendes and J. Kohl, European Trade Policies and the Developing World, London: Croom Helm, 1988; C. Stevens, The EEC 
and the Third World: a Survey, London: Hodder & Stoughton, 1984. 
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restrictions in sectors like steel, consumer electronics and 
footwear are good examples. Requests for protective measures 
against low cost imports were prevalent among industrialized 
countries in the 1980s. 
The OECD emphasized that the most effective protectionist 
Policy has been to accelerate the product and geographical 
diversification of developing countries' exports of 
manufactures. The more advanced NICs have been successful in 
diversifying out of industries most affected by restrictive 
trade measures into other labour intensive industries, into 
unrestrained sub-product areas within industries where 
protection exists, into new geographical markets and into 
industries which are less labour-intensive and more intensive in 
the use of skill. In spite of the efforts by the governments of 
developed countries, trade restrictions have increased, mainly 
in the form of discriminatory non-tariff barriers. Hughes 
and Newbery concluded that during the period 1973-1983, the 
Newly Industrializing Countries (NICs) were able to sustain a 
high rate of growth of manufactured exports despite 
protectionist actions. 294 They emphasize that although 
manufactured imports from developing countries have been growing 
fast, they still occupied a small share of apparent consumption 
in the industrial countries, except for clothing; not more than 
4 percent in 1981. This is confirmed in a paper by Waelbrock 
and Kohl, who showed that the rates of market penetration by 
294 Gordon A. Hughes and David M. G. Newbery, Protection 
and Developing Countries' Exports of Manufactures, Economic 
Policy; a European Forum, Vol. 1, No. 2, April 1986. 
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developing countries into the EU, the USA, and Japan were still 
very low, except for textiles and clothing and miscellaneous 
manufactured goods. They concluded that the developing 
countries' exports would be expanded if they could increase and 
diversify supply. 295 According to Corden, 296 recently 
revived protectionism could be detected by looking at three 
considerations: 
a) The adverse effects on trade may come later, since 
investment in export-oriented activities would be 
inhibited and since some of the measures concerned were 
only recent; 
b) The pattern of trade may have been distorted, even 
though world trade had not decreased; 
C) In the absence of the recent protectionist policies, 
trade would have expanded so much faster that a shift to 
more export-oriented growth was hampered. 
In establishing the international trade system after World 
War II, the aim was to end the laissez faire for individual 
governments which had been the main characteristic of the inter- 
war period and to replace it with a system of internationally- 
agreed rules governed by certain norms; a transparent and 
market-conforming instrument of protection, the tariff; the 
binding of protection; reciprocity; and unconditional non- 
discrimination. These basic norms serve the essential function 
of ensuring the existence of a global market. Nondiscrimination 
is central to this system, whose principle technique of 
liberalization is reciprocity and whose principle sanction is 
295" Jean Waelbroeck and Jacob Kohl, The Evolving Pattern 
of World Trade, EC Trade Policy: a European Forum, Vol. 1, No. 2, Chap. 3, Apr. 1986, quoted in Ibid., p. 6. 
296, W. M. Corden, The Revival of Protectionism, published by the Group of Thirty, New York, 1984. 
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retaliation. 297 
Martin Wolf argues that the EU has contributed 
significantly to the weakening of the system by adopting 
policies of preferential liberalization and discrimination of 
competition and economic change. Consequently, preferences have 
become the principle instrument of foreign policy, while the 
tariff has been displaced by discriminatory instruments of 
protection like Voluntary Export Restraints (VERS). The core of 
the EU's association policy is preferential treatment for 
associate countries through the reduction or elimination of 
tariffs for goods shipped from the associate to the Community 
and in many cases also by the grant of financial aid. In 
return, the associate countries offer certain tariff 
preferences, called "reverse preferences" for the import of 
community products. 298 
As the major actors in world trade, during the 1960s under 
the auspices of the GATT in the so-called Dillon and Kennedy 
Rounds, the American Government and the Community were the major 
parties involved in long drawn-out bargaining to reduce tariff 
barriers and to overcome some of the stubborn non-tariff 
barriers. In these negotiations the EC Commission assumed an 
increasingly important role as a negotiator, a role that was 
given to it by the EEC Treaty as a corollary of its 
responsibility to evolve common commercial policy 
297. Ibid. , p. 14. 
29B Werner J. Feld, The European Community in the World 
Affairs, p. 105. 
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prerogatives. 29 However, the positive role of the EC was much 
eroded entering the 1980s. Klaus Heidensohn summarizes the 
discriminatory external effects of the EU's trade policies: "' 
first, discrimination results from the EU pursuing a common 
commercial policy; 301 second, the EU's trade policies have been 
discriminatory in that the number, range and nature of the 
special trade agreements concluded by the EU have resulted in a 
hierarchical preference structure; third, specific trade policy 
measures have resulted in protectionism on a sectoral basis. "' 
3.1.2 Single European Market and the ROK 
Intra-regional trade has expanded more rapidly than extra- 
regional trade during the past decade. 303 A typical example may be 
seen in the intra-regional trade of the EU. 
299" Ibid., pp. 163-167. 
Soo. Klaus Heidensohn, op. cit., 1995, pp. 69-71. 
'ol. As the underlying reason for this discrimination, Heidensohn analyses that the CETs levied by the Union on imports from third countries and the non-tariff barriers the Union imposed implied that for a large range of goods low cost 
supplies from third countries have been replaced by higher cost 
supplies from producers within the Union. Also, the trade diversion effect has been relatively higher for products in industries in which member states have been less competitive in 
agriculture, electronics, motor vehicles, steel and textile 
sectors. 
302 The sectoral protectionist measures that impeded the South Korea's exports into the EU are surveyed in Chapter Four. 
'O3. This development is mainly due to the regionalization trend of the world economy, particularly in Europe after SEM and North America after NAFTA, and Pacific Asia after APEC. 
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Table 3.3 The Rapid Expansion of the EU Intra-regional 
Trade in the years 1958,1975, and 1992(unit: %) 
1958* 1975 1992 
Internal Shares of Exports 37 52 61 
Imports 35 49 59 
Note: Adopted from Eurostat 1993. 
The rapid increase of intra-EU trade is mainly due to the 
breaking down of internal barriers to trade, at a rate faster 
than the breaking down of barriers to trade with third country 
trading partners. 
Table 3.4: EU Internal 
1973 
Export(%) 52.4 
Import(%) 51.1 
Sources: IMF International 
GATT Internationa 
Trade Ratio 
1980 1985 1990 1991 1992 
55.7 54.4 60.6 61.1 61.7 
49.4 52.7 58.0 57.5 59.7 
Financial Statistics 
1 Trade 91-92 
The two tables above clearly show the increase of intra-EU 
trade. In the case of exports, the EU internal trade ratio for 
1973 recorded 52.4 percent and continuously increased to reach 
61.7 percent in 1992. A similar case could be noticed in the EU 
import trade ratio. An internal EU import trade ratio of 51.1 
percent in 1973, increased to 59.7 percent in 1992. The EU's 
efforts to break barriers and ensure more rapid economic growth 
tend to look for inward-oriented solutions. 
The European union's trade policy is clearly distinct in 
nature from those of APEC or NAFTA. The trade policy of the EU 
renders the Union comparable not with the regional groupings 
such as NAFTA or APEC, but rather, states like the U. S. A. and 
Japan. The supranational stance of the EU towards Asian NIEs is 
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mainly found in this context. There is also a possibility of the 
EU falling into the protectionist trap when member states could 
not compete with their competitors in the case of the EU's low 
international competitiveness. "' 
Table 3.5: Mutual Dependence Ratios in Trade between Asia 
and the EU, and Asia and the U. S, 1980-1991 
Developing Asia/EU Japan/EU D-Asia/US Japan/US 
1980 2.16 6.37 1.51 2.57 
1988 1.37 3.88 1.59 2.92 
1989 1.28 3.46 1.54 2.78 
1990 1.39 3.50 1.42 2.57 
1991 1.34 3.68 1.27 2.55 
East 
* Developing Asia contains the PRC and excludes the Middle 
Source: UN, Monthly Bulletin of Statistics, February 
1993; May 1993. 
As the mechanism of the EU to regulate the Asian exporters, 
contingent protection305 is a broader concept than protection 
through tariff and non-tariff barriers. It comprises pressures 
such as the issue of which powerful trading partners such as the 
EU anti-dumping procedures and safeguard provisions try to apply 
if their opposite partners do not comply with perceptions of 
"Orderly Marketing", anti-surge conduct, export monitoring, and 
surveillance. The principle of differential treatment according 
to the level of national development, which is embodied in the 
GATT, is actually distorted by this contingent protection 
304 Simon Nutall, "The European Union and the Asia-Pacific 
Region", in Kim Bak-soo (ed. ), The Asian Dimension of EC 
Integration- Problems and Prospects, Seoul: KIEP, 1993, pp. 264- 265. 
305 The concept of "contingent protection" was quoted in Rolf J. Langhammer's "The Economic Effects of European 
Integration on Asian Countries", Kim Bak-Soo, (ed. ), The Asian 
Dimension of EC Integration, Seoul: KIEP, 1993, P. 11. 
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concept. 
A conspicuous turn was expected with the launching of the 
SEM. M. Wolf306 explains the political dimension of the push 
for integration of the EC 1992 single market. According to him, 
after years of EC development and expansion to absorb the United 
Kingdom, Denmark, Ireland, Greece, Spain and Portugal, more 
intensive development was inevitable. 
Table 3.6: Simulated Effects of EC 1992, by Region(changes 
in 1988 US$billion) 
Region EC external surplus No EC external surplus 
GDP Exports Imports GDP Exports Imports 
EC 230.8 88.3 -80.3 230.8 20.0 11.8 
North 
America -20.8 -36.2 -25.3 5.4 2.1 2.7 
Asia-Pacific -12.3 -33.5 -31.7 -0.3 -0.2 0.5 Japan -17.7 -21.6 -7.6 -2.0 -0.7 -0.4 
Australia 1.2 -0.7 -1.5 0.6 0.3 0.2 
China 0.2 -1.4 -2.1 0.2 0.0 0.4 India 0.4 -0.7 -1.3 0.2 0.1 0.1 
Tigers -0.8 -7.5 -6.7 0.0 0.0 0.0 
ASEAN* 3.9 -1.1 -11.6 0.6 0.0 0.1 
Other Asia 0.5 -0.4 -0.9 0.1 0.0 0.1 
World 197.6 18.7-137.2 235.9 21.9 14.9 
Source: Center for International Economics, Western Trade Blocs: 
Game, Set or Match for Asia-Pacific and World Economy, Canberra, 
Australia, 1990, p. 35. 
Notes: ASEAN* members excludes Singapore because Singapore in 
included in Tigers. 
Especially in the economic dimension, the slow down of the 
EC economy was the fundamental reason for the Single Market. 3" 
306. M. Wolf, Liberalism, Nationalism and Mercantilism: 
Global Implications of the European Community's Programmes for 
Completing the Internal Market, New York: Manhattan Institute, 
1989. 
307 One of the main reasons for slow growth was 
productivity. In stark comparison with the 1960s, 1970s and the 
early 1980s, since the middle of the 1980s, productivity has 
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The simulated effects of EC 1992 shown in Table 3.6 indicates 
that only Japan and the ANIEs are losers. 
Rolf J. Langhammer'08 argues that various factors have 
contributed to the growth of uncertainty in the EU trade 
regimes. The first reason could be the failure to scrap Article 
115 of the EEC Treaty. It is still in the Maastricht Treaty, 
though the Single European Act provides no scope for any 
internal trade measure against non-EU sources after 1 January 
1993. In particular, there exists no scope for controlling and 
restricting indirect imports through other member nations. Nor 
is scope for substituting of such measures as national 
registration. Maintaining Article 115 in a single market is a 
clear contradiction in itself. Furthermore, the transition 
period has turned out to be excessively long. In the past, non- 
members were mainly subject to the majority of the EU quotas. 
In the future, they might face increased tariff quotas. 
The principle of multilateralism is damaged by a single 
trade policy-making body in Brussels and the greater community 
interest among the member states. There is some possibility of 
the EU becoming the third member of a cartel dominating the 
international trading system. 309 The implication of the SEM in 
the international trading arena have occasionally raised concern 
only recorded 1 percent, a far lower rate than the 4 percent 
recorded in the 1960s. 
1o8 Ibid., p. 19- 
309, This is well illuminated in the message of the US 
Super-301 the strategic impediment initiative against Japan, 
which uses access to the US market to force other countries to 
open their markets to US goods, services and direct investment 
and which the GATT has been powerless to prevent. 
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about the possible ill effect on trade with non-member nations. 
Third countries have been worried about the possible situation 
that the EU would be tempted to downgrade competitive forces to 
the detriment of third countries. 
The active participation of the Central Eastern European 
(CEE) nations into the SEM by having preferential access has 
major implications for Korea's future trade. Without doubt, in 
investment terms, Eastern Europe has a number of merits in 
international 
proximity. "° 
trade flows caused by its locational 
Hans-Eckarte Scharrer elaborates that the main 
purpose is probably to extract some compensation - more regional 
aid, relaxation of competition from third countries, - from the 
counter regions. This context also has important implications 
for Korea. Enhanced ties between the EU and the CEE nations 
through preferential preaccess implies some challenges against 
Korea. One way to overcome CEE competition is by way of 
technological development to produce goods more competitive than 
counterpart 
products. 311 
310. See Hans-Eckart Scharrer, "Implications for Eastern 
European Development, " in Soogil Young and Moon Soo Kang 
(eds. ), The Single European Market and Its Implication for Korea 
as an NIE, p. 76. 
'll. Hans-Eckart Scharrer elaborates that: 
a) Europe is likely to remain a growth area for years to come, even if the economic restructuring and development of Central and Eastern Europe takes longer than initially expected. 
With prudent political management, CEE nations can offer attractive investment and growth opportunities, a strong demand for Western technology capital goods and consumer goods, and easy access to the markets of Western Europe. 
b) A wider preferential area is emerging covering not only the EU and EFTA but all of Europe, reinforcing the observed trend towards economic regionalization. Within that area, locational competition between the centres, the Southern and Eastern regions is likely to intensify. 
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By setting the rule of origin or national composition to 
restrict the benefit of trade concessions to all or particular 
developing countries, the member states could extend the 
boundary of protectionism. "' The integration of the market 
will surely produce more purchasing power to boost imports. In 
the position of the outside world, the impact will be much more 
complex and more ambiguous. 313 
In the same context, from the view of the ROK, despite this 
ambiguity and complexity, some conclusions can be reached. Sung 
Lin Na and Kyttack Hong's research on the possible effect of the 
SEM on the Republic of Korea estimated the ex-ante effect of EC 
1992 Project on Korean export to EU. The usage of the 
traditional methodology of a customs union predicts that the 
c)Members of the group may become increasingly inward- looking. Faced with a sound growth potential, on the one hand, 
and major adjustment pressures and demand for compensation by 
other peripheral economies of the Community, on the other, the EU will try solving its internal problems partly at the expense 
of outsiders, including the ANIEs and Japan. This outcome is 
unavoidable, however, and its effects may be over-compensated by the trade-creating effects of a growing European Economy. 
312 Michael Davenport and Sheila Page, Europe: 1992 and the Developing World, London: Overseas Development Institute, 1991, 
pp. 11-15. 
313 The reasons for complexity and ambiguity could be 
summarized as follows: 
a. The internal gains and the external impacts of the 
programme depend crucially on the response of the EC economy to the opportunities that integration provides 
b. Crucial decisions about how the programme is to be implemented have still to be taken 
c. The evolution of future EC trade policy will to some extent be conditioned by the problems of adjustment of the 
member states, and perhaps of third countries, to the SEM 
d. It will be largely up to third world to exploit the opportunities of the wider, more integrated market and to meet the challenges of more intense competition or tougher technical standards. Ibid, p. 2. 
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EU's market integration effect (price effect) would reduce 
Korean exports to EC by 2.42 percent in the short-term and by 
5.45-5.82 percent in the long term. 
While the price effect does not pose any real threats to 
the ROK, the non-price effect (EU's trade protectionism effect) 
is considered as a threatening factor. The result is estimated 
to reduce the share of Korean export commodities on the EU's 
import restriction list in total Korean export to EC by about 10 
percent every year. 
The fear of fortress Europe is, according to the study of 
the Center for International EconomiCS3', based on four 
arguments. First, there is the precedent of the Common 
Agricultural Policy (CAP), caused by the political forces of 
Europe. Second, there are rising trends in protectionist 
sentiment in Europe and North America, as evidenced by rising 
levels of non-tariff protection. Third, there is the fact that 
production in the EU will become more concentrated after 1992, 
with large firms accounting for an increasing share of EU 
protection, since economies of scale will provide a substantial 
proportion of the economic gains to be had from EU market 
integration. The concentration of industry could lead to it 
seeking more protection. Finally, there is a tendency to resort 
to the lowest level of access for foreign goods when changing 
policy. 
Korea, as an export-dependent nation, will be no exception 
314 Center for International Economics, Western Trade 
Blocs, Game, Sector Match for Asia-Pacific and the World 
Economy, Washington D. C., 1990, pp. 39-42. 
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in facing these constraints by the EU. The creation of a common 
market was also accelerated by the fact that the US, Japan and 
the NICs315 are gaining more international competitiveness. 
The figures below clearly show the impact' of the EU 
protectionism on Korea as a tiger. 
Table 3.7: Simulated repercussions of "fortress" Europe 
EC liberalization(changes in 1988 
US$ billion) 
Region Fortress Europe EC liberalization 
GDP Exports Imports GDP Exports Imports 
EC 
-52.2 -57.6 -33.9 116.5 81.4 47.9 North America-39.5 -21.2 -27.4 30.8 13.9 17.9 Asia-Pacific -16.4 -14.0 -15.7 8.9 7.6 12.0 Japan -13.7 -7.6 -4.9 1.9 1.9 1.3 Australia 
-0.8 -1.0 -0.7 2.3 1.3 1.0 China -0.6 -0.2 -2.2 0.9 0.2 3.0 India 
-0.3 -0.3 -0.6 0.6 0.5 0.9 Tigers -1.7 -3.7 -3.8 1.9 2.3 2.4 ASEAN* 0.8 -1.0 -2.9 0.7 0.9 2.7 Other Asia -0.1 -0.2 -0.4 0.5 0.4 0.8 World 
-108.1 -92.8 -76.9 156.2 102.9 77.7 
Sources: The Study of the Center for International Economics, 
Washington D. C., 1990, p. 45. 
Notes: ASEAN* excludes Singapore. The figures above are based 
upon the calculation of the "World Trade Model" of the Center for International Economics, 1990. 
318 NICs here refers to all the Newly Industrializing Countries including Mexico, Brazil, etc. On the other hand, 
ANIEs are specifically referred to as the Asian four tigers or dragons, Korea, Singapore, Taiwan and Hong Kong. What differentiates the NICs from LDCs (Less Developed Countries) is 
that NICs broke free from the vicious circle of underdevelopment in terms of both the production and foreign trade structures 
associated with it, namely heavy concentration on exports of a few primary products. As a result they are rapidly closing the 
gap with the developed countries (Dcs) in terms of their income levels and they are increasingly developing a similar economic 
structure. Quoted in EC-NICs Trade: A Statistical Analysis, 
1991, p. 11, published by the Office for Official Publications of the European Communities. 
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Table 3.8: Simulation Results, Korean Exports to the 
1993-98, US billion 1 
EU 
1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 
Baseline Estimations 77.1 85.3 95.5 105.6 116.4 128.3 
Hypothetical Est. 74.3 84.2 95.0 105.7 117.1 129.8 
Price Effect -3.4 -2.6 -2.4 -2.2 -1.8 -1.2 Growth Effect +0.7 +1.5 +2.0 +2.3 +2.6 +2.8 
Source: Han, Sun-Taik, p. 17. 
Nah and Hong adopt a partial equilibrium analysis in that 
it considers the production, consumption and trade flow of goods 
in a singe market both before the introduction of the 1992 
Project and after its completion. They explain that the price 
effect of EC market integration, in other words, the price 
reduction effects of EC goods coming from the SEM, is 
unexpectedly small. According to their statistics, the 
immediate effect of price reduction of EC goods coming from SEM 
Will reduce Korean export to the EC by 2.42 percent on average. 
The long-term dynamic effects of economies of scale and 
increased competition will reduce the export by 5.45-5.82 
percent on average. Judging from the above figures, what really 
worries Koreans is the non-price effects of EC integration such 
as the external non-tariff barriers imposed by either individual 
member countries or at the EC. The EC's protectionist measures, 
such as import restriction count much more than the price effect 
of the SEM. 
Table 3.9: The Share of Korean Exporting Goods Under EC's 
Import Restriction Measure 
Year 1987 1988 1989 1990(Jan-Mar) 
Share 41.0 33.7 22.3 18.6 
Source: Economic Planning Board, ROK 
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The trade barriers of the EU within the region have been 
lowered as EU integration has proceeded according to the 
timetable of the 1992 Project. 316 At the same time, external 
non-tariff barriers were built up during the transitional period 
in the name of reciprocity317 or in the name of the protection 
of EU industries. Apart from the 1992 Project, protectionism is 
expected to affect Korean exports to EU considerably. Though it 
is premature to estimate the effects of non-tariff barriers on 
Korean exports to the EU, we gain some insight indirectly by 
analysing the effects of existing non-tariff barriers on Korean 
export to the EU. As is shown in the above table 3.9, the share 
of export goods under the EU's import restriction as a 
percentage of the total export to the EU is declining 
considerably. The implication of the data is that the effects 
of external non-trade barriers, including import restrictions, 
are much more important than the direct effects of the 1992 
316 
The Commission's official estimates involved 
calculations of: 1) short-term barrier removal effects; stage 1- 
costs of barriers affecting trade; stage 2- costs of barriers 
affecting all production and 2) long-term market integration 
effects; stage 3- economies of scale from restructuring and increased production; stage 4- competition effects on inefficiency 
and monopoly rents. Quoted in Klaus Heidensohn, Europe and World Trade, 1995, p. 38. 
317. The critics of the new reciprocity, especially those in the foreign official community, maintain that it is thinly disguised protectionism. Ironically, key sponsors of 
reciprocity legislation consider it a preferable alternative to 
protection, one that is designed to address trade pressures by increasing u. s imports. Indeed, groups are normally most inclined to support proposals regarding such legislation. Quoted in William R. Cline, "Reciprocity: A New Approach to 
World Trade Policy, " in William R. Cline, (ed), Trade Policy in 
1980s, Washington D. C: Institute for International Economics, 
1986, pp. 121-22. 
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project itself . 318 
Since 1986, the amount of trade between the two trading 
partners has increased tremendously. In 1989, the total amount 
of trade reached US$14 billion or about 12 percent of Korea's 
foreign trade. 319 After the U. S. A. and Japan, the EU is 
Korea's third largest trading partner. Excessive dependence on 
the U. S. A. and Japan for import sources is an unhealthy feature 
of the Korean economy which urgently requires Korea to develop 
another import source, and which bodes well for further 
expansion of trade between the two trading partners. 
There exist also some problems between the two trading 
partners. The EU considers the Korean Market as a protected one 
despite the fact that the current liberalization efforts are 
playing some positive role in reducing the trade friction. In 
1987 negotiations with the EC Commission on legal protection for 
copyrights fell, the EC canceled Korea's GSP status. This is 
recorded as the EC's first withdrawal of trade preferences for 
a developing country, which clearly indicates the increased 
trade friction between the two trading partners. Korea and 
other Far Eastern nations have been the target of the EC's 
toughest talk on trade. The EC has taken action against 
Japanese and Korean exports allegedly being "dumped. " Korean 
exporters have already found some barriers standing in the way 
of their textile goods and consumer electronic products. Export 
318 Ibid., pp. 124-25. 
319 For recent statistics of EU-Korean trade, see the introduction of this thesis, specifically on the justification 
of the study. 
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encountering barriers are expected in the future. By the end of 
1989, more than 30 Voluntary Export Restraints (VER) were in 
place, and investigations were underway for anti-dumping 
measures, and provisional anti-dumping duties of 30 percent were 
at that time imposed on VTRs, despite a voluntary temporary halt 
to shipments from Korea. 
The SEM would eliminate the trade barriers between the 15 
EU states. It is also true that the free movement of goods and 
services within the community with the Community standards, will 
benefit Korean exporters. If those programmes are implemented 
with the image of "fortress Europe", the international trading 
system will be in great danger. 32° The Single European Act is 
likely to heighten competition among participants in the EU 
markets. In 1989 cross-border acquisitions involving European 
companies totalled a record of more than 50 billion ECU (US$ 55 
billion). The majority of them were spurred by the 
consideration that the need for competition from stronger 
European companies after 1992 was expected to be greater not 
only in the EU but also Asia, the US, and elsewhere. 321 
The 1992 Project has both negative and positive 
implications for Korea. More than the price effect of the EU's 
integration after the 1992 Project, the non-price effect coming 
from non-tariff barriers caused by protectionist external policy 
'2O. Chae Woong Lee, 11 The EC 1992: Trade Implications for 
Korea", Korea and World Affairs, Seoul: Research Centre for 
Peace and Reunification of Korea, Spring, 1990, pp. 54-59. 
'31 Ibid., pp. 64-65. 
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is surely of great concern to Koreans. 322 The impact of the 
completion of the internal market and the impact of the increase 
of protectionism are both, by and large, related to the future 
export pattern from Korea to the EU. There is a possibility 
that protectionism against the Korean economy will be more 
strengthened, considering the characteristics of Korean economic 
structure. As Korea's export structure has been evolving from 
traditional labour-intensive products to technology and capital- 
intensive items such as colour TVs, VCRs and microwave ovens, 
the intra-regional, sectoral impact of integration is likely to 
have a significantly adverse effect on the overall prospects of 
Koran exports. 323 
3.1.3 From Complementarity to Competition in ROK-EU 
Trade 
Korea's market diversification strategy is an effort to 
reduce heavy dependence on Japan and the US, curtailing external 
vulnerability. The Ministry of Trade and Industry's 1988 
statistics explains this heavy dependence on the two world 
322 On the effect of the SEM, see A. Smith and A. J. 
Venables, "The cost of non-Europe: An Assessment based on a 
Formal Model of Imperfect Competition and Economies of Scale, " 
in Commission of the EC, Research on the Cost of Non-Europe: 
Basic Findings, 2,21, Brussels, 1988; D. Swann (ed. ), The 
Single European Market and Beyond -A Study of the Wider 
Implications of the Single European Act, London: Routledge, 
1992. 
Smith and Venables tried to estimate the effects of increased 
competition and market integration assuming non-competitive 
markets. Abolishing internal trade barriers would have the 
following effects: internal imports would increase by 45 
percent; external imports would be reduced by 25 percent; and 
the Union's exports would increase by 6 percent. 
323 Han, Sun-Taik, op. cit., p. 20. 
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economic powers. The United States traditionally has been 
Korea's biggest export market (35.3% of total exports), Japan 
next (19.8%) and third, the EU (13.4%) in 1993. The volume of 
trade with the EU has recently been improved by a gradual 
increase as a proportion of total exports to foreign 
nations . '2' 
Table 3.10: Korea's Exports to the EC by 
Country(millions of US$) 
1980 1982 1984 1986 1987 1988 
EC total in 1988 2,871 3,027 3,460 4,656 7,415 8,708 
West Germany 875 753 924 1,242 2,002 2,368 
UK 573 1,099 955 1,034 1,525 1,951 
France 291 259 288 543 880 1,070 
Netherlands 350 350 373 503 770 825 
Italy 229 154 288 319 552 733 
Others 553 412 632 984 1,686 1,761 
Source: Korea Foreign Trade Association, The Trends of Foreign 
Trade, 1988. 
Table 3.11: Korea's Imports from the EC by Country(millions 
of US$) 
1980 1982 1984 1986 1987 1988 
EC total in 1988 1,837 1,949 3,252 3,720 5,290 6,396 
West Germany 637 680 795 1,216 1,799 2,074 
UK 304 403 565 454 722 915 
France 191 224 347 706 784 1,135 
Netherlands 87 110 303 185 266 511 
Italy 119 122 205 310 536 638 
Others 499 410 1,037 849 1,183 1,123 
Source: Korea Foreign Trade Association 
In 1993, Korea was the 16th largest trading partner with an 
import value of 7,724,166,000 ECU, and export value of 
7,671,000,000 ECU. The total amount of export and import 
324. Korea Foreign Trade Association statistics, various 
years. 
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combined was 15,395,166,000 ECU, together making 1.6 percent of 
the EU total trade volume. "' 
A detailed analysis of export and import items by 
classification of industrial supplies, capital equipment, 
consumer non-durable and consumer durable suggests that Korea-EU 
economic relations were mutually complementary rather than 
competitive in the 1980s. However, entering the 1990s, trade 
friction occurred in high-technology sectors. The general 
pattern of trade is that the EU provides industrial materials 
and capital equipment in exchange for durable and non-durable 
consumer goods. Korea was in 1988 competitive in its non- 
durable and durable consumer goods of exports such as clothing, 
electrical appliances and sundries, while industrial supplies 
and capital goods such as industrial machinery, accounted for 
the majority of the EC's total exports to Korea in 1988. In 
achieving Korea's diversification strategy, the trade structure 
between the EU and Korea has very significant implications. Te 
geographical locations of the EU has been one of the prime 
reasons why Korea's trade with the EU has been comparatively 
neglected. Cultural differences have added to the negative 
factors. However, according to the data of the Economic Planning 
Board of the ROK, from 1988 onward, reliance of Korean exports 
on the U. S market has diminished, while Korea's exports to Japan 
and the EU market have increased respectively from 15 percent 
and 11 percent in 1985 to 20 percent and 13 percent in 1988 
respectively. 
325 Eurostat, 1994. 
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Table 3.12: Comparison of the EC's Trade with Leading Asian 
Nations, 1988 million: ECU 
Nations Korea Japan Taiwan Hong Kong PRC 
Total Balance-2.646 -24.035 -3.515 500 -1,158 
Source: KOTRA Statistics, Republic of Korea 
For the EU, in 1988, Korea ranked as the 13th import source 
and the 20th export partner, accounting for 1.8 percent of the 
EU's imports and -0.8 percent of the EU's exports. 326 In 1992, 
among the East Asian nations, Korea ranked second to Japan in 
its total trade volume, of exports and imports combined. Out of 
a total 141,784 million ECU, Korea advocated 13,662 million ECU with the 
balance, -1,198 million ECU with the EU. 327 
Table 3.13: Overall Trade 
(millions of 
Between 
US$, %) 
Korea and the EC 
year 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 
Trade Volume 6,304 7,520 11,208 14,178 11,372 
Exports 3,246 4,305 6,597 8,131 7,394 
(10.7) (14.0) ) 1 ( ( 
Imports 3,058 3,215 613 4 6,047 5,342 
( 9 ) 1 (11.2) ( ( (10 
Total Balance 188 090 1 1 987 2,084 688 
Note: Figures in parentheses represent the share in total exports or import. 
Source: Economic Planning Board of South Korea 
Complementarity is partially being replaced by competition 
in mutual trade. The EU provides industrial materials and 
capital equipment in exchange for textiles, clothing, footwear, 
travel goods, TVs, radios, VCRs, toys and athletic goods, 
326 In 1993, Korea's trade with the EU reached 1.6 percent 
of the EU's total trade amount, export and value combined. 
327. Derived from the table: The European Union's Trade with the 
Countries of Asia in 1992, in The European Commission, Toward a New Asian 
Strategy, 1994, p. 31. 
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artificial plastic goods, and so on. 328 
Table 3.15: Major Trade Items (unit: %) 
Exports to EC Imports from EC 
Share of total 1988 export Share of total 1988 import 
clothing 22.7 Chemical product 28.9 
Footwear 7.0 General Machinery 21.6 
Home Electrical Electrical/Electronics 10.5 
goods 24.7 
Total 54.4 Total 61.0 
Source: Korea Economic Planning Board 
Looking into the structure of the goods exported to the EU 
by Korea, it is easy to reach one conclusion: Korean interest, 
brought about by the process of European integration, is still 
very much influenced by traditional merchandise trade and its 
growth potential rather than by capital transactions and trade 
in services. A conspicuous development entering the 1990s was 
the rapid increase of Korea's electronics exports to the EU. In 
some items like semiconductors, Korea is leading the world 
markets. 
Until 1990, direct exports were favoured by Korean 
exporters. However, in recent years, Foreign Direct Investment 
(FDI) within the local market has increased gradually, 
irrespective of the decline in the level of external protection 
in the EU and the level of local content requirement. The role 
of FDI as a means of getting around trade barriers and supplying 
the large integrated market has been accorded much attention, 
"°. Capital equipment: electrical & non-electric machinery, transport equipment. Korea has been competitive in its non- durable and durable consumer goods(61 percent of exports in 1988, while industrial goods and capital goods accounted for 91% 
of the EC's total exports to Korea in 1988. 
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thus deserving systematic study. The EU indeed became the 
largest market in the world in terms of population, trade 
volume, Gross domestic product and industrial production. In 
terms of exports, the EU accounted for between 10 to 15 percent 
of total Korean exports including electric and electronic 
equipment (35 percent of total exports), textile products and 
apparel (25 percent) and footwear (7 percent) during the 1980s. 
Also in terms of imports, the EU accounted for between 7 to 12 
Percent of total Korean imports whose major items include 
machinery (22 percent of total imports), chemicals(15 percent), 
electric and electronic equipment (11 percent). 
Table 3. 15: EC's Demand for Korea's Exports: Rapi dly 
Increasing Item(86-88) 
(Growth rates(%), Millions of Dollars) 
SITC 2-Digit SITC 4-Digit 86-88 
Exports(88) 
Toys Toys 65 158 
Footwear 54 297 
Manufactured Metal Domestic Appliance 48 66 
Container 94 180 
Utensils 63 71 
Electronics Semiconductor 54 375 
Telecommunication Equip 167 103 
Computer and Accessories 53 657 Motor Vehicles Automobiles 66 113 
Plastics Fishing Equipment 78 82 
Other Musical Instruments 64 76 
Note: Goods are selected on the basis of export volumes 
Source: Korea Foreign Trade Association 
As table 3.15 shows, the major items of Korea's export 
increase have been electronics, footwear, toys, etc. The 
erosion of EU competitiveness and the sharpening of Korea's 
competitiveness have created a new dimension of competition in 
the high-technology field. The case study of Korea's 
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electronics industry, presented later, will illuminate this new 
phase of development. 
Asian nations had previously been in an unfavourable 
situation, with preferential access to the EU market limited to 
the tariff concessions available under the Community's GSP 
scheme. The two tables below demonstrate this rapid expansion. 
As a result of the sharp rise in their exports in 1991, Asian 
countries accounted for as much as 45 percent of all developing 
country exports to the EU, as compared to 15 percent in 
1980.329 The ROK has been at the core of this expansion. 
Table 3.16: EU Trade with Asia, 1980,1985 and 1990-1993 
(in billion ECU) 
1980 1985 1990 1991 1992 1993 
Imports 21(23) 32(3) 57(5) 69(21) 72(5) 81(12) 
Exports 16(7) 36(19) 48(0) 51(10) 56(9) 71(27) 
Trade Balance -5 4 -9 -18 -16 -10 
Source: Eurostat 
Percentage Change over previous years in brackets 
Table 3.17: EU Imports from NICs in Asian Developing 
nations, 1985 and 1993(in billion ECU and 
Percentage shares) 
1985 1993 
Total Imports 32(100%) 81(100%) 
NIC's Imports 14(45%) 31(38%) 
Source: Eurostat 
NICs means the four dragons: South Korea, Singapore, Taiwan, and 
Hong Kong. 
From the point of view of developing nations, the status of 
Korea has been tremendously upgraded in its significance to the 
329 The European Commission, EC and Developing Countries, 
1994, p. 23. 
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EU. Korea's rank among the 15 leading exporters to the EC 
(including oil-exporting countries), moved from 14th to 5th in 
a 13-year period from 1980 to 1993. This development 
accompanied a change in trade structure with the EU from a 
labour-intensive dimension to a capital or technology-intensive 
dimension, with the implication that the relatively 
complementary position of EU-Korean trade in the 1970s and 1980s 
is shifting to a more competitive one. ` Markets for EU 
exports are likely to be the developing nations. The EU's 
biggest export markets in the developing world are also major 
exporters to the EU. 3' 
3.1.3 Major Mechanisms to Restrict the ROK's Exports into 
the EU 
a) Anti-Dumping and Countervailing Duty 
Dumping usually happens when the export price of a product 
is less than in its home market or lower than the cost of 
production. 12 The instance occurs when the dumping firm 
discriminates among different purchasers of the same item. Such 
practices usually distort the original spirit of fair 
"o" In 1980, Korea ranked 14th with 2,079 million ECU and 1993, Korea ranked 5th with 7,735 million ECU. Excluding oil 
exporting nations, in 1980, Korea ranked 5th with 2,079 million 
ECU and 1993 ranked 4th with 7.735 million ECU. 
331. Out of the 15 leading markets for the EU exports, 1980 
and 1993, South Korea was the 6th largest EU exporting market 
with 7,553 million ECU. 
3'2. On the general picture of anti-dumping in international trade, see John H. Jackson & Edwin A. Vermulst (eds. ), Anti- 
dumping Law and Practice: A Comparative Study, London and New York: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1989, pp. 1-23. 
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competition which is the cornerstone of the liberalization of 
the world trade. 333 
Anti-dumping330 is usually resolved through unhealthy 
measures involving Voluntary Exports Restraints (VERS), 
Voluntary Import Expansions (VIEs), and other price controlling 
mechanisms, which clearly encourages illiberal and bilaterally- 
managed trade practices. Anti-dumping policies, it is often 
claimed, preserve competition by shielding producers from 
predatory and monopolistic practices which would otherwise drive 
them out of business . 33 According to de Jonquieres and Tucker, 
the EU anti-dumping reformers say they are not out to abolish 
anti-dumping policy, but simply to get existing rules 
implemented in a more even-handed way. One of their strongest 
complaints is that procedures have long been biased in favour of 
aggrieved producers and have taken little account of competition 
33. As the head of the European commission's industry Directorate in January 1995, Dr Stefano Micossi judged that the 
anti-dumping cases raised serious economic and competition 
policy concerns. The Financial Times, 19 October 1995, reports that a drive is gaining strength in Brussels to reform the policy. The EU is expected to apply stricter criteria when investigating dumping. Trade economists say the policy undermines global trade liberalization, hurts consumers and 
shelters inefficient producers. 
334The specific rules to govern the EU's anti-dumping legislation were laid down in Council Regulation No 2423/88 
which permits the EU to take anti-dumping measures provided : 
1)there is evidence of dumped imports; 
2)industry in the Community has been injured or threatens 
to be injured by the dumped imports; 
3)intervention is in the Community's interest. 
335. Guy de Jonquieres and Emma Tucker, "Pressure builds for EU to dump its dumping policy- Opponents say that penalties undermine trade liberalization, hurt consumers and shelter inefficient 
producers, " Financial Times, Thursday 19 October 1995, p, 7. 
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in the market concerned, overall economic welfare, international 
trade patterns or the views of consumers. 
336 
The general principle of the GATT clearly restricts the 
unfair abuse of anti-dumping. The Article XIX [see Appendix] of 
the GATT allows signatory nations to provide temporary 
protection from a sudden influx of dumping imports, especially 
when the sudden imports leads to serious injury of the domestic 
industry; also when imports are unfairly priced or supported by 
subsidy of exporting nations. Article VI [see Appendix] of the 
GATT permits the imposition of countervailing duties aimed at 
restoring fair trade practices. The GATT rules, however, 
stopped short of giving sufficient explanation as to what 
constitutes evidence of predatory intent or of threat to an 
otherwise competitive market. Nor do provisions of the GATT 
make any reference to consumer interests. 
The achievements of the Uruguay Round global trade records 
would be undermined by governments resorting to abuse of fair 
practices to protect national interests. "' Mr. Peter 
Sutherland, GATT director-general argues that in a review of 
developments in the trading system since spring 1993, confidence 
in the new system depended on a willingness to abide by the 
letter and spirit of the World Trade organization, which 
36 Despite such criticisms, the EU's regime still has staunch defenders, particularly among southern member states. 
337. On the Uruguay Round anti-dumping agreement, see Gary N. Horlick and Eleanor C. Shea, "The World Trade Organization Anti-Dumping Agreement", Journal of World Trade, Vol. 29, February 1995, pp. 4-31. 
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succeeded the GATT in January of 1995.38 He urged judicious 
use of countries' room for manoeuvre in implementing the Uruguay 
Round records in order not to erode the benefits for world 
trade. His anxieties centred on the growing use of anti-dumping 
actions to keep out cheap imports, and the proliferation of 
regional trade groupings. Though both are permissible in 
principle under international trade rules, they are increasingly 
seen as stretching those rules to the limit and beyond. 339 In 
the first annual report of the WTO, it is also noticed that 
anti-dumping and countervailing duty actions continue to play a 
338 Frances Williams, "Sutherland warns over growing 
recourse to anti-dumping", Financial Times, 16, December, 1994. 
339. Of 91 requests for consultation between 1989 and 1994, the first step in GATT's disputes settlements procedure, a 
quarter related to anti-dumping actions. This partly reflects the rising numbers of such actions and partly "an increasingly 
wide gap in perceptions of the acceptable limits of actions". 
After a peak of 251 cases in 1992-3, the number of anti-dumping investigations launched by the 25 members of GATT's anti-dumping 
code dropped back to 226 in 1993-4. However, 'this drop mainly 
reflected the earlier surge in suits brought by US and Canadian 
steel producers. Investigations initiated by the European Union 
and Brazil have risen sharply, leaving the EU and the US joint "leader" in 1993-4 with 47 cases each, followed by Australia and Brazil. The US had by far the largest number of anti-dumping 
measures in force-306 in June 1994, up from 279 a year earlier- 
while the EU came second with 157, down from 185 the previous 
year. However, the report points out that the most frequent 
users of anti-dumping actions are also frequent targets. EU 
companies head the list (89 cases in the two years to mid-1994), 
with almost half the cases concerning Germany and France. China 
was the biggest single country subject to investigation (58 
cases), followed by the US (45). The last couple of years also 
witnessed more anti-dumping suits against imports from eastern Europe, notably Russia and Ukraine. The GATT report says new 
regional trading arrangements -all in Europe - were notified to GATT between April 1993 and November 1994, bringing to 40 the total notified over the past five years. Also it is generally 
admitted that GATT's procedures for examining the consistency of free trade pacts with fair trade rules are inadequate. Virtually none of the working parties set up to examine regional trade arrangements has been able to agree on their GATT 
conformity. Financial Times 
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prominent role in the trade regimes of the US, the EU and 
increasingly of developing nations. "" 
The proliferation of regional trade groupings coincided 
with the rapid rise of use of anti-dumping cases. As a 
legitimate form of discriminatory protection3', which was made 
more restrictive in new EC legislation, the use of this tool 
rose in the 1980s. The majority of cases up to the end of the 
1980s were initiated by the EU (300 cases) and the U. S. (700 
Cases) till the end of the 1980s. In the five-year period from 
1988 to 1992"2, the EC launched 169 anti-dumping 
investigations, involving 40 countries, including the People's 
Republic of China (28 investigations), South Korea (15), and the 
former Yugoslavia (9). Most developing countries against which 
investigations were launched were Asian, and included Taiwan 
(6), Thailand (6), India (4), Indonesia (3) and Singapore (3). 
The sectors most involved were chemicals and electronics. "' 
The growth of anti-dumping procedures as a protectionist 
device is to be found in the relatively high concentration of 
anti-dumping cases across industries and relatively low 
concentration across exporting nations. Looking at the 
"O Frances Williams, " WTO chief tries to avoid 
confrontation", Financial Times, Thursday December 14 1995, p. 6. 
31. Brian Hindley in his writing, "Trade Policy of the EC, " in P. Minsford (ed. ), The Cost of Europe, Manchester and New York: Manchester University Press, 1992, however, points out the 
Possibility of using specific tricks in favour of anti-dumping 
complaints, especially where there is no readily available information on the reference price of a product. 
"'. The EU Commission, EC and Developing World, 1994, p. 12. 
"'. In Korea's electronics export to the EU, this mechanism has been playing a impeding role. 
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investigations initiated by exporting country from the period of 
1980-1988 and 1985-1992, it is clear that the majority of the 
cases were against Japan and the ANIEs, reflecting the recent 
emphasis on high-technology products. "` 
Table 3.18 : European Community 
subsidy Cases and 
Anti-dumping and Anti- 
outcomes, 1980-1988 
1980-1983 1984-1986 1987-1988 
Investigations Initiated 131 123 105 
Provisional Duties Imposed 35 42 34 
Investigations Terminated 149 132 86 
Definitive Duty 25 33 22 
Price Undertaking 88 58 40 
Change in Market Situation 4 - - No Dumping Finding 17 1 - 
No Subsidy Finding 1 1 - 
No Injury finding 13 23 12 
Others 1 9 8 
Source: Commission's Report on the community's Anti-dumping and 
Anti-subsidy Activities, various years up to 1987. 
For the statistics for 1988, See the Official Journal of the EC. 
Table 3.19: Investigations Initiated by Exporting 
Country, 1980-1988 
1980-1982 1983-1985 1986-1988 
U. S. A. 21 2 2 
Japan 5 10 14 
Other DMEs 17 27 6 
Asian NIEs 3 5 22 
Other LDCs 20 29 31 
Of Wh. Yugoslavia 4 12 10 
NMEs Of Wh. China 7 5 - 
Total 131 123 105 
DMEs: Developed Market Economies; 
NIES: Newly Industrializing Economies; 
NMEs: Non-market Economies 
Source: Commission's Report 
"'. For more information on the distribution of cases, See 
Finger, J. Michael, and Julio Nogues, "International Control of 
subsidies and Countervailing duties", The World Bank Economic 
Review, 1(4), 1987, pp. 707-25. 
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Table 3.20: Community Anti-dumping and Anti-subsidy 
Investigations Initiated by Broad Industry 
Group, 1980-1986 
Total 1980-1982 1983-1985 1986-1988 
Chemical and allied 141 60 35 46 
Textile and allied 26 3 5 18 
Wood and Paper 24 8 13 3 
Mechanical Engineering 68 26 22 20 
Iron & Steel 42 17 13 12 
Other Metals 18 6 8 4 
Others 40 11 27 2 
Total 359 131 123 105 
Source: Commission's Report 
Table 3.21: Anti-dumping Investigations Initiated(1985-92) 
Initiator Total No. of Nations Advanced Asia The rest 
Total 1,040 474 297 269 
Australia 278 144 87 47 
Canada 128 73 31 24 
EU 159 42 51 66 
USA 298 131 80 87 
Korea 9 8 1 0 
Advanced 924 401 274 249 
Developing 91 49 23 19 
Source: GATT 
The Steel & Chemical sectors have been subject to a larger 
proportion of investigations. it is clear that this instrument 
has been a major tool of the advanced nations. Out of the 
total 1,040 investigations initiated from 1985 to 1992, advanced 
nations accounted for 924 investigations, while developing group 
initiated 91 investigations. 
On commodity structure, Patrick. A. Messerlin"' 
indicates that mechanical engineering also has a high incidence. 
Most involved were chemicals and electronics. Trade is subject 
"s. Patrick A. Messerlin, Experiences of Developing 
countries with Anti-dumping Laws, mimeographed, World Bank, 
1988. 
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to protectionist instruments in special VRA. Anti-dumping 
actions contain a strong protectionist trend. 
Table 3.22: EC Anti-Dumping Investigations, 1985-1989 
Affected countries 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 Main affected 
Products 
All countries 36 24 39 40 28 
East Asia 75 20 26 13 
Japan 21 10 43 Semiconductors, 
Audio 
printers 
South Korea 
Taiwan 
Hong Kong 
polyester, denim 
1 1 5 7 1 
2 - 3 1 1 
- - 1 3 2 
CD players, TV 
receivers, mobile 
telephones, 
computer- 
cassettes and 
tapes 
electronic 
typewriters 
weighing scales, 
hydraulic 
excavators 
tungsten, 
ammonium, mica 
urea 
Other East Asia 2 3 1 11 6 TV receivers, 
Typewriter 
ribbons 
Bearings 
China 1 2 7 -5 tungsten, denim, 
slippers, 
ammonium, 
urea 
Latin America 5 4 5 -1 Brazil 2 2 1 -- kraftpaper, steel 
tubes, and coils, 
polyester, urea 
Mexico 1 1 3 -- Eastern Europe 14 11 8 11 9 electric motors, 
cement, steel 
sheets, 
Yugoslavia 5 4 3 32 tubes, and coils, 
mercury, 
fertilizers, 
potassium, urea 
Source: EC Commission data 
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Measures in the last 2-3 years have usually occurred in the 
area of high-technology products, and were mainly directed 
against Japan and Korea. Recent cases were mostly against the 
ANIEs. As we can see from the tables, all actions except just 
one, from 1984-1988, have been aimed at East Asian nations. 
Korea has been one of the most frequent targets of the anti- 
dumping impositions. 
In addition to a new stress on high-tech products, the EU 
anti-dumping instruments are employed against firms that 
establish plants within the community; the EU anti-dumping 
regulations have been revised to make this applicable. 
""' 
Brian Hindley"' clearly explains the process of anti- 
dumping investigations. An individual or firm may submit a 
complaint and request for anti-dumping action. The majority of 
such complaints have been brought by associations of EU 
manufacturers. If the Commission discovers some evidence of 
dumping, it consults with an advisory committee of member state 
representatives. If there is insufficient evidence, the case is 
dropped. In the opposite case, the Commission proceeds with an 
investigation, examining the records of importers, producers and 
other relevant bodies, including the records of exporting firms, 
36. Regulation No. 1761/87. 
Where a product has been found to be dumped, and since the action was initiated, the firms concerned have begun to 
assemble that product within the territory of the EC, in this 
case, anti-dumping duty is extended to the imported components 
without the procedure of a new anti-dumping investigation into imported parts. 
"' Brian Hindley, "Dumping and the Far East Trade of the 
EC", The World Economy, 11. (4), December, 1988, pp. 445-63. 
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provided that there is no objection from the national 
government. When some time has passed, after consultation with 
the advisory committee, a provisional duty may be imposed, which 
may later be removed if dumping is not established. Undertakings 
on prices or volume of exports made by exporting firms can lead 
the Commission, after consultation, to stop the case. However, 
the exporting firm is required regularly to provide information 
proving that the undertaking is being respected. In other 
cases, the Commission may propose that an anti-dumping duty be 
imposed by the Council, backed by qualified majority voting. The 
most important part of the investigation involves the 
calculation of the dumping margin. Article VI (1) [see 
Appendix] of the GATT gives three possible bases for 
calculations: The first one is the difference between the export 
price and the selling price in the nation. The second one is 
between the export price and the highest comparable price for 
export to a third nation. The third one is the difference 
between the export price and construction price. Construction 
price is the cost of production plus a reasonable sum for 
selling costs and profits. The difficulty lies in the room for 
differentiation on the calculations. The EU Commission has 
defended itself by emphasizing that anti-dumping duties are much 
lower than the dumping margins established in the 
investigations 
. 34" Examples of inconsistency with 
the general 
principle of the GATT clearly indicates that the anti-dumping 
38 Christopher Norall, "New Trends in Anti-dumping 
Practice in Brussels", The World Economy, vol. 9, No. 1,1986, 
PP. 97-111. 
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practice of Brussels is surely protection-oriented. 
Table 3.23: EC Trade Barriers on Korean Exports(December 
1989) 
EC National Examples 
Quantity Restriction 
. Inter-government agreement 36 MFA, Shoes 
. Private sector agreement Electric ovens 
Colour picture 
tubes 
. Unilateral restriction 18 Canned mushrooms, 
Silverware 
Price Restriction 
. Minimum Price 15 Picture tubes, VCRs 
. Anti-dumping Polyester, Videotapes 
Shipping services 
Technical & Quality Regulation 02 
Radios , TVs, Computers 
Anti-dumping and Safeguard 52 Compact Disk 
Players 
Colour TVs, Shoes 
10 23 Total 33 cases 
Source: Economic Planning Board, ROK 
Table 3.24: Regional Comparison of Korean Exports under 
import Regulations(unit: %) 
1985 1986 1987 1988 
EC 29.5 35.7 41.0 33.7 
U. S. 43.3 33.3 26.5 19.3 
Japan 32.0 19.6 19.4 19.7 
Source: Economic Planning Board, ROK 
The two tables above show the intensified level of resort 
to non-tariff barriers, during the 1980s. 
Anti-dumping measures in the EU have been used principally 
to protect community industry against price competition 
originating from predatory dumping, price discrimination caused 
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by uncertain market situation or comparative advantage. The 
public policy is strongly regulated by special interest groups 
of the EU. Empirical data supports the assumption that anti- 
dumping and anti-subsidy investigations are more likely to take 
place where there is a high degree of concentration in the 
industry and where the growth rate of the industry output is 
low. The logic of concentration is the situation in which an 
industry is dominated by a few large firms. Empirical work 
suggests that"' anti-dumping investigations and reviews are 
triggered by complaints predominantly from highly concentrated 
sectors, especially where industry growth has been slow or 
stopped. 
Moreover, the commission has extended anti-dumping actions 
towards high-tech goods. Unusually, products assembled in the 
Community by foreign firms using imported components are now 
being subject to anti-dumping procedures and duties. The new 
insertion of anti-dumping practice in the service sector has 
alarmed many developing nations including Korea. 
The anti-dumping policy of the EU has been closely related 
to its industrial policy. The EU does not just react to 
sectoral pressures for protection, but clearly is identifying 
certain key sectors, such as consumer electronics, in areas 
where the EU has vested interests in its future business. 
Discriminatory procedures devalue the EU's credit and distort 
the original spirit of the GATT. Anti-dumping measures should 
34' Patrick A. Messerlin, GATT-Inconsistent Outcomes of 
GATT-consistent Laws: The Long-Term Evolution of the EC Anti- 
dumping Law, Mimeographed, World Bank, 1988. 
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be imposed only when there is clear evidence of predatory 
dumping. 350 The world of extended and deepened interdependence 
requires more specified and justified rules and norms to be kept 
by the trading nations. 
Table 3.25: No. of Anti-dumping Investigations(1985-1992) 
Nation which Nations which were the targets initiated 
investigation total advanced Eastern Latin Africa Asia 
nations Europe America Middleeast 
Australia 278 144 15 22 10 87 
Austria 4 0 4 0 0 0 
Brazil 14 3 3 3 0 5 
Canada 128 73 13 10 1 31 
EU 159 42 56 14 6 51 
Finland 13 2 11 0 0 0 
India 5 1 0 3 0 1 
Japan 3 0 1 0 1 1 
Korea 9 8 0 0 0 1 
Mexico 63 37 0 10 0 16 
New Zealand 31 7 0 0 0 24 
Poland 24 24 0 0 0 0 
Sweden 11 2 9 0 0 0 
USA 298 131 30 45 12 80 
Advanced Nations 924 401 128 91 30 274 
Developing 
Nations 91 49 3 16 0 23 
Total 1,040 474 132 107 30 297 
Source: GATT 
Until the. Uruguay Round, agreement on Countervailing 
duties, no clear definition and application categories on this 
duty, have been suggested since the Tokyo Round in 1979. The new 
agreement on countervailing duty classifies three categories; 
prohibited duty, cöuntervailable duty, and allowable duty. The 
350. The new council Regulation 522/94/EEC Title I makes it 
easier to take anti-dumping and countervailing duty measures by changing the decision-making mechanism from qualified voting to simple Majority, which took effect from 13 March, 1994. 
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new regulation requires all contracting parties of the WTO to 
report the details of subsidies to the Subsidy/Countervailing 
Duty Committee, which would be a basis to analyse how subsidies 
influence trade patterns. In the case of the EU, this duty has 
not been used. In contrast, the US has imposed countervailing 
duties frequently. 351 Korea has not been impeded by this 
instrument in exporting to the EU market. 
b) Quantitative Restriction and Safeguard Measures 
The 1992 programme has been and will be used as a leverage 
for restricting competition from outside. Furthermore, the 
transparent understanding of non-tariff barriers seems very 
difficult because the instruments of protectionism are operated 
at the EU decision-making level, at the member state level or at 
both, concurrently. The complex mechanism of administrative and 
legal complexities further impedes transparency. 
Michael Davenport352 says that several points should be 
understood in the Community trade policy, in order to get the 
right picture of trade regimes such as quantitative 
restrictions. European commission official used to emphasize 
that third nations would benefit from the creation of the 
internal market and be expected to undertake reciprocal action 
to open their markets to EC exports. The concept of reciprocity 
is, as Davenport indicates, well reflected by the Community's 
351 In the period 1985-1992, of a total 187 impositions, 
106 were by the US. 
352 Michael Davenport, Europe: 1992 and the Developing 
World, London: Overseas Development Institute, 1991, pp. 102-103. 
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submission in July 1989 to the GATT Negotiating Group on Textile 
and Clothing. This is the EC's own version of reciprocity. The 
summary of the submission is that contributions from all those 
involved, including the textile-exporting nations according to 
their level of development, must ensure better access to markets 
through acting on tariffs and non-tariff measures; it provides 
for derogations for balance of payments and infant industry 
reasons. 357 
Davenport pinpoints the problem by arguing that there is no 
suggestion that these contributions should be judged by a GATT 
committee or any other independent arbitrator. Clearly the 
Community thinks of itself as a judge to determine the adequacy 
of contributions. Second, the conditions are sufficiently vague 
-"according to their level of development" - for the EC to apply 
its own interpretation. Thirdly, the Community talks about 
better access to markets, not specifically markets in clothing 
and textiles, and action on derogations for balance of payment 
or infant industry reasons. The Community's own interpretation 
does not pay much attention to the GATT code of "special and 
differential treatment of the developing nations". The logic of 
its trade regimes are well read in the national politicians and 
Commission officials' claim that they are doing this to remedy 
unfair trading practices. 
In a specific Korea-EU economic interaction, the EU has 
placed trade restrictions on over 30 percent of Korea's total 
3. For more reference, see GATT, "Negotiating Group on 
Textiles and Clothing", Communications on the European 
Communities, July 1989. 
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exports, a higher ratio than that imposed on the US or Japan, 
mainly defending their positions on the ground that this was 
done to remedy unfair trading practices. 34 It is clear that 
the ever-declining international competitiveness of the EU 
industries has forced the Commission and national governments to 
employ NTBs, including minimum price regulations, countervailing 
duties and VERs against various items of Korean exports to the 
region. The table below gives statistics for the quantitative 
restrictions by the EU and national government till December 
1989. '55 
Table 3.26: EC Quantity Restriction on Korean Exports till 
Dec. 1989 
Quantity Restriction EC level National level Examples 
Inter-government agreement 36 MFA, Shoes 
Private sector agreement electric ovens 
colour picture tubes 
Unilateral restriction 18 canned mushrooms 
silverware 
's` Regional Comparison of Korean 
selected years, percentages 
Exports under NTBs, 
1985 1986 1987 1988 
EC 29.5 35.7 41.0 43.5 
Us 43.3 33.3 26.5 19.3 
Japan 32.0 19.6 19.4 19.7 
Source: Economic Planning Board of the ROK 
'°s. Restrictions on imports into the communities have, to 
a large extent, been remnants of individual member states' trade 
regimes from before the enactment of the Treaty of Rome. 
Consequently, many EU restrictions have been levied at member- 
state level and not by the Communities as a group. The EC 
restricted imports of more than 120 industrial products at the 
end of the 1980s. France and Italy accounted for virtually all 
the quantitative restrictions out of the total restrictions. The 
problem is that in the majority of cases the import quantity 
restrictions were imposed on exporting products from Japan and 
the ANIEs. 
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Source: Economic Planning Board, ROK 
Among the 18 quantity restrictions imposed by the EU and 
member nations, 14 cases were imposed by individual national 
governments, and only 4 by the EC regulation. Out of 33 trade 
friction cases between the EC and Korea up to the end of 1989, 
10 were at the Community level and 23 cases at national level. 
Table 3.27: EC Non-Tariff Instruments, Government Level and 
Product Type: Quantification for the Mid-1980s 
Government Low-skilled Scale High-tech other product 
Level labor-intensive product product 
product 
1. VER National xx xx 
EC xx xx 
2. Anti National 
-Dumping EC xx xx 
3-Counter National 
-veiling EC x 
Duties 
4. Technical Nxxx 
regulations EC xxx 
certification 
5-Public N xx x 
Procurement EC 
6. EC N xx xx 
Surveillance EC 
7. Minimum N 
Prices EC xx 
8-Quotas Nx or xx xxx 
EC 
Note: x= some utilization 
xx = frequent or severe restrictions 
The products referred to excludes agriculture. 
Source: Jacques Pelkmans, "The European Community's Trade Policy 
Towards Developing Countries", in Christopher Stevens and Joan 
Verloren van de Maat (eds. ), Europe and International Division 
of Labor: New Patterns of Trade and Investment with Developing 
Countries, London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1987, p. 21. 
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Voluntary Export Restraint(VER) is another form of quantity 
restriction. 356 Out of all the EC non-tariff instruments, the 
importance of the VER can be seen in the table below. The VER 
began to be used in the late 1970s and became popular in the 
1980s. In sectoral terms, the major targets of the regulation 
were against developing nations' textiles and clothing and 
electronic products. Korea has traditionally been a major 
exporting nation of these items to the EU market since the 
1970s. The multilateralism of the GATT is damaged by VERs. In 
the same context, the MFN principle is impeded by measures to 
limit textiles imports through unilateral restraints and permit 
the negotiation of bilateral restraint agreement. Country by 
country discriminatory trade restrictions damage the principle 
of MFN. The Safeguard Clause (GATT 19) is also abused under 
MFA for a quota. Safeguard measures should be imposed on 
imports only when a market disruption or the danger of such a 
development exist. 357 
Under the rule of the GATT Article XIX [see Appendix] or 
356 A VER is a measure imposed by an importing nation to 
ensure that an exporting country restricts the volume of its 
exports to the importing nation on a voluntary basis. It is 
usually the result of the exporting nations' agreement to keep 
to certain level. A VER is, therefore, a bilaterally agreed 
measure to restrict exports on a selective basis. Major targeted items are motor vehicles, steel, machinery, electrical 
and electronic house-hold equipment, and textiles, which have been affected by export restraint arrangements. 
357 
, The EU has recognized the need to help developing nations to increase their exports into the EU since the Treaty 
of Rome. As responsibility for trade policy lies with the EU, 
some Members states have found themselves accepting measures 
they would not have adopted by their own will. Whenever 
necessary, all Member States need to safeguard the interests of their own producers. 
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under a community instrument or agreement, the EU may impose 
safeguard actions in the case of market disruption caused by 
a sudden and sharp increase in imports. The EU have taken 18 
actions since the 1979 Tokyo Round, while the US has taken only 
4 actions. According to the European Bank for Reconstruction 
and Development (EBRD), released on 21 September 1993, due to 
the frequent imposition of anti-dumping and safeguard measures 
against Chinese and Eastern European products, the amount of 
exports to the EU diminished greatly from 1989 to 1992. The 
problem lies in the intentional application of the rules 
depending on the situation controlled by the logic of 
Politics. 358 The legal device of Council Regulation 288/82 
itself is similar to that of the Uruguay Round agreement. Korea 
has been regulated with regard to electronic ovens and CPT, etc. 
in a voluntary form. The principle of MFN and GSP with special 
and differential treatment has been interpreted according to the 
rich nations' own calculations. This is a severe breach of 
multilateralism. 
c) Rules of Origin 
In order to qualify for preferential entry into the EU, 
goods must comply with its origin rules, to ensure that the 
goods have a certain level of local processing or manufacture. 
Such goods are allowed duty-free entry. The rules of origin vary 
'ß°. The discriminatory feature of this regime was proved in 
the 1993 negotiation with Russia. The EU expressed its flexible 
attitude to refrain from using this instrument only against 
Russia. This shows a lack of consistency in its application and implementation. 
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from one group of beneficiaries to another. The rules governing 
the ACP nations are most loose and textile and clothing-relevant 
application is the most restrictive. For Korea's FDI into the 
EU, this rule matters greatly in that screwdriver factories 
which simply assemble components, or repackage finished goods 
imported from a non-member nation, are subject to 
regulation . 's' 
d) GSP of the EU 
A pyramid of trade preferences in the EU has considerable 
impact on trade flows. Almost all developing nations are 
entitled to enjoy preferential access to the EU market. 
However, its range varies according to nations. 36° The EEC in 
the mid-1971 adopted a GSP scheme based upon the principle of 
duty-free entry for nearly all manufactured products and reduced 
rates of duty for selected agricultural and processed 
agricultural products. This scheme was largely rewritten in 
1994. The substantially revised GSP introduced on 1 January 1995 
for a further 10-year period, put much weight on sensitive 
sectors such as high-technology products. One of the main 
differences between the EU's old and new GSP scheme is the way 
359. See KOTRA, The WTO Trading Environment and Marketing 
Strategy into the EU, KOTRA Material 94-30, pp. 90-97. 
360 At the peak of the EU preferences are the 70 ACP 
nations linked through the Lome Convention. Next are the developing Mediterranean countries, while the third place is 
occupied by Asian and Latin American nations, as well as a 
number of Middle East oil-producing countries, including Iran, Iraq and Kuwait. Korea has been at the bottom of this 
preference regime by the GSP scheme. Since 1988, Korea has been 
selectively benefitted by this scheme, sector by sector, and is 
expected to graduate fully. 
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in which the interests of EU manufacture are safeguarded in the 
case of the so-called sensitive products. 
In 1986, the EU introduced a policy of differentiation for 
dealing with the problem posed by the fact that a small number 
of countries were virtually monopolizing the GSP. Under this 
policy, GSP status was withdrawn from some countries in 
sensitive products areas in which they could now be deemed 
sufficiently competitive, mainly on the basis of their share of 
the EU market. The EU also added a regional cumulation clause 
to its GSP rules of origin to encourage regional economic 
groupings such as ASEAN and the Andean Pact, to utilize the GSP 
to further their integration process. 361 
The growing competitiveness of a small number of developing 
nations led to a sharp increase in the number of tariff quotas 
and ceilings"362 The successful development of the Uruguay 
Round for tariff negotiations with the active participation of 
these countries, implied that the role of GSP is now 
complementary to that of multilateral mechanisms embodied in the 
WTO. 363 The earlier policy of differentiation has been taken 
'61. See Margaret Kelly, Naheed Kirmani, et al., Issues and 
Development in International Trade Policy, IMF Occasional Paper 
No. 63, pp. loo-101. 
362 Tariff quota refers to the situation in which a 
exporting nation exceeds the fixed quota for export. 
363 The new Tariff Modulation System (TMS) replaced all 
quotas and ceilings under the new GSP scheme. All manufactured 
products now fall into four categories: very sensitive, 
sensitive, semi-sensitive, and- non-sensitive. Only non- 
sensitive products now enter the EU duty-free. The GSP duty on 
very sensitive products, for example, is 85 percent of the MFN 
rate; in other words, the margin of preference is now 15 percent 
and not 100 percent. The preference margin on sensitive product is 30 percent and on semi-sensitive product is 65 percent. 
181 
to its logical conclusion. Under the new policy of 
graduation364, the degree of competitiveness of a beneficiary 
country is measured in terms, not of a specific product as 
before, but of an entire industrial sector, such as clothing, 
footwear or consumer electronics. GSP benefits are thus 
withdrawn for the sector as a whole, in the case of nations 
considered to be sufficiently competitive to have no further 
need of them. 
The new GSP scheme of the EU plans to withdraw all GSP 
benefits from most developing countries from 1998, on the basis 
of criteria to be drawn up in 1997. The EU can also withdraw 
the benefit either partially or totally in the case of fraud, 
unfair trading practices, export of goods made by prison labour, 
the practice of forced labour and inadequate controls on export 
or transit of drugs. 
Since the EU adopted a new guideline to be applied for the 
period of 1995-2004 on 1 June 1994, Korea has to be more 
concerned with the implementation of the Uruguay Round 
Agreements, environmental and labour conditions to reflect the 
Green Round (GR) and the Blue Round (BR). As one of most newly 
and most developed nations along with Singapore, Hong Kong, and 
Taiwan, Korea is expected to be subject to sectoral graduation. 
Existing sensitive products regulated by fixed duty-free amounts 
and tariff ceilings are likely to be exempt from the scheme. 
The GSP scheme will be withdrawn in all textile sectors. 
364 The EU secured transparency and objectivity by 
explaining in detail how the development and specialization 
indices at the heart of the graduation mechanism. All this 
information is annexed to the regulation implementing the new 
GSP scheme for a4 year period from 1995-98. 
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Partial exclusion of the textile sector was applied from 1 July 
1994. Manufactured products, which account for 92 percent of 
GSP benefits as a major exporting group, will be to a large 
extent excluded from the scheme. Among the concerned sectors, 
cars, semiconductors, footwear and electronics are the prime 
targets. 365 The new guideline favours sectoral/national 
graduation and this will be a big impediment to the ANIEs, with 
an increased tariff burden. 366 
e) Tariff and other Barriers 
Since the Community's common external tariff was introduced 
in 1968, it has been lowered during the subsequent Tokyo Round 
of multilateral trade negotiations. The current average rate of 
the EU is 5.7 percent, as compared with 5.5 percent in the US, 
and those are in the process of gradually being lowered to 3.6 
percent and 3.5 percent respectively in four years time after 
365 
KOTRA Material 94-30, pp. 106-113. 
366" The Eurostat statistics of the year 1992, show that the EU total imports from Korea reached US $9,587 million dollars. 
In practice, the amount of the imports actually benefitting from the GSP scheme without duty was US $2,013 million dollars, 21 
percent of the total. Consequently, in case textile and 
manufactured goods are in practice withdrawn from this scheme, the actual burden of tariff is calculated to be US $114 million dollars, based upon the average tariff rate of 5.7 percent, 
applied to the GSP benefitted amount in 1992. This would deteriorate price competitiveness of Korean products in the EU 
market. The only way to deal with this obstacle is to promote technology-intensive products and enhance quality 
competitiveness. The more Korea moves up into high technology 
and quality-intensive goods, the fiercer will be the trade friction with the EU. 
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the official launching of the WTO, on 1 January 1995.167 
Exceptions to the common external tariffs of the EU are made for 
imports entering under its GSP scheme and under the preferential 
trade agreements that it has negotiated with other countries or 
country groups. 369 
Table 3.28: Reduced Tariff of Major Advanced Nations 
(unit: US$ mill ion, %) 
Nation MFN-applied Weighted Average reduction 
imports(192) tariff rates rate 
present after UR 
Australia 25,152 20.1 12.2 39 
Austria 5,768 10.5 7.1 32 
Canada 28,429 9.0 4.8 47 
EU 196,801 5.7 3.6 37 
Finland 4,237 5.5 3.8 31 
Iceland 334 18.2 11.5 37 
Japan 132,907 3.9 1.7 56 
New Zealan d 4,996 23.8 11.9 50 
Norway 6,192 3.6 2.0 44 
USA 297,291 5.4 3.5 35 
Switzerlan d 10,227 2.2 1.5 32 
Sweden 10,324 4.6 3.1 33 
South Afri can 
Republic 14,286 24.6 17.3 30 
Total 736,944 6.3 3.9 39 
Source: GATT Secretariat Data Base 
In non-tariff import, it was in general 20 percent before 
the Uruguay Round. After the Uruguay Round it increased 
tremendously to 44 percent. The EU application of non-tariff 
increased from 24 percent to 38 percent. In the case of Korea, 
the tariff is about to be reduced from 18 percent to 8.3 percent 
367. Since electronics are Korea's strategic export 
products, the rate'of tariff reduction on this sector will not 
be tremendous, as the current rate is relatively low in 
comparison with other sectors. 
368. The EC Commission special report, European Economy, 
1994, Appendix I. European Community Trade and Industrial 
Policies, p. 90. 
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after the Uruguay Round. 
Table 3.29: Non-Tariff Rate after the Uruguay Round 
(unit: US$ million, %) 
nation MFN-applied non-tariff rate 
import amount(192) present after UR 
EU 196,801 24 38 
Japan 132,907 35 71 
USA 297,291 10 40 
Source: GATT Data Base 
The rest of the advanced group has been omitted. 
In addition to the surveyed measure to impede the natural 
flow of Korean exports to the EU market, there exist many other 
barriers such as regulations for intellectual property 
protection and to regulate counterfeited goods; sectoral quotas 
like MFA; technical barriers, and so on. 
3.2 The Development of the ROK's Industrial Policy 
3.2.1 Government-Business Relationship 
When we talk about the miracle of the Korean economy, the 
role of government is at the core of its success. Lee, Kye- 
uk369 elaborates that the successful economic performance was 
not the result of inward-looking industrial targeting"° or 
protectionist policies; rather it was the result of outward- 
169 Lee Kye-uk, "The Role of Government in Korea's 
Industrial Development", in Lee, Kyu-uk (ed. ), Industrial 
Development Policies and Issues, Seoul: Korea Development 
Institute, 1986, p. 30. 
"o. Lee, Kye-uk defines industrial targeting as government 
measures that aim to influence the development of specific industries through protection of the domestic market and, or through provision of tax, financial, and other incentives which 
affect the allocation of productive resources. Ibid, p. 2. 
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looking industrial policies. He further argues that Korea's 
market system has always been market oriented and it has not 
been the Korean government but businessmen who saw the 
opportunities for profit, made the necessary investment and 
tried to produce in the most efficient way. The government, he 
argues, has set the basic rules for their investments through 
providing tax, financial, or market incentives for their 
investments; but the results in general have been to promote 
efficient allocation of resources in the direction of properly 
exploiting the nation's comparative advantage. 31 Edward Chen 
shares the same view, asserting that "state intervention is 
largely absent, What the state provided is simply a suitable 
environment for the entrepreneurs to perform their 
functions. 11372 More emphatically, Milton and Rose Friedman 
also argue that Korea is one of the most successful East Asian 
economies which extensively relied on private markets. "' John 
Fei further claims that the major reason for the success of the 
East Asian NICs on the policy front, can be traced to the 
"lessening of government interferences" in the market economy 
371 Ibid., p. 30. 
"2. E. K. Y. Chen, Hyper-growth in Asian Economies: A 
Comparative Study of Hong Kong, Japan, Korea, Singapore, and 
Taiwan, London: Macmillan, 1979, pp. 41-43. 
373. Friedman, M., and R. Friedman, Free to Choose: A 
Personal Statement, New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1980, 
p. 57. Quoted in Robert Wade, Governing the Market: Economic 
Theory and the Role of Government in East Asian 
Industrialization, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990, 
p. 22. 
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during the export-oriented phase. "" 
In contrast, Bronwen Dalton attaches more importance to the 
role of government. 375 She argues that the Korean economy has 
been one of the capitalist world's most tightly supervised. 
Korea's state orchestrated rapid industrialization over the past 
three decades has employed a development strategy characterized 
by its marked autonomy from social forces. Dalton is supported 
by academic argument such as the Capitalist Development State 
(CDS) thesis, which places special emphasis on the role of state 
Planning in NICs, pointing to three characteristics36 of a 
developmental state, based upon research into the role of the 
state in managing and successfully promoting economic 
development in NICs such as the ROK. 377 Parvez Hasen says that: 
"`. Fei, J., G. Ranis, and S. Kuo, Growth with Equity: The 
Taiwan Case, New York: Oxford University Press, 1979. Quoted in 
Robert Wade, 1990, p. 22. 
"s. Bronwen Dalton, "Economic Liberalization in the Republic 
of Korea", Asian Studies Review, Vol. 17, No. 2, November 1993, 
p. 63. 
376. Firstly, the developmental state is insulated from 
social forces, due to a state-society linkage to exclude other 
groups from the decision-making process, which in turn insulates 
state bureaucrats and allows them to function technocratically; A second characteristic is a high degree of state-bureaucratic 
cohesiveness, which is a general agreement among the bureaucracy 
and politicians on government-set priorities, particularly the 
overriding importance of promoting economic growth. Conflicts of 
opinion are removed, and the decision-making process is 
characterized by a readiness to accept consensus. Finally, the developmental state has a range of instruments of control 
available to ensure compliance and cooperation from other groups 
within the society. 
"'. For a general introduction to the theory see Fred Deyo (ed. ), The Political Economy of New Asian Industrialism, Ithaca, 
NY: Cornell University Press, 1987; Chalmers Johnson, " Political 
Institutions and Economic Performance: The Government-Business 
Relationship in Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan, " and Stephen 
Haggard, " The East Asian NICs in Comparative Perspective, " 
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"The Korean economy depends in large measure on private 
enterprise operating under highly centralized government 
guidance. In Korea, the government role is considerably more 
direct than that of merely setting the broad rules of the game 
and in influencing the economy directly through market forces. 
In fact, the government seems to be a participant and often 
the determining influence in nearly all business 
decisions. 11378 
Robert Wade 379 cites, Edward Mason and associates' 
similar argument in their business-government analysis: "" 
"The rapid economic growth that began in South Korea in 
the early 1960s and has accelerated since then has been a 
government-directed development in which the principal engine 
has been private enterprise. The relationship between a 
government committed to a central direction of economic 
development and a highly dynamic private sector that confronts 
the planning machinery with a continuingly changing structure 
of economic activities presents a set of interconnections 
difficult to penetrate and describe. Planning in South Korea, if it is interpreted to include not only policy formulation 
but also the techniques of policy implementation, is 
substantially more than "indicative. " The hand of government 
reaches down rather far into the activities of individual 
firms with its manipulation of incentives and disincentives. 
At the same time, the situation can in no sense be described in terms of a command economy. " 
The role of government in economic development is 
determined by industrial policy orientation. It includes many 
different elements - from a plan to aid particular industries 
Annals of the American Academy of political and social Science 
No. 55,1989. 
3e" P. Hasan, Korea, Problems and Issues in a Rapidly 
Growing Economy, Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 
1976, p. 29. Quoted in Robert Wade, 1990, p. 24. 
379 . Robert Wade, Governing the Market, 1990, p. 24. 
380 Edward Mason, et al., The Economic and Social Modernization of the Republic of Korea, Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press, 1980, p. 254. Quoted in Robert Wade, 1990, 
p. 24. 
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with subsidies, tariffs, and tax breaks to more centralized 
planning to identify growth areas for development. They are 
usually distinguished in terms of the degree of government 
intervention and objectives underlying this intervention. 78' 
George C. Lodge382 provided a basis for the classified 
representation of capitalist economies as individualistic or 
communitarianistic. Laissez-faire competition characterized by 
individualistic capitalism and centralized planning featured by 
communitarianistic characteristics are at the extremes of the 
spectrum. In the middle ground are European socialism or 
administrative guidance in Japan. 383 
Hugh Neuberger38' takes an example of US intervention the 
purpose of which is regulation. Chalmers Johnson385 takes the 
Japanese government intervention as having strongly focused on 
developing the national economy and recognizing the need to 
'gl. Richard M. Steers, Yoo Keun Shin and Gerardo R. Ungson, 
The Chabol: Korea's New Industrial Might, New York: Harper & Row 
Publishers, 1992, pp. 22-23. 
382 George C. Lodge, "Roles and Relationships of Business 
and Government, " Business in the Contemporary World, Vol. 1, 
No. 2, Winter 1989, pp. 93-108, quoted in Ibid., p. 24. 
383. The individual plays a central role in laissez-faire to 
pursue individual needs, achieve the best results for all. Centralized planning has been exemplified in the former Soviet Union or North Korea. The People's Republic of China's total 
planning of the economy is being mixed with the market 
principle. Actually, every government intervenes in the private 
sector; the only difference among them is the underlying purpose for the intervention. 
38' Hugh Neuberger, Business-Government Relations, 1983, 
The Japan Society of New York Material, quoted in Ibid., p23. 
38'. Chalmers Johnson (ed. ), The Industrial Policy Debate, 
San Francisco: Institute for Contemporary Studies, 1984, quoted 
in Chabol, p. 24. 
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shape competitive activity so that development in a particular 
direction will occur. Korea is similar to Japan. 
There are two types of industrial policies. Defensive 
industrial policies preserve existing structures, maintain 
employment, and protect beleaguered industries. ""' On the other 
hand, Adaptive industrial policies encourage and facilitate 
industrial change by providing resources from aging or declining 
sectors to more productive sectors. The specification of sunset 
or sunrise industries, as practiced by the Japanese and Korean 
governments, is an example of an adaptive industrial policy. "" 
Kim Kwang-Suk and Michael Roemer388 argue that political 
factors have always played a crucial part in promoting or 
discouraging entrepreneurial ventures in Korea. The Korean 
Miracle389 is not a triumph of individualistic capitalism, but 
of a pragmatic non-ideological mixture of market and non-market 
forces. Where the market did not work, the government showed no 
hesitation in intervening by means ranging from a friendly phone 
call to public ownership. 
386 Quantitative restrictions are a tool of defensive industrial policy. 
. Richard M. Steers, Yoo Keun Shin, and Gerardo R. 387 Ungson, op. cit., p. 25. 
388. Kim Kwang-Suk and Michael Roemer, Growth and Structural Transformation, Boston, MA: Harvard University Press, 1979. 
389 The Korean economy, indeed, has achieved remarkable 
growth during the past three decades. Korea has become the 12th largest trading nation in the world, from a poor farming nation 
thirty years ago. On the speed of the development, looking at the statistics of the period from 1962 to 1983, the most 
outstanding factor in this expansion was the growth of exports, 
which increased from $ 55 million in 1962 to $ 24.4 billion in 1983. More details are in Chapter 5. 
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As a result, the government-business relationship in Korea 
has been much stronger than in Western capitalist societies. 
Korea belongs to the category of High Performing Asian Economies 
(HPAEs), in which in one form or another, the government has 
intervened systematically, and through multiple channels to 
foster development. 390 John Page emphasized the predominant 
role of government by arguing that government policy 
interventions were conducted through "targeted and subsidized 
credit to selected industries, low deposit rates and ceilings on 
borrowing rates to increase profits and retained earnings, 
protection of domestic import substitutes, subsidies to 
declining industries, the establishment and financial support of 
government banks, public investment in applied research, firm- 
and industry specific export targets, development of export- 
marketing institutions, and wide sharing of information between 
public and private sectors. ""' The industrial policy of Korea 
has been rather similar to that of Japan in shaping competitive 
activity to achieve a particular goal. A review of the 
relationship between government and business in Korea helps 
explain the existence of many of the prominent features of the 
Korean economy. 
Korean industrial policy can be classified into three 
evolutionary stages: 1) the "take-off" period from 1961-73,2) 
the shift from general export promotion to sectoral policy from 
'90. John M. Page called the successful East Asian Economies including Korea and Japan, the High Performing Asian Economies in his article, "The East Asian Miracle: An Introduction", World 
Development, Vol. 22, No. 4. pp. 615-25. 
391 
" Ibid., p. 615. 
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1973-1979, and 3) trade and financial liberalization, from 1979 
to the present. 
392 
1) The take-off period: 1961-73 
After 1945, aggressive export policies and rapid 
industrialization were adopted with the enactment of a new 
policy to promote the inflow of foreign resources and accelerate 
exports, characterized by intervention in export promotion, 
industrial finance, and protectionism. Outward-looking 
development, the development of basic infrastructure, the 
modernization of the nation's industrial structure, the 
development of several key raw material supplying industries and 
export promotion were the major goals, with important incentives 
provided to encourage export. 393 During this period, several 
key reforms were instituted, including fiscal and monetary 
policies aimed at increasing public and private saving; a 
uniform exchange rate; and, in 1970, a free trade zone. 
Incentives in general favored export-oriented industries; but 
based upon growing domestic demand and protection of the 
domestic market. Import substitution was also accomplished in 
the areas of raw material supplying industries. Little 
industrial targeting was done by the government at this 
stage . 394 
2) Sectoral Policy: 1973-79 
392 Richard M. Steers et. al., op. cit., p. 26-29. 
393 
. Lee, Kyu-uk, op. cit., pp. 
6-7. 
39. See Kim, Kwang Suk, "outward-looking industrialization 
Strategy: the case of Korea, " in Hong and Krueger (eds. ), Trade 
and Development in Korea, KDI Press, 1975. 
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The Government-business relationship was cemented and 
intensified in this period. More typical sector-oriented import 
substitution initiatives were impeded by the desire to 
accelerate changes in Korean comparative advantage, and support 
large-scale, capital-intensive industries. Special incentives 
were granted to these strategic industries, through means such 
as tax exemptions, custom rebates, access to foreign exchange, 
and other forms of protection. Thus, from 1973-79, the 
government was deeply involved in the allocation of resources to 
promote the development of specific industries. Partially 
helped by such strong promotion by the government, and partially 
because of the inevitable maturing of Korea's industrial 
structure, heavy and chemical industries grew rapidly. '" 
The success of government initiatives in the private sector 
can be explained by the lack of capital. This made the Korean 
Chabols dependent on government for financial assistance and 
equipped the government with leverage in implementing its export 
goals. 396 The Chabols came into prominence in the 1970s. A 
Chabol can be defined as a business group consisting of large 
companies which are owned and managed by family members or 
relatives in many diversified business areas. In other words, 
it is a financial clique consisting of varied corporate 
enterprises engaged in diverse businesses and typically owned 
395 
. For details of the Korean heavy chemical 
industry 
drive, see Richard M. Auty, Economic Development and Industrial 
Policy: Korea, Brazil, Mexico, India, and China, London: 
Mansell, 1994, pp. 123-142. 
"`. Jon Woronoff, Asia's Miracle Economies, Tokyo: the 
Lotus Press, 1986. 
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and controlled by one or two interrelated family groups. "' 
The policy of selecting and supporting particular 
individuals and their companies who were considered loyal and 
reliable led to the formation of large business groups. The 
Chabols have been Korea's leading agents of the exports of 
capital goods and related services. These Chabol groups have 
spurred growth in a variety of basic and advanced industries, 
such as steel, shipbuilding, consumer electronics, 
petrochemicals, and industrial construction. "" 
3) Trade Liberalization Policy: 1979 and Onward 
Coming into the 1980s, structural difficulties arose in the 
Korean economy. The painful experience of having encouraged 
over investment in heavy and chemical industries led to a 
dilemma regarding the government's ability to choose promising 
industries for promotion. The prolonged import protection for 
many Korean industries and the restrictions on direct foreign 
investment impeded investment by Korean firms in technology and 
human resources development. To introduce more foreign 
competition into the economy, liberalization of imports and 
direct foreign investment were carried out; to promote more 
efficient allocation of resources, preferences for specific 
industries were reduced, competition-limiting activities banned, 
"' Yoo Sangjin and Lee Sang M., "Management Style and Practice of Korean Chabols", California Management Review, 
Summer 1987, pp. 95-110. 
398 Lee, Kyu-uk, op. cit., p. 28. 
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and financial reforms done. 399 
The process of import liberalization, in fact, began in 
1979, arising from the government's firm conviction that 
foreign competition was necessary for Korean industries to 
continue to maintain their competitiveness in the international 
market . 400 Korea's embarking on liberalization 
in 1979 was due 
to the recognition of the importance of indicative planning and 
the role of the market. The government began to abandon the 
former preference for large, heavy-industry firms, in favour of 
smaller and medium-sized firms. The aim of these steps was to 
reduce government intervention and open up the market to greater 
competition. 
Table 3.30: Korea's Import Liberalization Ratios 
1980 1985 1989 1990 1991 
Overall Average 68.6 87.7 95.5 96.4 97.2 
Industrial products 70.0 89.7 99.6 99.8 99.9 
Agricultural Products 55.9 66.4 71.9 83.3 84.9 
Source: Korea Development Institute 
399. See Woo Jung-en, Race to the Swift: State Finance in 
Korea's Industrialization, Princeton: Princeton University 
Press, 1990, p. 67. 
`°°. In terms of financial regulation, various state 
agencies practiced "administrative guidance" based on the implementation of a range of incentive measures and rewards, including cheap loans, subsidies, and tax breaks, as well as 
some punitive measures as a means of ensuring active 
cooperation of business to realize economic growth. The 
financial measures to control the attitudes of businessmen 
centred around the provision of cheap credit to firms which demonstrated their capacity to lead export-oriented industrialization. These policy funds were used to develop 
further their exports competitiveness by achieving greater 
economies of scale. The capacity of the state to promote export 
depended on its ability to mobilize Korea's financial markets. 
Thus, there developed a strong government-business linkage via the chain of developmental strategy and financial-market 
management. 
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The liberalization programme has progressed smoothly since 
1979. 
Over time, increased emphasis is placed on the market mechanism 
rather than on state control, in the name of economic 
efficiency, continued growth and easing international pressure. 
Table 3.31: Investment Liberalization Ratio 
1984 1987 1989 1990 1991 
All Industries 66.1 78.9 79.0 79.3 79.4 
Manufacturing 86.0 97.5 97.5 97.7 97.7 
Services 47.2 60.8 61.0 61.4 61.8 
Source: KDI 
Table 3.32: Tariff Rate 
1984 1985 1989 1990 1993 
Total Average 23.7 21.3 12.7 11.4 7.9 
Industrial Products 22.6 20.3 11.2 9.7 6.2 
Agricultural Products 31.4 28.8 20.6 19.9 16.6 
Source: KDI 
A policy of economic liberalization has been a 
strategic decision of Korea in the context of both changing 
international politics and economics, and domestic socio- 
structural arrangement. "" 
3.2.2 Korea's Industrial Policy of Deregulation and 
Liberalization 
For the promotion of EU-Korean economic exchanges, given 
the unprecedented level of global interdependence, Korea should 
comply with the international call for more market opening. 
`oi See Young, Soo-Gil, New Challenges to the Korean 
Economy and their International Implications, KDI Working Paper 
9004, Seoul, 1990; Trade Policy Problems of Republic of Korea 
and the Uruguay Round, KDI Working Paper 8913, Seoul. 
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Since the inauguration of Kim, Young Sam's government in 
February 1993, although Korea has been making efforts to open up 
further, several obstacles still exist. The globalization 
initiative includes the comprehensive and substantial opening of 
the country's domestic market. "" 
The main stumbling block for EU exporters is the existence 
of non-tariff barriers. '°' Foreign exporters still face 
structural barriers such as lengthy customs clearance time, 
ambiguous regulations and anti-consumption campaigns led by the 
private and public sector. Foreign investors suffer from lack 
of skilled workers and have to compete with Korean companies 
allegedly employing illegal foreign labour. The Korean 
government's push for self-sufficiency, Emiko Terazono argues in 
the Financial Survey on South Korea, is also bad news for the EU 
exporters. 404 Meanwhile, deregulation presents a dilemma for 
the Korean government. The government tried to use regulations 
to rein in the Chabols or conglomerates, which dominate the vast 
majority of the Korean economy. 10s Globalization means that 
402 South Korea: Trade Industry and Finance, p. 33, Financial Times, Friday October 20 1995. 
'°' According to the Political and Economic Risk Consultancy, a Hong-Kong-based consulting company, Korea ranks 
second in discrimination against foreign investment following India. 
'°` In May 1995, the Korean government announced its "import substitution" program affecting 105 products imported into Korea. This is likely to hurt the EU, since the list includes products such as machinery and electronic components, 
which the region currently provides. 
405 The tactic has so far only distorted the market 
mechanism for market entry. Restrictive measures by the 
government sheltered the Chabols and created more inefficiencies 
at the expense of small and medium-sized companies. It is 
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Korean companies should be internationalized, and Korea should 
bow to international pressure to increase opportunities for 
foreign players in the domestic market. 
The peculiar structure of the Korean economy needs the 
active cooperation of Korean Chabols as the major actors of 
globalization. Despite the recent government efforts to slim 
down operations and improve efficiency, Chabols are 
relentlessly expanding their activities. `O6 John Burton in 
his special article on Korea, "Still reluctant to take the 
plunge, " in the Financial Times survey, argues that the 
expansion of Chabol and their concentration on production 
economies of scale has created serious weakness in the 
industrial structure, at a time when Korea is on the brink of 
transformation as the trade barriers and financial struts 
propping up the protectionist economies are dismantled. `°' 
During the rapid development stage in the 1970s, an 
economic regime of development mercantilism emerged to protect 
the growth of Chabol, consisting of restricting imports to the 
level dictated by the foreign exchange constraints, while 
calling for export maximization. Various types of export 
assistance as well as widespread import restrictions in the form 
expected that deregulation will allow other Chabols to expand further. 
`06" During the half g year period, April to October, 1995, the number of subsidiaries among the top 30 chabols has increased from 623 to 647, according to the Korean government Fair Trade Commission. 
`O7 For references on the weakness of the Korean Chabol, 
see Kim, Ki-Tae, et al., The Structure of Korean Economy, Seoul: Hanoi Academy 1993. In Korean. 
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of both quantitative restrictions and high tariff, were utilized 
for launching into rapid export-led growth. A high level of 
protection and assistance, was maintained where import 
restrictions, in particular, were considered a key to both 
limiting the size of the current account deficit and promoting 
infant industries. "' 
Those conditions favourable to the growth of Chabols, 
paradoxically induced a lack of attention to research and 
development. 409 Another structural weakness of Chabols lies in 
the weak industrial foundations. The unsophisticated small and 
medium-sized firms which constitutes the extensive 
subcontracting network of Chabols, have insufficient capacity to 
provide the necessary machinery and components. Productivity 
and industrial wages lag behind those of Japan. 
Economic deregulation is dismantling trade barriers erected 
as protection from foreign competition. '1'-0 The pressure of 
financial liberalization schedule411 is forcing Chabols to turn 
`O8. Duk-Hoon Lee, The External Policy of Korea, KDI Working 
Paper No. 9205, Seoul, January 1992, p. 13. 
409. For example, aside from its cutting-edge prominence in 
computer memory chips, Korea still depends upon imported technology for most of its products. The increasing challenge 
of Korean products in the overseas market create more difficulty in receiving necessary technology from foreigners. 
41O On the other side of the coin, deregulation means 
greater autonomy of Chabols from government intervention. Some believe, in the executive sector, that they will be able to handle any adverse effects with their capacity to enter more 
markets. Their confidence largely lies in an aggressive 
overseas expansion. Newly emerging markets in Eastern Europe, Asia and Latin America will be the new source of export growth. 
`i'. The prospect for economic liberalization, including the financial sector, is generally good. Even in the event of higher levels of protectionism, a greater degree of 
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to the financial market for credit as the government reduces 
their preferential access to bank loans and abandons the low- 
interest state-subsidized state policy loans that have financed 
expansion during the past three decades. 413 
The external pressures to open the market further by 
removing non-tariff barriers and domestic deregulation and 
liberalization measures to open more foreign competition, are 
causing Chabols to establish their presence in developed 
countries by establishing manufacturing facilities and 
distribution networks, and by marketing products under their own 
brand names. Of course, this implies an active policy dimension 
to deal with the emerging protectionism of regional blocs. `13 
Asia was the initial destination for a wide range of 
smaller Korean investments in the 1970s, then North American 
followed. The European region has become a more recent focus of 
attention. According to the Korea Institute of Industrial 
Economics and Trade, FDI by Korean companies reached a 
cumulative total of $7.65 billion at the end of 1994, compared 
with just $1.5 billion at the end of the 1980s. Overseas 
liberalization will be necessary for the more complex and more 
mature Korean economy to function. A developed Korea requires 
advanced financial intermediaries, and such intermediaries will 
only emerge in a more liberalized environment. Continued 
economic growth will need more liberalization of the financial 
sector. 
412 Financial Times, Friday October 20 1995, p-31- 
413 Korean companies have been establishing worldwide 
production facilities, mainly for the purpose of escaping high 
wage costs at home, to improve penetration of the foreign 
market, to source components more easily, and to acquire more 
advanced foreign technologies. They could also take advantage 
of overseas banks and financial markets which offer lower interest rates and capital costs than in Korea. 
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manufacturing investment is increasing rapidly, especially in 
electronics, accounting already for 54.8 percent of the 
cumulative total. The globalization programme of Chabols, along 
with the government push, encourages manufacturing, marketing 
and all the main business activities in a particular nation or 
region. '" According to Andrew Baxter, as a result of their 
globalization strategy for western nations, Korean companies are 
expanding the range of their activities overseas beyond 
manufacturing to avoid anti-dumping complaints - the primary 
reason, for example, why Samsung Electronics began producing TV 
sets in Biliingham, northern England in l987. `' 
The analysis of Han, Sun-Taik"6 presents the results of 
a survey of the motivations of Korean electronics FDI in the EU. 
Market factors accounted for 89.2 percent and defensive 
motivations, i. e., securing market accessibility, were the 
primary rationale. Local content requirement and rule of origin 
are the other factors that induce forced investment. By 
41,1 Andrew Baxter argues that a twin-track strategy is 
clearly identifiable in recent overseas investment, in Financial Times, South Korea Special Report on Trade, Industry and 
Finance, Friday October 20 1995, p. 32. According to the twin- 
track strategy, in the developed world, Korean firms want market 
access and a physical presence that will mean they are increasingly viewed as multinationals, or at least international, rather than Korean. This will have the effect of 
circumventing trade barriers. In the developing world, 
locations for low-cost manufacturing are a target as domestic 
wage costs surge. Also, market access is considered, especially in countries such as China. 
`is For details on the background and management strategy 
of Samsung Electronics and FDI in Billingham, see the Case Study. 
`16. Han, Sun-Taik, European Integration: The Impact on 
Asian Newly Industrializing Economies, Paris: OECD Development 
Centre, 1992, p. 24. 
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applying local content requirements, the EU forces foreign 
companies with manufacturing facilities in Europe first, to use 
European components and then, to invest further for local 
production of parts and components. ""' 
Table 3.33: Motivations of Korean FDI into the EU 
(percentage shares) 
Motivations Share 
" to secure market access from protectionist measures 45.5 
" to explore market chances, i. e., from EC integration 
and/ or East European markets 33.7 
" as a global strategy of the headquarters 13.9" 
" to acquire high-technology or know-how 5.0 
" to benefit from skilled manpower 1.0 
" to have easy access to parts and components - 
. to benefit from low financial costs 
Source: Han, Sun-Taik's Survey, OECD 
The Korean government's globalization strategy as a part of 
industrial policy encourages a more sophisticated strategy 
different from the above ones surveyed in the two tables. 
Table 3.34: Source of Korean Firm's Price 
Competitiveness(percentage shares) 
Sources Share 
" relatively cheap supply of parts and components 41.9 
" cost-saving management or process technology 22.6 
" efficiency in production equipment and facility 22.6 
" relatively cheap salary of managers sent from 
the parent company 6.5 
" cheap labour cost 1.6 
" relatively low financial cost 1.6 
. others 3.2 
Source: Han, Sun-Taik's Survey, OECD 
As an example of Samsung Electronics strategy, the 
41'. See for details, Jun, Y. W. and S. G. Kim, The Korean 
Electronics Industry: Current Status, Perspectives and Policy 
Options, mimeo, 1989. 
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Biliingham factory serves a different dimension from the past 
ones . 418 While Billingham remains a manufacturing plant, 
Samsung's new 450 million pounds electronics complex at nearby 
Wynnard opened in October 1995. This site is going to have its 
own research and development centre to carry out product 
development and engineering. Networks of component supply are 
being developed by the Koreans in Europe. Samsung produces 
colour picture tubes at a factory in Berlin which supplies TV 
plants at Billingham and in Hungary. LG Electronics is 
considering a TV components plant in Europe. "" 
The industrial policy of Korea is moving into a new 
dimension of active policy orientations, as opposed to the past 
passive lines. The drastic liberalization and deregulation 
programme induce Chabols to develop aggressive strategies to 
remain competitive in the world market. Globalization and 
regionalization of the world economy are strong intervening 
variables to determine the industrial policy of the Korean 
government in general and Chabols' new business' strategies in 
particular. 
Actively responding to external pressures to open more 
market, the industrial policy of Korea has pursued free trade as 
a main principle since the 1980s. In specific policy measures to 
418 See the case study 
419. This means that Korean companies are at the stage of 
aggressively considering moving some of their foreign 
manufacturing locations for strategic or financial reasons. 
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adopt the EU's demand420, automatic import license approval has 
been greatly expanded, tariffs reduced, and most importantly, 
import procedures have been sharply streamlined. Protection of 
Intellectual Property Right (IPR) has been dramatically 
intensified, and service liberalization has been accelerated in 
opening the insurance market opening to European firms, opening 
capital and security markets, opening the telecommunications 
market, liberalizing maritime transportation and opening 
distribution businesses for foreign companies. The agricultural 
market has been moving towards greater liberalization since the 
Uruguay Round. 421 
According to Korean government material422, Korea's 
overall trade surplus with Europe decreased and will continue to 
decrease as Korea's market opening initiatives progress and the 
Korean economy matures. Also, the deterioration in price 
competitiveness caused by wage increases, and currency 
depreciation against those of the major European nations, 
function to decrease Korea's trade surplus with the EU. Of 
`20. As a result of Korea's policies, imports from the 
European countries increased by 20.4 percent, significantly higher than the 14.6 percent annual increase rate of overall Korean imports, for the period 1984-88. The European share of the Korean market expanded continuously from 8.4 percent in 1975 to 14.2 percent in 1990. 
421 In view of the importance of Europe as a trading 
partner, the Korean government has extended foreign currency loans to finance imports, adopted an import diversification 
programme to favour a switch to European suppliers and supported 
special trade shows and buying missions to boost imports from the European countries. 
`2'. Ministry of Trade and Industry, ROK, Toward a new Era in Korea-Europe Relations: A Growing Partnership, Seoul, 1989, 
p. 14-15. 
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course, the Korean trading system is not completely free. More 
work needs to be done. Liberalization should be carried out with 
structural adjustment. "' 
Entering the 1990s, the major thrust of Korean industrial 
policy is focused on liberalization and deregulation. If the 
growth in world trade continues and international trade is not 
constrained, then Korea will prosper. The continued growth of 
the Korean economy implies its increasing complexity and 
maturity. As a complex economy with worldwide trade links, the 
prospect for economic liberalization is good. The more economic 
liberalization is achieved, the more the state will abandon 
control mechanisms. 424 The industrial policy of Korea will move 
towards expanding bilateral economic cooperation. Korea's 
commitment to free trade is firm and will continue to be a 
building block for the EU's market expansion as Korea pushes 
continuous deregulation and its liberalization programme. 
423 - The Korean government is working strenuously to address the more fundamental issue of restructuring its economy by: 
a) Accelerating the rationalization and liberalization of its economy; b) Encouraging private industry to reduce its 
dependence on exports; c) Promoting a more evenly balanced income distribution, which would tend to boost consumer demand; 
and d) Strengthening the basic framework of a free market 
system. 
424 Bronwen Dalton, op. cit., p. 76. 
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CHAPTER FOUR. THE ROK'S ACTIVE PARTICIPATION IN THE WORLD 
ECONOMY 
In the rapid industrialization process of South Korea, 
manufacturing industry has played a key role in achieving a 
Korean miracle. In the analysis of Korea's active participation 
in the world economy, it is also vital to recognize the 
importance of exports, especially manufactured exports which 
means that South Korea has depended heavily upon access to 
foreign markets for its development. These two trends have been 
actively supported by effective state intervention, including 
measures to protect the domestic market. However, the changing 
international trading environment forces Korea to comply more 
actively with the general trend of import liberalization and 
deregulation. 
4.1 South Korea's Active Participation in the World 
Economic Structure with Korea's Strategic Focus on 
Manufacturing and Exports by Government Intervention 
Korea's economic development since the end of the Korean 
War can be characterized as a process of very rapid 
industrialization. At the end of the Korean War in 1953, the 
economy in South Korea faced huge problems. The nation was 
severely burdened by a vast overpopulation problem aggravated by 
the massive inflow of refugees from north of the 38th parallel. 
It is no exaggeration to say that the South Korean economy in 
the 1950s was characterized by a vicious circle of poverty, 
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hyperinflation and high dependency on foreign aid. `=s 
Subsequent economic growth has been led by the rapid 
development of the non-agricultural sectors, particularly 
manufacturing industries. As a result of that policy, the 
structure of national production has brought tremendous changes. 
The movement of industrial output towards more sophisticated 
manufactured product has accompanied a new phase in the share of 
manufacturing in Korea's gross domestic product. 
Table 4.1: The Structure of Korean Exports 
1961 1975 1991 
Export Percentage Export Percentage Export Percentage 
1. Iron Ore 13.0 Textile, Garments 36.2 Electronic Products28.0 
2. Tungsten 12.6 Electronic Products-9 Textile, Garments 21.5 
3. Raw Silk 6.7 Steel Products 4.6 Steel Products 6.3 
4. Anthracite5.8 Plywood 4.1 Ships 5.7 
5. Squid 5.5 Footwear 3.8 Footwear 5.3 
6. Other Fish4.5 Deep-sea Fish 3.6 Chemical Products 4.2 
7. Graphite 4.2 Ships 2.7 General Machinery 3.3 
8. Plywood 3.3 Metal Products 2.4 Automobiles 3.2 
9. Grain 3.3 Petroleum Products 1.9 Fishing Products 2.3 
10 . Animal Fur3.0 Synthetic Resin Petroleum Products 2.0 
Products 1. 7 
Total 62.0 69.9 81.9 
Source: Sakong, I1,1993. 
It is also clear that foreign trade has played a leading 
role in the process of industrialization in Korea, due to the 
scarcity of natural resources and the limited size of the 
domestic market. As a result, the maintenance of the open 
economy has been a consistent policy. 
"26. Choong Yong Ahn, " Economic Development of South Korea, 
1945-1985, : Strategies and Performance", Korea and World 
Affairs, Spring, 1986, P. 91. 
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Table 4.2 : Korea's Trade Dependence 
year 1965 1975 1985 1988 1990 1995 
Export/GNP 5.8 28.0 35.8 40.05 32.2 
Import/GNP 13.7 38.2 38.0 33.5 33.5 
Trade/GNP 19.5 66.2 73.8 74.0 65.7 
Source: Korea National Statistics Office, Major Statistics of 
the Korean Economy, Seoul, 1991. 
It is comparatively recently that Korea has been considered 
as an important trading partner in the international economy. 
In 1990, Korea's most important trading partners were Japan 
(export to Korea 6.1 percent and import from Korea 5.0 
percent) '126 the U. S. A. (export to Korea 3.7 percent and 
imports from Korea 3.7 percent) and Australia (exports to Korea 
5.7 percent and imports from Korea 2.4 percent). Korea's share 
of trade with the EU was much lower than with the three major 
Korean trade partners. Although it has been a comparatively 
recent development, the diversification strategy of the Korean 
government has caused the volume of South Korea's exports to 
increase rapidly. 
Table 4.3 : Korea's Share in Foreign Countries' Imports 
and Exports(%) 
1979 1990 
-------------- ------------------ 
Export Import Export Import 
Japan 6.1 3.1 6.1 5.0 
US 2.3 2.0 3.7 3.7 
Australia 2.7 1.0 5.7 2.4 
Canada 0.5 0.7 0.9 1.6 
EU(revised from EC) 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 
World 1.2 0.9 1.7 1.7 
Source: IMF, Direction of Trade Statistics, 1985 and 1991 
426. This means six percent of Japan's total exports. 
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In terms of total trade turnover, by 1990, Korea had become 
the 7th largest trader of the US and Japan's second largest 
trading partner. 
The historical development of Korea's industrial policies 
in the post-war period may be divided into three phases. "' 
The first phase lasted from the end of the Korean War to 1960, 
and was characterized by easy import substitution. The second 
phase encompassed the years 1961-1965 and the period was 
characterized by the transition toward an export-oriented 
policy. The third phase began in 1966 and was a period in which 
the export-oriented industrialization strategy became 
institutionalized. 428 
Over the period from 1962 to 1983, the Gross National 
Product (GNP) of South Korea grew at an average rate of 8.1 
percent a year in real terms. "9 In 1995, the lowering of 
trade barriers represented a major threat and challenge to the 
Korean economy because Korea traditionally relied on its 
protected domestic market for earnings. Since 1980, Korea has 
rapidly implemented market liberalization policies. The 
government liberalized the importation of 95 products on 1 
January 1990 as one of a series of import liberalization 
measures. 
427 In Chapter 3, South Korea's Industrial Policy with particular reference to government, intervention is surveyed in detail. 
428 Edward S. Mason (ed. ), The Economic and Social Modernization of the Republic of Korea, U. S. A., MA: Harvard University Press, 1980, pp. 125-26. 
429 
" Choong Yon Ahn, op. g, P. cit., p. 92. 
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Table 4.4 : Liberalization Ratios 
Year 1980 1985 1989 1990 1991 1993 1995 
Overall Average 
In Import 68.6 87.7 95.5 96.4 97.2 
In Tariff Rates 23.7 21.3 12.7 11.4 7.9 
In Investment 66.1 78.9 79.0 79.3 79.4 
Source: adapted from the Major Statistics of the Korean Economy 
published by Korea National Statistics Office, Seoul, 1991. 
In 1991, the import liberalization ratio grew to 72.2 
percent from 68.6 percent in 1980. The conclusion of the 
Uruguay Round of the GATT has increased pressure to remove trade 
barriers. As a result of the opening of the market for 
agricultural products in Korea, the import liberalization ratio 
has increased from 66.4 percent in 1985 to 84.7 percent in 1991. 
The Korean government proposed the 1992-4 programme to open 
further Korea's agricultural markets, which was implemented 
without delay, and the subsequent 1995-1997 programme to remove 
remaining agricultural import restrictions is in process. In 
line with the import liberalization process, Korea is making 
efforts to accelerate structural reforms in the agricultural 
sector in order to enhance efficiency and productivity in this 
sector. 
The liberalization of FDI, foreign exchange transactions 
and capital markets are also very crucial measures towards the 
internationalization and globalization of the Korean economy. 
The liberalization of financial services may increase the 
chances for the EU to increase its exports to the Korean 
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market. "' 
Table 4.5: Key Facts on South Korea 
Area 
..................................... 99,000 sq km Population 
............................... 44.5 million Head of State ............................ Kim, Young-sam Currency 
................................. Won Average exchange rate .................... 1993 
$=803.7 
1994 $=776.2 
Economy 
1993 1994 
GDP (mkt prices, W'000bn).... 265.5 304.3* 
Real GDP growth(%) ............. 5.5 8.1* Annual % change in inflation-. 4-8 6.3 
Inds. production(%)............ 4.4 10.9* 
Foreign reserves**($bn) ....... 21.3 24.0*** Stk mkt indx(% change yr end). 27.7 18.6 
Unemployment rate(%)........... 2.8 2.4 
Trade .......................... Current account balance($bn)... 0.4 -4.8 
Exports($bn) 
.................. 82.2 96.4 Imports($bn) 
.................. 83.8 102.3 Main Trading Partners****(%, 1993) 
............................. Exports Imports USA ........................... 22.1 21.4 Japan 
......................... 14.1 23.9 Hong Kong ...................... 7.8 2.1 Germany 
........................ 4.4 4.7 Singapore 
...................... 3.8 3.7 
Source: EIU, World Bank, IMF, Economist, Datastream, quoted in 
Financial Times survey on Korea, Monday June 26 1995. 
Note: *Estimate, **Excluding gold, December figures, ***End 
November, ****Share of total trade. 
Opening up the domestic economy to foreign imports almost 
completely is a hard task. However, Korea has decided to jump 
into the main stream of free trade and economic liberalization. 
The hard task of complete liberalization is defined by John 
Burton who describes Korea's internationalization strategy as 
"reform with a nationalist tinge". 431 
Before the 1960s, Korea's economy was characterized by 
"O Jongchul Lim, "Growth and Structural Change", Korean 
Economic Journal, 30, no. 3, pp. 257-86. 
431 . Financial Times Survey, Monday June 26 1995. 
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severe economic dislocation caused by liberation from the 
Japanese, partition between South and North Korea along the 38th 
parallel, and finally the Korean War. "' 
, 
During the period 
between 1953-1957, South Korea's recovery was largely due to 
foreign aid. "' The major aim of national economic policy was 
to reconstruct the infrastructure and industrial facilities 
destroyed by the Korean War. Industrial policy during the 1950s 
remained inward-looking. Consequently, exports grew slowly and 
fluctuated. The government also tried to promote exports but 
very slow levels of growth were attained throughout the 1950s. 
Import substitution continued to play a larger role than export 
promotion. *" 
From 1962 to the mid-1970s, the export-led development and 
economic policy of a military government shifted from inward- 
looking reconstruction and stabilization to export-led rapid 
economic development. The First Five Year economic development 
plan (1962-1966) fundamentally changed the Korean economic 
development strategy of inward-looking import-substitution, to 
432 Ki-Joon Cho, Economic History of Korea, Seoul: 
Inshinsa, 1984, pp. 328-29. 
433. The most notable feature of the Korean economy during the 1950s was its heavy dependence on US economic help. Before 
the Korean War, US assistance consisted mostly of food and 
relief supplies. But after the War, it shifted to raw materials 
and capital goods for industrial use. The total amount of aid 
from the US and international organizations reached 
approximately $3 billion during this period. International 
assistance reached its peak in 1957 and 1958, began to decrease 
slowly in 1959, and ended at the end of the 1960s. In the latter 
half of the 1950s, US aid accounted for almost 80 percent of the 
1960s total aid amount. Quoted in Cho Soon, The Dynamics of 
Korean Economic Development, Washington, DC: Institute for 
International Economics, March 1994, p. 13. 
"I" 
Choong Yong Ahn, op. cit., p. 98. 
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the strategy of an outward- looking, export-oriented economy. 
This export-oriented development strategy opened up a completely 
new avenue for economic growth and industrialization, which is 
well illustrated by the rapid growth of commodity exports, an 
average increase of 35 percent a year in real terms from the 
early 1960s to the late 1970s. An abundant supply of labour and 
few natural resources and small domestic market compelled the 
Korean government to adopt an outward-oriented development 
strategy. The core of policy was to make the most of South 
Korea's comparative advantage in labour-intensive manufactured 
goods for export. Government intervention proved to be effective 
in combining an unlimited supply of labour, export orientation, 
and importation of foreign capital. Incentives were on the whole 
provided automatically; and the incentive system was little 
modified over time. 435 
Table 4.6: Targets and Performance of the first five-year 
plan 
Indicator Target Performance 
Economic Growth Rate (%) 7.1 7.8 
Investment as a share of GNP 22.6 17.0 
Domestic saving as a share of GNP 9.2 8.8 
Foreign saving as a share of GNP 13.4 8.2 
Current account in 1966($million) -246.6 -103.4 
Exports in 1966($million) 137.5 250.4 
Annual average percentage change 43.7 
Imports in 1966($million) 492.3 679.9 
Annual average percentage change 19.1 
Source: Economic Planning Board, Bank of Korea, National Accounts, 
1990. 
As a result of the outward-looking development strategies, 
the annual growth rate of GNP in real terms as shown in Table 
"S Bela Balassa, The Newly Industrializing Countries in 
the World Economy, New York: Pergamon Press, 1976, pp. 12-13. 
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4.7, accelerated from a modest 4.1 percent during the period 
from 1953-1962 to 9.6 percent in the 1962-1,976 period. "" 
Table 4.7: Annual Real Growth Rate of GNP by Industrial 
Origin and Exports, 1956-1976. 
1972 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 
Exports 1,624.1 5,081.0 7,715.3 10,046.5 12,710.6 15,055.5 
Imports 2,522.0 7,274.4 8,773.6 10,810.5 14,971.9 20,338.6 
Trade 
Balance -897.9 -2,193.4 -1,058.3 -764.1 -2,261.3 -5,283.1 
1972-76 1977 1978 1979 
Average Annual 
Growth Rate 
Exports 48.5 30.2 26.5 18.4 
Imports 29.7 23.2 38.5 35.8 
Source: Bank of Korea 
Manufactured exports helped to lead this extraordinary 
436 This conspicuous development was generally guided by 
basic guidelines in the planning documents of the government for 
economic policies: 
a) Korean economic development should be achieved through industrialization. While in the initial stage the light 
industries should be established to increase income and 
employment. Heavy and chemical industries would be established 
as the industrial structure is deepened; 
b) Economic development should be achieved under government 
control and leadership. The government should determine the 
direction of policies based upon economic development planning. 
The goals of economic development should be achieved partly 
through the price mechanism and partly through government investment and financing. The government may employ other means than the price mechanism for promoting priority industries; 
C) Although in principle firms should be owned and managed 
privately, the government could complement and replace private 
decisions in the case of major investments; d) To finance investments required for economic development, 
foreign capital flow should be induced. To increase employment 
and repay foreign debts, the increase in exports should have top 
priority among economic policy measures; 
e) For economic development, growth should have a higher 
priority than redressing imbalances in income distribution and 
unevenness in industrial development across geographical regions 
because growth was expected eventually to take care of these 
problems. Furthermore, some inflation should be tolerated; it is 
natural that high growth rates should be accompanied by some inflation. 
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economic expansion. Table 4.7 indicates that the annual real 
growth rate of commodity exports was 36.8 percent under the 
guidance of the export expansion regime that began in the early 
1960s to the mid-1970s. On the other hand, the rate of economic 
growth guided by the import substitution regime achieved 7.6 
percent average annual increase. During the period 1967-1977, 
despite the emphasis on export-oriented industrialization, 
import substitution in selected industries was also promoted by 
means of tax concessions and the allocation of preferential 
credits. Shipbuilding, iron and steel, machinery and 
petrochemicals were the major items for import-substitution. "' 
Table 4.8: Direct Contribution to Growth in Manufacturing, 
1960-1973 
Source of Growth 1960-63 1963-66 1966-68 1968-70 1970-73 
Export Expansion 4.8 14.2 12.4 15.1 35.9 
Import Substitution -2.8 0.2 11.4 7.2 -4.0 
Source: Larry E. Westphal and Kwang Suk Kim, "Industrial Policy 
and Development in Korea", The World Bank Staff Working Paper, 
No. 263, World Bank, 1977. 
The share of Korea's primary exports out of the total 
export volume declined from 73 percent of the total in 1962 to 
only 14 percent in 1971, whereas that of industrial products 
increased sharply from 27 percent to 86 percent over the same 
period. Despite the continuing expansion of traditional light 
industry products, a trend emerged toward the direction of 
sophisticated, skill-intensive products. On the imports side, 
the share of capital goods jumped from 17 percent in 1962 to 29 
"' Edward S. Mason, op. cit., pp. 131-32. 
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percent by 1971. Korea had been able to break out of the 
import-substitution which has been a typical characteristic of 
many developing countries, and had moved toward a modern, 
integrated manufacturing structure producing both intermediate 
and capital goods. Pack and Page argue that the active promotion 
of manufactured exports was a significant factor in the 
successor of High Performing Asian Economies (HPAEs), including 
South Korea. 438 Manufactured export growth provided a powerful 
mechanism for technological upgrading in imperfect world 
technology markets. 
A high rate of economic growth was attained continuously 
during the period of 1967-1975, led mainly by the rapid 
expansion of manufacturing, which was made possible by the ever- 
increasing exports of labour-intensive manufactured goods. The 
government policy of growth maximization through export-oriented 
industrialization during the 1960s, however, resulted in some 
neglect of agricultural development. Each of the first three 
five-year plans contained its own goals and policy direction. 
But one consistent, basic policy goal has dominated all plans; 
export-oriented industrialization and growth. Other government 
policy objectives were consistent with the basic goal. "" 
"8. Howard Pack and Larry E. Page, Jr., "Accumulation, 
exports and growth in the high-performing Asian economies", 
Background paper for the East Asian Miracle, Washington DC: 
World Bank, Policy Research Department, 1993. 
"9. Kwang Suk Kim and Michael Rosmer, Growth and Structural 
Transformation, Studies in the Modernization of the Republic of 
Korea: 1945-1975, Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University 
Press, 1981. 
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Table 4.9: Targets and performance of the second five-year 
plan(1967-71) 
Indicator Targets Performance 
Economic growth rate(%) 7.0 9.5 
Investment as a share of GNP 19.0 26.1 
Domestic saving as a share of GNP 11.6 16.1 
Foreign saving as a share of GNP 7.5 10.2 
Current account in 1971($million) -95.8 -847.5 
Exports in 1971($million) 550.0 1132.3 
Annual average percentage change 35.2 
Imports in 1971($million) 894.0 2178.2 
Annual average percentage change 26.2 
Sources: Economic Planning Board; Bank of Korea, National Accounts, 
1990 
As a means to pursue export promotion, there have been many 
incentive policies for industrialization. "* 
Table 4.10: Korea's Major Export-Promotion Incentives 
Type of incentive Duration 
Tax incentives 
Commodity tax exemption April 1950-73 
Business tax exemption January 1962-73 
Reduction of corporation and income tax 
by 50% on earnings from exports January 1961-December 1972 
Accelerated depreciation on allowance 
for fixed capital directly used for 
export production in mining, fishing, 
and manufacturing January 1961-1973 
Tax credit for foreign market development 
expenditures August 1969-1973 
Foreign market reserve system established 1973 
Overseas business loss reserve system 
established 1973 
Overseas investment loss reserve system 
established 1973 
"o See Hong, Wontak, Trade, Distortions and Employment 
Growth in Korea, Seoul: KDI Press, 1979. 
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Tariff Incentives 
Tariff exemptions on capital equipment 
on export production March 1964-December 1973 
Tariff payments on an installment basis 
for capital equipment used in export 
production January 1974- 
Tariff exemptions on raw material imports 
for export promotion July 1975 
Tariff drawback on imported raw material 
used for export production 
Wastage allowance 
Deferred payment system for tariff 
Financial incentives 
Financing for export sales 
Export shipment financing 
Export promotion fund financed by 
counterpart fund 
Financing imports of materials to be 
used in export production 
Export credits(trade credits before 1961) 
July 1975 
July 1965- 
July 1975-October 1988 
February 1948-July 1955 
June 1950-July 1955 
November 1959-January 1964 
October 1961-February 1972 
June 1950- 
Financing suppliers of US offshore military 
procurement September 1962 
Fund to promote the export industry July 1964-September 1969 
Fund to convert small and medium-size 
firms into export industries February 1964- 
Fund to prepare exports of agricultural 
and fishery products September 1969- 
Foreign currency loans May 1967- 
Foreign exports on credits October 1969- 
Automatic export financing ceiling for 
large exporters 1976- 
Overall export financing system introduced October 1985- 
Differentiated export financing for large 
versus small and medium companies October 1986- 
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Other promotion schemes 
Foreign exchange deposit system , 
June 1949-January 1961 
Trading license based on export performance January 1953 
An export bonus with preferential foreign 
exchange 
Payment of export subsidy 
Discount on railroad freight rate 
Monopoly rights on exports of specific items to specific areas 
Creation of exporters' associations for 
various export products 
Financing KOTRA 
Export-import link system 
1966- 
Discount on electricity rate 
Waiver issue for shipping 
Local L/C system 
Differential treatment of traders 
based on export performance 
Export insurance 
General trading company 
Export-import bank 
Special loan privileges for small and 
medium exporters' raw material imports 
Export financing for big corporations 
discontinued 
1951-May 1961 
1954-55 and 1960-65 
1958- 
April 1960-November 1980 
September 1961- 
March 1962 
Nov. 1962-Mar. 1965, 
1965-76 
1965- 
March 1965- 
February 1967 
January 1969 
May 1975 
June 1976- 
August 1987- 
February 1988- 
Source: Hong, Wontak, Trade, Distortions and Employment Growth In 
Korea, Seoul: KDI Press, 1979, and other official documents on export 
promotion measures. 
From the end of the Korean War to the mid-1970s, south 
Korea's industrial policies evolved around a continued 
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orientation toward an open economy. For example, through these 
incentive policies, the export-oriented, industrialization 
strategy became institutionalized. In the pursuit of export- 
oriented industrialization, import substitution in selected 
industries was also promoted by means of tax concessions and the 
allocation of preferential credits. The import-substitution 
industries in this regard included shipbuilding, iron and steel, 
machinery and petrochemicals. Some of these industries were 
promoted not only for import substitution but also export 
expansion. 
From the early 1970s to 1980, a policy of industrial 
development of heavy and chemical industries and agricultural 
and rural development was implemented. 441 In the Fourth 
economic development plan, with the slogans of "growth, " 
"efficiency, " and "equality", the balanced growth between 
industrial and agricultural sectors was formalized. 
Table 4.11: Trade Expansion in the 1970s 
Period Primary Secondary Tertiary GNP Commodity 
Total Manufactur 
-ing 
1953-1961 2.5 10.8 11.1 4.3 4.1 7.6 
1962-1976 4.5 17.9 18.5 9.4 9.6 36.8 
Source: Computed from Bank of Korea, Economic Statistics Year 
Book, various years, quoted in Kwang Suk Kim and Michael Roemer, 
op. cit. 
Also an important policy shift was made to the heavy 
chemical sectors in order to promote the import substitution of 
intermediate materials and capital goods and to serve the growth 
"'. On the macroeconomic impacts of Korea's heavy industry 
drive, see Richard M. Auty, 1994, pp. 123-42. 
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of strategic export industries. "" 
The continuous growth of GNP during the 1970s was really 
tremendous. The manufacturing sector was the main engine of 
Korea's rapid growth, with its annual growth more than double 
that of the rest of the economy. Also in this period, exports 
continued to grow very rapidly but imports remained larger in 
value than exports, causing the balance of payment to 
deteriorate further. By the latter half of 1979, the South 
Korean economy began to show some signs of strain. For 
instance, Commodity exports in real terms declined in 1979 for 
the first time since Korea began its industrialization in the 
early 1960s, and the growth rate of GNP fell sharply to 6.4 
percent in that year, the smallest rise since 1972. More 
seriously, the balance of payment situation deteriorated with 
the heaviest-yet debt obligation burden. 
Table 4.12: Target and performance of the third five-year 
plan(1972-76) 
Indicator Targets Performances 
Economic growth rate (%) 8.6 9.1 
Investment as a share of GNP 27.6 27.1 
Domestic saving as a share of GNP 19.5 20.8 
Foreign saving as a share of GNP 5.4 6.7 
Current account in 1976 ($million) -359.0 -313.6 
Export in 1976 3510.0 7814.6 
Annual average percentage change 47.1 
Imports in 1976 3993.0 8405.1 
Annual average percentage change 31.0 
Source: Economic Planning Board; Bank of Korea, National Accounts, 
1990 
At the end of the decade, the South Korean economy began 
to experience widening structural imbalances in connection with 
"' See Cho soon, op. cit., 1994, pp. 38-46. 
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a long period of sustained rapid growth and relatively high 
inflation. 
The underlying strains and pressures were exacerbated in 
1980 by a disastrous harvest, a rise in international prices and 
interest rates, and domestic political disturbances. 
Consequently, South Korea's economic performance worsened 
sharply. The loss of competitiveness of industries, compounded 
by slower market growth and greater protection abroad, caused 
export volumes to shrink. The fifth Five-Year Plan (1982-1986) 
clearly reflected the basic tone of economic management: a) 
continued high growth, b) price stability, c) improvement in 
income distribution. The proportion of freely importable items 
among all commodities rose from 54 percent in 1978 to 71 percent 
in 1981, and to 80 percent in 1983. Foreign investors were 
allowed access to pharmaceuticals, food processing and services 
through the liberalization of foreign ownership restrictions. 
The upshot of all reforms has been a greater reliance on free 
market mechanisms than on government control in the allocation 
of resource. "' 
During the period from 1945 to 1985, South Korea changed 
from an impoverished economy to an industrialized, export- 
dependent economy. It is agreed that the economic modernization 
"' The trend towards economic reform by means of 
liberalization deregulation is expected to continue. For, 
example, Korea chose to forgo the use of trade barriers to 
safeguard its balance of payments position (Article 18 of the 
GATT). As a result, all remaining trade barriers will be 
removed or brought into conformity with GATT rules by 1 July 
1997. 
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of South Korea during those 40 years was dynamic and rapid. "` 
Korea now needs to upgrade its industrial structure and to 
promote vigorously technology intensive products so that its 
manufactured products can be more competitive in world markets. 
These strategic products include semi-conductors, automobiles 
and machinery and equipments. While pursuing this structural 
shift to keep exports in line with South Korea's shifting 
comparative advantage and thereby maintain the momentum of 
development, South Korea needs to resolve many urgent 
socioeconomic problems such as ever-widening income inequality 
within Korea, increasing demands for social welfare, and the 
service burden of outstanding foreign debt. "' 
According to Kwang-Suk, Kim and Michael Roemer, 446 
political factors have always played a crucial part in promoting 
or discouraging entrepreneurial ventures in the Republic of 
Korea. The role of state intervention is very important in 
explaining Korea's economic development strategy. John M. Page 
has answered the question of what caused East Asia's 
success. "7 In his conclusion, he argues that High Performing 
Asian Economies (HPAE) achieved high growth by getting the 
"' To prove the validity of this argument, see P Hasan, 
Korea, Problems and Issues in a Rapidly Growing Economy, 
Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1976; E. K. Y. Chen, 
Hyper-growth in Asian economies: A Comparative Study of Hong 
Kong, Japan, Korea, Singapore and Taiwan, London: Macmillan, 
1979. 
445 . Ibid., pp. 110-15. 
446 Kim, Kwang-Suk, and Michael Roemer, Growth and 
Structural Transformation, M. A., Harvard Univ. Press, 1979. 
"' John M. Page, "The East Asian Miracle: An 
Introduction, " World Development, Vol. 22, No. 4, p. 624-5. 
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basics right. Private domestic investment, combined with rapidly 
growing human capital, were the principal. engines of growth. 
High-levels of domestic savings sustained the HPAE's high 
investment levels. Export-push strategies have been by far the 
most generally successful selective approach employed by the 
successful Asian economies. "" 
The Korean miracle is not a triumph of laissez faire, but 
of a pragmatic non-ideological mixture of market and non-market 
forces. The Government showed no hesitation in intervening by 
various means in case the market did not work well. Korean firms 
heavily depended on borrowed funds and state intervention, which 
was actively carried out through the control of the financial 
institutions by state power. Import controls are of crucial 
importance to facilitate an outward-oriented strategy. "' 
Permission to engage in foreign trade was restricted to those 
parties holding a trader licence. 
Export promotion policies have also been adopted to utilize 
South Korea's considerable comparative advantage in the 
production of labour-intensive manufactures. Restrictive 
monetary and fiscal policies have been used to cope with the 
inflationary aftermath of oil shocks, and measures have been 
taken to provide the new technology need to increase skill- 
". On the details of Korea's policies for rapid growth in 
a changing world economy, see Alice H. Amsden, Asia's Next 
Giant: South Korea and Late Industrialization, New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1989; Joseph E. Stiglitz, "Some lessons from 
the Asian miracle", Background paper for the East Asian Miracle, Washington DC: World Bank, Policy Research Department, 1993. 
°'9. On the import control mechanisms of Korea, see Chapter 
Three, the new industrial policy of deregulation and liberalization section. 
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intensive production. Extraordinary government emphasis has been 
placed on promoting exports, and this has helped the economy in 
two principal ways. One is that export production constitutes 
a particularly efficient use of Korea's resources. The other is 
that exports have been the key to the massive investment and 
expansion of industrial capacity required for Korea's high rates 
of GNP growth. 
A combination of cheap labour and active entrepreneurship 
was probably behind the rapid growth of textiles, plywood, 
apparel and other labor-intensive manufactures. From 1970 to 
1977, South Korean wages were less than one-third of Japanese 
wages in those industries, and value-added per worker 
productivity was more than a third as high. 
Outward-looking policies have been preferable to inward- 
looking, for export production generates greater earning effects 
and therefore improves human resources, creates closer ties with 
more advanced economies and thus encourages competition, and 
overcomes the limitations of the small Korean domestic market, 
by providing economies of scale for world markets. "" 
South Korea's high growth strategy was promoted by the 
import-increasing effect of export expansion. However, what has 
threatened South Korea's economic development, has been both 
world economic recession and protectionism. The latter has 
emerged as a key issue in the world trading system during the 
1980s, threatening to impede the rapid expansion of Korea's 
exports. 
's° Donald B. Keeling, "Outward-looking Policies and 
Economic Development", Economic Journal, 77,1967, pp. 313-20. 
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The characteristics of Korean industry are: 
1) A rapidly changing comparative advantage; 
2) A highly-concentrated export market, prone to 
protectionist pressures; 
3) A high degree of industrial concentration; 
4) A strong technological dependence on Japan, which is a 
primary supplier of imported manufactured inputs. 451 
South Korea has been under a great deal of pressure from the US 
and the EU to open the market and abandon privileges such as the 
GSP (Generalized System of Preferences) benefits. Korea now 
urgently needs technological development. Though the outward- 
looking strategy or export-oriented economic development 
strategy is more vulnerable to external influences like world 
economic recession and increased protectionism, it is still a 
better choice for the rapid promotion of a nation's wealth. 
Since the Korean democratization movement in 1987, government 
intervention has been drastically reduced. An extension of loan 
distribution to small or medium sized companies, liberalization 
of import control and decrease in tariffs, and a recognition of 
intellectual property has been facilitated. 
Table 4.12: Targets of the seventh five-year plan(1992-96) 
Indicator Targets 
Average 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 
Economic growth rate(%) 7.5 7.0 7.0 7.5 8.0 8.0 
Investment as share of GNDI 36.4 38.2 37.1 36.3 35.4 34.8 
Domestic savings as a share 
of GNDI 35.5 34.7 34.8 35.2 36.1 36.6 
Foreign saving as a share 
of GNDI -0.6 -2.7 -1.6 -0.4 0.5 1.4 Current account ($billion) - -8.0 -5.0 -1.5 2.0 6.5 Exports ($billion) - 78.5 89.4 101.8 116.0 131.6 Imports ($billion) - 85.5 93.7 103.3 114.5 126.1 
GNDI: gross national disposable income 
451. Danny M, Leipziger, "Industrial Restructuring in Korea, " 
World Development, 16.1,1988, pp. 121-135. 
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Source: Economic Planning Board, Korea. 
The progress of socio-economic development has produced a 
more relaxed political environment, reducing authoritarian 
mechanisms to maintain social and political stability. "' In 
order to accommodate domestic and external challenges and to 
achieve sustained growth, the seventh five-year plan targeted 
strengthened competitiveness of industry, enhanced equity and 
balanced development, and the pursuit of, internationalization 
and liberalization, ultimately aiming to provide the basis for 
national unification. Under the slogan of "pursuing an advanced 
economy and society, and heading toward national unification", 
ten major tasks were chosen by the Korean government: "' 
1) Competitiveness-strengthening 
a) Reorganize the educational and human resources 
development system so that they can supply human 
resources of technical manpower to accommodate the needs 
of an industrialized society. 
b) Enhance the technological development base and 
innovation, and prepare to keep pace with the 
information age. 
c) To promote the efficiency of the transportation system, 
invest more in infrastructure. 
d) Disperse the ownership of conglomerates and establish a 
professional management system to raise the efficiency 
of business organizations and industrial structure, 
thus, to provide small & medium companies with more 
competitive edge. 
e) In preparation for further agricultural market opening 
and to raise income levels, reorganize the regional and 
452 The volume and structure of the economy has grown too large and too complicated to be coped with by simple measures of 
macroeconomic management. The external trading environment is 
changing rapidly, with more uncertainties, and more pressures 
are felt to complete market opening. Technological 
protectionism proliferates. 
453 see Korean Economic Planning Board, The Seventh Five- 
Year Economic Development Plan(1992-1997), Seoul: Official 
Government Report on the future Korean economy. In Korean. 
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coastal society to cope with the sudden changes and 
enhance equal development among provinces. 
f) Solve the shortage of housing facilities, to curb real 
estate speculation, and regulate environmental 
pollution. 
g) For the general promotion of social welfare, expand the 
coverage of the national pension scheme to include 
farmers and fishermen, and promote the activities of 
culture and art. 
2) Active industrialization and liberalization and National 
unification 
a) Deregulate interest rate, foreign exchange, and foreign 
investment in the capital market to liberalize the 
financial system. Reduce the realm of government control 
in private economic management. 
b) Expand service and agricultural market opening, and 
enhance the competitive edge of these sectors. Develop 
the economic system to meet international trade norms to 
push the world liberalization drive and to expand the 
category of FDI to foreign lands. 
c) Develop the basis for national integration by gradually 
promoting economic cooperation with North Korea. 
The "tiger economies" of the Asia-Pacific region have 
sailed through the G7 recession with an extraordinary growth 
rate of up to 10 percent a year. it is quite true that Korea has 
become a new nexus of growing prosperity on the world stage. "' 
A more difficult question Korea faces today is how to advance to 
the next stage of joining in the group of advanced industrial 
nations, with much more investment and development in high- 
technology industries. 
The successful conclusion of the Uruguay Round gives Korea 
a new challenge because Korea is realigning new demands for 
responsibility sharing with domestic political resistence to 
market opening and sensitivities to necessary but difficult 
454 . The Times, Friday March 4 1994. 
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adjustments in agriculture and finance. 
455 
Table 4.13: Korean Composition of Trade Market by 
Principal Countries(%) 
Year 1975 1979 1985 1988 1990 1995 
Exports 
US 30.2 29.1 35.5 35.3 29.8 
Japan 25.4 22.3 15.0 19.3 19.4 
EU 18.5 15.3 16.8 16.1 16.7 
Hong Kong 3.6 3.5 5.2 5.9 5.8 
Taiwan 1.3 1.1 0.6 1.6 1.9 
Australia 1.2 1.1 1.2 1.4 1.5 
Imports 
US 25.9 22.6 20.8 24.6 24.3 
Japan 33.5 32.7 24.3 30.7 26.6 
EU 8.4 10.3 11.2 11.7 14.2 
Hong Kong 0.3 0.4 1.6 1.1 0.9 
Taiwan 2.3 1.0 1.1 2.1 2.1 
Australia 2.8 2.9 3.6 3.5 3.7 
Source: Korea National Statistics Office, Major Statistics of 
the Korean Economy, Seoul, 1991 
Thomas R. Callaghy656 describes the historical 
characteristics of Korean economic development by insisting that 
during the last forty years, Korea has become an impressive 
economic and industrial power- a transformation of quite 
startling speed and scope. In 1950, Korea had a per capita 
income of $146( in 1974 U. s. dollar), while the figures for 
Nigeria and Kenya were $150 and $129 respectively. Nigeria and 
Kenya, on the other hand, while stronger African cases, had not 
t55. I1 Sakong, Korea in the World Economy, Washington. D. C: 
Institute for International Economics, 1993, pp. 144-45. 
456 Thomas R. Callaghy, "Vision and Politics in the 
Transformation of the Global Political Economy: Lessons from the 
Second and Third Worlds", in Robert O. Slater, Barry M. Schultz 
and Steven R. Dorr, (eds. ), Global Transformation and the Third 
World, London: Adamantine Press, 1993, pp. 184-89. 
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achieved conspicuous success, despite Nigeria's abundant oil 
resources . 'S7 
He further elaborates that Korea is almost the paradigmatic 
case of economic transformation in the Cold War era. South 
Korea, however, does not match the neoclassical liberal 
prescriptions of the IMF and the World Bank. Though Korea 
transformed its economy through heavy statist policies, the role 
of the market and an export-oriented strategy played a major 
role. According to Callaghy's view, following the Japanese 
model, a series of military governments centralized economic 
decision-making in the hands of technocrats who were delegated 
considerable economic powers; created considerable state 
autonomy from key social groups, especially labour; established 
a controlled yet close tacit alliance with large business 
groups, the chabols; and structured the bureaucracy; bringing 
about considerable institutional transformation. This new 
developmental apparatus reversed a relatively short experiment 
with import-substitution industrialization and set about a 
dynamic pursuit of further export-oriented industrialization. 
The Korean government provided the Chabols with credit, 
subsidies, information, logistical assistance, protection, and 
controlled labour, yet forced them follow world market signals 
and to cope with international competition and some domestic 
`57. The GNP per capita figures( in 1989 U. S. dollars) and 
their respective average annual growth rates for 1965-1989 were: 
Korea, $4400 and 7.0%; Nigeria, $250 and 0.2%; and Kenya, $360 
and 2.0%. 
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competition . 058 
The relative overall world economic growth and relative 
openness of the advanced nations' market in the 1960s and the 
1970s helped Korea's success. Callaghy points to the strategic 
differences in the development process between the Korean case 
and those of Latin America in that Korea relied more on aid and 
borrowing from the international capital markets and less on 
foreign direct investments(FDI), on the other hand having far 
less initial presence of foreign capital. Due to substantial 
societal and cultural integration and relatively high levels of 
education, he asserts, Korea was able to gain higher levels of 
both stateness and cosmopolitanism than did Latin America- 
factors which became ingredients in its success. Koreans tried 
to establish links with the world economy by venturing out to 
acquire and master new technologies, knowledge, and institutions 
to build up their local capacities; and they learned to manage 
and manipulate their integrated economic structure into the 
world economy. 
In the early the 1980s after success of its high speed 
growth, Korea became faced with several factors to be adjusted, 
due to the changed social structure brought about by the rapid 
economic development. Internally, the government confronted 
high pressure for political liberalization, and externally it 
confronted a high demand for economic liberalization. 
`58. For more general information on Korean economic policy, 
see Economic Planning Board, Economic Policy of the Development 
Era, Seoul: EPB, 1982(in Korean); and The Twenty-Year History of the Economic Planning Board, Seoul: EPB, 1982(in Korean). 
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Throughout some turbulent experiences, the Korean government 
extended partial political liberalization and economic 
liberalization, bringing challenges. """ More than anything 
else, Korea had to pay back some of the costs of the economic 
transformation and come to terms with the threats of external 
factors. Despite substantial pressure for higher wages and fair 
distribution of wealth, Korea saw the new emergence of a labour 
relation based upon reciprocal concessions. In order to 
maintain its international competitive edge, Korea launched a 
major infrastructure rehabitation programme, while Korean firms 
invested in East and South Asia and in Europe, including Eastern 
Europe. In 1989, the growth rate was only 6.8 percent and was 
described as recession, but in 1990 the rate was 8.8 percent. 
It fell to 8.4 percent in 1991 and a projected 7.3 percent for 
1992,5.5 percent for 1995. The liberalization of the Korean 
economy, accelerated by the conclusion of the Uruguay Round, 
requires more capability to manage the difficult situation and 
to formulate and implement economic policy with much more 
openness, but Korea is expected to move toward its own versions 
of embedded liberalism and embedded economy. "' 
Korea's industrial structure, featured by large 
conglomerates, or chabols bears some unique characteristics. 
Chabols usually export high-tech products and sophisticated 
consumer durables, competing with industrialized economies. 
4"Tun-jen Cheng and Lawrence B. Krause, "Democracy and Development: With Special Attention to Korea, " Journal of 
Northeast Asian Studies, Vol. 10, No. 3, Summer 1991. 
`6O. Ibid., p. 189. 
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Foreign observers see the Korean economy as larger than it 
really is, because of its outward appearance. 
For the sustained growth of the Korean economy, the most 
significant public good is the maintenance of an open, global 
and multilateral economic system which is freely accessible and 
non-discriminatory to all trade partners. "" 
Table 4.14 : U. S., Japan, Korea Shares of World Trade, 
1962-1990(%) 
Year U. S 
Export 
Japan Korea U. S 
Import 
Japan Korea 
1962-66 15.95 4.41 0.08 12.86 4.53 0.30 
1967-71 14.83 6.33 0.25 14.37 5.79 0.63 
1972-76 12.74 7.02 0.60 13.76 6.90 0.81 
1977-81 11.97 7.02 1.00 14.20 6.91 1.19 
1982-86 12.16 9.32 1.55 17.09 6.99 1.54 
1987 10.75 9.78 1.65 17.42 6.20 1.68 
1988 11.95 9.82 2.25 16.57 6.75 1.87 
1989 12.49 9.40 2.14 16.45 7.00 2.05 
1990 13.52 9.87 2.23 n. a 7.86 2.32 
1987-1990 12.18 9.72 2.07 16.81 6.95 1.98 
1962-1990 
Overall Ave rage 
13.34 7.29 0.89 14.70 6.32 1.05 
n. a : not available 
Source: International Monetary Fund, 1990. 
The outward-looking stance of Korea is of continuous 
importance to its survival as one of the industrialized nations. 
Furthermore, the changed international environments is helping 
Korea continued integration of Korea's economic system into the 
world economy through its export-led, outward-looking stance. ""' 
'61. Charles R. Frank, Kwang S. Kim, and Larry E. Westphal, 
Foreign Trade Regimes & Economic Development: South Korea, Vol. 
7, New York: National Bureau of Economic Research, Columbia 
University Press, 1975. 
'62. On Korea's need for international economic cooperation, 
see Hak Soo Kim, Korea's International Economic 
Cooperation: Policy Issues and Recommendations, Seoul: Korea 
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Fred Bergsten463 says the reduced role of military 
security as the predominant driver in the international 
relations leaves the way open for more vigorous voices of 
economic frictions and disputes. The end of the Cold War has 
led the world into a period where economics has become the 
dominant factor in determining international relations. Korea 
has been on the verge of joining the ranks of industrially 
advanced nations since the World War II. Once Korea attains 
this status successfully, its significance as a model of 
outward-looking, developing economies will increase. One of the 
important steps to Korea's cultural integration into the world 
is to be found in the establishment of Korea International 
Cooperation Agency (KOICA). The KOICA will cover such projects 
as granting aid, technical assistance, training foreign 
personnel, sending Korean expert to developing nations, and 
training Korean personnel for international cooperation and 
activities 
. 464 
In the international economic scene, the recent history of 
Korea's FDI is a typical example of international cooperation. 
11 Sagong elaborates that from 1987 to 1990, the average annual 
growth rate in FDI, on approval basis, in actual investment, and 
in the accumulated total amount, was 49.9 percent, 80.3 percent 
and 39.85 percent respectively. Despite the sharp increase of 
Korean FDI, its ratio to total GNP in the 1990 was less than 1 
Institute for International Economic Policy, 1991. 
463 Fred. C. Bergsten, America in the World Economy: A 
Strategy for the 1990s, Washington. D. C.: Institute for 
International Economics, 1988, pp. 96-112. 
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Korean FDI, its ratio to total GNP in the 1990 was less than 1 
percent. 
The rapid increase in Korea's outgoing FDI in recent years 
reflects two mutually reinforcing forces. 
Table 4.15: Annual growth rate of Korea's outgoing FDI, 
1987-1990(percentages) 
Annual growth 
rate of FDI 1987 1988 1989 1990 Average 1987-90 
On approval basis 47.3 132.1 
Number of cases 
Amount -0.8 34.8 
In actual investment 
No. of cases 82.0 81.3 
Amount 130.08 -45.8 In accumulated net Investment 
No. of cases 12.4 25.1 
Amount 52.6 15.8 
45.8 39.6 66.2 
93.1 72.6 49.9 
53.9 44.9 65.5 
128.8 107.3 80.03 
34.6 38.4 27.6 
29.0 61.7 39.8 
Source: Bank of Korea. Economics Statistics Yearbook, various issues. 
First, Korean businesses are participating in the current 
international trend toward globalization of business operations. 
Korean companies face growing pressure to globalize their 
business by shifting parts of their aggressive export drive into 
offshore production. High labour and land costs at home are 
eroding competitiveness of some industries, particularly the 
electronics industry which has led recent overseas expansion. 
"Low-cost production is the key survival in the consumer 
electronics industry where there is over-capacity worldwide. '" 
The Bank of Korea statistics show the amount of overseas 
direct investment. Until November 1994, Asia shared the amount 
465. Financial Times, 9 February, 1995- Guy de Jonquieres 
and John Burton ask if the stampede abroad by South Korean 
corporations is brave or foolish with the article title, "Big 
Gamble on a European thrust". 
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of $4,191 million, with North America, $3,002 million, Europe, 
$1,290 million, Latin America, $ 312 million, and other regions, 
$920 million respectively. Behind this overseas expansion, the 
avoidance of trade barriers, high domestic wages, an 
appreciating local currency, the spread of regionalism and 
protectionism have been the major hidden elements. The 
different factor endowment in local nation and raw materials, 
and the need to acquire necessary skills and technologies have 
played a crucial role to favour FDI as a way to achieve an 
outward orientation in Korea's trade policy. Korea's experience 
of a balance of payments surplus in 1986 caused the Korean 
government to liberalize regulations on outgoing FDI. The 
financial resources of Korean firms enabled them actively to 
participate in global business activities, accelerated by the 
relaxation of tight foreign exchange controls in 1994. 
I1 Sakong elaborates that the distribution trend by 
industry and by country of outgoing FDI are worth noting. 
Almost half of Korea's outgoing FDI, in terms of total 
outstanding net investment, was to the manufacturing sector 
concentrated in North America and Southeast Asia. However, the 
regionalization of the world economy has induced the FDI the 
into European region. 466 As a typical sector of FDI, leading 
466. Korea's main investment projects in Europe by 
conglomerates: 
Samsung 
-$700m consumer electronics complex, Wynyard, UK, 1994-2000 
-$16m excavator plant in Harrogate, UK, 1995 
-$15m colour TV factory at Billingham, UK 1990 
-$30m with Texas Instruments, semiconductor assembly plant, 
Porto, Portugal, 1994 
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Korean electric and electronic firms generated the recent surge 
in machinery sector FDI, investing primarily in US until 1987. 
The plural flow of FDI from the US to other regions has been 
noticed. During the period of 1988-89, FDI in this sector was 
directed toward other geographic areas. Out of 38 newly approved 
projects, 24 went to the Asian region, 9 to the European 
nations, and only 3 to the U. S. A. The turning point of the 
Korean economy heavily requires more investment into the EU 
region as a way of tackling regionalism and globalism, 
successfully to accomplish the Korean government's market 
diversification strategy. 46" 
-$120m colour picture tube factory, Berlin, Germany, 1994- 
1997 
Daewoo 
-$42m VCR plant, Antrim, Northern Ireland, 1988 
-$23m microwave oven plant, Longway, France, 1988 
-$37m colour TV plant, Fameck, France, 1993 
-$150 colour tube factory, Longway, France, 1993-1995 
-$138m cathode ray tube factory, Lorraine, France, 1993 
-$l0m excavator plant, Frameries, Belgium, 1990 
-$759m car factory, Craiora, Romania, 1994-95 
LG(Lucky-Goldstar) 
-$40m colour TV and microwave oven factory, Newcastle, UK, 
1994-1995 
-$40m VCR factory, Worms, Germany, 1986 
-$10m refrigerator/freezer plant, Naples, Italy, 1990 
Hyundai 
-$10-$15m excavator factory, Geel, Belgium, 1995 
Source: Financial Times 9 February 1995 
467. On the turning point of the Korean economy, see Moo-ki 
Bae, "The Turning Point in the Korean Economy, " Developing 
Economies, Vol. 20,1982. 
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Another feature of Korean overseas direct investment is the 
increased amount of direct investment by small and medium sized 
firms. Their share of FDI in 1980 was 2.8 percent of the total 
cases and 1.85 percent of the total amount. These cases 
increased rapidly in recent years, reaching 32.6 percent and 9.9 
percent respectively in 1989, which is a good indication of 
Korea's business globalization strategy to deal with regionalism 
and protectionism. The upward trend of Korea's outgoing FDI 
continued until 1990. Around that time, the structural factors 
in the Korean economy changed factor endowment and impeded the 
rapid increase. However it is assumed that Korea's economic 
integration into the world economy by means of FDI will continue 
in the coming years. Deepening mutual interdependence is 
created by FDI. In the past, compared to foreign borrowing, FDI 
was not a popular way of doing business among Korean 
entrepreneurs, who preferred to use foreign debt rather than 
share benefits with foreign business partners. Technology 
transfer can take place through patents, licenses, FDI, and the 
import of capital equipment with embodied technology, and among 
these, FDI was not a popular option. However, the rising 
regionalism and protectionism have made it as one of the popular 
options in the business globalization strategy. """ 
In response to Korea's efforts to internationalize the 
domestic market, foreign direct investment toward South Korea 
increased by 264.3 percent to $102m in January 1995 from the 
previous year. According to the Finance and Economy Ministry in 
468 See I1 Sakong, 1994, pp. 114-123. 
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Korea, Japan was the biggest foreign contributor during February 
1995 with $37m for nine projects, followed by the US with $18m 
and the European Union with $5m. At the same time the previous 
year, the US had led the list with $14m; Japan and the European 
Union invested $5m each. d69 
One optimistic sign of Korea's further integration into the 
world economy is well reflected in Korea's stress upon 
continuing reform47° such as to achieve complete import 
liberalization, radical deregulation in the financial sector and 
foreigners' investment in Korea, based upon globalization, which 
gives new impetus to speed up the outward-looking stance of the 
Korean economy. According to the statistics of the Ministry of 
Finance and Economy, Korea was expected to reach US $10,000 Per 
Capita Income in 1995 and has already achieved the target. This 
implies continuous growth of the economy at an annual rate of 7- 
9 percent. The theme of the presidential statement 471 could be 
summarized in the policy goal for globalization. The national 
task of globalization has been sufficiently crucial to make the 
year 1995 "the first year of globalization" and lay a firm 
strategic foundation for this national task. 
469 Financial Times, Wednesday February 15 1995- News: 
Asia-Pacific 
070 Major content of reform is well surveyed in Chapter Three, in the latter part of the section on Korea's industrial 
policy section of the latter part. 
471. This refers to the presidential statement on the 1995 
government policy, quoted in Korea News Review, 14 January 1995. 
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4.2 Korea's Globalization Efforts for the Growing Partnership 
with the EU 
The European Union appears as a rather protectionist bloc 
to South Korea. Consequently, the external trade, policy of the 
EU is of vital concern to the economic-policy makers in the 
business sectors of Korean society. The import and export 
diversification strategy of the Korean economic development plan 
has paid much attention to the enlarged market potential of the 
EU. The export-oriented development strategy of Korea and the 
new need to diversify its exporting market, require further 
cooperation and promotion of bilateral economic relations 
between the ROK and the EU. Table 4.13 reflects the importance 
of the EU market. In absolute trade share, the most important 
individual trade partners for Korea are the US, Japan and the 
EU. These trading partners together account for 70 percent of 
Korea's trade. 
As one of the promoting factors to improve the level of 
trade between the EU and Korea, Korea. 's continuous pursuit of an 
outward-looking development strategy and more opening of the 
Korean market are necessary conditions to comply with the EU's 
demand for reciprocal market access . 472 As a active way of 
tackling reciprocity, Korea could positively promote the 
principle of open regionalism in the Pacific Rim endorsed by a 
"2. About the future desirable directions of Korea's 
economic policy formulation, Danny M. Leipziger and Peter Petri 
well elaborated in the article, "Korean Industrial Policy: 
Legacies of the Past and Directions for the future, " in Lee-Jay 
Cho and Yoon Hyung Kim (eds. ), Korea's Political Economy: 
International Perspective, Honolulu, Hawaii: University of 
Hawaii Press, 1993. 
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regional cooperation body, APEC. "' Korea should work to ensure 
that APEC becomes a better institutionalized free trade zone for 
promoting regional stability and prosperity. "' 
For the purpose of more liberalization of the Korean 
economy through the slogan of "globalization and 
internationalization, " the Kim Young Sam government has aired an 
important foreign policy change in two dimensions: 
a. A change in focus from the North to the South; 
b. A change from bilateralism to multilateralism; 
The multilateral concept of Korea's new policy direction of 
the present government stands distinctive from that of the 
previous government of Korea. At the Korean Council on Foreign 
Relations in May 1993, the foreign Minister of Republic of 
Korea, Dr. Sung-Joo Han presented a five-point foreign policy 
related to Korea's new diplomacy for the future. Also in the 
same category, President Kim Young Sam made a speech at the 
Pacific Basin Economic Council(PBEC) meeting held in Seoul May 
22-26,1993. The foreign minister, in elaborating on the 
president's PEBC speech on the "Pacific era and Korea's new 
diplomacy", revealed the following five fundamentals for Korea's 
new diplomacy: 
"'. Trade Ministers from 18 Pacific Rim governments on 16 November 1995 cleared the final obstacles to an agreement to free all trade and investment in the region by 2020. The APEC 
members reached a swift compromise on a 15-point "action-agenda" for joint and individual liberalization measures. The plan, to be launched formally at the start of 1997, calls on APEC 
members, which together account for half of world trade, to open their markets by cutting tariffs, liberalizing services, public 
procurement and investment, and harmonizing industrial 
standards. Quoted in Financial Times Friday November 17 1995, 
p. 4. 
""I1 Sakong, op. cit., p. 211. 
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1) Globalism; 2) Diversification; 3) Multidimensionalism; 
4) Regional cooperation; 5) Future orientation; 
These policy fundamentals in Kim's Government are the 
result of the policy changes075 designed to meet changes that 
have taken place in the international environment concommitment 
with the emergence of a new international order. The export- 
first policy within the framework of an outward-looking 
development strategy is not likely to be changed, though a 
little shift to a less extreme export -promotion strategy is 
expected. 
An outward-looking development strategy is often defined as 
either "export promotion" or " trade liberalization". In case 
of Korea, the outward-looking development strategy was 
implemented primarily through export promotion. Much in the 
same policy line, Korea's outward-looking stance in its economic 
policy and external liberalization measures is likely to 
constitute a positive factor to promote and deepen the trade 
relation between the EU and Korea in the future. "" 
"g See the middle part of this chapter. 
"6. Only an open economy will maximize the EU-Korean 
economic exchanges. Open regionalism of the EU with more 
liberalization of the Korean economy would be the best condition 
for the promotion of the exchanges. On the role of the open 
economy, see Michael Bruno, "Opening Up: Liberalization with 
Stabilization, " in Rudiger Dornbusch, F. Helmers, and C. H. 
Lesile, (eds. ), The Open Economy, EDI Series in Economic 
Development, London: Oxford University Press, 1988. 
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Table 4.16 : Major Economic Indicators of Korea 
year 1961 1971 1986 1988 1989 1990 1991 1995 
GNP Growth(%) 5.6 8.6 12.9 12.4 6.8 9.0 8.6 7.5 
Per Capita GNP 
(US$) 82 289 2.505 4.129 4.944 5.569 6.515 9.750 
Source: Korea National Statistics Office, Major Statistics of 
the Korean Economy, Seoul, 1991. 
The concept of globalism in the Korea's new diplomacy is 
that Korea will actively take part in global affairs and 
intensify the degree of inter-dependence among nations in the 
world. Multidimensionalism refers to comprehensive cooperation 
in every interactions, including security, economy, environment 
and culture. Also, by enhancing the diplomacy of regional 
cooperation, Korea is required to pursue open regionalism which 
contributes to building a common world community. "' The 
multidimensionalism of the economy should be accompanied by the 
liberalization of the Korean economy to the level of the 
advanced group under the WTO. 
"' Han, Sung-Joo, "Fundamental of Korean New Diplomacy: 
New Korea's Diplomacy toward the World and the Future", Korea 
and World Affairs, vol. 17, No. 2, Summer 1993, pp. 227-245. 
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CHAPTER FIVE. THE DEVELOPMENT OF TRADE BETWEEN SOUTH KOREA 
AND THE EUROPEAN UNION 
This chapter elaborates on South Korea-EU relations with 
particular focus on trade exchanges. Given the Republic of 
Korea's heavy reliance on the US and Japan, a dependence which 
is due to reasons of history as well as geography, Korea 
inevitably has paid more attention to its relationship with them 
than with the EC/EU since the Treaty of Rome. Since the 
establishment of diplomatic relations with the Community in 
1965, the framework of the GATT has served in discussing 
bilateral trade problems. Entering the 1980s, with growing 
protectionism, regionalism, and Korea's urgent need to diversify 
both its markets and its sources of supply, Korea came to regard 
the EU as of much more strategic importance than in the 1960s 
and 1970s. Thus, together with the EC's recognition, in the same 
context, of the importance of the ANIEs to its future economic 
activities, led to a decision to hold "Annual Consultations 
between the Commission and Korea" since 1983. 
5.1 General Evolution of EU-Korean Relations 
5.1.1 The EU's New Perspective on the ROK 
Brian Bridges' emphasis on the geographical distance 
between Europe and Korea seems to have lost meaning in this age 
of information and telecommunication. "" Europeans have in 
recent years been strongly aware of South Korea as one of the 
478. Brian Bridges, Korea and the West. London: Routledge & 
Kegan Paul for RIIA, 1986, pp. 76-80. 
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newly developing economies. Since the Korean war in 1953, the 
relationship between the EC and South Korea has been 
traditionally confined to economic interaction. Economic 
relations between the two have been characterized by imbalances, 
sectoral concentration and a recent surge of Korea's export into 
the EU market. "" 
To the Europeans, the rise of Asia where South Korea plays 
an leading role, has many implications for future economic 
strategies. "" The dynamism of East Asian Economies, including 
South Korea gives rise to a need for the EU to adopt more pro- 
active strategies, emphasizing fuller and increasingly targeted 
use of economic cooperation to promote European trade and 
investment. In reviewing the EU's existing policy instruments 
relevant to South Korea, several dimensions remain to be 
considered. 
South Korea's bilateral relations with the EU have been 
epitomized by the visit to Brussels on March 1995 of Kim, Young 
Sam, the ROK President. Before that, South Korea requested a 
formalized arrangement. In this sense, the Joint Communique by 
"". The details of the characteristics are surveyed in sub- 
chapters 5.2. 
°8O. The World Bank estimates that half the growth in the 
global economy will come from East and Southeast Asia alone by 
the year 2000. This growth will ensure that by the year 2000 
one billion Asians will have significant consumer spending power 
and of these, 400 million will have average disposable incomes 
as high, if not higher, than their European or US 
contemporaries. The European Union therefore needs to accord 
Asia a higher priority than is at present the case. Quoted in 
Commission of the European Communities, Toward a New Asia 
Strategy, Brussels, 13 July, 1994, p. l. 
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the Presidency of the Council of the EU and the ROK is 
historic. 481 
With a view to encouraging closer contacts between economic 
operators, the Korean government, supported by the European 
Commission, took the initiative in organizing a symposium in 
Brussels on September 16 and 17,1981. The purpose of the 
seminar was to provide European and Korean industrialists, 
bankers and traders with an opportunity to identify commercial 
and investment chances by exchanging information and 
Council of the EU Press Release 5219/95, Brussels, 6 
March 1995. 
The content of the joint communique is as follows: 
1. On the occasion of the visit by His Excellency, Mr KIM 
YOUNG SAM, President of the ROK, the Presidency of 
the Council of the EU and the ROK: 
- bearing in mind the progress already achieved, 
especially in the economic and commercial field; 
- also bearing in mind the two parties' growing 
importance on the international stage, 
declare their determination to reinforce and 
intensify their mutual relations, especially in the 
political, economic, technological and cultural 
fields. 
2. The two parties will draw upon common values and 
aspirations and will seek to: 
- emphasize their common commitment to democracy and 
respect for human rights, and their commitment to 
preserving peace and establishing a just and stable 
international order in keeping with the UN Charter; 
- reinforce their common interest in closer 
cooperation and reaffirm their undertaking to 
implement scrupulously the commitments entered into 
within the WTO; 
- hold the necessary discussions to ensure better 
mutual understanding; 
- develop mutual understanding, increase cooperation, 
and endeavour to identify areas of agreement on 
international issues, in particular non- 
proliferation and disarmament, the fight against 
terrorism, drug trafficking and money laundering, 
and other matters affecting peace and international 
stability. 246 
opinion. "' The emergence of the NICs more or less coincided 
with extremely difficult economic conditions in the EC. 483 The 
resulting tensions are reflected in the community's relations 
with South Korea. Consequently in 1979,1982 and 1987, sectoral 
trade agreements in textiles and steel were conducted and 
establishment of a delegation for more consultation was 
initiated in 1989. 
There is no regional level political dialogue such as the 
ASEAN has with the EU. However, South Korea participates in a 
ministerial level meeting every year in the framework of the 
ASEAN Post Ministerial Conference(PMC) where the EU is one of 
the dialogue partners, the others being the US, Canada, 
Australia, New Zealand, Japan. 484 The recent accord between 
Europe and Asia to increase volume of exchanges, which was 
agreed in Bangkok on March ist and 2nd, surely is an optimistic 
development. A meeting of 15 European leaders with ten of their 
Asian counterparts was an opportunity for Euro-Asian talk . 41, 
In a wider context, multilateral-cooperation has been 
implemented in the context of the GATT where the role of South 
Korea has increased tremendously, commensurate with Korea's 
growing importance in world trade and also through the UN 
framework. 
'82. Commission of the European Communities, The EC and the Republic of Korea, European Information in External Relations 
No. 52/81, September 1981, p. 2. 
`83. Ibid., p. 6. 
684 . The upgraded status of South Korea is reflected in this participation. 
485 The Economist, March 2nd-8th 1996, p. 18-19. 
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As has been surveyed in the previous chapters, the core 
part of the EU's commercial policy toward South Korea has been 
a call for Korea's further liberalization within the 
multilateral system with respect for all rules and commitments. 
South Korea has been requested to open more markets for European 
business in its bilateral negotiations. Various degrees of 
trade promotion measures from the EU perspective have been 
undertaken, with the Member States being the major performers of 
each policy line, with the coordination of the EU. 486 
The GSP of the EU 487 has been unilaterally offered to 
Korea. On the 1 June 1994, the Commission adopted its 
Communication to the Council and the European Parliament 
relating to the revision and updating of the principles to be 
followed in the elaboration of the new scheme to be applied for 
the period 1995 to 2004. This new guideline is predicted to 
deprive South Korea from being granted preferential market 
access in many sectors. `88 South Korea is definitely one of 
486. Since the SEM, the power of the EU Commission has 
gained more momentum in a number of trade policy instruments 
such as anti-dumping and safeguard measures. 
487. The Republic of Korea was among the major beneficiaries 
of the EC's GSP scheme since it was initiated in 1971. It is true that the steady rise of Korean exports to the EC market 
since the early parts of the 1970s, may be attributed to the GSP. Consequently, Korea is one of the nations most severely 
affected by the EC's policy of a much sharper differentiation in the allocation of benefits in the industrial sector. This scheme 
consisted of total exemption from customs duties for all industrial products and partial exemption of certain products. This was revamped for a new decade of operating in the 1980s. Tariff quotas were later drawn up so as to afford a certain 
amount of protection for sensitive products that face highly 
competitive exports from some countries such as South Korea. 
488 See chapter Three. 
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those nations which has become not only important partner of 
world affairs, but also a competitor in trade. "' 
The European Commission Report further argues that Europe's 
interests in Asia are: 1) to benefit from the economic 
opportunities and to respond to the economic challenges in the 
region which contains the world fastest growing countries, and 
which could represent between a quarter and a third of the world 
economy by the year 2000.4'° South Korea is surely regarded as 
the major partner to achieve the above-mentioned goal of the EU. 
The need for EU's new strategy towards South Korea lies in the 
fact that the EU needs to strengthen its economic presence in 
Asia for the purpose of maintaining its leading role in the 
world economy. Otherwise, the EU stands to lose out on the 
economic miracle taking place in Asia because of the strong 
competition; from Japan and the US, and also increasingly from 
the companies within the region's newly industrialized and 
capital-rich countries such as South Korea or Taiwan. The report 
further argues that if the EU companies are unable to take a 
full share of the world's main centre of growth in the next 
decade, this will affect their profits and competitiveness, not 
only in Asian markets, but also world-wide. If the EU loses out 
on the economic miracle taking place in Asia, this is expected 
`89. Commission of the European Communities, Toward a New 
Asian Strategy, Brussels, 13 July, 1994, p. 10. 
"o. Ibid., p. 13. 
The other two main concerns are first to integrate into the open, market-based world trading system those Asian 
countries such as China, India or Vietnam which are moving from 
state controls to market-oriented economies; and second to 
assist in the enormous problems of poverty alleviation. 
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to have political costs, and at the very least it will 
exacerbate the calls for more defensive policies from those who 
regard Asia as a threat rather than as a valuable partner, which 
in turn will further reduce the benefits to be gained from 
Asia . 491 
In particular consideration of South Korea's position, the 
EU is expected to place greater emphasis on market opening, for 
trade in goods and in services and to select priority sectors 
for economic cooperation to reflect its own comparative 
advantage, e. g., banking, energy, environmental technologies, 
transport equipment, telecommunications, etc. 
5.1.2 Intensified Partnership on Turbulence of Trade Frictions 
The rapid expansion of mutual trade resulted in a Korean 
export surge in the mid-1980s. The rapid increase of Korea's 
exports have hovered around the $7 billion level with trade 
surplus of $2 billion in 1988. The subsequent gradual decline 
of Korea's exports has been due to the declining competitiveness 
of Korean manufacturing sectors. 1991 recorded a turning point 
with the EC recording a trade surplus with Korea. Despite 
comparatively balanced development, trade relations have been 
friction-oriented, as both parties have politicized trade 
through sectoral disputes, bilateral export restraints and 
ambiguous application of multilateral rules. 492 
'91. Ibid., pp. 17-18. 
492. Kim Chung-Soo, "Development and Liberalization of the 
Korean Economy from the Perspective of Korean-Europe Economic 
Relations, unpublished paper, KIET, April 1985. 
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Table 5.1: The EC's Trade with the Republic of Korea, 1975-83(9 
months)(million ECUs) 
1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 
Imports 619 1014 1268 1428 1688 1972 2338 2402 2023 
Exports 474 532 659 1001 1245 941 1120 1297 1151 
Balance -145 -482 -609 -427 -443 -1031 -1218 -1105 -872 
Note: For 1980 one ECU equalled $ 1.39 
Source: EUROSTAT 
Table 5.2: Overall Trade between Korea and the EC 
(millions of US$, %) 
1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 
Trade Volume 6304 7520 11208 14178 11372 
Exports 3246(10.7) 4305(14.0) 6597(14.0) 8131(13.4) 
7394(11.0) 
Imports 3058(9.8) 3215(11.2) 4613(11.2) 6047(11.7) 
5342(10.2) 
Trade Balance 188 1090 1987 2084 688 
Note: Figures in parentheses represent the share in total exports or 
Imports 
Source: Economic Planning Board, Korea. 
The market opening pressure of the EU was intensively 
developed in the second half of the 1980s. The suspension of 
the GSP from South Korea in 1987 marked the culmination of the 
EU's complaints against unfair trading practices. The EU's 
complaints directly created room for the abuse of non-tariff 
barriers to deter the rapid increase of Korean exports. Thus, 
the system of effective protection for strategic industries 
induced the Korean FDI into the manufacturing sector. Indeed, 
about 75 percent of Korean FDI into the EU has been in the 
electronics sector, which has been most affected by restrictive 
measures such as anti-dumping and other grey area measures. In 
addition to the passive dimension, a more active dimension to 
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the Korean FDI was pushed by the strategy of globalization of 
business activities and the efforts actively of exploit the 
opportunity of a SEM without internal barriers. It is also true 
that the SEM raises some psychological fears among the Korean 
businessmen. Amid this kind of uncertain environment, diplomatic 
efforts to improve the understanding between the two partners 
have continued to produce some results. "" 
Brian Bridges094 points out that, traditionally, South 
Korea have been of little political importance, and heavily 
dependent on the US, whereas, Europeans preferred multilateral 
political frameworks such as NATO. Despite slight recognition 
accorded by the EU to Korea in the 1960s, with EC-South Korean 
diplomatic relations signed in 1965, it was only in May 1989 
that the Korean Mission in Brussels took place and the EC 
Commission Delegation office only opened in March 1990. The 
gradual status-upgrading of South Korea in the international 
community in the 1980s rendered individual EC member nations and 
the EC Commission more interested in drawing South Korea into a 
range of discussions on mutually beneficial fields. From 1983, 
Foreign ministerial-level meetings started. "' 
"' EC vice-President Frans Andriessen visited Seoul in 
1989. He proposed cooperative development of high definition television and asked the Koreans to adopt European standards. 
"` Brian Bridges, "Europe and Korea: Time for a 
Relationship, " The Journal of East Asian Affairs, Vol. VI, No. 2, 
Summer/Fall, 1992, p. 321. 
'" The two parties decided to hold "Annual Consultations between the Commission and Korea, " alternating between Seoul and Brussels, and these contacts have now become institutionalized. The first consultations, at ministerial level, were held in the 
Korean capital at the end of March 1983. The next round took 
place in Brussels at the beginning of July, 1984. 
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The increased importance of commercial contention during 
the 1980s and 1990s naturally called for more substantial 
political or cultural understanding. Apart from the economic 
dimension, Korea needed to broaden its interests away from 
excessive dependence on the US to a new dimension like the EU. 
The strengthened EU relationship would be an important balancer 
in Korea's coordination efforts between the US and Japan. This 
kind of awareness was followed by the visit of former 
presidents, Chun Doo-Whan and Roh Tae Woo in 1986 and 1989 
respectively. It is a pity that those visits did not produce 
any subsequent efforts on the Korean side and were poorly 
reciprocated on the European side. More aggressive efforts are 
expected in the interdependent nature of the global economy. 
South Korea needs to be equipped with more competence in dealing 
with the multicultural EU. 496 
5.2 The General Pattern of EU-Korean Economic Interaction: Rapid 
Expansion of Korea's Exports and the EU's Call for more 
Liberalization in Korean Market 
It was during the latter part of the 1980s that trade 
relation between the two regions drew keen attention from both 
sides. Although the diplomatic relationship between the two 
started in 1965, it was only in the latter part of the 1970s 
496 . Brian Bridges summarizes the three important variables in the Euro-Korean relationship in the 1990s. The first one is 
the development of South Korea's own economic and political role in international affairs and how the EU fits into Korea's world 
view; the second one is the evolution of the EC after 1992; and 
the third one is how the deepening and widening processes 
affects both Korea's economic growth potential and its ability 
to act with unity in foreign and economic policy-making with 
developments in the trilateral and broader multilateral context. 
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that both regarded each other as major trading partners. 
Korea, especially, began to pay more attention to the EC when it 
came face to face with the urgent problems of growing 
protectionism, and the need to diversify both its markets and 
its sources of supply. 497 Between 1975-1980, the EC 
represented a growing market for Korean products; its imports 
from Korea increased by 220 percent, and the Community accounted 
for around 15 percent of total Korean exports. Growth of the 
Community's exports to Korea have been less dramatic, however. 
Between 1975 and 1979 exports increased by 163 percent. 498 
To the Korean People, the U. S. A. and Japan are still 
regarded as more important partners in trade than the EU. 
However, Korea's need to diversify its markets has naturally 
led it to turn much more attention to the unified single EU 
market after the 1992 Programme. The importance of the ANIEs to 
the EU has also induced the EU commercial commission officials 
to pay much more attention to them on multilateral trade issues. 
The ministerial levels of meeting and more systematic efforts 
well prove that the two partners are strategically interwoven in 
the world trading system. On the 15th November, 1993, Korea 
and the EU had a ministerial level meeting between Leon Brittan, 
vice president and Commissioner for external economic relations 
of the EU Commission and Han Sung Joo, Minister of Foreign 
Affairs, Republic of Korea. Both sides agreed to conclude a 
"". Commission of the EC, The EC and The Republic of Korea, 
European Information on External Relations No. 52/81, September 
1981, p. 2. 
498 Ibid. p. 2. 
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basic agreement on relations as soon as possible. The new 
accord will establish new relations between the two sides in all 
fields, including economic, trade and political, in the 
future 
. 499 
They also agreed to form a Korea-EC wisemen's club to study 
ways of promoting EC-Korea ties toward the 21st century. 
Minister Han asked the EC nations to continue to allow Korea to 
retain GSP status until 1996, when Korea joins the OECD. EC 
Commissioner Leon Brittan pointed out that the EC needs a 
promise from South Korea that the Korean market should be more 
open to allow easier access, on the condition that no duty will. 
be higher than 20 percent. He also expressed the hope that 
South Korea would harmonize duties on textiles and clothing from 
the EC at 12 percent and allow EC markets to participate in the 
pharmaceutical sector. Regarding the financial service market, 
he expressed the wish that South Korea would further liberalize 
its banking, securities, investment trusts, investment advisory 
services, life and non-life insurance and insurance brokerage 
market. Brittan argued that the new opportunities opened up by 
the European Single Market would be exploited by Korean 
businessmen in view of the strength of the Korean economy: Cars, 
chemicals and chips increased their share of total Korean sales 
to Europe due to the Korean technological development. The 
completion of the intellectual property right protection, 
Korea's market access, Korea's high tariff rates, Korea's 
499. Korea and EC have had annual high-level consultations 
between ministerial-level officials since the early 1980s, but 
agreed to change the name to a ministerial conference in 
November, 1993. 
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financial market opening and public procurement were the major 
pending issues for the EU. 511° 
Korea's shift from labour-intensive industries to those of 
a less labour-intensive nature through the use of comparative 
advantage raised policy problems for the EU. The EU's response 
to South Korea has been much more sophisticated, enough to 
produce the sectoral protectionism that prevailed at the 
beginning of the previous decade. The EU has two problems with 
Korea. The economic one is that the combination of product 
specificity and extreme import growth rates can cause severe 
problems for a limited group of firms and traders. Thus, the 
cost of the short run adjustment might be pushed up beyond the 
society's gains from trade. The institutional problem is that 
the GATT Article 19 on "market disruption" was inadequate to 
protect the declining sectors of the EU industry, prompting the 
EU to argue for a selective safeguard clause, to persuade NICs 
into accepting the VERS (Voluntary Export Restraints) and to 
employ anti-dumping laws more intensively. With respect to the 
social and economic adjustment costs of targeting, the EU has 
reverted to a host of a sectoral approaches, some dating back as 
far as the 1960s. The Multi-Fibre Agreement in textiles and 
clothing, VERS in steel, certain consumer electronics, footwear 
and a protectionist tilt in anti-dumping cases have brought 
perhaps up to a third of EU-NICs trade under special restriction 
"'. Korea Newsreview, 30 November, 1993. 
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provisions . 5°1 
The 1992 Programme has brought the revitalization of EU 
business and given the Member States some confidence. The 
regulation of trade with the NICs has been reduced by the 
Commission; the Commission has become very cautious of price 
undertakings in anti-dumping policy; and is attempting to bring 
more VERs to the EU level and phase them out at that level. The 
Commission has initiated adjustment as a substitute for 
protection. It seems to be advocating a liberal market 
mechanism toward global competitiveness. 5O2 If it pursues that 
market-oriented industrial policy, the trade between EU and 
Korea is expected to increase tremendously. On the other hand, 
the outline of the internal market, the EC Commission's White 
Paper of 1985, devotes only a single sentence to trade with 
nonmember states: " The commercial identity of the Community must 
be consolidated so that our trading partners will not be given 
5°1. Joyce Tan and Jaceques Pelkmans, "Bilateral Trade 
Relations Between Korea and the EC, " in Min Chung Ki (ed. ), 
Korea-EC Economic Relations, Seoul: Korea Institute for 
International Economic Policy, 1991, pp. 101-2. 
sot. Keith Joseph has a different views on the role of the 
EC. He argues that the EC's position is incoherent: "It says the internal market is enriching because this allows comparative 
advantage full play. We rebels agree on that. The Commission 
then somersaults and says that free trade with the rest of the 
Community must be blocked by quotas, tariffs, and anti-dumping 
measures and voluntary(meaning compulsory) restraints. The EC 
has evolved an entirely new corpus of law -bogus impediments to trade. It is wrong-headed to say free trade with Belgium is 
beneficial but free trade with Argentina or Poland is bad. This is the schizophrenic position our superiors try to maintain. Discrimination against free trade is the leitmotiv of the EC's 
trade policies. Maastricht was a triumph for protectionism. " 
Quoted in The Daily Telegraph, Friday, January 12,1996, p. 18. 
The title of the concerned article, "Why the Tories are the real 
party of the stakeholder. " 
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the benefit of the wider market without making concessions 
themselves. " 503 
Table and Exhibit 5.3: community Trade with Korea: 1980-1990 
Ecu Millions 
8,000, 
6,000 
4,000 
2,000 
0,000 
-2,00 
-4,000 
Import 
Export 
Balance 
Import 
® Export 
Balance 
1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1983 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 
2,079 2,408 2,470 2,912 2,945 3,352 4,312 5,959 7,263 6,933 6,348 
0,967 1,155 1,319 1,645 2,242 2,763 3,062 3,663 4,389 5,205 6,055 
-1,1121 -1,2531 -1,151, -1,267 -0,703 -0,5891 -1,2501 -2,2961 , 2,0591 48-0.493 -1,7 
Source: EC Commission 
The analysis of Joyce Tan and Jacques Pelkmans based on the 
Graphics above revealed that the export value of Korean products 
to the EU more than doubled between 1980 and 1988. Their 
bilateral trade relations analysis can be summarized as follows: 
a. The trade balance represented a falling share of EC 
exports: still bordering around 100 percent of EC 
exports in the early 1980s; 
b. The dynamics in the trade relation stemmed from Korean 
exports leading up to 1988, and from EC exports 
beginning in 1986; 
C. The 1990 EC exports represented 12.1 percent of Korean 
imports; their exports to the EC amounted to 13.5 
percent of overall Korean exports. This put the EC in 
third place, for Korean export, behind the US and 
Japan (both 19.5 percent). On the Korean import side, 
the EC was still third, after Japan (26.3 percent) and 
the US (16.8 percent); 
d. The UK and Germany took in more than 50 percent of 
Korean exports to the EC; interestingly, France and 
503 Completion of the International Market, White Paper from the Commission to the Council, office for official 
Publications of the EC, Luxembourg, 1985, p, 8. 
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Italy both had a trade surplus with Korea in 1990.504 
The product structure of Korean exports and main products 
is explained in the two tables below. 
Table 5.4: Product Structure of Korean Exports to the 
EC(billion US $: %) 
Primary products 0.16 6.2 0.18 2.3 0.19 2.6 
Iron and Steel 0.11 4.3 0.07 0.8 0.09 1.2 
Chemicals 0.03 1.1 0.17 2.1 0.7 2.4 
Machinery and cars 0.5 19.6 3.36 42.2 3.10 42.9 
Office/telecom 0.3 11.7 2.32 29.1 2.04 28.3 
Equipment 
Electrical 
machinery 0.02 0.7 0.37 4.6 0.34 4.7 
Textiles 0.23 9.0 0.39 4.8 0.44 6.1 
Clothing 0.89 34.9 1.66 20.8 1.28 17.8 
Other consumer 
Goods 0.5 19.6 1.80 22.6 1.67 23.2 
Total 2.55 7.97 7.21 
Source: GATT, International Trade 1989-1990, Vol. II. Quoted in 
Ibid. 
Note: Columns do not add to total as some sectoral exports have 
not been included. 
The protectionism of the EU against Korea's export is 
prevalent in all major import-competing products. Joyce Tan and 
Jacques Pelkmans classified the protectionism mechanisms by 
items. 
Those are as follows : 505 
" Consumer electronics products such as video cassette 
recorders-price undertakings 
" Colour Tvs-Anti Dumping Duties 
" CD players-AD duties 
" Colour TV tubes-Voluntary Exports Restraints at floor 
price 
" Video Tape-Price Undertakings 
" Electronic Oven-VERs 
" Textiles and Clothing-Multi-Fibre Agreement 
" Synthetic Fibres-AD duties 
504 Ibid. , p, 104. 
5os. Ibid. 
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. Steel- Quotas in the framework of the manifest crisis 
regime of the Community, lifted in 1990. 
. Cars- Statistical Surveillance * Only toys were not given any protection 
Table 5.5: Main Korean Export Products for the EC(million US 
$: ý) 
1988 1989 1990 1991 % growth 1991 
first half (compared to 
first half 
1990) 
Electronics 
Electrical 2,885 2,568 3,141 1,819 32.2 
Colour T 173 117 278 155 44.9 
Parts & 
electronic components 720 781 950 559 29.4 
Textiles & clothing 2.192 1,887 1,894 1,031 24.8 
Clothing 1,633 1,256 1,179 680 37.9 
Shoes 568 480 727 425 27.6 
Toys 212 201 173 80 -2.4 
Steel 104 126 145 59 -15.7 
Cars 113 142 124 155 117.0 
Total 8,132 7,394 8,843 4,999 31.0 
Source: MITI-Seoul. Quoted in Ibid. 
Ji Hong Kim similarly maintains that in 1988,33.7 percent 
of all Korean exports to the EC ran up against non-tariff 
barriers, declining from 41 percent in 1987. In textiles alone 
72 percent of Korean exports suffered under MFA restrictions. 
Not surprisingly, some sectors have been more severely affected 
than others. A few industries of labour-intensive production 
have found themselves facing a highly difficult situation, in a 
critical case, marked by factory closures and job losses. 
Factory closures and job losses were the direct reasons for the 
EC concluding sectoral agreements in specific areas with 
exporting nations for the purpose of enabling the EC's industry 
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to adjust to the changing economic situation. "O' 
The Community has been much concerned with the increase in 
the NICs' market penetration into the EC market. Non-tariff 
barriers and grey-area measures have resulted from the 
Community's strong fear of such penetration. It seems reasonable 
to say that Korea did not properly deal with the emerging 
dissatisfaction about its trade policy discretion. Although the 
manifestations of Korean trade policy have not been so much 
bound by GATT rules as those of the EU have been, the Community 
appears to be in a position that when imports seriously hurt 
employment in the concerned industries, it avails itself of 
great discretion, too, especially in grey area measures evading 
the GATT rules. Amid that kind of continuing process, the 
product structure of the EC protection against Korea has 
gradually become similar to that of the items Korea exports to 
the EC. 507 
The antidumping policy of the EC has been a major concern 
to Korean trade policy makers, who regard this as the highest 
priority issue in bilateral relations. Anti-dumping measures 
against electronic consumer goods have become gradually more 
important and have been used as the main tool of restriction 
506 Faced with economic stagnation or even recession, it has not always been easy for the EC to keep liberal free trade 
policy lines, in specific cases as regard its relations with ANIEs, of which Korea is one of the forerunners. Reflecting the difficulties, the EC has concluded agreements or sectoral 
arrangements for textiles and steel with Korea and other 
nations, along with other products which have been particularly hard hit by the recession. 
507 Joyce Tan and Jacques Pelkmans, op. cit., p. 108. 
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against Korea's export expansion. Under pressure from the 
industries concerned, the commission initiated antidumping 
procedures on colour Television sets, video-tapes, tape- 
recorders, microwave ovens, and compact disc players. During a 
period of five years(1986-1990), a total of 19 Antidumping(AD) 
case initiations were applied to Korea, out of a total of 173 
initiations. In comparison, China had 18 cases and Japan 17 
cases. 5O8 The other three ANIEs together were subject to 
initiation of only 13 AD cases. In 1989,0.9 percent of EC 
imports were covered by the four Asian NIEs. 
The consumer electronics sector was severely affected by 
the AD measures. In 1990, the EC levied AD duties levied ranging 
from 8.3 percent to 32 percent on compact disc player, on small 
colour TVs ranging from 10.2 percent to 19.6 percent and on 
audio tape cassettes, up to 80 percent. In 1989, AD duties were 
imposed on VCRs, as well as on video cassette tapes. ` The EC 
was all the more disturbed by Korean exports since they threaten 
market shares previously held by European companies instead of 
reducing Japanese shares. As a strategy to avoid the AD 
508 For more statistics on anti-dumping duties imposed on 
Korean products, see Chapter Three on major trade- restrictive 
mechanisms. 
509. The export of Korean VTRs rose from 34,000 units in 
1985 to 700,000 units during only the first six months of 1988. 
Three Korean conglomerates, Samsung, Goldstar and Daewoo, 
voluntarily suspended exports of television sets and video-tape 
recorders to avoid anti-dumping action by the EC. Nevertheless, 
the EC decided on investigation and imposed anti-dumping duties 
on some products, up to 30%. And in 1987, the EC Commission 
upheld its first complaint about the services industry and imposed dumping duties on Hyundai Merchant Marine for unfair 
pricing of its cargo service. - Financial Times, August 24,1988. 
Quoted in Beate Neuss, " The European Community and South Korea, 
Korea and World Affairs, Spring 1990, pp. 105. 
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retaliation, Korean firms established subsidiary operations in 
the EC. The estimated average antidumping duty between 1980 and 
1985 was 23 percent. As a result trade was decreased by 40 
percent. The local-content rule is sometimes used to protect 
European industries which lack competitiveness in strategic 
areas involving high-technology and electronics. The EU, however, 
argues that anti-dumping duties are necessary because the NICs 
comparative advantage is gained through "social dumping" and 
partly with undervalued currencies. 
If we look at VERs to EC or Member States, an illustrative 
list shows the VERS for Denmark, the U. K, Benelux and Germany 
for frame on non-rubber footwear, and for the UK on radios, 
black and white TV sets, footwear and communication equipment, 
together with the EC-wide steel quotas. 
Over the 1985-1988 period, Korea's footwear exports to the 
EC increased tremendously, by 649 percent. In the compact disc 
player AD cases, a 23-fold increase in the volume of Japanese 
and Korean exports over five years is reported, occupying two- 
thirds of the EC market. 51° The effort to create a Single 
European Market was the answer of the Europeans to economic and 
technological challenge from the U. S. A., Japan, and the four 
Asian NICs. 
The European nations felt that their middle-sized economies 
could not survive the global competition unless they strove for 
economies of scale as well. The dynamic development of the 
Pacific region fostered Europe's fear of decline. 
51O Beate, Neuss, op. cit., p. 110. 
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Table 5.6: VERs for Korean Exports to EC or Member States 
product type of measure EC/Member State(s) 
I. frozen squid 
2. footwear 
excl. slippers 
3. footwear 
4. microwave ovens 
5. VTRs 
6. metal flatware 
reference prices Italy 
VER+prior EC surveillance EC-wide 
VER at industry level Ireland 
export moderation 
at industry level EC-wide* 
export moderation/ 
monitoring exports/ 
EC surveillance EC-wide 
VER at industry level Benelux** 
Notes: *The Commission is not aware of this VER. 
** The government of Belgium and Netherlands are not 
aware of this VER. 
Source: GATT, 1991, quoted in Ibid. 
To maintain Europe's wealth and stability, it needed to 
restore its competitiveness in the world market, especially in 
high technology products. Korea's high-tech product export to 
the EU had been increasing rapidly. Semi-conductor showed much 
potential for export with tremendous expansion into the future 
51' EU market. 
By the end of 1989, the general liberalization ratio in 
South Korea had reached 95 percent. In 1987, nearly 38 percent 
of Korean exports to the EC were subject to import restrictions. 
The EC has a number of instruments of trade policy which can be 
utilized against Korean, and other non-EC country exports to 
reduce volume by means of VERS, national quotas, import 
surveillance mechanisms and anti-dumping actions. 512 EC 
sll Ibid., pp. 91-92. 
512 Pelkmans surveyed the EC's non-tariff instruments for 
the mid-1980s in his article, "The EC's Trade Policy Toward 
Developing Countries, " edited by Stevens & Themaat, Europe and 
International Division of Labour, Hodder and Stoughton, 1987. 
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policies are affected by the complex interplay between the 
Commission, member governments and European companies. European 
consumers favour cheaper Korean TVs, but EC manufacturers do 
not. Since the mid-1980s, Korea has promoted a diversification 
campaign designed to reduce their dependence on Japanese 
imports, particularly in intermediate technology and components. 
Looking to EC companies as alternative suppliers was one of the 
main themes of the former President Chun Doo-Whan's visit to 
Western Europe in 1986, yet no substantial measures were 
followed. 
Korean export opportunities will be enlarged by the 
improved of access to the EU market. The improvement of access 
to the EU market will be applied to textiles and clothing for 
technical reasons; the overall EU quota will be utilized to 
boost exports because any possible barriers to the intra-EC 
trade deflection removal will be created by the non-application 
of Article 115 after 1992. The anticipated amount of extended 
market potential for Korea in 1992 was calculated to be 15-20 
percent. In case of cars, where different sectors may be 
subject to national quotas, though EC-wide quotas do not exist, 
it is expected that quota-free trade shall be available after 
1999. The EU does not have any restrictions on the car exports 
by Korea. Car market competition in the EU is very high. The 
EU car industry is very nervous of the Japanese penetration. 
Price and quality brings competitive advantages. Korean cars 
He typically mentioned VER, anti-dumping, countervailing duties, 
technical regulations and certification, public procurement, EC 
surveillance, minimum prices and quotas. 
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may have comparative advantage in prices. In counter-strategy 
against the price advantage of Korean cars, the price strategy 
of some EC production is to build plants in sites of low wages 
such as the Central Eastern European nations. The combination of 
price and quality will be a decisive factor in competition with 
the EU. The Korean footwear industry is faced with the danger of 
being thwarted by East European competition and by the EU's 
efforts to preempt further protection by adjustment assistance 
and R&D programmes. Protectionist measures in consumer 
electronics are very strong in the EU. The strategic element of 
the consumer industry has compelled the EC to initiate anti- 
dumping cases, since this sector offers such strong opportunity 
for Korea to penetrate into the EC market. Nobody can foresee 
the absence of protection against Korea in the 1990s. Telecom 
terminal equipment and services have bright prospects to 
exploit, bu will also bring barriers for Korea deal with. 
In 1990, Korea ranked as 15th in the EC exports market and 
17th among import sources. The ever-expanding trend of EU-Korean 
exchanges changed the ranking from 17th and 15th to about 12th 
for both exports and import in 1993. The EU exports to Korea 
grew six-fold larger during the 1980s. The machine sector, 
chemicals and pharmaceuticals occupied two-thirds of EC exports 
to Korea. In 1979, EC was able to benefit favors because Korean 
tariff and non-tariff barriers were low. The trade pattern with 
the EC reflects complementarity based on comparative advantages, 
especially in the sectors of machines and chemicals. The Korean 
government claimed a comparative advantage. 
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Table 5.7: Product Structure of EC Exports to Korea: 1979- 
1990(ECUs and percentages) 
mio ECU % mio ECU % mio ECU % 
Agri-food+beverage, etc. 29.1 2.3 73.6 2.4 150.2 2.5 
Raw materials + veg. 20.8 1.6 96.2 3.1 162.3 2.7 
Oils, fats, fuels, gas, e tc. 
13.1 1.0 31.5 1.0 10.0 0.2 
Chemicals 142.2 11.2 502.8 16.4 982.6 15.4 
Various manufactures* 191.3 15.0 663.2 21.7 1456. 224.0 
Machinery+transp. eq. 790.8 62.1 1304.9 42.6 2799.0 46.2 
Special articles+gold 86.6 6.8 389.5 12.7 549.1 9.0 
Note: *SITC 6+8 
Source: EC Commission, quoted in Ibid. 
The EC's protectionism was based upon the product 
structure of Korean exports to the Community. EC's exports were 
faced with high protection in the Korean market. In this 
context, some products like high quality clothing, industrial 
textiles, carpets, specialty steels, high performance cars, 
luxury travel articles, quality shoes and jewellery, having a 
high income flexibility, are critical to the exploitation of 
Europe's comparative advantages. 
Korea also has trading barriers against the EC exports. 
The social campaigns against the use of excessive luxury items 
could be considered as perhaps the most feared one. The 
government monitors persons who consume luxury items, backing up 
the campaign effect, which gave special worries to the EC 
exporters. The general business of importing into Korea takes 
trouble. We can see two conspicuous structural problems. One 
is the access to finance for deferral of imports payments. The 
other is formal and informal economic entries to distribution. 
Finance liberalization measures would solve the problem. On the 
other hand the Korean conglomerates' distribution cartel is not 
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checked, as is the EC distribution, by the Korean government's 
competition policies. Entry into the Korean market is much more 
difficult than its entry into the EC. For example, in spirits, 
the discriminatory taxation on domestic quasi-substitutes like 
liquor tax and education tax leads to dramatic price 
discrepancies, causing these EC products to sell for below their 
potential. Also, luxury cars costing above 70 million won are 
taxed seven times higher than cheap cars; EC cars are almost all 
priced higher than 70 million won. "' 
In the case of services, effective market access and equal 
competitive opportunity is regarded as fair from the European 
point of view, Korean markets are still heavily restricted and 
closed. EU policy in this respect strongly favour the opening up 
of the insurance and securities markets, making it easy for EU 
businesses to enjoy effective market access and the same 
competitive opportunities. 514 Still, many restrictions are 
placed on investment in warehousing and storage, and 
preferential treatments is accorded to state-owned enterprises. 
Property rights, issues including patents and copyrights have 
also clouded relations. The problem of counterfeiting was 
regarded by the EC as theft. Design, brand image , quality 
reputation and originality need legal protection. The high 
quality industry of the European Community will be fatally 
513 Ibid., pp. 115-118. 
514 Kwang Suk, Kim, "Industrial Policy and Trade 
Liberalization in Korea, " Sanyon Ronchong, Seoul, 1987, pp. 1-30. 
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affected without such a legal framework. 515 
South Korea is also affected by the 1992 Programme in a 
multidimensional way. 516 There is a complex interaction 
between the EU's efforts to agree on Common External 
Tariffs(CET), to agree on a common external trade position and 
the continuing progress toward removing the intra-EU barriers. 
South Korea's major concern lies in the ease of market access to 
the EU and the extent of EU market liberalization to third 
countries. 
Generally the prospects for the two countries' exports to 
each other's markets are bright. In the Korean market, the EU 
feels it critical to improve access to all levels of import and 
distribution trade and to enjoy protection for it. Since 1989, 
Korea has been in competition with Eastern European countries in 
small metal products, textiles and clothing, domestic appliances 
and footwear, and such competition is expected to rise in the 
future. Korea could sell and invest there for the purpose of 
utilizing the region as a base to the EU. Korea is attempting 
to create higher value-added products, through innovation, 
R&D and high skill contents. 
Korea's liberalization efforts would also involve 
abolition of existing national quantitative restrictions, such 
as VERS. In this respect, the speed with which regional trading 
blocs in Europe are completed after 1992 is the big question. 
515 Brian Bridges, " Deepening the EC-Korean Economic 
Relationship, " Korea and World Affairs, Spring, 1990, pp. 79-80. 
516 Chapter Three on SEM and Korea explains in detail the 
impact of SEM on Korea, with statistical calculation. 
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National quantitative import restrictions in sensitive sectors 
such as automobiles, textiles, footwear51' and consumer 
electronics matter much to the Korean side. To move beyond 
those sectors toward more future-oriented directions, every 
efforts should be made to develop high-tech industry, much 
national support. As the third largest trade partner of Korea 
just after the U. S. A. and Japan, the EU is a very important 
group of countries, accounting for 14 percent of Korea's total 
exports, and 20 percent of its imports. In terms of investment, 
the EU occupies about 12 percent of FDI in Korea and the EC has 
about 7 percent of Korea's outward FDI. Since 1989, Korean 
exports have been decreasing in the industries closely related 
the anti-dumping regulation. Computers and VCRs were typical 
cases. Looking at the frequency of dumping cases between 1987 
to 1990, we could find 6 cases in the U. S., 2 cases in Canada, 
9 cases in Australia, but 18 cases in the EC. Some inconsistent 
anti-dumping regulations have been found in the EC case. 518 
Most frequently targeted items are colour television sets, 
video-tape recorders, microwave ovens and compact disc readers. 
A typical case of anti-dumping investigations was initiated when 
517. Korea is very competitive in this industry also, and is 
the EC's second-largest supplier, exporting 45 million pairs of 
shoes per year to the EC in the middle of the 1980s. 
518. In the case of colour TVs, with the exception of Japan, 
which was the main export country, only Korea was accused of 
dumping. Hong Kong and China were added as targets to be 
examined and reviewed for anti-dumping cases when the issue of 
discrimination was raised. In the car radio case, Malaysia and 
Singapore had a tremendous amount of car radios in the market, 
but only Korean firms were accused of dumping. Judging from 
those facts, the EC anti-dumping system maybe regarded to be 
negatively affecting Korea's Exports to the EC. 
270 
the export of Korean VTRs rapidly increased to 700,000 units 
during only the first six months of 1988 from a mere 34,000 
units in 1985. According to the report of the Financial Times 
August 24,1988, upon the strong pressure of the EC, three 
chabols, Samsung, Goldstar and Daewoo voluntarily suspended 
exports of television sets and video-tape recorders to alleviate 
the trade friction. Despite the chabol's measures of voluntary 
suspension, investigation was done and anti-dumping duties of up 
to 30 percent were imposed. 
As a response strategy to avoid anti-dumping, the Korean 
firms established subsidiary operations in the EC. 519 These 
products disturbed the EC by threatening market shares of the 
previous European companies'. However, by creating a new 
article 13.10 of the EC anti-dumping regulations, screw-driver 
operations were deterred. 520 As a liberal trading member 
in the world, Korea needs to stick to the liberalization policy. 
Regarding the manufacturing sector, almost 100 percent is open 
to the outside world. This is important in view of the Non-EC 
countries' very great concern about the potential for 
protectionism of the EU member countries. The heterogeneity of 
member nations often strengthens the inclination to view 
favourably requests for protection from fellow-member countries 
which suffer not only from foreign imports but also from an 
indigenous difficulty of adjustment. The EC single market, thus, 
111 See the case study of Chapter. Eight. 
520.0. Grolig, P. Bogaert, "The Newly Amended EEC Anti- 
Dumping Regulation: Black Holes in the Community Market, " 
Journal of World Trade Law, Vol. 21, No. 6, December 1987, p. 80- 
83. 
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pocesses a potential for strong protectionism. The articles of 
the Single European Act relating to non-members include articles 
regarding trade relations. Article 19 states that "the outside 
countries can not have the benefit of the single market without 
any reciprocal compensation and measures. " Article 30 is in 
regard to the common trade policy of the EC. Compared to the 
U. S. A., and Japan, the EC lags behind in high-tech industries, 
such as telecommunications, semiconductors and computers. In 
these sectors, and other public procurement sections or in the 
industrial sector where their competition edge is inferior to 
that of Japan or U. S. A. and Asian NICs, preferential treatment 
will be given to non-European firms, thus discriminating and 
excluding outside companies who participate in such areas; the 
automobile, steel, and electronics parts. National quotas of 
the above sectors could be replaced by the EC common quota 
system. The rule of origin or the anti-dumping act maybe 
intensified. 
Korea's efforts to liberalize its market should not be 
ignored. As far as the manufacturing sectors are concerned, as 
of 1990, the domestic markets were almost completely opened, 
except for a few items, to Japan's exports. Upon strong pressure 
from the US to open up domestic markets for services and 
agricultural products since 1987,521 Korea took a series of 
measures such as a new copyright law, extension of intellectual 
property protection to computer software, substantial opening of 
the insurance market, national treatment for foreign banks, 
"'. Ministry of Finance, "88 White Paper on Tariff Rates 
Reform, " Bureau of Tariff, February, 1989. In Korean. 
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allowance of greater participation to foreign firms in trading 
company and distribution networks, opening of motion picture 
markets, and total opening of advertising markets by 1991, and 
finally gradual opening of the capital and security market 
during 1991-1992. The account surplus in 1987 had amounted to 
nearly $10 billion, which exacerbated trade frictions with the 
US. This also increased US pressure to appreciate the Korean 
currency drastically. The answer to the US challenge was 
completely to liberalize the imports of manufacture, for 
instance, by licensing the number of Automatic Approval(AA) 
items and lowering the rates of tariff as scheduled, making 
special concessional tariff cuts, eliminating the Surveillance 
List, 522 and revising Special laws to restrict imports even for 
items on the automatic approval list. 52' 
The Korean National Assembly passed the "new tariff 
schedule" in December 1988, to be conducted over a five-year 
period of 1989-1993.524 The simple arithmetic basic tariff 
rate for manufactured products was scheduled to fall from 16.9 
percent in 1988 to 11.2 percent in 1989, and to 6.2 percent in 
522 The application of the Import Surveillance System, 
which was introduced in 1977 for monitoring the import situation 
of newly liberalized products and for resuming protection in 
case sharp rises in imports inflicted damage on specific 
sectors, was abolished in January 1989. 
523 Ministry of Finance, Korea, Report, 1989. 
524 The strong pressure of the US government caused the 
Korean government to start dismantling various tariff and 
nontariff barriers in 1987. The Korean government reduced 
tariffs on 1.873 items regarded as priorities by the US, which included passenger cars, tobacco products, cosmetics, electrical 
goods, and paper and paperboard. Furthermore, in February 1989, 
tariff, on 203 items of particular US concern were reduced, 
including such items as chocolate, refrigerators, and computers. 
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1993; that for agricultural products from 25.2 percent in 1988 
to 20.6 percent in 1989 and to 17.9 percent in 1993; and that 
for all commodities from 18.1 percent in 1988 to 12.7 percent in 
1989 and to 7.9 percent in 1993. These measures of the import 
liberalization movement that began in the early 1980s were 
nearly completed by the end of the decade. 525 
In a relatively short period of time, in the latter half of 
the 1980s, Korea was in the midst of political democratization 
and economic internationalization. Although EU underestimated 
the Korean government's efforts toward further market 
liberalization, tremendous increase in inward FDI in the 
manufacturing sector illustrate that liberalization efforts 
have already some fruit. 
Table 5.8: Import liberalization in items, 1976-92 
Year Total No. Automatic 
of approval(AA) 
items items 
Restricted 
items 
Prohibited Liberalization 
items ratio(share of 
AA items) 
1976 1,312 669 579 64 51.0* 
1980 7,465 5,183 2,282 0 69.5*** 
1983 7,560 6,078 1,482 0 80.4*** 
1986 7,915 7,252 663 0 91.6*** 
1990 10,274 9,898 376 0 96.3**** 
1992 10,321 10,079 242 0 97.7**** 
* Based on 4-digit level under Standard Industrial Trade 
Classification 
**Based on 4-digit level under Cu stoms Cooperation Council 
Nomenclature 
***Based on 8-digit level under Customs Cooperation Council 
Nomenclature 
****Based on 10-digit level under Harmonized Commodity Description 
and Coding system. 
Source: Ministry of Trade an d Industry, Korea 
5Z' Ministry of Finance, "88 White Paper on Tariff Rates 
Reform, " 1989. 
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Table 5.9: Foreign direct investment: liberalization 
status, 1980-November 1992(percentage) 
Date Liberalization ratio*overall 'Liberalization ratio, 
manufacturing 
1980 49.9 
1983 60.9 80.0 
July 1984 66.1 86.0 
Octo. 1985 76.3 92.5 
July 1987 78.9 91.5 
July 1989 79.0 97.5 
July 1990 79.1 97.7 
Jan. 1991 79.4 97.7 
Nov. 1992 81.7 97.8 
* Number of sectors eligible for FDI over the number of all 
industrial 
sectors 
Source: Ministry of Korea, Financial Statistics, various issues. 
The nation's total incoming FDI approved between 1992 and 
1991(as of January 1991) was $ 8.0 billion, out of which 80 
percent had entered Korea since 1982, at the time FDI reforms were 
conducted . 5"6 
Table 5.10: FDI by country of origin on an approval basis, 1962- 
90 
Japan US Europe Other Total 
year US$1000 % 
1962-66 8,329 17.6 24,984 52.7 10,841 22.9 3,257 6.9 47,411 
1967-71 89,688 41.0 95,340 43.6 9,891 4.5 23,701 10.8 218,620 
1972-76 627,059 71.3 134,955 15.3 38,775 4.4 78,636 8.9 879,425 
1977-81 300,851 41.7 235,660 32.7 95,311 13.2 88,827 12.3 720,649 
1982-86 876,190 49.6 581,623 32.9 191,735 10.8 118,181 6.7 1,767,729 
1987 497,014 46.7 255,140 24.0 210,484 19.8 100,689 9.5 1,063,327 
1988 696,244 54.3 284,401 22.2 242,926 18.9 59,161 4.6 1,282,732 
1989 461,528 42.3 328,792 30.2 211,913 19.4 88,046 8.1 1,090,279 
1990 235,792 29.4 317,465 39.6 206,709 25.8 42,566 5.3 802,532 
1991 226,239 16.2 296,556 21.2 823,130 59.0 50,161 3.6 1,396,096 
Total4,018,934 43.4 2,554,926 27.6 2,041,715 22.0 653,225 7.0 9,268,800 
Source: Ministry of Finance, Korea, Financial Statistics, various issues. 
526 I1 Sakong, op. cit., p. 116. 
275 
More than 40 percent of total FDI flows, or 58 percent of 
the FDI cases from 1962 to 1991, came from Japan and about 30 
percent of FDI originated in the US. However, in recent years, 
the European share of FDI has been increasing as the Korean 
economy gradually becomes more and more integrated with the 
European economies. Table 5.10 above provides detailed 
statistics on the gradual increase of the European FDI. 
The Korean government is still committed to overall market 
liberalization, including the financial markets, and, it is not 
likely that there will be any changes in that direction. Korea 
needs to be more specific in its definition of rules. The 
internationalization of the Korean economy will result in 
improved economic status and development. Despite the various 
difficulties, Korea has actively participated in multilateral 
negotiations. The conclusion of the Uruguay Round trade 
talks"" is compelling the Korean government to accelerate its 
adaptation to the norms of advanced countries in promoting trade 
and industry. According to the MOITE (Ministry of Trade, 
Industry and Energy)528, the Uruguay Round agreement on 
subsidies and countervailing duties itself may be 
disadvantageous to Korea. But since it will be implemented 
together with other agreements which are advantageous to Korea, 
such as the deal on safeguard which will abolish the VERS, Korea 
52'. See Chap. Six for further implications of the Uruguay 
Round for Korea. 
628 The Ministry of Energy and Resources was merged into 
the ministry of Industry and Trade. 
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is expected to see its exports increase marginally. 
The government has been scaling down its direct investment 
in trade and industry promotion in preparation for winning 
membership to the OECD by 1996. However, the 'Uruguay Round 
agreement on subsidies and countervailing duties is forcing 
Korea to amend its industrial promotion system. The main tenet 
of the agreement is that each government should refrain from 
providing direct support to specific industries or firms in 
order to boost exports or curtail imports. As the Korean 
economy used to depend heavily upon exports for growth, it 
revised a wide array of institutional arrangements to support 
domestic businesses engaged in export or import substitution. 
As a way to find a new route toward more competitiveness, 
Korean industry is strongly urged to develop technology to 
compete with industries in advanced countries. From short- 
sightedness, this non-interventionist policy seems to affect the 
fates of many individual firms. However, in the long run, the 
process will also affect Korea's industrial structure as a 
whole . 29 5 
529. Korea Newsreview, December 25,1993. 
The content of prohibited subsidies 
* According to a report of the Ministry of Finance, the 
following export promotion measures are certain to be 
categorized as "prohibited subsidies" as defined in the new UR 
agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Duties. 
-The provisiön of bank loans for small exports to secure 
materials for export goods 
-The provision of loans to encourage small exports to 
invest in production facilities 
-Taxational benefits to small exports when they 
depreciate their foreign currency-earning assets 
-The taxation practices which define money reserved by 
exporters, either for possible losses in selling goods 
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The exchange of personnel between the Federation of Korean 
Industries and its European counterparts, the European 
Parliament and the Korean National Assembly and many other young 
organizations is expected to contribute to a deepened mental 
understanding. In order to develop the Europe-Korean relations 
into a more substantial and mutually beneficial one, both 
parties need to make more positive efforts. "" 
It is apparent that the European Union will surely enhance 
its position toward a more regionalized market mechanism if it 
will secure greater benefits. The Pacific Basin, where South 
Korea is located, is the least integrated region of world trade. 
If protection-oriented regionalism deepens and is more 
substantially facilitated, a fragmented world economy will be 
developed, which may far from helpful for the growth and wealth 
of all the trade contracting parties. 
According to the statistics and study result of the 
KOTRA531, Korean firms need a new strategy to do business in 
the EU market. The first proposal is that local direct 
investment or establishment of firms in the local areas will be 
abroad or for exploration of new markets as tax- 
deductible 
* Under the new UR agreement, Korea, a developing country 
is compelled to abolish these export promotion policy 
tools within 8 years form the date the agreement goes 
into effect. Korea may also be required to abolish 
"export financing system under which banks offer 
relatively low cost loans to small exporters who have 
received letters of credit from foreign buyer. 
s'° " Brian Bridges, op. cit., p. 85. 
531 KOTRA, Marketing Strategy in the EC after the 
Completion of the internal Market, 1993. 
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very much desirable. The image of fortress Europe has induced 
the U. S. and Japan and also other exporting nations to have 
physical presence in the EU, to invest in the region. Despite 
the heavy burden of initial costs, difficulties in management, 
hardships in material supply, fund and distribution routes, 
provided that the demand for the product consumption is high and 
a high speed of growth rates on the item is expected, Korean 
firms are advised to invest in the territories of the EU. 
Companies could accumulate direct experience and will 
secure a mutual cooperation framework against common third 
competitors in the same products. Another pattern of co- 
managing the local factory is joint venture, though we expect 
some frictions in management. This would save companies from 
heavy costs and R&D. One of the most popular strategies for 
the EU after the 1992 plan has been the Merger & Acquisition. 
Its main benefit lies in that it could take over all the 
existing resources including labour force, production 
facilities, market for product and distribution network. This, 
however, necessitates information on the previous history of the 
company. From the position of the government authorities, 
efforts must be focused upon the careful examination of friendly 
bilateral Korea-EU relations. Against the EU's requirement for 
reciprocity, the Korean government needs to be more careful in 
its national legislation and practices in sensitive areas. 
Korea, to a reciprocal degree, needs to liberalize the market 
access for the exports of goods, services and capital from the 
EU. It is quite natural for Korea to take appropriate measures 
in case the agreement is not properly recognized by the EU. The 
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legislation on capital movements, banking, financial services, 
transport matters and public procurement, face the authorities 
of the EU with sophisticated task of identifying shortcomings in 
their nations and proposing appropriate countervailing actions. 
Korea naturally pays attention to the fact that the EU has 
strong complaints with respect to the control of capital 
movements by Korea, the internal financial market and access to 
important sections of service; intellectual property right, 
counterfeiting, insurance law, banking etc. 
The EU will create strengthened trade policy regimes 
against non-member nations. For the benefit of Korea, the 
mainstream of the EU trade regimes should be open-oriented. "' 
As countermeasures to cope with challenges constraints, three 
dimensional approaches are needed; i. e. at the macroeconomic, 
firms and government authority levels. The levelling-up of the 
EU standards on product and more strict application of the rules 
of origin definitely require Korea to move production units to 
appropriate industrial sites in the EU market to avoid trade 
barriers. Korea-EU trade relations depends heavily upon the 
future trade order, which will be shaped through agreements of 
532. Leon Brittan, Vice President of the Commission of the EU, in Shaping Framework for global trade: challenge for the EC, Jean 
Monnet Regional Lecture, European Access, No. 3,1993, distinguished 
between free trade and open trade: open trade is not free trade. Free trade is possible within the Community because the rules 
guaranteeing a level playing field are strong and firmly in force. However, we can not yet do away with the old instruments of trade 
protection: safeguard actions, anti-dumping and countervailing duties where subsidies have been granted contrary to international 
standard. Quoted in Frank McDonald and Stephen Dearden( eds. ), 
European Economic Integration, 2d ed., London and New York: Longman 
Group LTD. 1992, pp. 239-50. 
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multilateral negotiations and regional tendencies with specific 
bilateral relations. However, the major denominator shall be 
how competitive the Korean economy proves to be in the rapidly- 
changing world trading system. 
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CHAPTER SIX. THE SUCCESSFUL CONCLUSION OF THE URUGUAY ROUND 
AND ITS IMPACT ON THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE 
EUROPEAN AND SOUTH KOREA 
This chapter tries to address the general background to the 
launch of the Uruguay Round and subsequent conclusion; and also 
attempts to find implications for the central theme of how the 
European Union-South Korean relationship has been affected by 
the conclusion of the Uruguay Round in trading regimes in 
general, how the development of Korean exports has been affected 
by previous rounds of the GATT and what were the stance of the 
companies and government of Korea and the European Union during 
the Round in particular, with specific evidence of Korea's 
willingness to assume the role of provider of multilateral 
collective goods. 
6.1 The Changes of the World Trading Environment and the 
Creation of the World Trade organization 
6.1.1 The Background to the Uruguay Round Negotiations 
After the birth of the General Agreement on Tariff and 
Trade (GATT) in 1948, the contracting parties made efforts to 
ensure world trade liberalization through multilateral trade 
negotiations, of which seven had been held, by the end of the 
1970s. Despite efforts to pursue liberalization of world trade, 
the slump and imbalance of the world economy between the 
developed and underdeveloped nations since the 1980s caused the 
proliferation of new trade protectionism. 
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Table 6.1: Multilateral Trade Negotiation of the GATT 
No. Name of Nego. No. of Participants Period 
1 Geneva Round 23 April 1947-October 1947 
2 Annecy Round 13 April 1949-October 1949 
3 Torquay Round 38 September 1950-April 1951 
4 Geneva Round 26 January 1956-May 1956 
5 Dillon Round 26 May 1961-July 1962 
6 Kennedy Round 62 May 1964-June 1964 
7 Tokyo Round 97 September 1973-July 1979 
8 Uruguay Round 117 September 1986-December 
1993 
Source: Kim, Ki Hong, GATT, Uruguay Round and Korea, Seoul, 
Korea: Hanul, 1991, p. 27. In Korean. 
The resurgence of protectionism accompanied by the 
formation of a Single European Market (SEM) stimulated the 
formation of the North Atlantic Free Trade Area (NAFTA) in North 
America and Asia Pacific Economic Council (APEC) in the Pacific 
Rim. 533 
The sharp decline of US industrial competitiveness and its 
trade deficit was exacerbated when the dynamic nations in East 
Asia such as Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong, and 
Singapore emerged as strong competitors in high-tech industrial 
and manufacturing sectors. Trade friction between the dynamic 
East Asian nations and the advanced group represented by the US 
and the EC, was ever more intensified, resulting in sudden 
proliferation of new trade protectionism. S34 The 
ineffectiveness of the GATT dispute settlement mechanism, 
533 
. Ji , Young Hee, Young Weon Ha, et. al ., The Uruguay Round and Firms' Response Strategies, Seoul, Korea: Korea Economic 
Research Institute, 1993, pp. 1-2. 
534. In order to protect the declining industrial 
sectors, e. g., textiles, steel etc., the industrialized group of 
nations abused the multilateral regulations of the GATT by 
adopting import regulations and using Grey Area Measures such as Voluntary Export Restraint and Orderly Marketing Arrangement. 
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surveillance function, caused the advanced nations to use 
bilateral means based upon their economic powers, to achieve 
their trade-related goals. This development required 
comprehensive multilateral trade negotiations within the GATT 
framework. The market-opening pressures of the US and EC 
against the defensive industrializing nations including South 
Korea accelerated the need for the dynamic group in East Asia to 
absorb those pressures through multilateral negotiations. 5's 
The Punta Del Este Conference in 1986 declared a Round of 
negotiations to ensure the maintenance of a free international 
trading system. The most obvious purpose consisted in further 
liberalizing trade by the reduction of tariff and non-tariff 
barriers. The other aim was to correct some serious omissions in 
the international trading system. The exclusion of service in 
the GATT framework, despite its making up over 20 percent of 
global trade, and inadequate protection of intellectual property 
rights(IPRs), emerged as the problems, in the fair management of 
general trade. Thus, international rule-setting was clearly 
required to address the problems. The core purpose was to bring 
up to date the rules governing international trade, in line with 
the realities of the new international trading environment. As 
a counter move to deter protectionism and regionalism, the 
reestablishment of multilateralism as the mainstay of the 
international trading system was a prerequisite. ""' 
S35. Kim, Yong Ii and Seung Ki Park, Interpretation of the Final Uruguay Round Agreements, Seoul, Korea: Korea Trade and 
Economy, 1994, p. 11. 
536. The Commission of the European Communities, The Uruguay Round, Brussels, 1994, p. 8. 
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6.1.2 The Launching of the World Trade Organization and Its 
Meaning for World Trading System 
The World Trade Organization (WTO) is a comprehensive new 
start for the international trading system, which contains vast 
and huge regulations to deepen and broaden the scope of 
multilateral rule-making, ranging from agricultural trade to 
trade in services, as well as the Trade-Related Intellectual 
Properties (TRIPS) and Trade-Related Investment Measures 
(TRIMs). g" As the capacity of the GATT could no longer 
accommodate the rapid expansion of world trade in services, 
TRIPs and TRIMs, etc., the exacerbation of trade frictions led 
to ever more arbitrary unilateral action of protectionist 
measures in the industrialized group and to more dangerous forms 
of closed regionalism in Europe and North America. Before 
surveying the details of the WTO and its impact on the ROK-EU 
trade relations, we need to understand what the GATT has been 
and how it has been operating. 
Since foundation in 1947 along with the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank (WB), the GATT was one of the 
institutions to regulate the international economy and prevent 
a recurrence of the disastrous policies. 538 The major function 
of the GATT was to oversee international trade in goods and 
Particularly the liberalization of world trade by means of a 
537 Commission of the EC, The Uruguay Round, p. 27. 
538. Ibid., p. 8.285 
negotiated reduction in tariff barriers. 539 The original draft 
Charter for an ITO, a new specialized agency of the United 
Nations (UN) was not only intended to provide world trade 
disciplines but also contained rules relating to employment, 
commodity agreements, restrictive business practices, 
international investment and services. 
In 1946, tariff negotiation were opened among the 23 
founding GATT "contracting parties" in an effort to promote 
world trade liberalization and to deter protectionism which had 
been in place from the early 1930s. The first Round resulted in 
45,000 tariff concessions affecting $10 billion- or about one- 
fifth of the world trade. 54° The tariff concessions and rules 
together by the name of the GATT entered into force in January 
s". The scope of the GATT, as a result, was limited. To 
complement this, there had originally been plans to found the 
International Trade organization(ITO), which were ultimately 
canceled due to the failure of a number of nations to ratify the 
Agreement. The progress of the GATT system was proceeded through a succession of Rounds. The EC participated in a group 
represented by the European Commission as a whole, though individual member states are the members of the GATT. As world trade rapidly expanded, the issues have become more and more 
complicated. As a the number of contracting parties increased 
and as the number of the areas covered has risen, the succession 
of Rounds took longer and longer, as time went on. The functioning of the GATT on a consensus basis and to achieve 
agreement between 117 industrialized and developing members, 
with widely divergent and even opposing views, was a far more 
challenging task than between a few members, as was the case at the initial stage in 1947. 
54o. The second Annecy Round in 1949 produced 5,000 tariff 
concessions with 32 participating nations, the third Torquay, 8,700 tariff concessions with 34 participating nations; the fourth Geneva Round, 3,000 tariff concessions with 22 
Participants; the fifth Dillon Round, 4,000 tariff concessions 
with 23 participants; the sixth Kennedy Round, 30,300 tariff 
concessions with 46 participants; and the seventh Tokyo Round, 250,000 tariff concessions with 99 participants. 
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1948.501 The multilateral trade negotiations by the name of 
Rounds provided developing and less developed nations with a 
chance of influencing the multilateral system by allowing 
participants to seek and secure advantages across a wide range 
of issues . 5'2 
The Tokyo Round conducted between 1973 and 1979 with 102 
participating countries became the basis for the Uruguay 
Round. 543 Despite the tremendous success in tariff reductions 
in manufacturing sectors, the Round failed to cope with the 
fundamental problems affecting farm trade and also failed to 
provide a new agreement on "safeguards". A series of agreements 
on non-tariff barriers referred to as "codes" came later to 
serve as the basis for amendment and extension in the Uruguay 
Round. The Tokyo Round Agreements on non-tariff barriers were as 
501 Although the ITO Charter was finally agreed at a UN 
Conference on Trade and Employment in Havana in March 1948, 
ratification faced some troubles and the US announced in 1950 
that it would not seek Congressional ratification of the Havana 
Charter, which meant the death of the ITO. Since then, the GATT 
remained the only multilateral instrument to regulate international trade from 1948 until the establishment of the 
WTO, January 1995. 
542. The experience of the Rounds tells that concessions can be made easily in the context of a package to contain 
politically and economically attractive benefits. By the 
mechanism, most of the GATT's Rounds were aimed at reducing 
tariffs. The Kennedy Round in the mid-sixties included a new 
GATT Anti-Dumping Agreement and the Tokyo Round in the 1970s was 
conspicuous in extending and improving the free world trading 
system. 
5" The reduction of tariff cut was one-third in the 
world's nine major industrial markets, bringing the average tariff on manufactured products down to 4.7 percent compared 
with about 40 percent in 1948. The tariff reductions, phased in 
over a period of 8 years, involved an element of harmonization, bringing the highest tariffs down proportionately more than the 
lowest. Quoted in Internet Information. 
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follows: 
1) Subsidies and countervailing measures-interpreting 
Articles VI, XVI and XXIII of the General Agreement 
2) Technical Barriers to trade-sometimes called the 
Standards Code 
3) Import licensing procedures 
4) Government Procurement 
5) Customs valuation-interpreting Article VII 
6) Anti-dumping-interpreting Article VI and replacing the 
Kennedy Round Anti-Dumping Code 
7) Bovine Meat Arrangement 
8) International Dairy Arrangement 
9) Trade in Civil Aircraft 
The WTO embraced those non-tariff measures by multilateral 
commitments and plurilateral agreements. 5" Given its 
provisional nature and limited field of action, the success of 
GATT in promoting and securing the liberalization of much of 
world trade over 47 years is incontestable. 
How was South Korea affected by the previous GATT Rounds? 
The argument of Ki Hong Kim is that since the membership of the 
GATT in April 1967, Korea has been regarded as one of the most 
successful nations in using the GATT system to increase 
international trade. Korea depends on trade for 60 percent of 
total GNP and thus, the MFN principle and GSP of the GATT helped 
to expand Korea's exports especially to the US and EC market. 
The strengthening of multilateralism through the several rounds 
of the GATT has created favourable circumstances for Korea's 
export expansion. The major GATT Principles of Most-Favoured- 
Nation Treatment, National Treatment on Internal Taxation and 
Regulation, General Elimination of Quantitative Restrictions and 
S°°. Subsidies, countervailing measures, technical barriers to trade, import licensing, customs valuation and anti-dumping 
are multilaterally committed in the WTO framework and government 
procurement; bovine meat, dairy products and civil aircraft 
remain plurilateral agreements. 
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Negotiations on a reciprocal and mutually advantageous basis, 
all have functioned to help boost Korean exports into the EC/EU 
market. 
The initial Rounds of the GATT, Geneva, Annecy, Torquay and 
Dillon concentrated their negotiations on tariff-reductions, 
while the Kennedy Round first dealt with non-tariff barriers. 
The Tokyo, and Uruguay Rounds produced substantial agreements on 
non-tariff barriers. Korea for the first time joined in the 
Kennedy Round tariff-reduction negotiations after becoming GATT 
contracting party. An average 35 percent reduction of tariff in 
30,000 items was aimed at improving multilateral, liberal world 
trading order, by which South Korea was able to export 
manufactured items more easily to the EC market. The relative 
decline of US competitiveness in the latter part of the 1960s 
was accompanied by the sharp rise of EC and Japanese 
competitiveness to compete with US-manufactured products. 
The resurgence of a new protectionism was inevitable due to 
the failure of the world economic readjustment caused by the 
relative decline of the US economy. Thus, new protectionism was 
targeted at protecting uncompetitive declining industrial 
sectors by using non-tariff barriers. In order to deal with this 
situation, the Tokyo Round was launched in September 1973, 
ending in November 1979. The importance of this Round was the 
shift of the focal negotiation agenda from traditional tariff 
reduction to non-tariff clarification efforts. The favourable 
treatment of developing nations, including South Korea, was 
guaranteed by the GSP. The benefit of the GSP was complemented 
by the Graduation Concept which also required appropriate duty 
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of benefitted parties, according to their level of development. 
In the early 1980s, intensified trade frictions between the 
industrialized group and the newly emerging group, such as 
Japan, and the NICs, were the underlying motivation for the 
industrialized group to abuse or violate the GATT regulations by 
employing grey area measures such as VERS, OMAs etc. Korea was 
one of trade-dependent nations most severely-affected, by the 
abuse of non-tariff barriers. In this sense, the GATT Rounds 
efforts to reduce tariff or clarify the non-tariff barriers 
were important in its export-expansion strategy. An average 33 
percent reduction of tariff after the Tokyo Round also helped 
the Korean products to sell in industrialized nations' 
market . 545 
The creation of the WTO originated from the Ministerial 
Meeting of GATT members in Geneva. After four years painful 
negotiationsS06 on the work programme, the Uruguay Round was 
launched in September 1986 in Punta del Este, Uruguay. A 
negotiating agenda was accepted to cover virtually every 
outstanding trade policy issue, including the extension of the 
trading system into services and intellectual property. In 
1988, the ministerial Meeting in Montreal, Canada took the form 
of a "Mid-term Review, which led to the elaboration of the 
515 Yong I1, Kim and Park Seung Ki, Interpretation of the 
Final Uruguay Round Agreement, Seoul, Korea: Korea Trade and 
Economy, January 1994, pp. 10-11. 
546. It took four years of exploration and clarification of issues, and painstaking consensus-building, until the launching 
of the Uruguay Round, mainly due to the stalled meeting on 
agriculture. 
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negotiating mandate for the second stage of the Round. "" 
The Ministerial Meeting in Brussels in December 1990 
disagreed on the nature of commitments to future agricultural 
trade reform, which brought about the extension of the Round. 
By December 1991, a comprehensive draft text was prepared of the 
"Final Act", containing legal texts fulfilling every part of the 
Punta del Este mandate, excluding only market access results. 
The following two years witnessed continuous negotiations of 
successes and failures. Irrespective of the deadlines, farm 
trade, services, market access, anti-dumping rules and the 
proposed creation of the new institution were hot debating 
issues. Furthermore, as the major points of conflicts, there 
were discrepancies between US and EC in agricultural issues 
which was a central block for a final, successful conclusion. 
A final resolution on all issues and conclusion on negotiations 
on market access for goods and services came into being on 15 
December 1993. The 125 participating governments signed the 
deal at the meeting in Marrakesh, Morocco, on 15 April 1994.548 
The signature of the final deal at last brought about the 
54ý. Ministers agreed a package of early results to include 
some concessions on market access for tropical products, aiming 
at assisting developing group of nations as well as a 
streamlined dispute settlement system and the Trade Policy 
Review Mechanism to provide for the first comprehensive, 
systematic and regular reviews of national trade policies and 
practices of GATT members. 
548 The participating nations adopted a declaration (composed of 8 sub-sections) to build upon the 
success of the Uruguay Round through the participation of their 
economies in the world trading system, based upon open, market- 
oriented policies and the commitments set out in the Uruguay 
Round Agreements and Decisions. 
291 
establishment of the comprehensive WTO in January l995. s"' 
The WTO is much more comprehensive than the GATT. It is open 
to whoever agrees to adhere to the whole package of the Uruguay 
Round. Unlike the previous negotiations, members should accept 
a"single acceptance of all aspects of the agreement. " This 
reflects the breadth of the agreement and the balance struck 
between the negotiators in the various sectors, increasing 
transparency and certainty. To be a member of the WTO requires 
exact awareness of its obligations, too, for a member has to 
accept the whole package. sso 
549 The WTO was established, according to the Marrakesh 
Agreement recognizing that relations in the field of trade and 
economic endeavour should be conducted with a view to raising 
standards of living, ensuring full employment and a large and 
steadily growing volume of real income and effective demand, and 
expanding the production of and trade in goods and services, 
while allowing for the optimal use of the world's resources in 
accordance with the objective of sustainable development, 
seeking both to protect and preserve the environment and to 
enhance the means for doing so in a manner consistent with their 
respective needs and concerns at different levels of economic 
development; recognizing that there is need for positive efforts 
designed to ensure that developing countries, and especially the 
least developed among them, secure a share in the growth in 
international trade commensurate with the needs of their 
economic development; and thus, being desirous of contributing 
these objectives by entering into reciprocal and mutually 
advantageous arrangements directed to the substantial reduction 
of tariffs and other barriers to trade and to elimination of 
discriminatory treatment in international trade relations; 
resolved, therefore, to develop an integrated, more viable and 
durable multilateral trading system encompassing the General 
Agreement on Tariff and Trade, the results of past trade 
liberalization efforts, and all of the results of the Uruguay 
Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations; and determined to 
preserve the basic principles and to further the objectives 
underlying this multilateral trading system. 
550. Those nations not being a position to accept the whole 
package, will remain within the old GATT framework, which will 
exist continuously with the limited, frozen situation in the 
pre-Uruguay Round with implications that the trade-liberalizing 
schedules within the Round will only be available to those 
nations that are members of the WTO. 
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To give a clearer understanding on the comprehensiveness of 
the WTO in comparison with the GATT, the following differences 
will serve to distinguish between them: 
551 
1) Whereas the GATT was a set of rules, a multilateral 
agreement with no institutional foundation, only a small 
number of associated secretariats which had its 
origin in the failed attempt to found an ITO in the 
1940s, the WTO is a permanent institution with its own 
secretariat. 
2) The WTO are fully and permanently committed, where the 
GATT has been provisional even if government chose to 
treat it as a permanent after more than forty years. 
3) The regulations of the GATT only covered trade in 
merchandise goods. On the other hand, the WTO covers 
trade in services, and trade-related aspects of 
intellectual property in addition to trade in goods. 
4) While GATT was a multilateral instrument, added by many 
new agreements with plurilateral and selective nature by 
the 1980s, the agreements of the WTO are almost all 
multilateral and thus, involve commitment for the 
entire membership. 
5) The WTO dispute settlement system is faster, more 
automatic, and thus much less susceptible to blockages 
than the old GATT system, on the other hand, the 
implementation of WTO dispute findings will also be more 
easily assured. 
The dual existence of the old GATT framework along with the 
new WTO framework is guaranteed by the end of the 1995 to allow 
all the GATT member nations to accede to the WTO and to create 
an overlap of activity in areas like dispute settlement. The 
updated version of the GATT 1994552 is an integral part of the 
"'. Kim, Young Ii & Park, Seung Ki, op. cit., pp. 20-23; 
and Internet Service, WTO Home Page. 
552. The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994 shall 
consist of: a) the provisions in the General Agreement on Tariff 
and Trade, dated 30 October 1947, annexed to the Final Act 
Adopted at the Conclusion of the Second Session of the 
Preparatory Committee of the United Nations Conference on Trade 
and Employment(excluding the Protocol of Provisional 
Application), as rectified, amended or modified by the terms of 
legal instruments which have entered into force before the date 
of entry into force of the WTO Agreements; b)the provisions of 
the legal instruments set forth that have entered into force 
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WTO Agreement which will continue to give the key disciplines in 
international trade of goods. 
6.2 The Influence of the Uruguay Round on the ROK-EU Trade 
Relations 
6.2.1 General Overview of the Agreement 
The underlying theoretical support for the conclusion of 
the Uruguay Round is important in the analysis of the Uruguay 
Round. Traditional trade theorists' emphasis on the advantages 
of maximum productivity is based upon a strong conviction that 
international free trade will boost world development. Robert 
Baldwin553 insists that international commerce based upon 
comparative advantage leads to efficient use of resources both 
nationally and globally by inducing countries to concentrate on 
what they can do best. The gains from specialization and 
ensuing trade are so conspicuous that any country choosing free 
trade can benefit. 
The problem of trade policy formulation is based upon the 
fact that the costs of increased import competition are highly 
concentrated, while its benefits are widely distributed. If the 
logic of benefit is based upon the concept that concession is 
defined by reduction of one's own tariffs and gain by opening of 
the other's market, the international trading system will fall 
under the GATT 1947 before the date of entry into force of the 
WTO Agreement; c) the understandings ; d)the Marrakesh Protocol to 
GATT 1994. 
55' Robert Baldwin, " The Political Economy of Trade 
Policy", Journal of Economic Perspectives, vol. 3, No. 4, Fall, 
1989. 
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into disorder as all pursue their own interests. The successful 
conclusion of the recently completed multilateral trade 
negotiations to launch the WTO serve to reduce the spread of 
protectionism and unilateralism. The factors deterring against 
protectionism and regionalism are well illuminated in section 1. 
of the Marrakesh Declaration of 15 April, 1994.56" 
C. Fred Begsten 555 summarizes the danger of an international 
trading system without the functioning of an effective watch- 
dog: 
The end of the Cold War could sharply heighten the prospect 
of a trade war... security and economic issues remained largely 
compartmentalized in all of the industrial democracies. Removal 
of the security blanket could erode this separation. In short, there is an intimate interaction between the basic international 
political and economic transformations; removal of the security 
blanket increases their risk of economic conflict, which could 
erode security ties. 
The end of the Cold War implies a new type of 
international conflicts caused by the collapse and breakup of 
554 Declaration: l. Ministers salute the historic 
achievement represented by the conclusion of the Round, which 
they believe will strengthen the world economy and lead to more trade, investment, employment and income growth throughout the 
world. In particular, they welcome: 
- the stronger and clear legal framework they have adopted for the conduct of international trade, including a more effective 
and reliable dispute settlement mechanism, 
- the global reduction by 40 percent of tariffs and wider 
market-opening agreements on goods, and the increased 
predictability and security represented by a major expansion in the scope of tariff commitments, and, 
- the establishment of a multilateral framework of disciplines 
for trade in services and for the protection of trade-related intellectual property rights, as well as the reinforced 
multilateral trade provisions in agriculture and in textiles and 
clothing. 
555 C. Fred Bergsten, It The World Economy after the Cold 
War, " Foreign Affairs, vol. 69, No. 3, Summer 1990, P. 98. 
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the former Soviet Union. It was context of such a radical 
transformation of the international system that the Uruguay 
Round opened in September 1986.556 
In this vein, the completed agreement would be the 
engine to push ahead with a world welfare maximization scheme 
to promote peace and prosperity in the 1990s. If all 
contracting parties complete ratification procedures and stick 
to the rules of the agreement, it would greatly contribute to 
invigorating the free multilateral trading system, reducing 
some uncertainties existing in the previous framework of the 
GATT. Had the negotiation failed, resort to use of unilateral 
and regional measures to extend protectionism would 
proliferate. The fundamental structural changes of the 
international system require a new framework to embrace all 
the conflicting factors ; rules for everybody, not just for 
the strong. The collapse of the free trade regime will 
produce unstable factors. Provided that we can achieve the 
necessary reforms and changes for the successful management of 
the international free trading system, it is hoped that 
everybody will reap more benefits. 
The product of 2500 days' negotiation, a 550 page final 
agreement by 117 nations, is a epoch-making event for world 
trade. The main objective of the Uruguay Round was to further 
556 The major motivation was caused by the sharp increase 
of non-tariff barriers in the international trading system. The 
initiation of the UR has been described by GATT as the most 
comprehensive and ambitious yet undertaken. It encompasses 
fifteen negotiating topics, including such new areas as 
intellectual property, foreign investment and services, as well 
as old, unresolved ones like safeguards and agriculture. 
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liberalize the world trade by reducing tariff and other non- 
tariff barriers. 
Table 6.2: The Fifteen UR Negotiating Groups 
Group Declared Aims 
1. Tariffs Reduce or eliminate 
2. Non-tariff measures Reduce or eliminate 
3. Tropical Products Fully liberalize, including processed 
forms, receive special attention 
4. Natural resource- Fully liberalize including processed 
based products forms 
5. Textile and Clothing Formulate modalities permitting 
eventual integration into the GATT 
6. Agriculture Increase Liberalization 
Strengthen GATT rules and 
disciplines, and make them more operationally 
effective 
7. GATT articles Review as requested 
8. Safeguards Clarify and reinforce GATT 
disciplines 
9. MTN agreements and Improve, clarify, or expand 
arrangements 
10. Subsidies and Improve GATT disciplines 
Countervailing 
measures 
11. Dispute Settlement Improve and Strengthen rules and 
procedures, develop adequate 
monitoring arrangement 
12. Trade-related Clarify GATT provisions 
intellectual Elaborate new rules and provisions 
property right 
13. Trade-related 
investment measures Elaborate further provisions 
nec essary 
14. Functioning of the Enhance GATT surveillance of national 
GATT system trade policies 
Increase ministerial involvement 
15. Services Establish a multilateral framework of 
principles and rules 
Source: GATT 
It also sought to correct critical omissions into the 
international trading system. The inclusion of trade in 
services, occupying 20 percent of the world trade, and the 
intellectual property rights(IPRs), which have an adverse 
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impact on trade, was aimed at having more predictability, 
clarity and certainty in international trade. It aimed to 
bring the up-to-date the rules that govern international 
trade, in line with the transformed realities of the new 
international trading environment. The major deficiencies of 
the GATT dispute settlement mechanism were to be adapted to a 
changed reality with much more flexibility. The question of 
multilateral level cooperation was addressed for the purpose 
of ensuring that the link between trade policies and other 
policies, growth and development, was recognized and, if 
possible, to help the developing regions. Fair multilateral 
cooperation is to be institutionally established by following 
the agreements. 
According to the practical aims of the Uruguay Round, the 
outcomes are categorized as follows: l) further reduction in 
tariffs; 2) prevention of further proliferation of non-tariff 
barriers; 3)reform in agricultural trade agreement. 55' 
At least on the surface, all the participating members 
wished to reinforce multilateralism as the mainstay of the 
international trading system and decrease the potentially 
malevolent rise of inward-looking regionalism. The 
paradoxical inference that the gradual erosion of the 
international public good accompanied by the relative decline 
of the US hegemony has gradually invited greater proliferation 
of trade protectionism, reminds us of the fact that the 
55' On the detailed purposes of the UR, see GATT, 
Ministerial Declaration on the Uruguay Round, Geneva, 20 
September, 1986. 
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initiation of the Uruguay Round itself reflected the rapid 
increase of protectionism before the Round. The failure of 
the Uruguay Round might have produced an exacerbation of trade 
frictions, which could have led to more arbitrary unilateral 
action, a slide to overt protectionism and a subversion of 
outward-looking regionalism into a more dangerous form of 
closed regionalism. 558 
The common rules to be remembered are well elucidated in 
the three basic principles of the GATT: non-discrimination or 
most favoured-nation treatment(MFN), open markets and fair 
trade. Jagdish Bhagwati559 terms the negotiation mechanism 
of the GATT "a contractorian institution". Multilateral trade 
negotiations have provided an opportunity through which member 
nations make their claims and request against the relevant 
trading partners and seek settlement negotiations through 
giving concessional exchanges. The life of a system is 
determined by the wills and actions of its signatories. 560 
Usually, international trade rules are made through these 
multilateral trade negotiations. The GATT was mainly charged 
with regulating international trade in goods through the 
558 Official Publication of the EC, The Uruguay Round, 
Global Agreement, Global Benefit, Luxembourg, 1994. 
559. Jagdish Bhagwati, Protectionism, Cambridge: MIT press, 
1988, pp. 35-36. 
560" The life of the WTO system, in this context, remains to 
be seen. An Economist article, "Mickey Kantor, trade cop, " 
already points out the arbitrariness of the strong player by 
saying that "The WTO's dispute settlement mechanism, after all, 
is worth little if member nations that flout multilateral rules 
are not brought to book. " Quoted in The Economist, January 13 
1996, p. 85. 
299 
liberalization of the world trade by the negotiated reduction 
of the tariff barriers. The function of the GATT was limited, 
which gave strong impetus to the successful conclusion of the 
Uruguay Round. "' 
The Uruguay Round took seven years because the GATT works 
on a consensus basis and it was difficult agreement among 117 
members, with widely divergent and even opposing views. 
Usually, the successful completion of the Rounds is helped by 
the nature and process of negotiations: that of reciprocity 
through which trade barriers are lowered in return for changes 
of rough equivalence by trading partners. Through this 
mechanism, the Uruguay Round has resulted in a further 
liberalization of international trade by tremendous 
substantial tariff reductions and also by an expansion of the 
coverage of the system. The conclusion will guarantee the 
continuous upward trend of the world trade in recent years. 
This has very crucial implications for both the EU and ROK. 
The extension of the GATT rules into service and agricultural 
sectors creates new challenges and opportunities for them 
both. By further liberalization, Korea with its traditional 
outward-looking development strategy, will soon become more 
integrated into the world economic structure. 
561 World Development Report 1987, pp. 134-36. It well 
summarizes the brief history of the Rounds. 
Negotiations are usually done through the succession of 
the Rounds. In case of the EC, the individual members are 
members of the GATT. But the negotiation representative is the 
European Commission as a whole. As the number of negotiating 
parties increases, each round has taken longer and longer to 
complete. 
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As Bernard HoekmanS62 elaborates that the concept of 
reciprocity was used in the Uruguay Round. Tariffs cuts are 
to be negotiated through bargaining, reflecting a balance of 
recognized benefits at the margin rather than via negotiations 
resulting in a perceived full equality of market access and 
reverse market access. " The prospects of agreements is 
increased, allowing different nations to proceed with 
negotiations by the level of their marketing openness, 
admitting the diversities of the political economic situation 
of the nations. 
To prevent the abuse of the system, better rules and 
disciplines have been negotiated along with liberalization. 
To protect nations against unfair trade practices, safeguards 
and anti-dumping were also recognized as the key instruments, 
by refining to increase their efficiency and guarantee fair 
application without being abused. 564 The revised dispute 
56'. Bernard Hoekman, "Determining the Need for Issue 
Linkages in Multilateral Trade Negotiations", International 
Organization, vol. 43, No. 4, Autumn 1989, pp. 694-95. 
563. Bhagwati, op. cit., pp. 35-38. 
561. Agreement on implementation of Article VI of the GATT 1994 covers all the aspects of anti-dumping: it includes 
Principles, Determination of Dumping, Determination of the 
Injury, Definition of Domestic Industry, Initiation and 
Subsequent Investigation, Evidence, Provisional Measures, Price 
Undertakings, Imposition and Collection of Anti-Dumping Duties, 
Retroactivity, Duration and Review of Anti-Dumping Duties and 
Price Undertakings, Public Notice and Explanation of 
Determinations, Judicial Review, Anti-Dumping Action on Behalf 
of a Third Country, Developing Country Members, Committee on 
Anti-Dumping Practices, Consultation and Dispute Settlement and 
Final Provisions. The Agreement on Safeguards includes General 
Provision, Conditions, Investigation, Determination of Serious 
Injury or Threat Thereof, Application of Safeguard Measures, 
Provisional Safeguard Measures, Duration and Review of Safeguard 
Measures, Level of Concessions and Other Obligations, Developing 
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settlement procedure will help Korean firms with more 
transparency and clarity, providing them with the means of 
finally settling trade differences, consequently reducing the 
disruption and uncertainty created by action of the strong 
against the weak. 565 
The right accorded by the GATT for all member nations to 
levy anti-dumping or countervailing duties in case their 
industries are injured by goods dumped in their market or with 
the help of subsidies, greatly benefitted the industrialized 
nations which have weak international competitiveness in 
manufactured goods. The Korean business circle is happy with 
the new capacity of the WTO to regulate artificial subventions 
not to abuse the original spirit of the liberal trade 
regime. 566 
J. Pelkman pointed out that the ineffectiveness of the 
former GATT mechanism resulted from its being practiced under 
the international anarchy system. Its effectiveness was 
largely determined by the determination of the major trading 
powers to conform to the rules and codes of the GATT or 
Country Members, Pre-existing Article XIX Measures, Prohibition 
and Elimination of Certain Measures, Notification and 
Consultation, Surveillance, and Dispute Settlement. 
565. EC Official Publication Office, The Uruguay Round, 
1994, Brussels, p. 9. 
There have been a various estimates of the potential 
economic gains of the UR, starting from an extra ECU 180 billion 
of global income a year. In addition, a global public 
procurement market worth ECU 346 billion will be opened up for 
external tender by the Round. 
566. J. pelkmans, "Collective Management and Economic 
Cooperation", in Cesare Merlini (ed), Economic Summit and 
Western Decision-Making, London: Groom Helm, 1984, pp. 98-100. 
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otherwise. The limitations of the GATT in the changing 
international economic environment have been recognized. Trade 
has contributed to the conspicuous development of the 
developing nations with outward-looking development 
strategies. In particular, the ANIEs in East Asia have been 
the major beneficiaries from the dismantling of the high 
import barriers . 96' 
The conclusion of the Uruguay Round will give impetus for 
more economic exchanges. The changed structure of 
international politics is also very favourable for economic 
expansion of trade. Taking advantage of these changes, the 
Uruguay Round creates an environment where all the contracting 
parties will benefit, provided they keep to the rules of the 
game in the WTO framework. 
Table 6.3: Growth Rate of Production and Exports, 1965- 
1980( in %) 
GDP Growth Rate 1965-73 1973-80 1980-89 
World 5.0 3.3 3.1 
OECD Members 4.7 3.0 3.0 
Developing Nations 6.5 4.7 3.8 
Growth Rate of Export Volume 
World 9.2 4.9 4.1 
OECD Members 9.5 5.4 4.1 
Developing Nations 5.1 3.5 5.4 
Source: World Bank, World Development Report, 1991 
According to the Ministerial Declaration of Punta del 
Este, the aims of the multilateral trade negotiations were: 
1) to bring about further liberalization and expansion of 
world trade; 
56'. According to a World Bank Report, 1963-1973, the annual 
average GDP growth rate was 9.5 percent for the strongly 
outward-oriented group, more than the double 4.1 percent 
attained by the strongly inward-oriented group. 
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2) to strengthen the role of the GATT, improve the 
multilateral trading system based upon the principles 
and rules of the GATT and bring about a wider coverage 
of world trade under agreed, effective and enforceable 
multilateral disciplines; 
3) to increase the responsiveness of the GATT system to 
the evolving international environments; 
4) to foster current cooperative action at the national 
and international levels. 
The degree of market accessibility through the reduction of 
tariff and non-tariff barriers by at least a third, was the 
major debating topic. Reduction of tariff barriers within a5 
year period was a particular result. As a result of various 
commitments, the final level of tariff for industrialized 
nations will be decreased from an average of 5 percent to 
approximately 3.5 percent. To South Korea, non-tariff barriers 
have been a major impediment to its exports to the EU. However, 
based upon the concept of reciprocity, developing nations will 
also be limited in the use of non-tariff barriers. The new 
balance of payment agreement improved transparency by 
notification of criteria used to impose restrictions and this, 
combined with a reinforced consultation procedure and ultimate 
recourse to dispute settlement, should ensure that any such 
actions are justifiable. The sector of textiles and clothing 
has traditionally been a major source of trade friction between 
the developed and developing nations. The Multifibre 
Agreement(MFA) will be gradually phased out over the 10 years 
period available to those members who have difficulties in its 
adjustment to this changed regime. 
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Bradly McDonaldS68 argues that from its initial stage, two 
issues characterized the negotiations with regard to the 
agricultural sector. One is the reduction of the EC subsidies 
and the other is liberalization. These had been ceaseless 
requests by the US and Cairens group for the EC to reduce its 
domestic and export subsidies. Major exporters insist that all 
kinds of domestic support policies and protectionist measures 
should be replaced by tariff. The main focus of negotiation was 
aimed at agricultural policy instruments for protection. The 
fixing of tariffs of the existing protection system still allow 
Community Preference, though greater market access is 
guaranteed. Setting of minimum export levels and a proposed cut 
of 36 percent in the new tariff will change the agricultural 
market. Internal support regimes are allowed to be used and 
discretionary action is, as a result, possible. The upper limit 
of 20 percent cut in the global level of internal support over 
six years is significant. The problem of export subsidies is 
solved through the commitment by developed nations to reduce 
export subsidies by 36 percent over a six year period and to 
decrease the amount of subsidized export by 21 percent over the 
same period. The major outcome of negotiation in this sector is 
aimed at a more stable world trading environment, which will 
make the sector more market-oriented and compatible to the GATT. 
In parallel with this, the new agreements allows the use of 
sanitary and phytosanitary measures against protection. 
568. Bradly McDonald, " Agricultural Negotiations in the 
UR", The World Economy, vol. 13, No. 3, September 1990, pp. 298- 
300. 
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The reduction of bureaucratic procedures relevant to 
international trade could bring about more costs and duration of 
time than is really needed. The Uruguay Round tried to have 
more transparency against protectionism in the areas of import- 
licensing procedures, rules of origin, customs valuation, and 
pre-shipment inspection. In abnormal situations, a nation could 
seek ways to impose higher levels of protection. The term 
"safeguard" is usually used, to include a variety emergency 
measures and anti-unfair trade practices, thus including the GATT 
Article XIX [see Appendix] safeguards, anti-dumping and 
countervailing duty actions and so-called grey-area measures 
which are not subject to GATT rules, such as Voluntary Export 
Restraints(VERs). 569 
The trend to frequent use of discriminatory and restrictive 
measures outside the GATT suggests that its safeguard rules are 
inappropriate and ineffective. The two principal measures 
allowed in the Uruguay Round are safeguard clauses to protect 
domestic industries from sudden, unexpected surges in imports 
and anti-dumping measures to deter against the resort to unfair 
trading practices. The results of the negotiation reinforced 
the effectiveness of the instrument, on the other hand limiting 
the scope and duration of measures. The gradual phasing out of 
all grey-area measures such as VER and Orderly Marketing 
Arrangement (OMA) was agreed. In the adopted regulation 
mechanism, the safeguard Committee will survey and monitor all 
measures taken and ensure that they are in conformity with the 
569. A definition of the term "safeguard" was quoted in 
Jeffrey Schott, Uruguay Round, pp. 18-19. 
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agreements . 570 
Table 6.4: Uruguay Round: main results 
Liberalization 
Agriculture 
- Tariffication of non-tariff barriers 
- Reduction of domestic farm support, production and export 
subsidies 
import barriers 
- Gradual opening of Japan's and South Korea's rice market 
Textiles and clothing 
- Gradual incorporation of the MFA into the GATT over ten years(1995- 
2005) via: dismantling of quotas, reduction of tariffs and other 
trade barriers. 
Services[General Agreement on Trade in Services(GATS)] 
- Introduction of basic fair trade principles such as non- 
discrimination 
- Abolition of market access unless incompatible with regulations 
established by member countries' national schedules. 
- Special(restrictive) provisions for air transport, labour movement, 
financial services and telecommunications. 
- Further negotiations, especially on financial services. 
Intellectual Property Right[Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of 
Intellectual Property Rights(TRIPs), including trade in counterfeit 
goods] 
- Introduction of measures to protect copyrights, patents, trademarks 
and geographical indication. 
- Third World countries allowed more years to conform to agreement. 
Investment[Agreement on Trade-Related Investment Measures(TRIMs)] 
- No TRIMs attempts by any government to make the operation of a 
foreign company within its borders conditional to be used. 
- Publication of specific TRIMs deemed to be inconsistent with 
Articles III concerning national treatment and XI concerning 
quantitative restrictions on imports. 
Public Procurement 
- Agreement restricted to 12 signatories(Austria, Canada, EU, Finland, 
Hong Kong, Israel, Japan, Norway, South Korea, Sweden, Switzerland, 
USA). 
- Tokyo Round agreement extended to open more areas- services, 
procurement by local/regional governments and public utilities- to 
international competition. 
- Telecommunications and aircraft excluded. 
570. Patrick Meserlin, " Anti-dumping", in T. Bark & W. Chae 
(eds. ), Uruguay Round: Unresolved Issues and Prospects, Seoul, 
Korea Institute for International Economic Policy, 1991. 
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Industrial Tariffs 
- Increase in the share of trade of goods that is tariff-bound(tariff 
are not allowed to increase). 
- Increase in the share of trade at zero-bound tariffs. 
- Cut of tariffs by industrialized countries by, on average, one third. 
Technical Barriers 
- Improved rules to reduce trade distortion resulting from restrictive 
technical regulations(technical norms, testing and certification 
producers) via harmonized international standards. 
- Exchange of information on technical regulations between member 
countries to create more market transparency. 
Origin Rules 
- Attempt to avoid trade obstacles by standardizing rules of origin 
largely thwarted by specific exclusion or origin- rules used, for 
example, in the EU's preferential trade agreements. 
GATT System 
Anti-dumping and safeguard measures 
- New rules for determining dumping, 
dumping investigations. 
- Introduction of time limits on the 
- Phasing out of grey measures such 
establishing injury to industry, 
use of anti-dumping duties. 
as VERS. 
Subsidies 
- Agreement list of prohibited subsidies including those favoring 
exports and discriminating against the use of imported goods in 
domestic production but excluding agriculture, aircraft, regional 
aid, research and development. 
- Third world countries allowed to phase out export subsidies over a 
longer period of time than developed countries. 
Settlement of Disputes 
- Removal of consensus voting. 
- Introduction of stricter time limits for adoption and implementation 
of reports. 
- Streamlining of procedure with provision for appeals and binding 
arbitration. 
- Curtailment of unilateral decisions by members to seek trade remedies 
outside the GATT system such as, for example, America's Super 301 
clause. 
World Trade Organization(change in name of the original Multilateral 
Trade Organization). 
- To be operative not later than 1995. 
- Permanent world trade body covering in addition goods, services, and 
intellectual property rights. 
Single institutional framework embracing the GATT, as modified by the. 
multilateral trade agreements embodied in the Uruguay Round and 
plurilateral trade agreements. 
Supposed to operate, like its predecessor, on the basis of consensus, 
except for dispute settlements. 
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Source: Financial Times, 16 December, pp. 4-5. 
According to Meserlin, a single consensus seemed to be hard 
to reach. The negotiations on anti-dumping in the Uruguay Round 
were targeted at two issues; the enforcement of classic anti- 
dumping rules embodied in the anti-dumping code of the Tokyo 
Round and the introduction of new anti-dumping issues not 
covered by the code. The major conflicts on anti-dumping was 
between the U. S. and the EU's different positions. The past 
different regulations and different interpretations of the major 
trading powers made anti-dumping one of the frequent abuses of 
the trade rules. The Uruguay Round tried to clarify the 
complexity and to increase predictability and transparency. The 
most conspicuous achievement of the Uruguay Round is the 
acceptance of the principle that firms may, during their 
starting up period, sell up to 20 percent of their production at 
a loss, which gives great flexibility in the firms' market 
strategies. 
The question of subsidies in trade is very complex and 
controversial. Subsidies can be given for economic and non- 
economic purposes. Ambiguous rules on subsidies could create 
very distorted results in international trade. For the purpose 
of ensuring more certainty and clarity, the Uruguay Round 
provided the green list that will not be subject to retaliatory 
action by other parties, if they are in conformity with the 
rules on subsidies. The green list includes regional aid, 
support for research and development and environmental subsidies 
with a differentiated discipline for the developed, developing 
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and less-developed nations. The Uruguay Round defined subsidies 
as a legitimate tool of social and economy policy, but with more 
stricter regulation over their use. 
The importance of service well reflects that trade in 
services now accounts for 20 percent of global trade. Updating 
the trade regimes of the GATT to include services seemed, in 
some sense, to be urgent, in view of the size of the trade in 
service sectors. 571 Kakabadse elaborates that the key sources 
of conflicts in the services negotiations were the different 
ways and levels of liberalizing services trade, how to apply the 
MFN principle, and to what extent to allow exemptions with 
regard to specific service sectors. The anarchy of 
international service sector rules is subject to very 
differentiated national rules in terms of access, including 
reciprocity and other forms of discrimination. The general 
agreement on trade in services establishes the principle of most 
favoured nation condition. Some exemptions to MFN are to be 
sought in specific situations. One of the major sectors in the 
service area is the financial sector, which forms an integral 
part of the GATS. For the first time in the history of 
international economic cooperation, a wide range of banking, 
securities and insurance activities will be subject to 
enforceable rules and disciplines on a multilateral level. 
Trade-related intellectual properties (TRIPS) and trade- 
related investment measures (TRIMS) are also an epoch-making 
571 Mario Kakabadse, International Trade in Services: 
Prospects for Liberalization in the 1990s, London: Groom Helm, 
1987, pp. 61-65. 
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achievement of the Agreement. The steeply increasing share of 
world trade involving intellectual property right and Foreign 
Direct Investment (FDI) is an important feature of the global 
economy. The Uruguay Round has deepened and broadened the 
boundary of multilateral rule-making. The WTO will become an 
important actor in the international political economy. It will 
be able to coordinate with other organizations like the IMF or 
World Bank, etc. to achieve greater coherence in global economic 
policy-making. The concept of transparency and clarity is 
especially very crucial to the developing nations. "" 
Developing nations must bear in mind that fact that they 
can no longer expect free-riding in the changed setting. South 
Korea is willing to assume the role of providing multilateral 
collective goods by responding to the reciprocal outer demands 
of market liberalization and willing to contribute to helping 
developing nations in need of help, with financial resources and 
economic development experience. "" Attention was drawn to the 
influence of the ANIEs on other developing nations which have 
adopted free trade in the conclusion of the Round. The economic 
success of the outward-looking strategies of East Asian NIEs 
572. The WTO is not the successor of the GATT, 1947. The 
WTO is a new body open to everyone who agrees to abide by the 
entire Uruguay Round Package. 
573. The GATT demand for Korea's greater role in the 
management of the GATT institutions resulted in Korea's payment 
of management fund, of 1,486,720 Swiss Francs, 2.02 percent of 
the total 73.6 million Francs, which was the sixth largest 
amount in 1990. Korea's responsibility-sharing efforts to keep 
the international public good, and multilateral trade rules, 
were more clearly proved in Uruguay Round negotiations, When she 
acted as a mediator between the industrialized group and the 
third world. 
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creates a strong influence toward free-trade. The rising 
protectionism of the major trading powers will be slowed down by 
the conclusion of the Round. Both the developed and developing 
countries face chances and challenges. The Uruguay Round 
prevents countries not only resorting to unfair practices in 
trade, bu also from expanding and continuing to use unfair 
practices. With increased certainty and predictability, all 
members of the WTO will be in the realm of obligations-57' 
The IMF report says that developing nations will suffer 
from the costs of transition: the decline of benefit from 
preference schemes, under which industrialized countries allow 
specified imports with low or no duties, and also high food 
costs . 575 M. Camps and W. Diebold""' argue that the GATT as 
57. The Financial Times, 18 November, 1994, says that 
Market liberalization agreed in the UR could benefit all 
countries and reduce trade conflicts and protectionism. The IMF 
analysed that given the fairly long implementation period, any 
transition costs are likely to be felt gradually, providing time 
to exploit opportunities opened up by the Round. 
575. The IMF says that preliminary analysis suggest that 
erosion of preference margins is small. The main beneficiaries 
have been the more advanced developing nations, which have more 
to gain from tariff cuts and liberalization of agricultural 
textile and apparel trade. However, some nations, notably in 
North Africa and the Caribbean, which rely overwhelmingly on 
preferences on industrial products, could be adversely affected. 
Although developing nations importing much of their food might 
be hurt by higher prices, farm sectors in other countries could 
thrive as world market distortions are reduced. Countries 
protecting their farmers may simply replace their quotas with 
prohibitive tariffs, the report notes, and anti-dumping measures 
could still be used for protection. Still, the achievement in 
market liberalization, strengthening of rules and institutions 
and extension of discipline to new areas will be far reaching 
, the report said. Equally important, it has uttered the 
environmental issues conducive for tackling future challenges in 
trade policy. 
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an institution should become the center of the world trading 
system. But what matters more is not which particular instrument 
is used, but whether nations accept the fact that the 
international trading system, the rules and procedures, method 
of cooperation, formal and informal, that ensure order, promote 
freedom and provide fairness-is in peril and will only be 
revised when cooperation is deepened and widened. Those nations 
whose actions importantly shape the system bear a special 
responsibility. 
6.2.2 Positions and Responses of the Participating Actors 
The US, as the most influential negotiator of the Uruguay 
Round, was very much interested in the bottom line objectives of 
agricultural and service trade liberalization. Those two 
sectors will help improve the current deficit of balance of 
payments. Other key objectives of the US were intellectual 
property rights and trade-related investment issues, new 
disciplines on subsidies and anti-dumping policies, and improved 
dispute settlement procedures. In a similar category, the key 
objectives of the EU were new rules on services and intellectual 
rights; acceptance of the principle of selective application of 
safeguard measures, reforms in dispute settlement including the 
U. S. Section 301, and the institutional reform of the GATT. 
Similar contents are observed in case of Japan: strengthening 
576. M. Camps and W. Diebold, Jr. , The New Multilateralism: Can the World Trading System be saved, New York: Council on 
Foreign Relations, 1983. p. 83. - Quoted in I1 Young Chung, Korea 
in a Turbulent World: Challenges of the new international 
Political, Economic Order and Policy Responses, Seoul: The 
Sejong Institute, 1992, pp. 107-108. 
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the dispute settlements procedures including anti-dumping, 
limits on U. S. Section 301, and a new rules on services, 
investment, and intellectual property rights. Developing 
nations including South Korea, (though South Korea differs from 
pure developing nations), focused on agricultural and textile 
liberalization in the developed nations. 
The enhancing of multilateral rules and disciplines will 
benefit the developing group because they are weak in bilateral 
negotiations with the OECD group. In particular, the ANIEs, 
including South Korea, were keenly interested in improving anti- 
dumping and safeguard codes and dispute settlement procedures 
and removing various non-tariff barriers in the industrialized 
economies. 
a) Position of the EU in the Uruguay Round 
The basic position of the EC in the Round is reflected in 
the EC's need to be fully aware of over-ambitious programmes 
accompanied by unrealistic expectations in reference to the US 
maximalist tendencies. "? Stephen Woolcock quoted the European 
Commission's mandate 578 as the basis for argument ground that 
a multilateral approach, including coordination of monetary 
policy and exchange rates as well as trade, is needed if 
protectionist policies are to be adequately dealt with. To the 
S" Jonathan Story (ed. ), The New Europe: Politics and 
Government and Economy since 1945, oxford and Cambridge in the 
US: Blackwell, 1993, pp. 298-99. 
57e European Commission, Mandate for the Uruguay Round 
trade negotiations, unpublished, 1986. Quoted in Stephen 
Woolcock, "Trade Diplomacy and the European Community, " in 
Jonathan Story (ed. ), The New Europe: Politics, Government and 
Economy since 1945, oxford and Cambridge: Blackwell, 1993, 
P. 313. 
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EC, the major aim of the Round was to strengthen and 
reinvigorate the open multilateral trading system. He further 
argues that with respect to the US, the EC tried to review the 
special advantages of some contracting parties in the form of 
waivers and grandfather provisions. 579 Japan was another target 
to which the mandate referred, specifically to the imbalance in 
real advantages between Japan and her partners. The EC also took 
the issue of continued special and differential treatment for 
developing nations with specific reference to the graduation of 
newly industrialized nations. Newly industrialized nations were 
asked to accept greater rights and obligations in the GATT. 
Woolcock says that the mandate was non-committal on 
quantitative restrictions, or grey area measures. There was only 
a general reference to textiles and clothing, mainly because of 
the Italian and Portuguese resistence to liberalization. As a 
token of the selfish position of the EC, the mandate stressed 
that negotiations should not raise the issues in the policies of 
the contracting parties in agriculture, such as the Common 
Agricultural Policy (CAP), and all forms of agricultural support 
should be considered as characteristics of the EC system. 58° 
b) Responses and Stances of Korean Government and Firms 
Since Korea became an official member of the GATT in April 
1967, the GATT system has been a basis to utilize 
579. Ibid., P. 298. 
580. The Safeguard issue was one of the EC's priorities, 
partly because it remained an unresolved issue from the previous 
Round(Tokyo), though tackled in the 1982 Ministerial Meeting, 
and subsequently in 1983 and 1984. 
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multilateral ism or freedom in the world trading environment, for 
Korea's rapid export expansion. 581 Korea's improved economic 
status enabled it to contribute to the management fund of the 
GATT as the sixth largest contributors" The significance of 
the GATT system to Korea has been so manifest that the 
multilateral Uruguay Round negotiations were a good chance to 
express Korea's views on conflictual issues of trade between 
industrialized and developing groups, as a mediator between the 
two conspicuously divergent views. 
The impact of the Uruguay Round on Korea's economy could be 
analysed into four categories: a) Manufactured-Products market 
opening issue (tariff, non-tariff, textile and clothing, 
agriculture, tropical product); b) Institutional reform issues 
(GATT Articles, MTN Agreement, Subsidies, Countervailing 
measures, Dispute settlement procedure, Strengthening of GATT 
functions); c) Market opening of service sector and protection 
of intellectual property right (IPR); d) Trade-Related 
Investment Measures (TRIMS). Agricultural market opening 
threatens the farming basis of Korea in the countryside. Tariff 
581. The specific examples of the favours of the GATT system 
have been Most-Favoured Nation Principle, and the GSP system, 
both of which provided South Korea with easy market access to 
the advanced markets. 
582. According to the GATT Press Release, 1477, in 1989 
Korea grew to be the 13th largest trading entity of the world 
with the export amount of US $62.3 billion, 2.0 percent share of 
the world total export amount, ranking 13th and the import 
amount, US &61.5 billion, 1.9 percent and ranking 13th in 
importing amount. South Korea paid the GATT management fund, 
1,486,720 Swiss Francs in 1990, which was the 2.02 percent of 
the total fund 73.6 million Franc, the sixth largest amount a 
contracting nation paid in the year. This shows that Korea had 
already become such important player in the GATT trading system. 
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reduction and clarification of non-tariff barriers will 
accelerate the value of foreign products imported into the 
Korean market. The gradual phasing out of Multifibre Agreement 
(MFA) also can not guarantee Korea a clear increase in exports 
in the framework of the GATT principle. The institution- 
reforming issue could create potential for Korea to get more 
easy access to the exporting market, especially to the EU 
market. The domestic market-opening of the service sector and 
intellectual property rights (IPR) are expected to have great 
impact on the domestic economic activities. 683 
On specific tariff issues, the expected reduction of tariff 
will have both negative and positive effects on Korean strategic 
export items and import items respectively. Enhancement of 
international competitiveness is the priority of Korean 
government plans. Anti-dumping, subsidies and countervailing 
duties, agriculture, safeguards, textiles and clothing, dispute 
settlement, trade in services, TRIPS and TRIMs are all important 
areas to be considered. " 
g°'. The opening of non-manufacturing sectors is a challenge 
to the Korean economy. IPR influences trade pattern in that 
high-technology product-related IPR protection will change the 
trading pattern. The application of MFN in IPR, extending to all 
the contracting nations implies negative aspects for the Korean 
economy. The service sector even includes the cultural 
dimension. 
586 See GATT Publications on general issues, Draft 
Financial Act embodying the results of the Uruguay Round of 
Multilateral Trade Negotiations, MTN. TNC/W/FA, December 1991; 
Final Act embodying the results of the Uruguay Round of 
Multilateral Trade Negotiations, MTN/FA, December 1993; and on 
the specific Korea-related issues, Korea Institute for 
International Economic Policy, General Review of the Uruguay 
Round: Sectoral Analysis of the Final Agreements, Policy Study 
Material 93-25, Seoul, December 1993. 
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6.2.3 Tariff Reduction and More Clarity in Anti-Dumping 
a) Tariff 
Tariff has been at the heart of the GATT system and 
dominated the Uruguay Round negotiations. 
Table 6.5: Classification of Domestic Industries-Related 
Negotiating Agenda 
Negotiating Agenda Relevant Domestic Contents 
Industries 
Tariff All concerned Market-opening by tariff 
reduction 
Non-Tariff All concerned Market-opening by reducing 
or eliminating NTBs 
Textile Textile industry Phasing out of MFA and 
& clothing & clothing liberalization of the 
trade 
Natural Product Mining industry Little impact on Korea 
Tropical Product Tropical Product Little impact on Korea 
GATT Articles 
Safeguard 
MTN Agreement These issues usually have 
Subsidies indirect impact as the 
Countervailing All Concerned institutional reform is 
Measures conducted 
Dispute Settlement 
Mechanism 
Strengthening of 
the GATT function 
Agriculture 
product Agriculture Market-opening in 
agricultural sector 
Service Trade Service Industry Market-opening 
IPR Industries concerned Protection of IPR 
with high-tech sector 
TRIMs All concerned Liberalization of 
Investment measures 
Source: Kim, Ki Hong, op. cit, p. 245. 
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The aim in tariff negotiations was to reduce tariff 
barriers by at least a third in principle within a five-year 
period, and to reduce uncertainty through expanding the range of 
bound tariffs to include a wider range of products for which 
contracting parties were committed to keep the same level of 
tariffs. s`s 
For the EU exporters, tariffs will fall further as the main 
industrialized nations have reduced their tariffs to a lower 
level. 586 In total, about 40 percent of the EU industrial 
imports will be duty free in the future. Involved sectors are 
construction equipment, agricultural equipment, steel, beer, 
medical equipment, pharmaceuticals, toys, paper, furniture and 
distilled spirits, which would affect in excess of ECU 10 
billion of EU Exports and over ECU 7 billion of EU imports. ""' 
The duty-free imports of the EU will directly affect the 
competitiveness of EU exports as well as make imports cheaper, 
benefitting both the consumer and manufacturers. "' 
Evaluating the impact on South Korea, the Korea Institute 
585. For details of negotiation process, see Korea Institute 
for International Economic Policy, The Uruguay Round: Progress 
of Sectoral Negotiations and Prospects, October, 1990; Kim, Ki 
Hong, op. cit.; Korea Institute for Industrial Economics & 
Trade, The major contents of International Commercial 
Negotiations and Its Policies, June, 1990. 
586 The EU's agreement to reduce tariff will drop the 
present average tariff rate, 5.7 percent to 3.6 percent after 
the Uruguay Round. 
587. The EC Commission, The Uruguay Round, p. 13. 
598 According to the GATT data, the proportion of the 
duty-free import after the Uruguay Round is expected to increase 
from the present 24 percent to 39 percent, $196,801 million. 
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for Industrial Economics and Trade (KIET) predicted that the 
agreed tariff reduction of the Uruguay Round will increase 
Korean export by $5 billion and import by $500 million, reducing 
the trade' deficit by $4.5 billion annually in future years, 
after reduction has been completed. The Korea Institute for 
International Economic Policy (KIEP) calculated an export 
increase of $22.5 billion and import increase of $8 billion in 
the coming 10 year period. In the same context, Korea 
Development Institute (KDI) suggested the positive effects of 
the tariff reductions in the WTO framework would be a five 
percent increase of Korea's exports and 0.3-0.6 percent import 
increase during the next five years. 589 Benefitted sectors are 
predicted to be steel, metal, chemical, petroleum, rubber, 
shipbuilding, electronics and semiconductors whereas 
disadvantaged sectors are expected to be construction equipment, 
machinery, medical equipment, pharmaceuticals, footwear, 
textile, and environment equipment. 
By reduction of tariffs after the Uruguay Round, the 
electronics sector will be benefitted to gain more international 
competitiveness in the international market. "' In the domestic 
market, the electronics sector has been protected by relatively 
high import tariffs. 
589. Kim, Yong I1 & Park, Seung Ki, op. cit., p. 67. 
590 Ministry of Industry & Trade and Energy, The Progress 
Report of the Uruguay Round, Government Coordination Material 
91-2,1991, p. 5-7. 
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Table 6.6 Tariff Structure in Korea (unit: ) 
1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 
Manufactured Goods 18.7 18.2 16.9 11.2 9.7 
Raw Material 10.0 9.8 9.8 3.9 3.9 
Semi-finished Material 18.1 17.8 17.1 11.7 10.7 
Completed Goods 21.8 21.1 19.1 13.3 11.4 
Source: Ministry of Finance, ROK. 
Therefore, the reduction of import tariff59' will diminish 
price competitiveness as we could see the higher tariff rate of 
finished products rather than raw material and semi-manufactured 
goods. 
Tariff barriers and special tariffs such as special 
consumption tax assisted by non-tariff barriers, in fact, helped 
the Chabols' dominant share of domestic market in car and 
electronics sectors. More imports of EU products are predicted. 
b) Anti-Dumping 
This has been one of the most frequently used measures to 
protect certain industrial sectors. The major trading powers, 
however, have applied different regulations and interpretations. 
The exacerbation by the US and EU distorted the natural flow of 
trade. The major task of the negotiation in anti-dumping was to 
increase the predictability of actions. The clarification of the 
definition of overheads and profits and the fair comparison of 
prices will help Korean exporters to avoid the restrictive 
import regulations of the EU. In the year 1992, Korea's exports 
591. Korea's tariff reduction is expected to drop from the 
present 18 percent to 8.3 percent after the Uruguay Round 
321 
restricted by anti-dumping and other restrictive measures 
reached 8 percent out of the total. Export expansion in the 
electronics and steel sectors is expected to increase. ""' 
By the new agreement, firms may sell up 20 percent of their 
production during their start-up period at a loss, which would 
provide businesses with greater flexibility in their business 
strategies. One omission is the non-existence of any common 
formula to deal with the problem of circumvention, i. e., the re- 
routing of exports to avoid anti-dumping actions, though 
individual members of the EU are entitled to develop their own 
legislation to deal with this problem within the framework of 
the GATT . 593 
S'2. Kim, Yong-Il and Park, Seung Ki, op. cit., p. 85 and see 
Kim Ki Hong, op. cit, pp. 141-147. In Korean. 
s". The introduction of the sun-set clause will result in 
a five-yearly review of each AD action to see if it is still 
valid. The methodology has been fixed and a disclosure 
obligation laid down, which will make the procedures of the AD 
more predictable and transparent. 
322 
CHAPTER SEVEN. THE POSTWAR DEVELOPMENT OF THE SOUTH KOREAN 
ELECTRONICS INDUSTRY 
7.1 The Characteristics of the Development of the South 
Korean Electronics Industry--------------------------p. 324 
7.1.1 Dependence of the Korean Electronics Industry upon 
Export and Foreign Technology Licensing------------p. 328 
a)Dependence on Exports ---------------------------p. 328 
b)Dependence on Foreign Technology-----------------p. 333 
7.1.2 Government Intervention in Strategic Industries----p. 338 
7.1.3 Vulnerability of the Korean Electronics Industry to 
the outer Environment------------------------------p. 343 
7.1.4 Liberalization Pressures on the Korean Electronics 
Sector---------------------------------------------p. 345 
7.1.5 Foreign Direct Investment by the Korean Electronics 
Industry-------------------------------------------p. 348 
7.1.6 The Important Role of the Chabol in the Sector-----p. 349 
7.1.7 Korea's Export into the EU in the Electronics 
Sector---------------------------------------------p. 352 
7.2 Korean Electronics Industry's Strategy of Globalization and 
Localization and the EU's Restrictive Measures against 
Korean Electronics Product Export--------------------p. 356 
7.2.1 Dilemmas of the Korean Electronics Industry--------p. 356 
7.2.2 Globalization and Deregulation as a 
Strategic Choice-----------------------------------p. 361 
a) FDI as a Means of Globalization -----------------p. 364 
b) Management Innovation and Changed Government 
Role---------------------------------------------p. 376 
7.2.3 Major Restrictive Measures of the EU Trade Regime 
against the ROK's Electronics Export---------------p. 380 
3 OL 
Table 7.1 : The Comparison of Growth Rate in Electronics Industry, 
Economy as a Whole p. 324 
7.2 : Electronics Export Products in Percentage, 1980-1987p. 330 
7.3 : Electronics Exports in Millions of Dollars, 1980-87 p. 330 
7.4 : Statistics of Production, Export, Import from 1988 p. 331 
7.5 : Regional Composition of Korea's Technology Imports 
by 1990 p. 335 
7.6 : Comparison of South Korea, US, and Japan 
Technological Level in Electronics Sector p. 335 
7.7 : Export Ratio in Key Korean Electronics Products p. 335 
7.8 : Major Item Export Ratio by Brand Name p. 336 
7.9 : Domestic Consumption Ratio p. 337 
7.10: Korea's Average Tariff Rate, 1980-92 p. 347 
7.11: Korea's Outgoing FDI: 1968-90 P. 349 
7.12: Annual Growth Rate of Korea's Outgoing FDI p. 349 
7.13: Chabols' Share of Employment and Shipment, 1977-87 p. 350 
7.14: Chabols' Share of Shipment in Manufacturing 
Sectors, 1987 p. 351 
7.15: Amount of Production, Export and Import from 
1992-1993 in Korea p. 353 
7.16: Major Quantity and Amount of Korea's Export to 
European Nations in 1992,1993 in industrial 
Equipment, Component and Consumer Equipment Total p. 354 
7.17: Korean Electronics Companies in 1988 p. 356 
7.18: The Proportion of the Electronics Industry in 
Korean Economy p. 358 
7.19: Position of Korean Electronics Industry in the 
World p. 359 
7.20: Importing Trends of Major Electronics Items p. 360 
7.21: Ratios of the US Home Electronics Share by Nations p. 360 
. 
7.22: Ratio and Composition of Korean Electronics 
Industry Exports p. 364 
7.23: Electronics Exports-Products, 1988-89 p. 364 
7.24: Electronics Exports Direction, 1987 p. 365 
7.25: Domestic Consumer Electronics Firms' Primary 
Motives of FDI p. 366 
7.26: Korea's FDI by Year and Region P. 367 
7.27: Overseas Investment by Major Korean Electronics 
Manufacturers, till 1990 p. 370 
7.28: Consumer Electronics Consumption Demand and 
Production in the EU Market P. 380 
7.29: Exports and Imports of the EU in Consumer 
Electronics Industry p. 386 
Figure. 7.1 : Korea's Overseas's Investment by Amount and Region- p. 377 Figure 7.2 : System Picture of Korea's Electronics Firms' Global 
Networking as Globalization Strategy p. 379 
3W-i> 
CHAPTER SEVEN. THE POSTWAR DEVELOPMENT OF THE SOUTH KOREAN 
ELECTRONICS INDUSTRY 
This chapter examines three characteristics of the Korean 
electronics industry with regard to its postwar development. The 
key points of the chapter are the increasing dependence of the 
industry upon the export market including the European Union, 
the dependence of the industry upon licensed technology from 
overseas, and the active role of government in assisting the 
development of technology and setting policy guidelines. The 
Korean electronics industry is now under pressure to undertake 
FDI but lacks its own indigenous research and development 
capacity, and also lacks means to ensure access to its overseas 
markets. The problem is that liberalization of the market may 
guarantee access to markets of products, but it does not 
guarantee access to technology. Another problem is that demands 
for liberalization mean major reforms in the South Korean 
domestic market-above all, a reduction in the role of 
government. Liberalization will inevitably involve a loss of 
control over the pattern of development of the industry. It is 
important to emphasize that the Korean government has assisted 
the industry to develop its own products and research and 
development capability, and the demands for liberalization and 
a reduction in the role of government intervention are a problem 
for the industry, given the importance of the role played by the 
South Korean state in the promotion of the electronics industry 
in the postwar period. 
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7.1 The Characteristics of the Development of the South Korean 
Electronics Industry 
Before examining the peculiar characteristics of the 
development of the Korean electronics industry, it would be 
advisable to look at the general characteristics of the 
electronics industry. The electronics industry today constitutes 
one of the largest industries in the world economy. It also 
continues to grow faster than any other industry, thus being 
regarded as the engine of growth for production and trade of 
industrial products, as much as of services. "' 
Table 7.1: The Comparison of Growth Rates in Electronics 
Industry and Economy as a whole(unit: $ Billion) 
standard year predicted year growth rate 
year size year size 
World Economy 
in GDP 1983 8,001 2000 16,688 4.4 % 
World Electronics 
industry 1982 335 1992 841 9.6 
South Korea GDP 1984 49,147 2000 147,118 7.1 
Korean Electronics 
industry 1983 1,503 2000 16,986 15.3 
Source: Electronics Industry Association of Korea Data 
The importance of the industry goes beyond its direct 
contribution to world trade and output growth. The electronics 
industry is central to the process of industrial transformation. 
As an incubator of pervasive technological and organizational 
innovations, this industry is supposed to submit outdated 
industrial and market structures to creative destruction, thus, 
594 OECD Development Centre Studies, Competing in the 
Electronics Industry: The Experience of Newly Industrializing 
Economies, Paris, 1992, p. 13. 
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paving the way for their modernization. 59 The significance of 
the industry has caused the Korean government to accord it 
strategic importance as the engine of economic growth. 
Korea faces a turning point in its industrial policy 
orientation. It is not an exaggeration to argue that the 
industrial structure of Korea pocesses great potential-arguably 
the greatest potential of any ANIEs. 596 The general industrial 
growth of Korea is still vulnerable to the international trading 
environment. Korea has owed much of its success to an 
aggressive approach to technology acquisition, as well as a 
favorable international environment that has made it a natural 
collaborator in an international struggle between US and 
Japanese companies. 597 
According to the Electronics Industry Association of Korea 
(EIAK)598, the Korean electronics industry has achieved such 
conspicuous development that it is regarded as the world's sixth 
largest producing nation. In consumer electronics dimension 
alone, including electronics products and electronic components 
595 Ibid., p. 14. 
596. See Ernst, D, and D. O'Connor, Technology and Global 
Competition: The Challenge for Newly Industrializing Economics, 
OECD Development Centre Studies, Paris, 1989. 
59 Martin Bloom, Technological Change in the Korean 
Electronics Industry, Paris: OECD Development Centre Studies, 
1992, pp. 124-25. 
"". Electronic Industries Association of Korea, 1987-88 
Electronic Industry of Korea. 
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and parts, particularly semiconductors, 59' it ranks third just 
behind US and Japan. To understand the EU-South Korean economic 
relationship, a sectoral case study of the electronics industry 
illustrates how the rapid expansion of Korea's exports to the 
European Union have caused severe trade frictions. The trade 
friction has been largest in the consumer electronics sector. 
South Korea is the second largest producer of colour televisions 
in the world. In the case of microwave-ovens, of which was 
initiated in 1980,1987 recorded South Korea as the largest 
producer, with 30 percent of the world market in comparison to 
Japan's 25 percent; Korea has now claimed 40 percent of the 
world market for VCRs. In total videotape production, it 
occupies the second place in the world, just behind Japan, and 
has 60 percent of the world market for standard grade 
videotapes. As Korean companies diversify and upgrade into 
progressively higher technology sectors like the semiconductor, 
Korean technological capabilities and marketing capacities are 
predicted to be upgraded, and dependence on Japanese and other 
foreign technologies is likely to be diminished. " Korean 
firms have become competitors with advanced firms in OECD 
groups. The key to success has been provided by a coherent and 
co-ordinated strategy. The Korean electronics industry is widely 
regarded as one of the most successful examples of industrial 
599. The Fortune Magazine, 14 August 1978 and 31 July 1989, 
shows that the rapid development of the sector is typically 
represented by Samsung Electronics's tremendous development in 
only ten years, from the 197th largest industrial company to 
the 20th, then to the 15th, excluding US firms. 
6O° Martin D. Bloom, op. cit., pp. 20-21. 
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latecomer strategies. The experience of this industry is unique 
in the Korean context. One aspect of its uniqueness is that it 
has relied historically more heavily on foreign investment than 
any other sector. The replacement of consumer electronics 
exports by component exports has been a fundamental change. 
During the last few years, industrial electronics exports have 
grown very rapidly, and export-oriented assembly of integrated 
circuits has been completed with fully integrated production of 
sophisticated computer memories. Despite its own efforts to get 
accustomed to the changed international environment, the Korean 
electronics industry is in a very difficult stage of adjustment 
to a new internal and external environment. Growing 
protectionism in the US and the EU create formidable challenges 
to future success. Major competitors in Japan limit the access 
of the Korean firms to strategic technologies. Foreign firms' 
tough application of intellectual property right(IPR) and 
demands to liberalize the Korean market are also impeding the 
continued success for development of the Korean electronics 
industry. 
The internal environment also impedes further sophisticated 
development, as could be found in steep wage increases. The 
importance of Korea's electronics industry as a strategic choice 
for the future growth engine is facing a difficult phase of 
adjustment. In the future Korea-EU economic relations, exports 
of Korea's electronics products are expected to be aware of 
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continuous trade friction with the EU. 6°1 
7.1.1 Dependence of the Korean Electronics Industry upon Export 
and Licensed Technology from overseas 
The Korean government adopted a policy of rapid industrial 
development, based on large scale foreign borrowing to finance 
investment in export industries. In the promotion of the 
electronics industry, the same incentives were offered by 
providing the most successful exporters with a range of 
benefits- including preferential access to loans at a subsidized 
interest rate, exemption from certain taxes, discounts on power 
and freight costs, and access to import licences for machinery 
and components. 602 Consequently, the electronics industry in 
Korea could easily obtain raw materials, components, and 
machinery that were necessary for producing these exports. "' 
a) Dependence on Exports 
Martin Bloom further argues that the policy options of the 
Korean electronics firms were largely determined by the Korean 
601 On the future implications of the strategy in the 
Korean Electronics Industry against the EU, see Yong-Wook Jun 
and Sang-Gook Kim, " Structure and Strategy in the Korean 
Electronics Industry, " paper prepared for the project on 
Technological Change in the Electronics Sector, OECD Development 
Centre, Paris, 1990. 
602 Martin D. H. Bloom, "Globalization and the Korean 
Electronics Industry, " The Pacific Review, Vol. 6, No. 2,1993, 
P"120. 
603. The concentration of economic power into a few key industrial groups was achieved by measures which were linked to 
control over market entry into some export sectors that were 
protected against imports and against domestic competition. 
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government's decision for export-led growth. '°' The 
concentration of economic power in a few business groups like 
Samsung, Hyundai, Daewoo, and Lucky-Goldstar was achieved by the 
special relationship with the government, thus building up 
export volume as fast as possible in order to obtain the 
maximum amount of government incentives. It can be said that the 
promotion of the industry was in line with the government 
framework of export-led growth, depending upon foreign 
markets. "' 
Though the basic strategic target of the electronics sector 
was export-led growth, the domestic market also played a crucial 
role in the rapid development process. "' The Korean market is 
still, however, too small for cost-effective production of many 
electronic products. 
604. Even as of now, the South Korean market with 45 million 
consumers falls behind that of Japan with 120 million. Korean 
companies can not compete without access to overseas markets. 
For most of the electronics goods produced by Korea, overseas 
markets will remain crucial for the foreseeable future. 
605. In the export promotion of the electronics sector, 
limited technological capacity, little brand recognition 
overseas and no international marketing presence made the Korean 
government obtain both process and product technologies and 
access to overseas market through OEM or subcontract production 
within joint-ventures, though margins were lower and control 
over product development was overseas. This was due to the 
characteristics of the industry, whereby technologies are 
continuously changing, as are the components incorporating those 
technologies and the end products. 
606. Prior to 1969, most production of electronics in Korea 
was for the domestic market. In that year, 52 percent f 
production was exported, and the level reached 80 percent in 
1973. In the 1980s, the level varied between 55 and 65 percent. 
Consequently, the promotion of production directed to the 
domestic market has remain below 50 percent throughout the past 
20 years. 
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Table 7.2: Electronics Exports- Products- 1980-87 
(percentage of production exported) 
1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 
Total Exports 70 58 54 54 60 60 64 64 
Semiconductors 100 96 96 95 102 92 92 91 
Audio Products 90 90 75 64 73 65 71 79 
Televisions 84 57 49 55 69 74 78 77 
Computer&Peripherals 
59 36 76 55 65 76 80 75 
VCRs 0 0 0 0 0 40 78 82 
Microwave Ovens 100 94 89 55 92 83 89 90 
Video and Audio Tapes 
105 88 69 70 74 80 86 83 
Telephones 25 16 43 79 64 59 72 74 
CRTs 58 11 4 6 11 50 45 40 
Magnetic Heads 126 122 117 94 88 83 80 76 
Note: More than 100 percent of production may be exported for 
several reasons. For example, there may be time delays between 
production in a year and its subsequent export, while some 
imports may be re-exported. 
Source: Martin Bloom, 1992, p. 43. 
Table 7.3: Electronics Exports- Products- 1980-87 
(Million dollars) 
1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 
Total Exports 2015 2210 2201 3093 4448 4549 7170 11195 
Semiconductors 425 483 623 812 1297 1062 1359 
1967 
Audio Products 462 489 407 464 672 558 754 1573 
Televisions 415 489 410 624 751 624 955 1297 
Computers & 
Peripherals 6 12 36 112 283 402 707 1089 
VCRs - - - - - 205 593 
895 
Microwave ovens 11 23 58 116 244 214 483 639 
Video & 
Audio Tapes 41 66 66 100 212 227 426 533 
Telephones 6 7 33 152 94 113 183 344 
CRTs 57 22 8 17 40 196 244 314 
Magnetic Heads 22 32 42 73 109 94 165 176 
Others 28 % 27 24 20 17 19 18 21 
Source: Electronic Industries Association of Korea, quoted in 
Martin Bloom, p. 42. 
As a result, for the major export items, exports represent 
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at least 75 percent of production. "' 
Table 7.4: Statistics of Production, Export, Import 
from 1988 to 1993(unit: Million US $) 
Industrial Consumer Sub-Total Component Grand Total 
Equipment Equipment 
1988 Production 4573 9211 13784 9474 23531 
Export 3225 6436 9661 6070 15731 
Import 2287 622 2909 5219 8128 
1989 Production 6097 10247 16344 12291 28635 
Export 3485 5948 9433 7131 16564 
Import 2573 670 3243 5683 8926 
1990 Production 6345 10141 16486 12432 28918 
Export 3481 5727 9208 8016 17224 
Import 3068 724 3792 6057 9849 
1991 Production 7104 11054 18158 14946 33104 
Export 3895 6054 9949 9385 19334 
Import 3530 743 4273 6973 11246 
1992 Production 7221 
Export 4227 
Import 3205 
10540 
5966 
777 
17761 
10193 
3982 
15631 
10490 
7668 
33392 
20683 
11650 
1993 Production 8172 11198 19370 17095 36465 
Export 4928 6253 11181 11045 22226 
Import 3796 856 4652 7613 12265 
Growth Production 13.2 6.2 9.1 9.4 9.2 
Rate(%) Export 16.6 4.8 9.7 5.3 7.5 
1993/1992 Import 18.4 10.2 16.8 0.7 5.3 
Source: EIAK, 1994. 
Note: Only recent years have been selected for simplicity. 
From 1980 to 1987, the importance of exports remained 
almost at the same level. The Electronics Industries 
Association of Korea (EIAK) statistics on production, export and 
607 Martin Bloom, Technological Change in the Korean 
Electronics Industry, Paris: OECD Development Centre, 1992, 
pp. 33-35. 
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import from 1988 to 1993, show a gradual increase in all three 
indicators. In 1992/1993, the growth rate in the sector recorded 
9.2 percent, 7.5 percent, and 5.3 percent in production, export 
and import respectively. The growth rate has been gradual and 
continuous. 
Admitting the importance of export for the Korean 
electronics industry, production for the domestic market in the 
1960s and the early 1970s was crucial for radios, black and 
white televisions, and many other consumer electronics products. 
This provided the local companies with the conditions to improve 
quality and price competitiveness before exploring export 
markets. 608 Through the 1980s, a pattern of domestic 
production aiming at the gradual expansion of exports 
occurred. 609 While strategic emphasis on the expansion of 
electronics goods is accorded more importance the future engine 
of the Korean economy, sales in the domestic market are also 
expected to play an important role for local Korean companies. 
Martin Bloom emphasizes that in a commercial world where size is 
of crucial importance, domestic sales could provide a base level 
of production. They could also assist in product development, 
especially where in-house production or government procurement 
is involved. The impact of economic liberalization on imports 
608 Martin Bloom, op. Cit., 1992, p. 34-35. 
609 Computers and telephones production expanded in this 
pattern of domestic production to leading to a gradual expansion 
of exports in the 1980s. For VCRs, the domestic market was a 
prerequisite as technology licensing restrictions denied access 
to export markets until 1985. The first assembly of colour 
televisions reversed the situation with the government ban on 
domestic sales, quotas having previously been applied on the 
domestic sales of consumer electronics goods produced locally. 
Quoted in Martin Bloom, 1992, i4 . 
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will further increase competition in the domestic market. '" 
b) Dependence on Foreign Technology 
At the initial stage of development in the 1960s, Korean 
companies owned little technology, little research 
infrastructure and lacked skilled manpower. The totally-owned 
American subsidiaries in Korea gave little technology to 
domestic firms. Without foreign production technology, Samsung 
Electronics and Lucky-Goldstar had little choice but to acquire 
technology by purchasing machinery and equipment for electronics 
assembly. The operation of machinery and equipment enabled them 
to develop the requisite managerial skills. Aided by their 
productive low-cost female labour to assemble the basic 
components and other raw materials, the firms enlarged their 
overseas market on an OEM basis, with their own brand sales on 
the domestic market. 611 Foreign technology was essential and 
licensing increased in importance. Korea's own research 
activities developed and activities expanded to speed up the 
further absorption of technology into Korean industry. "" 
61" For the maximum utilization of the domestic market, 
certain sectors were much favoured with preference for local 
content requirement for foreign products and local suppliers; 
government purchasing has been a effective part of government industrial strategy. 
611 Martin Bloom, 1993, p. 120. 
612 Samsung and Goldstar(now called LG Electronics) 
utilized joint ventures with Japanese firms to obtain necessary technology in the 1970s. At a later stage, technology-licensing 
and Original Equipment Manufacturing(OEM) were major routes for 
Samsung and Goldstar's technology absorption and acquisition as they expanded their own research activities in the electronics 
sector when the Japanese partners withdrew their joint ventures. 
The major role of these research institutes in the technological 
dimension was in assistance to select technologies for licence 
and in their absorption. 
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Thanks to the vigorous efforts to acquire basic production 
technologies to operate machinery and equipment for assembly 
operations, assisted by recruitment of production management 
manpower from foreign ventures established in Korea and of 
Koreans working in the electronics industry in the US, 
production efficiency improved so considerably that Samsung and 
LG Electronics could use the latest equipment. However, OEM 
operation of the industry resulted in a lack of sophistication 
in production engineering, designing and automated production 
skills . Korean firms had to try to adapt production machinery to 
low-volume specialized products to escape the stage of 
concentration on high-volume of standard products. 
As one way of tackling technological handicap, Korean firms 
strove to make efforts on component production and product 
development by rapidly expanding their research facilities. 
Government also assisted in providing incentives along with the 
extension of the public research system, so that Samsung and LG 
Electronics could localize product development. With additional 
government measures to assist in technology acquisition and 
absorption, they have mastered production processes used in 
certain major components. 613 Lucky-Goldstar and Samsung have 
mastered cathode ray tubes (CRTs) production processes for both 
television and computers and magnetrons for microwave ovens. 
613. To achieve this sort of success, the import of foreign 
technologies increased tremendously from an average of 32 
annually in the 1970s to 121 in the 1980s, the amount of total 
royalties paid to foreigners being US $1,760 million by the end 
of 1990. 
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Table 7.5: The Regional Composition of Korea's Technology 
Imports by 1990. 
Total US Japan EU others 
No. of Technology 
Import 1,733(100%) 633(36.5) 870(50.2) 202(11.7) 28(1.6) 
Source: EIAK Data 
Table 7.6: Comparison of South Korean, US and Japanese 
Technological level in Electronics 
Basic Science Applied Tech. Industrial Tech. 
Design Process Assembly 
Korea Low Middle Middle Middle High 
Japan Middle High High High High 
US High High High Middle Middle 
Source: Ministry of Science and Technology, ROK 
They are now tackling key materials technologies used for 
electronic components. Although the level of production skills 
is advanced, precision-engineering has fallen behind that of the 
advanced group. 
Korean design and product development capabilities still 
fall behind these of Japan and the US. Still, formidable 
barriers remain. 
Table 7.7: The Export Ratio in Key Korean Electronic 
Products 
Item Export($ million, %) in 1991 
Audio 1,579(8.2) 
Colour-TV 1,505(7.8) 
VTR 1,287(6.7) 
Computer 2,120(11.0) 
Semiconductor 5,654(29.2) 
Source: EIAK, Monthly Progress Report, February 1991 
Note: () represents the ratio out of the total exports 
Denis Fred Simon and Changrok Soh's definition of 
techno-nationalism suggests that the post-war period commercial 
technology issues are likely to become intertwined with basic 
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national security concerns. "" 
Table 7.8: Major Items Export Ratio in Brand Name 
1989 1990 1991 
Colour-TV 46.6 % 54.0 60.3 
VTR 38.7 40.9 45.5 
Electronic Oven 29.1 30.5 34.3 
Source: Ministry of Industry, Trade and Energy, ROK 
In this context, how to reduce the dependence on foreign 
technology is of vital importance. The keen awareness of this 
importance during the last three decades has caused Korea to 
make great strides in the field of technological development. 
The Korean economy, once featured by an emphasis on low-cost 
labour, assembly-type operations has shifted to a new commitment 
to skill-intensive and knowledge-intensive industries. By 
gradually increasing total research and development spending in 
both private and government sectors, Korea has reduced its 
dependence on foreign suppliers for technology, while some 
sectors have increased their dependence on others. '" 
614 . Denis Fred Simon and Changrok Soh, "Korea's Technological Development, " The Pacific Review, 1993, Vol. 7, 
No. 1, p. 89. 
615 This was in part due to a well-developed, well- 
articulated science and technology system to combine the 
strengths of business, academia and government. 
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In the electronic sector, structural problems still exist. 
The analysis of the Korea Institute for Industrial Economics and 
Trade (KIET) mentions five problems. "" The most important 
structural problem is the backwardness of design and product 
development technology. "' The others are weak key materials 
industry, high volume production of standard product, heavy 
proportion of OEM export out of the total, and a weak domestic 
market. 
Table 7.9: Domestic Consumption Ratio(unit: %) 
Item Ratio 
Consumer electronic products 45.2 
Industrial electronic products 45.2 
Computers 29.3 
Communication Equipment 57.0 
Components and parts 32.9 
Semiconductors 11.5 
others 56.4 
Total 41.6 
Source: EIAK, 1991 Statistics of Electric & Electronics 
Products. 
In Korean. 
The weak domestic market does not function as the test base 
before a newly-developed item is exported into the foreign 
market. High dependence on export recorded 58.4 percent in 
1991. In addition, the ratio of original Equipment 
Manufacturing(OEM) export is 70 percent, which creates a barrier 
to shifting from low-technology mass production to small-scale 
616 KIET, The Vision of Korean Industry and Development 
Strategies toward the 21st Century, Seoul, Korea, 1994, p. 45. In 
Korean. 
617 For more detailed understanding of Korea's technological development problems, see Changrok Soh, "Political 
Economy and Technological Innovation: Implications for 
Development of High-tech industries, " The Korean Journal of 
Policy Studies, Vol. VII, 1992. 
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production of more specialized products. 61B 
7.1.2 Government Intervention in Strategic Industries 
In order to overcome the challenges of adjustment to a new 
era, broader measures need to be taken by government circles as 
well as by combined strategy of firms and government. These may 
include, the strengthening of local parts and components 
production, nurturing of small and medium sized firm sector, 
management of domestic market liberalization to minimize 
disruptions, and steady maintenance of access to foreign markets 
and technology. 
In a developing economy with manufacturing for export being 
the "engine of economic growth", policy formulation on choice of 
industry for international specialization has a critical impact 
on the development performance of a country. Industries to be 
promoted for export purposes, must be selected properly if the 
country is to succeed in attaining modern economic growth 
strength through industrialization. 619 The electronics industry 
has been promoted as the strategic sector in many industrialized 
nations. Furthermore, with ever increasing emphasis on 
technological innovation and with consumption demand for 
electronics products rapidly expanding, the electronics 
industry is leading the production innovation in the 
618 KIET Study Report, 1994, pp. 45-47. 
" 619 See Chenery, H. B. and Hughes, H., The International Division of Labor: The Case of Industry, IBRD, Staff Working Paper, No. 123,1972. 
- Johnson, H. G., Comparative Cost and Commercial Policy 
Theory for a Developing World Economy, Stockholm: Almqvist and 
Wiksell, 1968. 
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manufacturing process. 
In this vein, the Korean electronics industry has high 
potential to be explored and also has an obligation to create 
new competitiveness, based upon the accumulation of 
technological experience helped by the high-growth of the 
industry. It should contribute to the restructuring of 
industrial structure to an advanced stage and to the expansion 
of exports; hence, to ultimate economic expansion. The Korean 
electronics industry is considered as one of the most dynamic 
export-oriented industries in the recent development pattern of 
Korean industries. At the initial stages of Korea's 
industrialization, Korea put export manufacturing in the 
forefront of its development strategy, and electronics was 
promoted as one of the core industries. The development 
strategy of government and the inflow of FDI were major stimuli 
for the rapid growth of this industry. The close government- 
Chabol relationship in Korea over the past four decades has been 
the basis of a government-controlled industrial policy that has 
facilitated growth and development. 620 The Korean government's 
indicative planning and mechanisms to steer its economy in the 
desired direction was complemented by the proper role of the 
Chabols in maximizing growth potential, "' despite criticisms 
of political favouritism and uncontrolled expansion. George C. 
Lodge's classification of Japan and Korea as being in the 
620 See Chapter. Three, Korean Government-business 
Relationship section. 
621. Korea's growth rate has been remarkable, averaging 
almost 9 percent per annum in the period 1965-1985. Exports grew by over 100 percent from 1980 to 1986. 
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category of communitarianism featured by the developmental role 
of government seems to be a good analysis.. 622 
The international specialization plan required Korean 
government intervention. The electronics industry produces both 
final goods and electronic components. Final goods can be 
divided into consumer goods and industrial equipments. The 
industry was initially identified with consumer goods but over 
the past 40 years, it has shown remarkable growth through 
technological innovations in the production of electronic parts 
and components. The diffusion of innovation and technology to 
the other developed countries has been rather rapid in the 
electronics industry. While the electronics industry in general 
is highly research-oriented and technology-intensive, its 
production processes are separated into a technology-intensive 
phase and a labour-intensive phase. The production of semi- 
conductors requires both chemical and testing processes 
corresponding to the technology-intensive phase and assembly 
process at the labour-intensive phase. 62' Whatever the 
limitations of the industry in terms of dependence on foreign- 
technology and OEM sales, it has achieved a very conspicuous 
success. 
Korea shares the same attributes as Japan has had. It has 
622. George C. Lodge, "Roles and Relationships of Business 
and Government, " in Business in the Contemporary World, Winter, 
1989, pp. 93-108. 
623. For more specialized understanding of the semiconductor industry, see J. E. Tilton, International Diffusion of the 
technology: The Case of Semiconductors, Washington, D. C.: The 
Brookings Institution, 1971; UN-Centre on Transnational 
Corporations, Transnational Corporations in the International 
Semiconductor Industry, New York, 1985. 
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a rather short history of development initiated with the first 
domestic production of transistor radios in 1958. During the 
second half of the 1960s, the multinational corporations began 
to invest in Korea's electronics industry. 624 From its initial 
stages of development, the Korean electronics industry was 
promoted as an export-industry. The government was very active 
in inducing foreign capital into the electronics field. It 
offered various incentives and favours to foreign investors and 
special privileges to the electronics industry. The rapid 
expansion of this sector was largely attributable to the 
investment of multinational corporations and the export-oriented 
development policy of the government. 
At the initial stage, export markets for Korean electronics 
were geographically highly concentrated into a few regions. In 
1973,62 percent of the total exports went to the US, 15.6 
percent to Hong Kong, and 13 percent to Japan. The pattern was 
based upon the fact that many American and Japanese firms 
established foreign subsidiaries and joint ventures in Korea to 
tackle the upsurging labour costs in their local territories. 
Consequently, the products of these subsidiaries and joint 
ventures were channelled either to their home markets or to 
their main customers. 625 
The historical evaluation of the characteristics of the 
62`. The multinational corporations which invested in Korea 
during this period include Komy Corp., Fairchild, Motorola, 
Signetics, Contrea Data, etc. Quoted in Wontak Hong and Anne, 0. 
Kueger (eds. ), Trade and Development in Korea, Seoul: Korea 
Development Institute, 1975, p. 109. 
625. Ibid., p. 113. 
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Korean electronics industry from the perspective of its adoption 
of a pattern of international specialization deserves attention. 
The imitation pattern involves a nation's borrowing technology 
and imitating the new product of other nations. Also, domestic 
market conditions provided incentives for technological 
diffusion. New technologies were brought in by foreign 
subsidiaries through their authorized access to the know-how of 
innovating nations. Such development has been generally evident 
in the Asian nations, Taiwan, Hong Kong, Singapore, and South 
Korea. In these nations, the underlying force behind the export 
expansion of electronics products was provided by the 
multinational corporations and by the proper role of the 
government. Multinational corporations brought into Korea 
capital, technology, production experience and market 
facilities, the only resource to be provided by Korea was cheap 
labour. The most attractive feature of Korea for foreign 
investors was the abundant supply of relatively skilled workers 
with low wage rates and high productivity . 1626 Also target- 
oriented approaches of the government in the past succeeded to 
a considerable level. In the future, however, it will not be 
adequate to cure the shortcomings of the past development 
pattern. 
626. Ibid., p. 117. As pointed out already, comparative 
advantage in the electronics industry shifted among the advanced 
nations over the product cycle, stemming from a combination of 
technological diffusion, economics of learning and low wages. 
The multinational corporations were setting up a base in a low- 
wage countries to supply markets in developed nations. 
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7.1.2 Vulnerability of the Korean Electronics Industry 
The vulnerability of the Korean electronics industry is 
highly influenced by the trade policy of the competing nations. 
In the past four decades, the favourable international trading 
environment enabled Korea's electronics industry to achieve 
rapid development with the active support of government. Korean 
electronics firms are now forced to move up markets and 
diversify their product range in response to pressures on their 
existing business, particularly in consumer electronics markets. 
The heavy dependence on imported components indicates the 
comparative low level of accumulated technology and low level of 
sophistication. Samsung Electronics, with components imports of 
36-60 percent of the value of its main products from Japan in 
1987, was at the middle level of accumulated technology or 
accumulation. By and large, the major Korean electronics firms 
were not in the category of high level technology accumulation 
in 1987. Around the mid-1980s with an average of 60 percent of 
all components imported and almost 60 percent of domestic 
production of components in foreign owned subsidiaries or joint 
ventures, vulnerability remained at the same level. Despite 
tremendous strides of the industry, it still has a long way to 
go in technological sophistication to reach the level of top- 
ranking firms in the industrialized nations. 
However, looking at the recent agreement between NEC, the 
Japanese electronics company, and Samsung, Korea's largest 
semiconductor manufacturer in 1995, to produce semiconductor 
chips jointly in Europe, Korean firms' technological level in 
the international scene has been recognized. This project is 
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particularly meaningful in that the project was negotiated on 
equal terms in technology and its marketing capability. Of the 
world's 10 largest manufacturers of current generation 4- 
megabyte D-Rams, six are Japanese and three are Korean. 
Samsung's strong financial capacity and its ability to invest 
quickly in development projects and manufacturing operations, 
and NEC's greater expertise in the non-memory chip field with 
sophisticated technology, are complementarity and mutually 
beneficial. 
However, despite a few successful cases, lack of 
sophistication of technology has become an important constraint 
for the future business strategy of Korean firms. 627 The heavy 
dependence on imports of components and local joint-venture 
production does not reduce the vulnerability of Korean 
manufacturers, and gives comparatively little strategic 
leverage. High-value added, imported components increase 
ex-factory prices, thus giving Korean firms smaller margins. The 
heavy dependence on foreign components ultimately makes the 
Korean product more vulnerable to foreign competition. "' 
The problem is not acquisition of technology, but of 
acquisition of technology at the early stages of its production- 
life cycle. The capacity of the Korean companies to get and 
absorb technology, to produce and develop new products, and to 
adjust to changing circumstances, in some measure, is a 
reflection of the level of the development of Korea's research 
627 The constraints of the Korean electronics company is 
generally surveyed in Chap. 8. 
628. Martin Bloom, op. cit., pp. 15-16. 
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infrastructure. They are asked to be able to develop new product 
ideas and produce them at a competitive cost in order to create 
and promote a new market, tackling the major trade barriers of 
the existent market. Research and development is very 
significant. Its structure has been built up in a few Korean 
companies, which will be functioning as the basis of 
technological creation in the future. As of now, the innovative 
capability of Korean firms is not high, though more efforts are 
expected to bear fruits in the latter part of the 1990s. 629 
7.1.4 Trade Liberalization Pressure Upon Korean Electronics 
Industry 
Korea benefitted very much from the favourable 
international environment at the initial stage of its industrial 
development. The situation has changed630, partly as a result 
of its own success and that of other exporters. The government 
can no longer control industrial development as it did in the 
past. Internal and external pressures and constraints are 
forcing both the Korean government and industry to respond in 
ways which require modification of Korea's traditional 
629. The core argument of this part is based upon a personal interview with Seung Koo OH, Senior Economist, American & 
European Studies Dept. Samsung Economic Research Institute, 
Seoul, Korea. It was done in 23 July 1994 at the Research 
Institute. 
630 On the changed situation of the world trading 
environment, Chapters, I, II, III give details. Technological 
factors are mainly discussed in this chapter. Regarding the 
paradox of the U. S. role in reflecting the transformed 
circumstances of the world trading system, Jay Branegan wrote a 
short article, "Uncle Sam Won't play: The U. S. pulls out of a 
crucial deal on financial services. Is it still committed to 
free commerce? " Time, July 24,1995. 
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industrialization and adjustment strategy. Korean exports have 
been expanded with rapidity, which has caused considerable trade 
friction in Korea's major export markets- the US and the EU. The 
accessibility of the Korean markets to their manufacturers and 
businessmen has been recognized as a core dispute point. In 
particular, the US has pressed for a revaluation of the Korean 
Won to reduce the competitiveness of Korea's export products. 
Liberalization of Korea's trade regime was also demanded in the 
Uruguay Round negotiations. "' In particular, the Korean 
government promoted revision of 48 relevant domestic laws to 
suit the multilateral trade record, including those concerned 
with farm subsidy, tariff rates, and trade procedures by the end 
of 1995. This was done in the belief of the importance of 
international trust-building is important. "' 
The Korean government is on the process of liberalization 
of imports. 633 Korea is faced with the task of liberalizing 
imports fast enough to satisfy the US and the European demands. 
631. According to the report of Korea Newsreview, November 
18,1995, Korea will newly open 22 business sectors to foreign investment and expand the scope of liberalization for 26 
Partially-opened industries between 1996-2000, according to a 
government plan. Out of the 48 business areas, 27 will be opened fully to foreign corporate investors with the remaining 21 
partially opened, according to the '95 five-year foreign investment opening programme announced by the Ministry of 
Finance and Economy. Partially opened between 1996 and 2000 will be such industries as investment trust, general and specialized tutoring, rental of housing units and regular air cargo 
services. Foreign investors will be allowed to set up wholly- 
owned corporations engaging in fully-opened business sectors, 
while their stake or scope of operation will be restricted in 
partially-opened areas. 
632 Korea Newsreview, May 20,1995, p. 22. 
63. On Korea's market liberalization efforts, see Chapter 
5. 
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The government also has to protect domestic markets, especially 
where production is still based upon assembly of imported 
components. Gradual liberalization of imports with step-by-step 
improvement of transparency is making the Korean economy more 
integrated into the world economic system. In the mid-1970s, 
Korea gradually started to liberalize current account 
transactions. In 1978, an ambitious intermediate-term import 
liberalization plan was announced, suspended and resumed in 1981 
with the adoption of import-surveillance system and preannounced 
schedule. The next import liberalization schedule was announced 
in 1984, and extended in 1985 to include the period 1986-1989. 
The speed of liberalization was particularly accelerated since 
1986 when Korea began to record trade surpluses. A tariff 
reduction schedule was also announced in early 1983 and again in 
1988.634 
Table 7.10: Average Tariff Rates, 1980-92(percentages) 
year Average Tariff Rate 
1980 24.9 
1981 24.9 
1982 23.7 
1983 23.7 
1984 21.9 
1985 21.3 
1986 19.9 
1987 19.3 
1988 18.1 
1989 12.7 
1990 11.4 
1991 11.4 
1992 10.1 
Source: The Office of Customs Administration, Korea. 
634 . I1 Sakong, Korea in the World Economy, Washington DC: Institute for International Economics, January 1993, pp. 208-209. 
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As a strategic response to protectionism in the US, and too 
heavy reliance on Japan for key components imports, Korea is 
endeavoring to decrease its high degree of dependence on the two 
nations in its trade: this is usually aimed at increasing 
imports of components from the US and Europe, while promoting 
the increase of exports of finished products to Europe, Japan, 
China and the member nations of the CIS. As a commercial 
strategy, the Korean subsidiaries of conglomerates have begun to 
sell products overseas, under their own brand names through 
overseas agents or their own sales networks. 
7.1.5 Foreign Direct Investment by the Korean Electronics 
Industry 
As a response to external pressures, Korean companies are 
moving some production overseas. Since 1987, Samsung Electronics 
and Goldstar have been leading the overseas investment shift as 
part of their diversification strategy. 635 Major companies 
have set up assembly operations in the US and Europe to seek 
more market accessibility. If allowed, they import components 
from Korea or traditional suppliers. But, this is very 
vulnerable to the rules of origin. The second type of investment 
is to build overseas factories to overcome the high costs of 
labour in local markets, as was done in Southeast Asia. The 
third one is that the larger companies have set up or acquired 
overseas design or research operations bases, especially in 
635. According to the statistics of Fortune, July 29,1991, 
out of 45 largest world electronics companies, Samsung ranked the third in sales value, with $45,042 million; Daewoo ranked 33th with sales $22,260 million, and Goldstar 34th, with $4,225 
million. 
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California, to help them in semiconductor, telecommunications 
and industrial electronics fields. 
Table 7.11: Outgoing FDI, 1968-1990 
Years 
d 
Total approval 
No. of cases Thousands 
o1 
Accumulated net investment 
of dollars No. of Cases Thousands of 
1ars 
1972 15 2,739 32 18,311 
1976 39 17,800 100 56,537 
1979 51 102,412 269 126,499 
1983 67 83,240 401 393,383 
1986 74 358,504 475 633,341 
1987 109 356,235 534 966,056 
1988 253 479,593 668 1,119,162 
1989 369 926,935 899 1,444,144 
1990 515 1,600,000 1,244 2,335,500 
Sources: Bank of Korea, Economic Statistics Yearbook, various issues. 
Table 7.12: Annual growth rate of Korea's outgoing FDI, 1987-90 
Annual growth rates Average 
of FDI 1987 1988 1989 1990 1987-1990 
On approval basis 
No. of cases 47.3 132.1 45.8 39.6 66.2 
Amount -0.8 34.8 93.1 72.6 49.9 
In actual investment 
No. of cases 82.0 81.3 53.9 44.9 65.5 
Amount 130.8 -45.8 128.8 107.3 80.3 
In accumulated net investment 
No. of cases 12.4 25.1 34.6 38.4 27.6 
Amount 52.6 15.8 29.0 61.7 39.8 
Source: Bank of Korea, Economic Statistics Yearbook, various issues. 
7.1.6 Electronic Sector's Heavy Dependence on the Chabols 
Korea's electronics sector is substantially concentrated in 
the subsidiaries of Samsung, Lucky-Goldstar, Daewoo and Hyundai, 
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occupy 56 percent of total production and 41 percent of all 
foreign technology agreements. 80 percent of all the private 
research staff in this sector are employed by these four groups. 
Their special privileges allow them to have access to government 
research facilities and project funds. In case of quantitative 
restrictions from the exporting nations, these four groups 
receive a much higher allocation of any quotas. Government 
policies to cut the power of the Chabols were introduced to 
reduce the influence of the large conglomerates. "" 
Table 7.13: Chabols' share of employment and shipment, 
1977-87(percentages) 
Top Chabols Employment Shipment share 
1977 1982 1987 1977 1982 1987 
Top 5 9.1 8.4 9.9 15.7 22.6 22.0 
Top 10 12.5 12.2 11.9 21.2 30.2 28.2 
Top 15 14.4 14.5 14.0 25.6 33.9 31.6 
Top 20 17.4 16.0 15.1 29.3 36.6 33.9 
Top 25 18.9 17.1 16.3 31.9 38.8 35.8 
Top 30 20.5 18.6 17.6 34.1 40.7 37.3 
Source: Kyu-Uck Lee and Jae-Hyung Lee, Business Group and 
Concentration of Economic Power, Seoul: Korea Development Institute 
Press, 1990. In Korean. 
The changes in the international trading environment have 
forced Korea's strategy to be modified. In the face of environmental 
uncertainties, more coordinated and intensified cooperation is needed 
between governments and corporate organizations. 
636. On October 9 1995, the Ministry of Finance and Economy 
announced measures to liberalize and foster healthy FDI by 
Korean firms. The new policy guidelines call for companies to finance at least 20 percent of an overseas project with their 
own funds when the investment amount is $100 million or more. It is likely to be an excessive burden in the long run. 
350 
Table 7.14: Chabols' share of shipment in manufacturing sectors, 
1987(percentages) 
Top chabols Food Textiles Chemicals Fabricated metal 
beverage wearing petroleum, coal products, machinery 
tobacco apparel rubber, and and equipment 
leather plastic products 
Top 5 4.9 6.3 27.4 40.9 
Top 10 6.0 10.2 37.0 46.4 
Top 15 18.3 13.5 40.6 47.1 
Top 20 22.6 13.5 46.2 47.8 
Top 25 23.8 18.2 46.3 48.7 
Top 30 26.2 20.4 49.0 49.2 
Source: Ibid. 
The past successful experience of export-led growth based 
upon foreign technology and components will no more be effective 
as leverage in establishing international competitiveness. With 
the political repercussions of export expansion, increasing 
trade restrictions require less intervention by the government 
in the management of the economy. 
Success is usually assured to large integrated companies 
capable of financing the massive investments needed to 
commercialize newly developed technologies and operate smoothly 
without failure in the competitive international markets. In 
this context, the large conglomerates are in the best position 
to secure chances to diminish the level of dependence on foreign 
technology and imported components with high ex-factory costs. 
After an economy achieves a certain expansion, government 
control loses its validity, from the efficiency point of view. 
Large companies with distribution and information networks will 
become more able to compete internationally without government 
assistance and start to move their production offshore to pursue 
a globalization strategy. 
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Korean companies are trying to diversify into higher 
technology sectors. As in the past, licensing, joint ventures 
and OEM deals tied to imported foreign components will also play 
a certain role in attracting more higher technologies. 637 
The democratization movement leading to the major labour 
... ý strikes and upsurge in wage levels, coupled with the high level 
of the won, Korean currency, has greatly undermined some of the 
cost advantages that Korea has enjoyed in the past. The 
development path of the electronics industry in the 1980s has 
also generated a number of challenges and constraints which 
require more fundamental and creative operation. "" 
7.1.7 South Korea's Electronics Products Exports into the EU 
Market 
According to the EIAK's estimation, 63 Korea's 
electronics industry will continue to record an annual increase 
of 12.1 percent in production rate, and 12.4 percent in export 
637 It is true that export-led growth based on foreign 
technology and components provides a method of rapid industrial 
development. However, with the more restrictive measures in 
technology acquisition, it is a high-burdened strategy in case 
there is no large market or strong technological base. 
638. See Kim Kwang Suk and Michael Roemer, " Growth and 
Structural Transformation", Studies in the Modernization of the 
Republic of Korea: 1945-1975, Cambridge, Massachusetts: Council 
on East Asian Studies, Harvard University, 1979 ; Jones, P. 
Leory and I1 Sakong, "Government Business, and Entrepreneurship 
in Economic Development: The Korea Case", Studies in the 
Modernization of the Republic of Korea ; 1987-1988 Electronics 
Industry of Korea, Electronics Industry Association of Korea; 
1994 Electronics Industry of Korea, Electronics Industry 
Association of Korea. 
639 EIAK, Electronics Industry Almanac, 1992. 
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increase rate until the year 2001. Thus, the share of the 
electronics industry in the manufacturing sector by the year 
2001 will be expanded from 14.4 percent in 1991 to 16 percent. 
Exports' share of the total manufacturing sectors will be 
increased from 27.4 percent to 34.4 percent. 
Table 7.15 : Amount of production, export and import 
from 1992-1993 in Korea (unit: $1,000 US) 
Year 1992 1993 Growth Rate(%) in Amount 
Production 26,079,518 29,264,068 12.2 
Import 11,650,340 12,265,998 5.3 
Export 20,683,127 22,227,131 7.5 
Indirect 3,303,430 3,501,856 6.0 
Domestic 6,976,665 8,039,493 15.2 
Source: Electronics Industries Association of Korea, Statistics 
of Electronic and Electrical Industries, Seoul, Korea, 1993, p. 
9. 
* Some statistics modified. 
Looking specifically at the EU market, we can see that the 
EU has lost competitiveness in comparison with Japan and the US, 
except in the communications equipment sector. As a result of 
this, the EU has frequently resorted to non-tariff measures of 
anti-dumping, quota restrictions and other import restriction 
measures. The EU's efforts to restore its competitiveness are 
reflected in its programme to develop technological power by 
launching the EUREKA programme, including the ESPRIT plan in the 
electronics and information industry field, and the RACE plan in 
the communications industry. 640 After launching of the Single 
European Market, firms' strategic alliances and collaborations 
within the single market proliferated to improve international 
competitiveness. Korea should take advantage of overseas 
6'o EIAK's Electronics Industry Almanac, 1992. 
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production by utilizing the benefit of international 
standardization 
. 
641 
Table 7.16: Major Quantity and Amount of Korea's Export to 
European Nations in 1992 and 19.93 in 
Industrial Equipment, Component, and Consumer 
Equipment Total 
(unit: QTY: 1,000 PCS, Set AMT: 1,000 US$) 
Year 1992 1993 Growth Rate(%) 
Quanti ty Amount Quantity Amount 
Belgium 28,502 124,198 31,154 96,641 -22.2 Denmark 40,819 31,352 26,431 32,843 4.8 
France 667,817 359,635 656,616 362,986 0.8 
Germany 1,572,506 1,139,458 613,906 1,061,748 -6.8 Greece 6,474 21,543 7,033 27,014 25.4 
Ireland 20,659 27,974 12,084 24,988 -10.7 Italy 249,249 195,789 242,551 178,492 -8.8 Luxembou rg353,854 332,983 210,176 334,439 0.4 
Portugal 6,466 34,803 3,568 23,440 -32.8 Spain 48,251 168,965 58,415 187,322 10.8 
U. K 514,778 639,712 584,958 708,480 10.7 
Austria 104,141 119,548 97,116 115,102 -3.7 Finland 39,649 28,286 7,446 31,748 12.2 
Norway 715 26,926 1,369 34,604 28.5 
Sweden 23,295 77,406 32,478 97,955 26.5 
Switzerland24,690 68,464 25,257 65,481 -4.4 Turkey 171,289 204,170 268,277 202,470 -0.8 
Source: Electronics Industries Association of Korea, Statistics 
of-Electronic and Electrical Industries, Seoul, Korea, 1993, pp. 
49-206. 
* Only the total of each nation is quoted. 
The only way to overcome market entry barriers is through 
the promotion of international competitiveness in prices and 
quality. 642 Woo argued that among the many sectors, the 
manufacturing sector should be the engine of the future growth 
6`l. KIET, The Vision of Korean Industry and its Development 
Strategy, Seoul: KIET Publication, 1994, p. 54. In Korean. 
6'2. I had a informal chat with Woo, Kook-Bin, Deputy- 
Director of International Cooperation Department, Korean 
Productivity Center, Seoul, Korea, August, 1994. The general topic was the regionalization and globalization of the world 
economy and Korea's manufacturing sector 's response strategy. 
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by restoring its production vitality, and securing comparative 
advantage in the world structure of international division of 
labor. 
Entering the 1990s, we witness the co-existence of the 
spread of a free trade regime and regionalization of the world 
economy, which are the major features of the new international 
economic order. The globalization of the world economy is 
accelerated by the successful conclusion of the Uruguay Round. 
Since 1987, Korea's electronics industry has been leading the 
growth of the Korean economy as the biggest exporting industry 
sector. It accounts for 14 percent of domestic manufacturing 
production and for 27 percent of the total exports. However 
from 1989, we have seen the relative slowdown of the export 
expansion rate. This is partly caused by the heavy dependence 
on foreign technology and key components and materials and the 
mass production system for low and middle level products, export 
through OEM and finally the weak domestic market demand, 
accompanied by structural problems. 
Focusing on the future domestic market, an annual 12.1 
percent production increase and 12.4 percent annual export 
increase is expected, making this a growth-leading sector. By 
the year 2001, production and exports of Korea's electronics 
industry in the world market are estimated to rank as 5th. 
The most important factor in reaching the target is 
production base expansion by Korean technology, and change of 
major production items toward the high VAT items such as 
industrial equipment. 
355 
Table 7.17 : Korean Electronics Companies in 1988 
(US million dollars and %) 
Companies Amount of Sales 
Samsung Electronics 4,427 
Goldstar 4,131 
Daewoo Electronics 1,622 
Goldstar Cable 830 
Samsung Electron Devices 829 
Hyundai Electronics Industries 677 
Samsung Electro-Mechanics 581 
Taihan Electric Wire 478 
SKC 405 
Samsung Corning 378 
Goldstar Semiconductor 357 
IBM Korea 342 
Motorola Korea 307 
Anam Industrial 300 
Samsung Aerospace 300 
Daewoo Telecommunications 251 
Goldstar Alps Electronics 249 
Orion Electric 246 
Goldstar Telecommunications 239 
Korea Electronics 224 
Name of the company Proportion of the sales 
Samsung 23.4% 
Goldstar 22.9% 
Daewoo 6.8% 
Hyundai 3.2% 
Others 40.0% 
Source: Korea's Top Electronics Companies, Electronics Korea, 
October and November 1988. 
* Samsung Electronics was merged with Samsung Semiconductor and 
Telecommunications in 1988. 
7.2 Korean Electronics Industry's Strategy of Globalization 
& Localization; and the EU's Restrictive Trends in 
Korea's Electronics Exports 
7.2.1 Dilemmas of the Korean Electronics Industry 
In the era of a technological development trade warb", a 
6". The concept of the trade war has been intensified since 
the collapse of the Cold War structure. A new trade order 
requires the competitiveness of firms to survive in an ever- 
increasing competition to seek more national benefits. See more 
P. Cowhey and J. Aronson, " A New Trade Order, " Foreign Affairs, 
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key aspect of Korea's development process has been the 
acquisition and absorption of technology. In the Korean case, as 
in the other developing nations, there was little technological 
ability at the initial stages of development. Inadequate 
research infrastructure -and shortages of skilled manpower 
hindered the smooth development of Korea's electronics industry. 
Foreign technologies were vital and joint ventures provided the 
main source of foreign technology into the Korean industry. "' 
The main features of the electronics industry in the initial 
development stage are reflected in its the characteristics and 
general situation today. Large companies, as well as medium and 
small-sized companies, are afraid of transformation in line with 
the world trend of internationalization. Traditionally, growth 
of the electronics industry was firmly rooted in the consumption 
of the domestic market. Internationalization should not be aimed 
at escaping firms' lack of competitiveness. Rather it should be 
aimed at constructing a strong base in credit and technology in 
the overseas market. Those efforts must include greater 
specialization and sophistication of the electronics firms, 
active technology development and marketing strategies, close 
cooperation between large and small firms, and finally, 
continuous education for internationalization of human 
Vol. 72, No. 1,1992/93. 
6" On the importance of technology for economic growth, 
see D. Ernst, "Innovation, International Diffusion of technologies and the World economy-Comments, " in F Areangeli, P. 
David and G. Dosi (eds. ), Technology Diffusion and Economic 
Growth, Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 1991. 
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resources. 645 
The strategic importance of Korea's electronics industry 
can be seen from the data. Out of the total exports in 1982, 
the electronics industry contributed 9.5 percent. This 
proportion rapidly increased to 27 percent in 1992. This 
increase was mainly caused by a huge facility investment and 
good labour force with cheap wages, with export-promotion 
incentives by the government. As a result of this rapid growth, 
Korea ranks the sixth largest electronics products-producing 
nation, with 7.6 percent output out of the world-total output; 
in particular, it ranks third in home appliances, just behind 
Japan and the US . 646 
Table 7.18: Share of the Electronics Industry in 
Korea's Economy (unit: $ million, billion Won, %) 
Exports Production 
Electronics Total Ratio Electronics Total Ratio 
1982 2,069 21,853 9.5 791 14,996 5.3 
1987 11,133 47,281 23.5 3,208 34,903 9.2 
1992 20,683 76,632 27.0 6,885 63,209 10.9 
Source: Korea's Electronics Industry Association 
The growth of Korea's electronics industry under the 
assembly structure has produced the following features: 
a. low ratio of industrial electronics because its growth depended 
heavily on finished, natural products; 
b. the weak competitiveness of the Korean firms because of 
the dependence of key technology, components and parts, 
and brands on the foreign firms, resulting in low 
6`5" Korea Electronics Daily, Tuesday, 19, April, 1994- 
Special annual series, " Let's promote the competitiveness of 
Korea's electronics industry". 
646. The rapid increase of the FDI into Europe and the ASEAN 
region would upgrade the status of Korea as one of the most 
fastest growing electronics nations. For more details, see 
Chapter 8. 
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localization ratio of key components, and high OEM 
method; 
c. a few items targeted towards exports based upon 
price competitiveness; 
d. low efficiency and weak self-growth base because of the 
monopoly of the market by the big assembly firms and the 
backwardness of small and medium sized firms; 
e. heavy dependence on the US and Japan for technology 
transfer and components imports. 
Table 7.19: Position of Korea's Electronics 
the World (unit: $ 100 million) 
Industry in 
Nations Total Output Home Electronics Industrial Component 
USA 2,010 60 1,509 441 
Japan 1,857 312 947 598 
Germany 508 38 359 111 
France 289 17 231 41 
UK 277 23 207 47 
S. Korea 263 68 70 125 
Italy 224 9 187 28 
Singapore 168 19 94 55 
Taiwan 154 15 81 58 
Brazil 126 22 83 21 
Source: Korea's Electronics Industry Association 
The structural changes in the domestic markets have shaken 
the base that made the growth possible. The 100 percent 
liberalization of imports regulations after 1988 in the 
electronics sector and the deregulation of imports procedures, 
presented challenges and risks to the electronics firms in 
Korea. Foreign firms' domestic market penetration will be 
accelerated since the opening of the distribution market in 
July, 1993.6" Table 7.20 shows the sudden increase in rates 
of electronics products imports to the Korean market. 
The liberalization of the electronics sector was conducted 
6" On the Korean government liberalization scheme, see 
Chap. Four; on specific foreign investment liberalization, see Ministry of Finance, Republic of Korea, The Guide to Foreign 
Investment in Korea, Seoul, pp. 96-121. 
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via the government' gradual liberalization scheme. The opening 
of the distribution market and 100 percent liberalization of the 
import regulations of the electronics sector were in active 
response to the demands of the US and the EU, further 
accelerated by the Uruguay Round Negotiations. 
Table 7.20: Importing Trend of Major Electronics Items, 1993, 
the End of May, 1994(unit: $1,000, Percent) 
Item 1993 Increase Ratio End of May 1994 Increase 
Ratio 
Wire communication 
equipment 204,229 14.1 92,905 64.9 
Cordless Communication 
equipment 718,419 18.5 343,172 53.7 
Computer 1,851,761 13.0 865,443 34.2 
Measuring equipment 361,952 30.0 236,033 107.0 
Semiconductor 5,041,679 -7.1 2,390,189 14.0 
Color TV 8,759 17.6 3,375 11.5 
VTR 21,409 -22.3 14,475 66.3 
Audio equipment 512,246 15.5 193,086 1.1 
Refrigerator 27,290 1.5 16,794 81.4 
Source: EIAK, Conference Material for Government-Private Firms 
Consultation Meeting on Electronics Sector, 8 July 1994, p. 14. 
As a subsequent symptom of these measures, it has been 
common in recent years to see foreign electronics products in 
departments and distribution networks in Korea. 
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Table 7.21: Ratios 
market 
of the 
Share 
US home electronics 
by Nations(unit: %) 
1988 1990 1991 1992 1993(January-August) 
S. Korea 12.5 10.1 10.0 9.9 8.3 
Japan 55.1 52.5 51.9 46.0 46.1 
Malaysia - 2.0 7.5 10.2 10.7 PR China - - 6.5 7.3 7.9 
Source: EIAK 
Table 7.21 also shows the very difficult position of Korea, 
648. 
EIAK 1992 Electronics Industry Almanac, p. 60. 
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being followed by Malaysia and People's Republic of China. 
Korea is in the position of a sandwich between highly 
sophisticated products and the low and middle range products 
manufactured by the ASEAN, China and Mexico whose cheap labour 
gives price competitiveness. "' 
7.2.2 Globalization, Liberalization as a Strategic Choice 
As one of the fostering factors to stimulate Korea's 
internationalization and globalization, the world trend of 
regionalization is restricting the favourable international 
environment Korea has enjoyed in the past. The rapid 
integration of the EU and formation of the NAFTA, is intended to 
maximize their economic benefits at the possible expense of 
shaking the international liberal trade regime. The creation of 
trade blocs may work against the smooth development of the 
Korean electronics industry. The elimination of the tariff 
among regional body members and strengthened rules of origin 
impedes the natural flow of Korea's exports to the market. 
However, FDI environment is improved by economies of scale, 
and member nations incentives to attract more FDIs, despite the 
rules of origin and increased local contents requirement. The 
successful completion of the Uruguay Round and creation of the 
WTO strengthens multilateral disciplines to foster electronics 
industry trade in the world dimension. The export market will 
be a little more expanded by the reduction of tariffs, the 
649. South Korea's difficulty is to escape technological 
dependence on Japan and the US and also how to run ahead of those the industrializing nations in ASEAN and China with more 
sophisticated, technology-intensive products. 
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expected greater clarity in application of restrictive measures 
in anti-dumping, more transparent rules of origin, relaxation of 
technological barriers and participation in the local government 
procurement markets. The Green Round will have great impact on 
the competitiveness of the industry in the international arena 
because it needs pan-national efforts. 650 The regulations on 
environment-damaging materials will change the trade patterns of 
the nations due to discrepancies in the environmental costs. 65' 
The Green Round poses not only challenges, but also 
opportunities to Korean firms. The development of 
environmentally-friendly technology would give Korea more 
credibility. 
The sophistication of the business structure is detrimental 
to upgrading business competitive edge. This efforts requires 
a new approach for the internationalization of firms. Korea 
should graduate from the old formula of original Equipment 
Manufacturing (OEM) exports and technology transfer, if 
possible, through the development of sophisticated technologies. 
The reason is quite simple: the structural change of 
6s°. The role of government in tackling the GR issues will be important, as it has been in technology development. The industrialization of East Asia including Korea, as has been 
surveyed in the chap. 6.1, has been characterized by the proper 
combined role of the public and private sectors. Those who want 
to have more information on the government intervention for the 
sustained economic growth, see R. Wade, Governing the Markets: 
Economic Theory and the Role of Government in East Asian 
Industrialization, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990. 
651. According to the Montreal Agreements, the usage of CFCs 
for the manufacturing of electronics products will be totally 
banned from the year 1996. Unless a substitute is developed, it 
will be totally impossible for firms to produce or export items 
such as refrigerators and air conditioners in which CFCs have 
Played an important role. 
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international environment makes it no longer possible for the 
firms to expand their export markets without owning their own 
technologies. Only through the development and acquisition of 
new technologies, can firms be forerunners in the market. The 
continuous expansion of overseas markets is possible only when 
technological development capacity is secured. 652 
The stages of internationalization are gradual. The 
gradual stages of internationalization are as follows: 653 
1) the stage for domestic market; 
2) the stage for promoting exports; 
3) the stage for marketing for foreign local market; 
4) the stage for local production for local market; 
5) the stage for regional or global integration. 
Viewed in terms of the above stages, the Korean 
electronics industry is in the process of shifting from the 
stage of export-promotion to the stages of FDIS for local 
production for local market led by the home electronics 
industry. More specific flows of the stages are as follows: `" 
a) concentration on domestic market; 
b) OEM exports; 
c) self-brand exports; 
d) FDIs; 
e) networking of overseas production base. 
The OEM ratio in export is about 70 percent. The second 
problem is the concentration of export items on colour TVs, 
semiconductors and audio equipment, reaching 62.9 percent of the 
652 Just looking at the competitiveness side, the 
technological factor is most important in the electronics 
industry. 
Young-Wook Chun and Dong-Jin Yoon, Internationalization 
Strategies of the Korean Electronics industry in an era of 
Globalization, Research Project on Korean Electronics Industry, 
1993, p. 14. In Korean. 
6Eý 
. Ibid. 
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total exports of the electronics, as is the heavy market 
concentration on the US and the EU, 32.. 4 percent and 14.9 
percent respectively. 
a) FDI as a Means for Globalization 
Especially in the consumer electronics field, FDI has 
always been foremost in Chabols' globalization scheme in 
tackling protectionism. 
Table 7.22: Ratio and composition of Korean Electronics 
Industry Exports( unit: $ million, %) 
year 1980 1985 1991 1992 
Export amount 
ratio 
1,964 
68.9 
4,590 
63.0 
19,334 
58.4 
20,683 
61.9 
Composition US 44.7 59.2 32.2 32.4 
Of EU 13.9 11.7 17.3 14.9 
Export Japan 14.2 9.8 9.4 8.4 
Market Asia 12.9 11.8 22.1 26.1 
Others 14.3 7.4 19.0 18.2 
Source: Electronics Industries Association of Korea 
Table 7.23: Electronics Exports-Products-1988-1989 
(unit: million dollars) 
1988 1989* 
Total Exports 15,162 16,875 
Semiconductors 3,179 4,336 
Computers and related 1,872 2,046 
VCRs 1,322 1,434 
Televisions 1,417 1,419 
Radios 1,362 1,275 
Microwave Ovens 843 894 
Video and Audio Tapes 684 850 
CRTs 637 702 
Telephones 341 413 
Others 3,505 3,628 
* calculation based upon 9 months data 
Source: Electronics Korea 
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FDI655 into the advanced nations was mainly aimed at 
import restrictions, with the pattern of. assembling consumer 
electronics. Since the early part of the 1980s, Korea's 
electronics industry began to invest overseas to tackle the 
advanced nations' protectionism, especially the abuse of anti- 
dumping cases and the minimum price regulation. The annual 
rapid increase of consumer electronics exports by 30-40 percent 
in the early 1980s, caused the US and the EC to raise non-tariff 
barriers to protect their domestic industries. 
Table 7.24: Electronics Exports Direction-1987 
Value(million dollars) % of total value 
Total 11,195 100 
US 4,938 44 
Japan 984 9 
West Germany 601 5 
United Kingdom 598 5 
Hong Kong 523 5 
Canada 350 3 
France 331 3 
Singapore 304 3 
Malaysia 205 2 
Italy 176 2 
Netherlands 175 2 
Australia 166 2 
Spain 155 1 
Taiwan 149 1 
Panama 109 1 
Others 1,431 12 
Source: Electronics Industries Association of Korea 
655. A simple example of the benefit of FDI is to be found if the concerned firm wants to continue to export to existing 
markets which impose restrictions. For example, Samsung 
Electronics was charged 15.95 percent anti-dumping duty on C-TV 
exported to the US in 1984; it is much more cost-effective to 
have local production with additional 7 percent production 
costs, rather than paying the 15.95 percent anti-dumping duty based upon C. I. F. price. 
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In addition to that, as a way of reducing unemployment rate 
and to correct the balance of payment deficit, they used various 
incentives to induce foreign firms' local production in their 
own territories. 656 Table 7.25 below shows motives for 
establishing local production lines. 
FDI into developing nations was mainly aimed at dealing 
with high labour costs in the domestic market. Small and medium 
sized companies actively invested in other labour-cheap 
developing areas. Table 7.26 shows the regional distribution. 
Table 7.25: Domestic Consumer Electronics Firms' Primary 
Motives for FDI 
Europe N. America S. E. Asia Total 
Cheap labour cost 1 2 8 11 
Trade Restriction 7 3 - 10 
Market Penetration 9 3 4 16 
Competitive FDI 1 2 -3 
Acquisition of advanced 
Technology - 1 -1 
Export expansion for 
semi-finished product 1 - -1 
For consumption in 
domestic market - - -- 
Development of export 
base for third nations 2 1 47 
Source: KIET Investigation, quoted in Park, Sung-Tak, et. al., 
op. cit, p. 66-67. 
Southeast Asia received Korea's FDI, mainly because Korea 
sought cheap labour costs, while Europe and North America were 
selected mainly for the purpose of avoiding trade restrictions 
and expanding or exploiting market shares. 
656. Sung-Tak Park, et al., FDI Strategy of Korean Consumer 
Electronics Industry, KIET Research Paper No. 300, Seoul, 
Korea: Korea Institute for Industrial Economics and Trade, 
January 1994, p. 64. In Korean. 
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Table 7.26: Korea's FDI by the analysis of year and region 
Europe N. America S. E. Asia China Total 
1981 - 1 -- 1 1986 1 - -- 1 
1987 1 - -- 1 
1988 4 2 3- 9 
1989 4 - 2- 6 1990 1 1 21 5 
1991 2 - -- 2 1992 1 - -- 1 
Total 14 471 26 
Source: KIET 
* This KIET investigation by questionnaire was carried out among the three big Korean consumer electronics firms, Samsung, Daewoo 
and Goldstar. 
As a more sophisticated form of FDI, international 
strategic alliances began to acquire much significance. Several 
characteristics of Korea's globalization in electronics industry 
can be classified as follows: 
a. Korea is at a transitional stage from export orientation to 
the initial stages of FDI with a sudden upsurge since 1988 
in FDI. 
b. the main pattern of FDI could be defined as a defensive 
and passive one as main means of escaping trade 
restrictions imposed by the major exporting market or 
to solve the problem of labour wage increase in Korea. 
Usually, this has been done in the style of assembly, 
though since the 1990s, substantial production schemes have been 
actively pursued. 
c. Firms lack transferable competitiveness: 
unlike the firms of the advanced nations in the US, the 
EU and Japan with the technical capability of 
transferable technology development and experience of 
marketing, Korean firms have been expanded by the force 
of low-wage, government support and domestic market 
protection, massive production facilities, and vertical 
integration of components, which makes transfer to 
the international scheme impossible. 
d. Hasty internationalization: without the previous 
accumulation of firms' own experience and knowledge, 
with the sudden increase of the domestic labour costs and 
labour disputes forced the firms to seek FDI, many firms 
lack marketing strategies, which causes some 
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confusion. 657 
e. The concentration of the region centring around ASEAN 
and People's Republic of China: the recent trend to 
diversify the regions does not change the major flow of the 
FDI into Southeast Asia and China; 
As has been surveyed above, the internationalization of the 
Korean electronics industry crucially lacks the business 
management capability in the foreign local market to promote 
comparative advantages and to change the industrial structure 
into a sophisticated one, suitable for the local environment. 
Another task of Korea's electronics industry is to restructure 
the industry and management structure to concentrate on 
technology and knowledge-intensive products. The purpose of 
internationalization should focus on establishing global system 
for competitiveness based upon a sophisticated business 
structure. The global competitiveness system means the 
promotion of the global competitive edge in the electronics 
industry by the global deployment of managerial resources with 
global networking and upgrading local adaptability capacity. "", 
Korean companies are moving production bases overseas. 
Many multinational corporations in the overseas market have been 
shifting from exporting to the setting up of overseas assembly 
and then to full-fledged manufacturing operations, ending up as 
almost local companies. In case of the multinationals, this 
65' Apart frozw'these domestic factors, the resurgence of 
protectionism in the US and the EU has been the underlying basis 
for Korea to push ahead with hasty FDIs. 
658. On the globalization of the world trade, see Charles 
Oman, Globalization and Regionalization: The Challenge for 
Developing Countries, Paris: Development Centre Studies Series 
in OECD Publication, 1994. 
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process took rather long time. With a few exceptions, the 
progression for Japanese firms has been more recent. The 
pressures pushing Japanese firms6" are almost the same, yet 
more intense for Korean firms. "' 
Looking into the electronics industry overseas investment, 
Samsung and Goldstar have been leading overseas investment since 
1987.661 
659. Stefano Micossi and Gianfranco Viesti elaborate in 
"Japanese direct manufacturing investment in Europe, " in L. Alan 
Winters and Anthony J. Venables (eds. ), European Integration: 
Trade and Industry, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991, 
pp. 210-11, that "the theory of FDI and multinational 
corporations has identified three key components in the 
motivation to invest abroad: the existence of ownership 
advantages in product or process technology, organization and 
marketing skills, economies of scale or joint production; the 
fact that these advantages can best be exploited internally to 
the companies, rather than by selling or licensing them to other 
firms; and the strong interdependence within these advantages, 
the possibility of exploiting them internally, and the choice of 
location". According to the Jetro survey, "avoidance of trade 
frictions ranks first in the decision to set up local assembly 
units in general, electronic and transport machinery. " The 
bibliography of Stefano and Gianfranco's writing gives the full 
title of the Jetro survey: Jetro, Current management situation 
of Japanese manufacturing enterprises in Europe: Fifth Survey 
Report, March 1989, Tokyo, Japan. 
660 On future possible orientations of FDI for 
multinationals, see D. Julius, Global Companies and Public 
Policy: The Growing Challenge of FDI, London: The Royal 
Institute of International Affairs, 1990. 
661. The aggregate overseas investment amounted up to $11.9 
billion for about 5,800 projects as of the end of August, 1995. 
There were times when overseas investments were synonymous with 
plant relocations. Led by cash-rich large groups, such as 
Samsung and LG, however, the latest trends in overseas investment are the merger and acquisition of foreign firms, 
which the company officials say are more effective in acquiring 
up-to-date technology and local marketing. According to Korea 
Newsreview, November 11,1995, local analysts say the latest 
phenomenon indicates that Korean firms' overseas investments are 
shifting from the beginning to a middle stage. In a few years, 
Korean firms will enter into an aggressive investment stage, 
armed with advanced offshore financing and M&A techniques. 
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Table 7.27: Overseas Investments by Major Korean 
Electronics Manufacturers until 1990 
Location Product Output Date Notes 
Samsung Electronics 
Portugal- Estoril Colour TVs 300 000 1982 55: 45 joint venture 
Audio $7 million 
investment 
Products 
USA- Roxbury, N. J. Colour TVs 1000 000 1984 
Microwave 
ovens 400 000 
UK- Billingham Microwave 
Ovens 500 000 1987 
VCRs 120 000 
Colour TVs 400 000 1988 
Mexico Colour TVs 400 000 1988 
Colour TVs 
Chassis 400 000 solely of US plant 
Thailand Colour TVs 300 000 1988 Thai Samsung: 51: 49 
Joint Venture with 
Saha Group 
Cassette 
recorders 200 000 50% of total 
production 
to be exported 
Spain -Valles VCRs 250 000 1989 
Colour TVs 300 000 
Microwave Ovens 
China TVs, VCRs, 1989 
refrigerat ors 1989 
cassette r adios 1989 
Hungary Colour TVs 300 000 1989 50: 50 joint venture 
with Orion Radio 
Electrical Works 
Microwave ovens 
Turkey Colour TVs 1989 
Samsung Electro-Mechanics 
Portugal TV parts 1990 
Thailand - Bangkok Household 
electrical 
appliance 
parts 1990 $23 million investment 
Samsung Electron Devices 
Spain CPT for TVs 1990 
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Goldstar 
USA- huntsville 
, Alabama Colour TVs 1 200 000 1983 
Microwave 
ovens 300 000 1986 
VCRs 1988 
West Germany- 
Worms Colour TVs 300 000 1986 
VCRs 400 000 1986 
Microwave 
ovens 600 000 
Mexico Colour TV 
chassis 45 000 1987 
Thailand TVs 200 000 1987 50: 50 joint venture 
with Mittor 
Washing 
machines, etc. 30 000 1987 
Turkey Microwave 
ovens 2 00 000 1988 25: 75 joint venture 
with Vestel 
Indonesia- 
Jakarta Colour TVs 200 000 1988 
Black & White 
TVs 100 000 1988 
Cassette 
players 200 000 1988 
United Kingdom Microwave 
ovens 300 000 1988 
Thailand Telephones 500 0 00 1988 $1.5 million, 60: 40 
joint venture 
Philippines Washing 
Machines 50 000 1989 
Telephones 30 000 
China Colour TVs 150 000 1989 
Hungary Small consume r 
electricity 
refrigerators 1989 
Goldstar Alps Electronics 
West Germany VCR decks and heads 1990 
Daewoo 
France-longwy microwave 
ovens 30 000 1988 51: 49 joint venture 
with JCB 
UK-Northern 
Ireland VCRs 
Sammi Sound Technology 
Thailand Speakers 2.4 
371 
million March 88 
$182 000 plant 
Taiyang Electric Lamp 
Thailand Electric 
bulbs 1.2 
million Sep. 88 
$300 000 joint 
Venture 
with P. U. C. Co. 
Jung Poong Products 
India Switches 16 million $4 million joint 
venture with 
Universal 
Electronics 
China Electronic 
components 
Daeshin Chonyon 
Bombay-India Transformers 
and coils 
Source: Quoted in Martin Bloom, Technological Change in the 
Korean Electronics Industry, Paris: OECD Development 
Centre, 1992, pp. 109-112. 
The recent announcement of Samsung Heavy Industry's FDI in 
Harrogate, UK is a good example of a hasty decision to avoid 
anti-dumping by the EU. In contrast to this case, Samsung 
Electronics' FDI into Billingham, Cleveland, UK is a good 
example of a well-prepared case to promote the group's 
globalization strategy. ""' 
As part of an aggressive globalization strategy, Hyundai 
has also unveiled a ambitious long-term investment plan up to 
2000 to build a $1.3 billion semiconductor factory in Eugene, 
662. Samsung Group Chairman, Lee Kun-hee said recently, "For 
us businesses, going abroad is not just one of many options, it is the very strategy for corporate survival. " FDI has become a 
major corporate business strategy. 
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Oregon, US. Samsung Electronics has also announced $1.5 billion 
semiconductor project in Austin, Texas and recently bought a 
stake in U. S. personal computer maker AST Research Inc. at a 
cost of $370 million. LG Electronics announced a plan to 
purchase Zenith Electronics Co. of the US for $350 million. 663 
Summing up the general features of Korea's overseas 
investment, we can identify three distinct patterns in the 
overseas investment of the Korean manufacturing electronics 
industry. The leading firms in Korea, Samsung, Goldstar, Daewoo 
and Hyundai have set up assembly operations in the US and Europe 
to gain market access and acquire technology. If conditions 
allowed, Korean firms could take components from Korea or their 
original suppliers, which are often blocked and vulnerable to 
some local restrictions. For example, the European Commission 
has introduced a minimum contents requirement on Korean Assembly 
in Europe, and in 1989 then increased the level from 20 percent 
to 40 percent. As a result of this, magnetic heads for VCRs are 
being sourced from Phillips. Another restriction is that Korean 
manufacturers were limited to imports of 900.000 CRTs into 
Europe in 1989, a reduced amount of one-third over the 1987 
levels. In order to overcome these restrictive measures, the 
major electronic firms in Korea set up manufacturing operations 
in Europe in the 1990s. 66" In case of the US market, the 
663 The Korea Newsreview, November 11 1995 further tells 
that Daewoo Motor Co. plans to buy a Polish auto company FSO at $1 billion; and Hyundai Motor Co. is to set up a joint-venture 
auto assembly plant in Turkey, investing $400 million. 
664 .. Samsung Electronics records the biggest investment in 
Europe by any Korean company. Samsung, the largest company in 
Korea, the 14th largest in the world and the fifth largest 
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inability to import CRTS has forced Korean producers to 
concentrate on larger-size televisions using CRTS which have 
been purchased from RCA, Zenith and so on. 
The second category of investment is to establish overseas 
operations to overcome the problems of the cost pressures, as 
has been well shown in investments in the region of Southeast 
Asia. The third type of investment is that the big firms have 
set up or acquired overseas design or research operations, for 
example in California, to assist them in the semiconductor, 
manufacturer of electronics products, is pouring 600 million 
pounds into establishing a complex that will stimulate an area 
hit by economic recession and unemployment. The investment, 
supplemented by central and local government grants, will create 
more than 3,000 jobs by the year 2000 and many through 
construction and contracts. The building of the complex will be 
in two phases. The first phase will be ready in August 1995, 
when the manufacture of personal computer monitors and microwave 
ovens will begin. In 1997 work will begin on the second phase, 
to be completed by the end of the decade- factories to 
manufacture fax machines, colour display tubes and personal 
computers, and centres for training, administration and research 
and development. Samsung is considering further expansion on the 
Teeside site, which will be the group's base for supplying 
Europe. At the same time the group's European headquarters is 
moving into Britain. Furthermore, the Teeside project is an 
integral part of Samsung's ambitious international strategy of 
establishing five continental production bases serving markets in Europe, USA, South America, Japan, and China. The choice of 
the 200-acre Wynyard park site was automatic as Samsung opened 
a television factory at Billingham, only a few miles away, seven 
years ago. The group values the infrastructure of roads, ports, 
airports and utilities in the North-East that are vital to 
successful business. From its experience at Billingham, Samsung 
has also come to value the people who take pride in the quality 
of their work. Despite its size, Samsung appreciates that 
achieving success globally is dependent on being first-class locally, and its policy is to build strong relationship with the 
people in the countries where it operates. In addition, by devoted 7 percent of its annual turnover to research and development, Samsung demonstrates that enhancing quality of life through innovation is as important as creating business. " 
This will be a typical example of the Korean firms' future 
globalization. 
Quoted from the Financial Times, December 11,1994. 
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telecommunications and industrial electronics fields. 66S As a 
result of sudden and numerous overseas investments, Samsung and 
Goldstar have become multinationals. For LG Electronics, for 
example, about 7 percent of its sales of consumer electronics 
products were supplied from overseas sales in 1988 and the aim 
was 15 percent by 1991; a level is equivalent to that of 
Japanese electronics companies. Their overseas research 
activities are also innovative, as late starters of the 
electronics industry. 666 
From the experiences and systemized studies of the Korean 
electronics industry, several proposals could be presented for 
the future internationalization strategy. 667 
1) Gradual approaches to avoid uncertainties; 
2) Feasibility studies in consideration of its high task; 
665 Clifford Mark and Jonathan Moore, "Overseas 
Attractions, Entrepreneurs Shift production to low-cost 
countries", Far Eastern Economic Review, 16 March 1989, pp. 98- 
101. 
666. Samsung Electronics and Goldstar will be extended 
multinationals with more technological and production capacities 
in the 2000s. Annual Analysis Book of Electronics Industry, 
1992, published by Korea Electronics Industry Association, 
predicts that the export value of electronics goods will reach 
38 % of total exports. In 1970,1988 and 1992, it recorded 7 
percent, 22 percent and 32 percent respectively. This rapid 
increase suggests that the electronics industry in Korea will 
lead Korea's future economic growth with an estimated annual 
growth rate of 10.6 percent by the year 2000. Korean Electronics 
Industry Association, Chap. 3. The Role of Electronics Industry 
in the 2000s, in Annual Analysis Book of Korean Electronics 
Industry, Seoul, Korea, 1992, p. 7. 
667 The role of the government is changing. The government 
should leave investment to the private sector because it is the 
businesses themselves who can make the best decisions in this 
respect and take the ultimate responsibility for the results. 
Instead, the government should take up areas that can not be 
taken by the individual companies, such as the gathering of information, fostering of manpower and constructing social infrastructure. 
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3) The enhancement of the firm's own international 
competitiveness; 
However, pessimistic side of industry draws the same 
attention as the optimistic one. Korean firms' competitive 
advantages in the overseas markets are based, to a larger 
extent, upon the temporary characteristics of cheap management 
costs, intensive managers' efforts, supply capacity of semi- 
finished products, technology and components production suitable 
for the local markets, rather than on product differentiation 
ability, supported by technology and brand image. As a higher 
level of internationalization is achieved, it will become more 
important for firms to have their own competitive advantage. 
To promote the competitiveness of the Korean firms, FDI 
serves several purposes in technological acquisition, 
strengthening of the marketing capability and aggressive 
deployment of small and medium sized components firms. 668 
Complementary strategic alliances promotes comparative 
advantage. 
b) Management Innovation and Changed Role of Government 
The way of thinking in business management must be 
internationalized. Management culture needs to be innovative. 
668. Out of the total 160 Korean firms approved to invest 
abroad by the Korean government in August, 117 or 73.1 percent 
were small businesses. The small investors' portion which 
remained at around 30 percent in 1989, has since kept rising to 
44.3 percent in 1991,51.4 percent in 1992,58.6 percent in 1993 
and 65.7 percent in 1994. The changing direction of small 
companies' investment is noticed in their focus shift from such 
labour-intensive businesses as textile, leather and toy 
manufacturing to technology-intensive ones such as electrical 
and electronic goods. 
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"Think Global, and Act Local" will be a guiding principle. 
Autonomy of branches in the overseas market will 
make firms' 
strategy more practical. 
Figure 7.1: Korea Is overseas Investment by Amount and 
Region 
Overseas investments by region 
(Jan. -Aug., 1995) 
Note: Southeast Asia's figures include China's. Source: Finance & Economy Ministry 
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Southeast (China) Middle North Latin Europe Others 
Asia East America America 
The concentration of the decision-making power into the 
headquarters will be diffused more into local operational 
subsidiaries. Local adaptability is usually cemented through the 
mutual exchanges of understanding between firms and local people 
such as active contribution to local cultural development or 
offering economic development funds, etc. 669 
The role of government is no less important in the success 
of the internationalization strategy. Providing incentives to 
help FDI for technology acquisition and setting the dialogue 
channel between the large assembly corporations and small and 
medium sized components firms is the duty of the government. ""' 
In order to prevent a industrial phenomenon of hollow, the 
Korean government should allow foreign workers with low wages to 
work in the Korean firms. Financial and technological support 
for high-value added product is crucial, with automatic facility 
investment. This means that the role of government will remain 
crucial, even in an era of globalization. Deregulation and 
inducing measures for foreign FDI into Korean territory should 
be aimed at the ultimate goal of Korean firms' structural 
adjustment and sophistication. 
669. The problems and proposals of the Korean firm's 
strategy are based upon an interview with Dr. Kim, Bak-Soo, 
Research Fellow at the Korea Institute for International 
Economic Policy, Seoul, Korea, in July, 1994. 
67O In this new industrial era, the government role is to improve the domestic business environment, set up a long-term 
investment attraction strategy and stick to it consistently. 
Thus, the companies should be the very ones to be nearest to 
their markets and places which can provide various factors of 
production at the lowest costs in this integrated and globalized 
economy. 
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Figure 7.2. : System Picture of Korean Electronics Firms 
Global Networking as globalization Strategy 
finished products 
-------components 
....... technology 
US-base for local marketing Europe-overseas production 
---ý and obtaining technology base for local market ---- -, 
and information through local4- - ---ý occupation 
i---marketing centre and R&D for . high-tech production 
design and item development base 
i R&D, design, marketing 
setup of local HQs 
Mexico-export base f___ Korea-General Hqs for global 
. low and middle level orientation, base for R&D 
product production . high-value added product 
" production and global management 
resources 
--- Southeast Asia-multipurpose production Communist Bloc-New 
market for export' 
base, component. supply to Europe and US low price product 
'"---. local market, import to domestic market. production and 
. HQ for purchase and general affairs ' base for component 
production,, 
Japan-new port market 
technology transfer 
" local R&D centre 
" local marketing centre 
Source: Young-Wook Chun and Dong-Jin Yoon, Internationalization 
Strategies of the Korean Electronics Industry in an era 
of Globalization, Research Project on Korean Electronics Industry, 1993. In Korean. 
* Yong-Wook Chun is a professor at the Dept. of Trade, ChoongAng 
University, Seoul, Korea and Dong-Jin Yoon is a advisor to IlEun Investment Co. in Seoul. 
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7.2.3 Restrictive Trade Measures of the EU against the 
Korean Electronics Products Export 
Looking at importing sources of the EU consumer electronics 
products, the EU's concern for South Korea can be evaluated 
accurately. Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong and Singapore 
are the major exporting nations to the EU market in consumer 
electronics products. Korea ranks the third biggest importing 
source with a 6.9 percent share of the EU's total imports in 
consumer electronics, after Japan's 44.8 percent share and 
People's Republic of China's 8.2 percent. 67' The economic 
slump period of 1988-1992 in Europe only witnessed average 
annual 0.9 percent increase in the EU consumer electronics 
market, while the period of 1983-1988 recorded a average annual 
8.3 percent increase. The consumption demand for consumer 
electronics products caused by the continuous economic slump 
continued to grow even in the early part of the 1990s. '72 
Table 7.28: Consumer Electronics Consumption Demand and 
Production in the EU Market(unit: Million ECU) 
1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 
Consumption 51855 54309 55366 51453 47200 
Production 40664 42864 42210 39684 36000 
Employee 
(Thousand) 387.4 384.6 375.6 356.9 338.0 
Note: Eurostat Prediction in 1993 
Source: KOTRA, Study Report, 1993. 
Looking at the 1992 statistics for the value, excluding 
audio in consumer electronics, the EU imported 5,255 million ECU 
from Japan, 955 million ECU from PRC and 800 million ECU from 
Korea out of the total 11,643 million ECU, coming from outside 
the EU market. Quoted in KOTRA statistics, 1993. 
672 Even in 1992/1993, a decrease of 8.3 percent was 
recorded. EACEM predicts a gradual slow increase in consumption 
of 1.2 percent during the period 1994-1997. 
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The decrease of consumption and production and reduced 
number of employees in the electronics sector has forced the EU 
Commission to take measures to protect the industry. "' As a 
response to this sector's lack of competitiveness, the European 
Community Commission launched a Five-year Scientific Technology 
Development Programme in 1987. The ESPRIT, RACE and BRAIN 
projects are part of the programme. Another one is EUREKA, 
which is being implemented under the project name of JESSI. 6" 
The Projects are aimed at increasing national competitiveness 
and creating industrial technological base. 675 Usually, 
industrial policy is a base to produce a specific trade policy. 
The EU's industrial policy in aiding research and development 
project is potentially related to competitiveness of the 
industries concerned. The degree of government intervention and 
673 Entering 1992, consumption and production showed a 
declining trend, from 554 billion ECU in 1991 to 514 billion ECU 
in 1992, and 422 billion ECU in 1991 to 397 billion ECU in 1992 
respectively. The number of employees decreased by 20,000 during 
the year of 1991/1992. The period of 1985-1992, furthermore, 
recorded 44 percent increase in labour cost per unit, although 
the productivity index in the EU consumer electronics industry 
increased by 30 percent. The sharp decline of competitiveness 
in the consumer electronics sector caused the expected 
cancellation of GSP to South Korea in sensitive items from 
January 1996 and resort to the frequent abuse of anti-dumping 
measures against the export of Korean electronics products. 
674 In order for European firms to deal with fierce 
competition ever intensified after the Uruguay Round, direct 
marketing, productivity enhancement, quality control, and development of a new product are major issues as a response 
strategy. Joint investment in computers, telecommunications and 
specialization of comparative advantageous product and more than 
anything else, strategic alliance in R&D are on a sharp increase. For example, Thomson and Philips are collaborating in 
HD TV development and also in the technology development of a flat TV screen, LCD(Liquid Crystal Display). 
675 EIAK, 1992 Electronics Industry in General, Seoul, 
Korea, p. 17. 
381 
the objectives of industrial policy determine the trade policy 
orientation. "', 
Reflecting the EU's difficulties in the consumer 
electronics sector, the EU is predicted to suspend its extension 
of Generalized System of Preferences(GSP) favours67 to Korean 
made cars, electronics, footwear and textile products from 1 
January 1996.678 The EU has decided, furthermore, to jack up 
the import tariff rate on CD-ROM drivers to 14 percent from the 
present 3.9 percent starting 22 November 1995. Korean makers of 
cars, electronics, footwear and textile goods are likely to face 
serious difficulties in their exports of such products to the EU 
"". "Industrial policy can mean many different things from 
a plan to aid particular industries with subsidies, tariffs, and 
tax breaks to more centralized planning that identifies growth 
rates for development. " Quoted in Richard M. Steers, Yoo Keun 
shin and Gerardo R. Ungson, The Chabol: Korea's New Industrial 
Might, New York: Harper & Row Publishers, 1992, p. 22. 
677. Generalized System of Preferences: Guidelines for the 
1990s, Published by the Commission of the EC, COM(90) 329 
Final, Brussels, 6, July 1990, explains that the system was 
originally designed to give developing nations more favourable 
access to the markets of developed nations. Conceived in the 
early 1960s with UNCTAD, launched at the 2nd UNCTAD Conference 
in New Delhi in February-March 1968 and finalized by Resolution 
21(11) of the Special Committee on Preferences in October 1970, 
it was subsequently implemented by means of various national 
schemes. The EC was one of the first industrialized powers to introduce such a scheme on 1 July 1971. The developing nations 
are no longer a homogenous group. Their situation now ranges 
from that of dynamic and competitive economies such as South 
Korea to that of the least developed nations where the vast 
majority of the population is at minimum subsistence level. The 
suspension of GSP from Korea starting from January 1996, is a 
measure to restrict GSP benefit for exporting nations to protect 
the Community market from explosive penetration by sensitive 
products. 
678. The Korea News Review, November 11,1995, p. 4. 
382 
in the future. 679 
The third GSP management plan covering 1995-2004 is 
expected to revise its regulations especially to accommodate the 
Uruguay Round Agreements. The European Association of Consumer 
Electronics Manufacturers and other relevant industrial 
associations finally succeeded in lobbying to suspend the GSP 
toward South Korea in sensitive electronic product areas. 68° 
The EU's GSP has been applied into two categories; sensitive 
products (Annex I)681 and non-sensitive (Annex II) products 
with varying degrees of favours. "' In case of sensitive 
products (Annex I), Fixed Duty Free Amounts and Community Tariff 
679 The spokesman of the Ministry of Trade, Industry and 
Energy further said after the EU's decision to cancel the GSP 
favor to Korea that the EU Executive Committee would abolish the 
extension of GSP favours to specific goods produced by some 
developing countries with an annual per capita GNP of more than 
$6,000, beginning 1 January 1996. South Korea, Singapore, Saudi 
Arabia, and Brunei will be affected, and in particular, in the 
Korean case, the EU's step is expected to dampen Korean exports 
of textile fabrics, plastic, rubber, automobiles, steel and 
machinery and electronics products in the future. 
680At the EC-Korean Ministerial Talk in September 1992, 
the EC decided to reopen GSP favour toward Korea from the year 
1992. Since its suspension in 1988 January, caused by the 
Korea's discriminatory measures against the EU in IPR measures, in comparison with the US, after 4 years suspension in the 
system regained its favour for the next 4 years. 
681. The classifications of Annex I and II are based on the 
degree of sensitivity, which means that the rest of the items 
excluded from the list of sensitive products belong to Annex II 
category. Typical items of Annex I are television receivers, 
reception apparatus, clocks, electrical capacitors, electric 
filament lamps, automatic data-processing machines, ball 
bearings, with greatest external diameter not exceeding 30mm, 
microwave ovens, turntables and so on. These are just rough 
categories because details writings are too complex to deal with 
here. 
682 The total beneficiaries of the EU GSP have been 133 
developing nations, including 42 least developed nations and 25 
protectorate territories. 
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Ceilings have been applied. "" Fixed duty free amounts are 
applied to sensitive products of competitive nations. Within 
the fixed duty-free export amount, South Korea was able to 
export without incurring the Community's import tariff, but, in 
case of exceeding the fixed amount, automatic application of 
tariff was restored. The Community Tariff ceiling is applied to 
the remaining sensitive products on a community-wide basis. If 
the ceiling is exceeded, member nations of the EC can request 
the Commission to impose a tariff on the product. "" The non- 
sensitive items, on which no tariff is imposed, can also be in 
the category of Reference Base through which the EU reviews 
imposition of tariff when the item exceeds more than 6 percent 
of the total EU import in the item from outside nations in Annex 
I Items and 2 percent in Annex II items. 6821 The gradual five- 
year tariff reduction schedule and Korean firms' FDI into the EU 
local market is likely to diminish the negative impact of import 
tariffs in Korea's consumer electronics product export to the EU 
683 - EIAK, Korean Electronics Industry Almanac 1992, pp. 251-56. 
68`. EIAK, The 1992 Electronics Industry in General, Seoul, 
Korea, p. 252-54 in detail shows the classified items and amount 
in application of Fixed Duty-Free Amount and Community Tariff 
Ceiling. See Index. 
685 The practical application of the Uruguay Round 
Agreement in tariff reduction within the EU GSP framework, 
especially in consumer electronics industry, does not produce 
substantial import tariff reduction in the EU. The major export items of Korean enterprises to the EU market such as VCR, C-TV 
Will continue to be subject to 14 percent tariff. On the other 
hand, CPT, electronic oven and vacuum cleaners will be subject 
to a reduced tariff from 15.0 percent, 5.1 percent and 4.0 
Percent to the 14.0 percent, 5.0 percent and 2.2 percent 
respectively. 
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market in the future. 686 However, according to the EU tariff 
reduction plan of the Uruguay Round, Computer Peripherals, 
microprocessors, S-RAMs and telephones will be exempted from 
tariff imposition. 687 The new GSP guideline which was 
announced on 3 June 1994 by the European Commission, states that 
sensitive products (Annex I) will be subject to at 75 percent of 
the Most-Favoured Nation (MFN) tariff rate. The EU's graduation 
formula of Item/Nation method in GSP management after 1995 
January will greatly reduce the GSP favours Korean electronics 
and electric export items have enjoyed so far. 688 
Non-tariff barriers are much influenced by the Uruguay 
Round Agreement. The Safeguard Agreement in the Round requires 
that VERS and OMAS and other grey area measurers should be 
notified to the Safeguard Committee in the WTO within 180 days 
and as a following step, those measures should be abolished 
within four years from the date when the Agreement becomes 
effective. There does not exist any formal agreement on 
export/import restrictions between the EU Commission and South 
Korean government. 
. 
However, between the firms and industrial 
associations, VERS in MWO and CPT exist. 
686. KOTRA Material 94-30, p. 171. 
687 Fax machines, tape recorders and home refrigerators 
will benefit from tariff reduction, from the tariff reduction 
from 7.7 percent to 3.6 percent, 9.5 to 6.0 and 3.8 to 1.5, 
respectively. 
688 The KOTRA Material 94-30, pp. 172-73. 
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Table 7.29: Exports and Imports of the EU in Consumer 
Electronics Industry(unit: million ECU) 
Nations Export Import 
Japan 54 5,225 
People's China(PRC) 5 955 
South Korea 12 800 
Austria 317 761 
Singapore 67 745 
USA 282 735 
Malaysia 32 354 
Taiwan 7 338 
Hong Kong 50 227 
Turkey 38 186 
Indonesia 3 88 
Brazil 15 72 
Total 1,167 11,643 
Source: EACEM 
The export/import amount with South Korea in the consumer 
electronics sector alone is heavily unbalanced. In this sector 
alone, a 788 million ECU trade surplus is recorded on the Korean 
side. To tackle this unbalanced import/export amount, largely 
caused by uncompetitiveness of the European firms, anti-dumping 
measures have been employed"689 The recent example of anti- 
dumping imposition on imports of microwave ovens originating in 
the Republic of Korea reflects the general characteristics of 
past impositions. "' 
According to the proposal for Council Regulation, 
provisional anti-dumping duty has been extended on imports of 
microwave ovens originating in the People's Republic of China, 
689. For general statistics of AD, see Chapter 4. 
690. Commission of the EC, Proposal for a Council 
Regulation, Brussels, 10 November 1995, COM(95) 462 Final. 
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the Republic of Korea, Thailand and Malaysia. "' The legal 
foundation used to impose anti-dumping duty are the Treaty to 
establish the EC Council Regulation (EC) No 3283/94 of 22 
December 1994 on protection against dumped imports from 
countries not members of the EC, as last amended by Regulation 
(EC) No 1251/91; Council Regulation (EC) No 2423/88 of 11 July 
1988 on protection against dumped or subsidized imports, as last 
amended by Regulation (EC) No 522/94; and Commission Regulation 
(EC) No 1645/95 to impose a provisional anti-dumping duty. 692 
Those Regulations concerning anti-dumping are expected to be 
used as restrictive trade measures against Korea's exports in 
the electronics sector even after the Uruguay Round Agreement 
became effective. 693 
691. Article 1- The validity of the provisional anti-dumping 
duty on imports of microwave ovens originating in the People's 
Republic of China, the Republic of Korea, Thailand and Malaysia 
imposed by Regulation(EC) No 1645/95 is hereby extended for a 
period of two months and shall expire on 8 January 1996. It 
shall cease to apply if, before that date, the Council adopts 
definitive measures or if the proceedings is terminated pursuant 
to Article 9 of Regulation(EC) No 2423/88. 
Article 2- The Regulation shall enter into force on 
the day following that of its publication in the Official 
Journal of the EC. This Regulation shall be binding in its 
entirety and directly applicable in all Member States. 
692. Even in the legal definition of the anti-dumping 
category, clarity is lacking, despite considerable improvements 
in contrast to clear definition of subsidy/countervailing duty 
in the Uruguay Round Agreement. 
693 On the agreed new legal foundation of non-tariff barriers in the WTO framework, see The Results of the Uruguay 
Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations: The Legal Text, 
Published by the WTO, 1995. Special agreements on technical 
barriers on trade, rules of origin, import licensing procedures, 
subsidies and countervailing duties and safeguards have implications for non-tariff barriers, pp. 39-325. 
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CHAPTER EIGHT. THE SOUTH KOREAN ELECTRONICS INDUSTRY: A 
CASE STUDY OF ITS DEVELOPMENT 
This chapter tries to examine the specific development of 
Samsung Electronics and LG Electronics, how they have been 
affected by changing trade policies, and how they have responded 
to them, especially to globalization and regionalism. The heavy 
role of government in the rapid expansion of Korea's electronics 
industry is in the process of adjustment to a new dimension as 
we have seen Korean society's demand for a separation of the 
state from the Chabols. One thing to be noted is that the growth 
history of the two firms is rather similar, in the context that 
a close government-Chabol relationship has been the main basis 
for the rapid expansion of the industry and its subsequent 
exports. 
8.1 Similar Development Pattern of the Two Leading Korean 
Electronics Firms: Samsung Electronics and LG Electronics 
8.1.1 Efficiency of the Chabol through Economy of Scale 
In the enhancement of international competitiveness, market 
transactions plays a crucial point, and are often used as an 
instrument for protecting or amplifying a dominant market 
position. Market transactions are more easily and more 
efficiently created with more efficiency by large firms, which 
have great economy of scale and scope than smaller ones usually 
do. Generally, strategic decision-making is becoming more and 
more centralized, while actual practices are implemented by more 
specialized functional units. Good companies are more and more 
characterized by an extensive network of commercial affiliates. 
388 
They usually sell their products worldwide. The manufacturing 
is usually done by a few highly efficient and specialized mono- 
product factories. The production process is usually supported 
by the new information technology coming from global product 
divisions and central service centres including finance, 
procurement, advertising, Research and Development, electronic 
data processing and transport facilities. ""' 
The two subsidiaries of Korean business groups or Chabols- 
the Samsung and the Lucky-Goldstar Group, occupy about a 45 
percent share of Korea's electronics and telecommunications 
industry production and employ well over half of all research 
human resources in this sector. The economy of scale dimension 
enables the two groups to be effective global competitors, a 
good example of the globalization of business activity based 
upon a competitive advantage. In the process of Korea's rapid 
economic development, the electronics activities of the two 
groups have played key roles. 695 Samsung and LG have been at 
696. OECD, Competing in the Electronics Industry, pp. 37-38. 
695. Since the late 1970s, four Asian tigers including South 
Korea, after a previous rush out of the low income group 
appeared as if they were able to offset the stability of the "club" formed by industrialized nations at OECD: they were 
exporting more and more manufactured products to OECD nations. These facts, among others, illustrate the reality of a dynamic 
change mainly driven by a competitive search of greater 
efficiency. Technology improvement, search of the best practice 
of existing technologies, higher qualifications of labour, 
higher quality of goods, optimization of interrelationships 
among all actors involved in design, production and marketing, 
form the main points contributing to enhance productivity. The 
electronics industry has played a key role in this development. 
Quoted in U. Muldur and R. Petrella (ed. ), Science and Technology Policy: The European Community and the Globalization 
of Technology and the Economy, Brussels: The Commission of the 
European Communities, 1994, p. 243, in Chapter NINE. 
Globalization in the Electronics Industry by Marc Humbert. 
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the core of the most active electronics firms which have moved 
their production facilities overseas, establishing overseas 
assembly operations, joint ventures and research facilities, 
sometimes through the acquisition of overseas firms. 696 
8.1.2 Heavy Dependence on Foreign Technology 
Subcontracting assembly operations has been a major 
strategy in the success of Samsung and LG Electronics. They 
negotiated with foreign firms, equipped with production 
technology, product design skills as well as marketing and 
distribution channels, to sub-contract some assembly operations 
to companies in an economy where lower labour costs would enable 
both parties to gain. Because of this, Korean firms came to 
ignore active investment in international marketing channels and 
boosting their technological capabilities. This situation 
naturally led to weaknesses that restricted their options and 
speed of development. The access to production technologies was 
a very important part in the early stage of Korea's 
development. 697 Component technologies determine 
competitiveness in the modern electronics industry. The 
management domain was governed by a direct response to the 
policies of the Korean government and the prevailing 
international economic and political environment. Samsung and 
696. Martin D. H. Bloom, " Globalization and the Korean 
Electronics Industry, " The Pacific Review, vol. 6, No. 2,1993. 
. See Sang Chul Suh, " Development of a New Industry 69 through Exports: the Electronics Industry in Korea", in Wontack 
Hong and Anne 0. Krueger (eds. ), Trade and Development in Korea, 
Seoul, Korea: Korea Development Institute, 1975. 
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LG were restricted in their ability to share these strategies. 
Instead, they became global companies in some respects by virtue 
of the role they came to play in the globalization of Japanese 
companies and in the counter strategies of American firms to 
compete with the Japanese. 
Samsung and LG Electronics depend heavily upon foreign 
components and original equipment manufacturing (OEM). 698 This 
makes them limited in their capacity to adopt a more wider range 
of strategies. ANIEs including South Korea, have pursued export- 
oriented growth strategies. In this context, the electronics 
industry has been leading rapid industrialization to push ahead 
with economic growth. 699 
Traditionally, since the late 1960s, Korea has been 
competing on the basis of low-cost skilled engineering and 
technical labour. Foreign technologies still continue to play a 
critical role. Korea has been relying heavily on licensing. The 
Korean government has been playing an active role" in 
encouraging capital accumulation and private sector risk-taking 
in pursuit of export market opportunities created by new 
technologies, and by strengthening of indigenous R and D 
capabilities. 
698. Martin D. H. Bloom defines the OEM as the situation 
where a company arranges for another company to produce an item 
under its own brand name, and often to its own design. It is a 
type of subcontracting relationship. 
699. On Korea's relationship between industrial policy and 
the Electronics industry, see Korea Electronics Industry 
Association, Annual Electronics Industry Data Book, Seoul, 
Korea, every year. In Korean. 
". Ibid., p. 106. 
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Table 8.1: Top 10 Exports Items in 1970,1980, and 1991 
1970 1980 1991 
l. textiles & garments 40.8 % textiles 28.6 electronics 
28.0 
2. plywood 11.0 electronics 11.4 textile, garment 
21.5 
3. wigs 10.8 steel products 10.6 steel products 
6.3 
4-Iron ore 5.9 footwear 5.2 ships 
5.7 
5. electronics products 3.5 ships 3.5 footwear 
5.3 
6-confectionery 2.3 synthetic resin 3.3 chemical product 
4.2 
7-footwear 2.1 metal products 2.5general machinery 
3.3 
8-tobacco and products 1.6 plywood 2.0 automobiles 
3.2 
9-steel products 1.5 deep-sea fish 2.0 fishing products 2.3 
10-metal products 1.5 electric productsl. 9 petroleum 
product2.0 
Source: Korea Foreign Association Trade Yearbook, various issues. 
High education levels have contributed to production of 
relatively large numbers of scientists and engineers, but 
specialized high standard human resources have been 
deficient. 7O1 
The only way to enter into the advanced group of the 
electronics industry is by technological development and 
acquisition. The technologies available on licence are not 
state of the art, but a generation or more old. However, in the 
specific case of South Korean Chabols, the proper timing of 
entry into the D-RAM market made possible the licencing state of 
the art timing technology from US firms, which pocess superior 
designs but inferior production capabilities. Most advanced 
'ol. see sub-chapter 7.3. 
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group electronics firms in Japan, the US and Europe are seeking 
to strengthen the protective mechanisms to. limit the leakage of 
new technologies at the initial stage of commercialization. 
Therefore, the accumulated capacity of the Korean electronics 
firms to access most-recent technologies depends heavily upon 
the level of their own key technologies or the amount of other 
exchangeable assets they have. Only highly specialized expertise 
will enable Korea to acquire the advanced technologies. 
Only a few firms are in a position to seek equal 
partnership with advanced electronics firms in the US or Japan. 
An important question for research is whether Korean firms will 
be able to create the partnership to narrow the technology 
gap. 702 The problem for South Korean firms is increasing 
difficulties in gaining access to key technologies which they 
need to upgrade their industrial structure. Apart from business 
strategies, in the generation and diffusion of new technologies, 
international trade regimes relate in particular to the pattern 
of economic and political conflict in the national context and 
with regard to international transactions. In addition, the 
input of new technologies is regulated to a great extent by the 
basic features of the industrial market and organizational 
structures and by the driving forces pushing the current 
internationalization of industrial production and of related 
702 Among many factors influencing the export of 
electronics products to the EU, technology and market access 
seem to be the most important dimensions to be tackled with 
systematic efforts. 
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services . 'o' 
There is a logical evolution in a newly industrializing 
nation's technology acquisition strategy as absorption capacity 
matures. In an initial stage of technology acquisition, FDI 
probably accounts for a major source of technology, technology 
licensing being less important. Innovative technology 
acquisition strategies like strategic partnership with firms in 
the industrialized group are not easily available. Licensing 
becomes a more fruitful technology source. 7O' 
Table 8.2: Number of Technology Imports from 1962-1990 in 
Electric & Electronic sector (unit: No) 
1962-80 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 Total 
326 33 60 79 78 125 131 162 209 227 212 1,642 
Source: EIAK, Electronics Industry Almanac in 1992, p. 306. 
The government role is very important in accelerating the 
transition from a more passive to a more active technology 
acquisition strategy. 70 A number of South Korean Chabols have 
technology tie-ups with OECD firms in high-technology. In case 
of semiconductors, Samsung with Intel and Hyundai with Texas 
Instruments are conspicuous. Such arrangements may be one way of 
countering the general tendency toward more restrictive 
conditions of access to new technologies. A strategic 
partnership establishes a relationship between the firms where 
the progress of technology of each is critical to the 
703 Susan Strange, "Protectionism and World Politics", 
International organization, Vol-39, pp. 233-59,1985. 
70: From 1962 to the end of 1990, a total 6,944 technology imports were carried out in Korea. 
705 . Ibid., p. 107. 
394 
competitive success of the other. Thus, technology exchange 
could be more extensive than in traditional OEM arrangements 
such as Korea used to have. The easiest way for Korean firms to 
establish such partnership is through possession of key 
technologies or some other complementary assets needed by the 
opposite firms. 7116 Korean firms have been quite unable to 
shift from being multi-product to multi-technology firms. This 
increases reliance on external technology acquisition. 
International technology networks have been boosted by the 
external technology acquisition, cutting across national 
boundaries. Privatization of the international technology flows 
makes it much harder for Korean firms to penetrate into the 
higher value-added markets. OECD nations dominate international 
technology acquisition. The fourth main reason for partnership 
is access to finance; access to the pool of cheap scientists, 
engineers and designers; and access to national R and D 
subsidies, government procurement markets, and national regional 
collaborative projects. Certainly, Korean firms have been 
unable to have full access to international technology 
networks. 707 
International technology diffusion has been limited because 
electronics market leaders have introduced a variety of entry 
deterrence measures aiming to restrict the rate of technology 
diffusion. Potential competitors including Korean firms have 
706 Efficient manufacturing capacity and quick delivery 
network could be complementary assets. 
'°' For more details, See K. H. Keller, "Science and Technology", Foreign Affairs, Fall, 1990. 
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continuously been restricted in licensing core technologies. 
Even access to "pre-competitive" research has been restricted by 
governments to strengthen the competitiveness of their 
electronics industries. Technology diffusion and generation will 
determine, to a large extent, the possibility of South Korea's 
joining in the group of advanced nations. Given the limited R 
and D and design resources at present, South Korea is required 
to expand those resources to put its firms in the first rank in 
the world market. More importantly, making more effective use 
of those resources through collaborative R and D is very 
essential. 
In terms of technological capability, Samsung seems to be 
a little more advanced with more integrated production 
facilities than LG Electronics. On the other hand, LG has more 
wide-spread production facilities. In terms of overseas 
marketing, they have a similar level of OEM production and 
similar range of their own marketing networks. The management 
styles of the two firms, however, differ: Samsung prefers 
centralization, while LG prefers diffused management. The major 
frame of their internationalization programme assisted by 
government, has stressed export-led growth. OEM based upon 
imported machinery and components is the most effective strategy 
they have employed. External pressures forced the two firms to 
follow a strategy of internationalization and globalization. k 
the initial stages of Korea's industrialization, Korea suffered 
a lack of research infrastructure and skilled labour force. By 
importing machinery and equipment for electronics assembly, 
Korean firms could obtain the necessary skills to operate those 
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equipments. Low-cost female labour was utilized to assemble the 
basic components. Production technology was obtained mainly 
from Japanese firms, with whom joint ventures were established 
especially in the consumer electronics sector. At a later 
stage, technology licensing and OEM agreements played important 
roles. The expansion of research activities assisted in the 
selection of technologies to license and in their subsequent 
absorption. The efforts of learning to operate the machinery 
and equipment for assembly purpose enabled these firms to 
acquire production technologies. Despite their increased 
production, efficiency assisted by the recruitment of production 
management from the foreign ventures established in Korea and of 
Koreans working in the electronics industry in the US, high- 
volume production of standard products has been the key 
production trend, limited by the OEM schemes. In order to 
produce a lower volume of more specialized products, Korea would 
need much more advanced production engineering and skills to 
design automated production systems. The present production 
skills are quite high, but there are some defects in precision 
engineering. The government has assisted Samsung and LG 
Electronics with measures to proceed with the localization of 
product development, as well as for acquisition and absorption 
of technology. They are trying to develop key materials 
technologies used for electrical components. "" 
'oa. Samsung and Goldstar have now mastered production 
processes used in certain major components, including cathode 
ray tubes(CRTs) for both televisions and computers and 
magnetrons for microwave ovens. The backwardness of design and 
product development capabilities overwhelm successes as with the 
first micro-oven that Samsung developed in the 1970s. For the 
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8.1.3 Strengthening Own-Brand Name Export and Distribution 
Network 
After proper production, selling the products under the 
company's its own brand names seems to be a much more difficult 
task than the task of acquiring and absorbing foreign production 
technologies. The market leaders, mainly firms in the US, Japan 
and EU, often control distribution channels. A weak brand image 
and perception of low quality on the part of foreigners is a big 
obstacle. The profitability of the OEM is low for the sub- 
contractor. Samsung and LG face the difficult task of overcoming 
these barriers. The supply of key components by foreign firms 
gives them leverage over Korean firms; however, continuous 
efforts by Korean firms have gradually reduced the degree of 
dependence on foreign components and technology. The level of 
OEM can be reduced only by building up overseas marketing 
networks. Without globalization strategies in the domain of 
both technology acquisition and assembly activities, even future 
business prospects will not be bright. The OEM scheme has 
restricted the firms' ability to develop their technological 
bases and expand their overseas market networks. Success in the 
acquisition and absorption of assembly techniques has not been 
matched in design and component technologies. These structural 
two firms to be in line with the advanced firms in the US, Japan, and EU, they still need to overcome formidable barriers. However, these barriers are being reduced as they close the gap 
with the world first class firms. 
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impediments limit further upgrading to advanced level. 70' 
8.1.4 Government Support for the Chabols 
In the outward-looking stance and export-led development 
strategies of Korea710, the Korean government adopted a policy 
of rapid development aided by large-scale foreign borrowing, and 
imports of raw materials, components and machinery. The strong 
incentive for successful exports led to a concentration of 
economic power into Chabols. They were favoured through the 
means of preferential access to loans at subsidized interest 
rate, tax exemptions in certain areas, discounts on power and 
foreign costs and access to import licences for machinery and 
components. The concentration of economic power in Chabols 
provided the Samsung and Lucky-Goldstar Groups with the 
resources to enter and eventually dominate the electronics 
industry in the Korean market. Their strategy of building up 
export volume to obtain maximum government incentives was 
boosted by the special linkages with government research 
TO9. Business Korea, December 1989, pp. 46-47. 
"lo. On the export-led growth, see Anne O. Krueger, "The 
Experience and Lessons of Asia's Super-exporters, " in V. Corbo 
et al., (eds. ), Export-oriented Development Strategies: The 
success of five Newly industrializing Countries, London: 
Westview Press, Boulder Co., 1985; I. M. D. Little, "Trade and 
Industrialization Revisited, " unpublished paper, Nuffield 
College, oxford, 1994; World Bank, The East Asian Miracle: 
Economic Growth and Public Policy, Oxford University Press for 
the World Bank, W. D. C., 1993; Park Chong Kee (ed. ). Essays on 
the Korean Economy Volume III. Macroeconomic and Industrial 
Development in Korea, Seoul: Korea Development Institute, 1980. 
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facilities. '! " The recent corruption scandal of former South 
Korean President, Roh, Tae Wo0712 is a clear example of close 
government-chabol linkages. -"-' The natural exchange of favours 
between the top executives in government circles and Korean 
Conglomerates has been a traditional basis of strong government 
support for Chabols through various incentives. '; The 
government used its power through preferential loans and 
interest rate, through licensing authorizations and through 
inclusion of certain companies in its five-year economic 
development plans, selecting and then guiding those chosen for 
success. 71Z In exchange for government support of the 
companies, the Chabols offered money to those in power, in the 
name of political contributions. 71-6 The government control of 
The Korean Government technology policy mainly favoured 
the big conglomerates. Technological imbalance between the 
large and small companies has been widened due to this 
prejudiced technological policy. 
'12 In a tearful press conference, the retired general 
admitted that he had controlled a $650 million secret fund as 
President of the ROK from 1988 to 1993 and had kept$221 million 
for his own use. The money was from Chabols, South Korea's huge 
conglomerates. 
'13. To be connected to the core figures of the power, 
companies had to support the incumbent political party, make the 
donations to the right causes, and succeed with their sponsored 
ventures. Failure to accomplish any of these activities could 
and sometimes did-lead to a terminations of financing and 
immediate bankruptcy. 
716 . See Edward W. Desmond, "I take responsibility, 
" Time, 27 
November 1995, p. 75. 
'1,. Richard M. Steers, Yoo Keun Shin and Gerardo R. Ungson, 
The Chabol: Korea's New Industrial Might, London and New York: 
Harper & Row, Publishers, 1990, p. 43. 
'lb. See the result of companies' disloyalty to the ruling 
circle in Mark Clifford, "Filing for divorce(Kukje), Far Eastern 
Economic Review, 21 April, pp. 58-60. 
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Chabols are expected to be diminished and incentives to them is 
likely gradually to disappear, leaving management of huge 
family-oriented businesses to market principles with stricter 
measures to regulate unfair business practices. 
However, state will continue to play a significant role in 
developing new state of the art technologies. The degree and 
form of state intervention is bound to vary widely, but there 
are several key policy areas which can not be neglected by 
government when they try to create the conditions for exploiting 
new technological opportunities. The major areas are as 
follows: 
a) strengthening indigenous technology development and 
absorption capabilities; 
b) developing the human resources base needed for 
industrial development; 
c) providing an environment in which flexible adjustment of 
production structures in the face of changing demand 
conditions is possible; 
d) facilitating access to information about, and the 
acquisition of new technologies by domestic firms; 
In case of industrial transformation, in managing the 
trade-off between specialization and diversification, South 
Korean conglomerates are faced with the problem of how to 
transform management from its traditional family style supported 
by high degree of centralization of decision-making, to a more 
professional and less centralized management system, able to 
respond more flexibly to changing technological requirements and 
market conditions. '=7 
? 17 Paradoxically enough, the deregulation, privatization 
and liberalization efforts of the Korean government efforts 
Particularly since the Kim Young Sam Administration, seem to 
give more power to the concentrated management style of family dominance as government loses more power to regulate them by 
measures of policy guidelines and regulations. 
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8.1.5 Unbalanced Relationship with Japan 
As a response to Japanese firms moving their production 
bases overseas in the early 1970s, the Korean government tried 
to tie the initial Korean electronics producers to a Japanese 
strategy for globalization. '" Samsung and LG Electronics 
benefitted in some respects from Japan's investment. ""' The 
Korean firms' passive development strategy forced upon them by 
the Japanese strategy for globalization, produced an unbalanced 
relationship between the two nations: electronics components and 
parts remain the one area where the Japanese still take control, 
accounting for almost 60 percent of total components production, 
mostly through joint-ventures. 
8.1.6 Globalization Strategies and Responses to Regionalism 
In the era of regionalization and globalization of the 
world economy, localization and globalization of the electronics 
industry is a prerequisite for successful management of the 
718. On the Japanese globalization strategy, see B. Yamada, 
Internationalization Strategies of Japanese Electronics 
Companies: Implications for Asian Newly Industrializing 
Economies, Technical Paper No. 28, OECD Development Centre, 
Paris, 1990. 
'19 Samsung, for example, established joint ventures with 
NEC and Sanyo Electric, the Lucky-Goldstar group with NEC and 
Alps Electric. By 1976, more than 50% of all employment in 
electronics industry was foreign-owned or joint-venture firms. 
The success of Korean firms' export strategies was accompanied by withdrawals of the Japanese companies in the 1980s. 
Consequently, employment in wholly-owned foreign subsidiaries declined by a third between 1976 and 1985. On the contrary, 
employment in the industry as a whole grew by about 50%. 
Despite this figure, their share in Korean electronics exports fell from 55% in 1972 to 40% in 1980. 
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industry. The growing trade frictions with the US, the EU and 
advanced nations, forced the Samsung and LG Electronics to seek 
globalization strategies. Also, the appreciation of the Korean 
currency, the Won, and the unionization of the Korean labour 
force, forced the Korean firms to seek overseas production where 
costs were relatively cheaper. The advanced market leaders' 
continuous demand for the liberalization of Korea's trade 
regime, compelled Samsung and LG Electronics to establish 
international marketing networks. 
In addition to overseas design or research operations, they 
built assembly operations in the US, Mexico, and Europe to solve 
the problem of barriers to market access. Different types of 
overseas investments were mainly aimed at securing market 
access. '2° The restricted environment, however, caused the 
total sales records of consumer electronics overseas to fall 
well below the target. 72' 
a) FDI into the EU to Avoid NTBs 
Looking specifically at Korea's FDI into the EU, market 
security has been the most important motivation, as the EU's 
72O. According to Han, Sun-Taik's survey in European 
Integration: The Impact on Asian Newly Industrializing 
Economies, OECD Development Centre Document, Paris, 1992, p. 24, 
major motivations of Korea's FDI into the EU have been a) to 
secure market access from protectionist measures; b) to explore 
market opportunities; c) as an active global strategy of firms; d) 
to acquire high-technology or know-how; e) to benefit from 
skilled manpower; f) to have easy access to parts and 
components; g) to benefit from low financial costs. 
731. Mark Clifford and Jonathan Moore, " Overseas 
Attractions, Entrepreneurs' Shift Production to Low-cost 
countries", Far Eastern Economic Review, 16, March, 1989, pp. 88- 
89. 
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protectionist measures, particularly anti-dumping litigations, 
have proved to be relentlessly effective in impeding exports of 
Korean electronics products. The typical period of 1987-1991 
witnessed several anti-dumping investigations against South 
Korea. An industrial association filed a complaint to the EC to 
initiate an anti-dumping investigation-22 against Korean and 
Japanese-produced Compact Disc Players on 16 January 1987. After 
imposing a provisional duty ranging from 20.1 to 32.5 percent on 
13 July 1989, on 17 January 1987 the European Commission imposed 
anti-dumping duties on Samsung's products at 10.7 percent on 
Goldstar's(now called LG Electronics)products at 26.1 percent, 
on Haitai Electronics at 19.4 percent and Dongwon Electronics at 
14.4 percent . 723 
Exports of major Korean electronics products decreased 
substantially between 1987 and 1989, both at the national and 
the firm level. Moreover, the fact that 8 out of the total 15 
cases of the Korea's Foreign Direct Investment were undertaken 
within 2 years from the initiation of the anti-dumping 
investigations gives strong credence to the defensive position 
of Korean electronics FDI. '1' 
b) Dual Characteristics of FDI By Samsung and LG 
The Samsung and LG electronics FDI into the EU has dual 
characteristics. Despite the loss-making of almost half of the 
722, The legal foundation for this action was EC Regulation 
No. 2176/84(anti-dumping). 
'2'. Eleven Japanese companies were subjected to by anti- 
dumping duty by this decision, ranging from 6.4 percent to 33.9 
percent of the dumping margin. 
724, Han, Sun-Taik, 1992, p. 24. 
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Korean FDI in the EU"g, the two firms have undertaken a 
somewhat defensive type of investment to serve as an export- 
extension strategy when export markets are threatened by 
protectionism. 726 
Table 8.3: Anti-Dumping Impositions against Korean Firms, 
1987-1991 
Date of Imposing Item Companies Result Legal Regulation 
Duties Targeted of Dumping 
Duty 
17 Dec. 1987 Compact Disc Player Goldstar 26.1 % EC Reg. No2176/84 
Samsung 10.7 
Haitai 19.4 
Dongwon 14.4 
1 Sep. 1988 VCR Provisional Daewoo 29.2% EC Reg. No2176/84 
Goldstar 26.4 
Samsung 25.2 
19 June, 1988 Video Tape Saehan Media 1.9 % EC Reg. No2176/84 
SunKyung 3.8 
Kolon 2.9 
Goldstar 2.9 
27 Apr. 1990 Small Colour TVs Daewoo 10.2% EC Rego. 
No2176/84 
Goldstar 10.4 
Samsung 10.5 
Others 19.6 
13 Nov. 1990 Audio Tape Provisional SunKyung Magnetic 3.1% 
No2423/88 
Others 19.4 
31 July 1990 Car Radio Commission's ban on Korean-made 
car radio indirect importing 
No. 2423/88 
through France 
Targeted Firms: Samsung Electronics 
and other 65 firms 
Source: EIAK, Korean Electronics Industry Almanac in 1992, pp. 246-50 
"s The survey result of Han, Sun-Taik show that 42.1 
percent of Korean FDI in the EU are loss-making and only a 
quarter of them are profitable. 
726 . Han, Sun-Taik, 1992, p. 27. 
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Table 8.4: Business Performances of Korean Electronics FDI 
in the EU 
Profitable Loss-making Not yet known 
26.3 % 42.1 % 31.6 % 
Source: Han, Sun-Taik's Survey 
Han argues that in spite of various studies stressing the 
beneficial effects of the EG 1992 programmes on growth and 
import demand, third nations in general and developing nations 
including South Korea in particular feared that the EC would 
become more discriminatory toward non-members and build higher 
protective trade barriers. His opinion survey of Korean 
businessmen in the EC region confirms the growing sense of 
uneasiness: a striking 85.7 percent responded that the external 
policy of the EC would become more protectionist after 1992, 
while a mere 7.1 percent said to the contrary. 727 Their active 
globalization plans have also been major determinants. -'2" 
8.1.7 EU's Various Restrictive Barriers against Samsung and 
LG Electronics Penetration 
For Samsung and LG to be in the group of world market 
leaders, they have to overcome regulatory barriers 2' The 
world market leaders impede the advancement of the other firms 
to penetrate into the market of their occupation. To this end, 
they usually employ deterrence strategies. It is very important 
72' Han, Sun-Taik, 1992, p. 27. 
'2a. Sub-chapter 8.2 discusses on globalization plans in 
detail. 
729 OECD, Competing in the Electronics Industry: The 
experience of Newly Industrializing Economies, pp. 40-41. 
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to note that neo-mercantilism prevails, transcending national 
boundaries. Bilateral, regional or even multilateral, 
international arrangements restrict the developing nations' 
access to market and technology. The variety of such supra- 
national arrangements has increased tremendously, ranging from 
price ceiling and market access regulations to joint R and D 
consortia, and technology export restrictions. "' 
Those restrictions are on market access, whether through 
discriminatory access to " government procurement markets 
(telecommunications; computer equipment for the public 
administrations and the educational sector) or through market 
share quotas and "market reservation schemes"; and restrictions 
on the establishment of firms in a particular activity, through, 
for instance, statutory monopolies, investment licensing and 
restrictions on FDI; and regulations concerning standards for 
product design, quality and reliability, and interface and 
connectivity requirements; and restrictions on access to 
730. Examples: the September 1986 US-Japanese trade 
agreements on semiconductors to create a bilateral, cartel-like 
managed trade agreement; the European Communications Sectoral 
Research consortia, in particular ESPRIT; and the still quite 
pervasive restrictions to the international disseminations of 
so-called "dual-use technologies as codified in the past COCOM 
lists. Despite the successive conclusion of the UR to salvage 
the multinational trade system, such supra-national regulatory 
barriers to international trade investment, and technology flows 
will further increase in importance. 
For further reference, see C. V. Prestowitz, Trading Places, 
How we allowed Japan to take the lead, New York: Basic Books, 
1988; L. Mytelka, (eds. ), Strategic Partnerships and the World 
Economy, London, 1991; C. Haklisch and N. S. Vonortas, " Export 
Controls and the International Technical System: The 
Semiconductor Industry", Center for Science and Technology 
Policy, New York: Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute, 1988; S. 
Ostry, Government & Cooperation in a shrinking World: Trade & 
Innovation Policies in the US, Europe and Japan, Council on 
Foreign Relations Press, New York, 1990. 
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scientific and technological knowledge and particular types of 
qualified labour, through intellectual property rights 
protection, technology export controls and restrictions on the 
mobility of scientific-technical personnel; limitations on 
access to core components, subassemblies and materials; 
restrictions on access to capital; restrictions on pricing 
behaviour and the establishment of distribution channels; and 
finally restrictions concerning the final behavior of potential 
entrants, particularly with regard to discriminatory fiscal 
treatment and restrictions on profit repatriation. 11731' 
Restrictive measures adopted by the electronics firms in 
the industrialized nations of the US and EU, deter Samsung and 
LG from reaching the same technological and organizational 
level. The changed trade environment is forcing the Korean 
government and the electronics firms in Korea to seek new 
strategies for a new direction with a stronger technological 
base. The following section, 8.2, will show response 
strategies, especially Samsung's strategies against regionalism 
and LG's on the globalization of world economy. 
8.2 A Case Study of the Two Korean Firms Responses to 
Regionalism and Globalization 
8.2.1 Samsung Electronics 
A study of the characteristics of Samsung Electronics in 
"l. The difficulties of the later comers should be removed 
by developing proper strategies in the future. On future 
strategic responses, see Martin D. Bloom, op. Cit., chapter 5., 
PP. 113-125. 
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General and in particular, its business strategies to deal with 
regionalism and globalism"' concludes that Samsung electronics 
is not exceptional in sharing the general problems of the Korean 
electronics industry. "33 LG, Hyundai, Daewoo"', and Anam 
732. This sub-chapter is based solely upon primary sources. 
Among many primary sources, the four principal sources are as 
follows: 1) Chun Young-Wook and Yoon Dong-Jin, 
Internationalization of the Korean Electronics Industry in an 
era of globalization, Research Project paper; 2) Samsung's Study 
Report on Response Strategies against the EU Integration; 3) 
Samsung's Blueprint on the Vision of the Samsung in the 2000; 4) 
Samsung Group Planning Team Task Force, Report on the Group's 
Internationalization Strategy, March 1994. In addition to the 
above, the Ministry of Industry, Trade and Energy Study Paper, 
The Impact of Japanese Currency Appreciation on the Korea's 
Exports to the EU Market, Trade Promotion Bureau, June 1994; 
Ministry of Industry, Trade and Energy, Bureau of Electric and 
Electronics Industry, The Results of the UR Negotiations and 
Response Strategies: Focusing on Electric and Electronics 
Industry, Policy Reference Material 1994-1; Ministry of 
Industry, Trade and Energy, Korea's Response Strategies on SEM 
of the EC since its initiation, Market Study Reference Material, 
November 1993. All in Korean. 
"". Interviews and review of documents were mainly carried 
out during my visit to Seoul from the middle of May 1994 to the 
Middle of September 1994. Except for the on-the-spot interviews 
done on the 26th, July 1995 at Samsung's Billingham factory 
which are surveyed in detail in Appendix I, all the interviews 
and small opinion exchanges were done at Samsung Group 
Headquarters Building in Seoul. Among those are Seung Ro Yoon, 
Assistant Manager, Marketing & Regional Strategy Team for 
Europe, International Operations Office; Yong Suk Cho, Manager, 
International Strategy Corporate Planning Office; Yun Hawn Kim, 
Assistant Manager, Marketing & Regional Strategy Team, 
International operations office, all in Samsung Electronics Co. 
LTD.; and Seung Koo Oh, Ph. D., Senior Economist, American & 
European Studies Dept., Samsung Economic Research Institute, 
Seoul, Korea. 
"`. Financial Times, Tuesday August 15 1995, introduces the 
rapid expansion of Daewoo Electronics. South Korea's third 
largest company also recorded a 45.6 per cent rise in first-half 
net-earnings to Won24.9bn. The raid profit growth is mainly due 
to increased overseas sales of consumer electronics and 
appliances, as Daewoo expanded marketing abroad to reduce its 
dependence on the Korean market, which has been subject to 
intensifying competition and recent price cuts. Daewoo put much 
focus on the export of high-margin, own-brand consumer products 
to developing countries, while accelerating overseas production 
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electronics share common structural problems . 735 Export market 
diversification is also a vital issue to Korean firms. Rising 
protectionism of the EU is making Korean exports very vulnerable 
to external factors. 
a) Major Tasks of Samsung Electronics 
Technology diffusion is an important phenomenon that could 
shape future international trade flows. There are two basic 
assumptions on the future technology diffusion perspectives. 
One is pessimistic and the other is rather optimistic, though 
with some reservations. The pessimistic view is of a scenario 
where current trends towards a more restrictive electronics 
industry structure by advanced firms continue to exist or even 
be expanded with more restrictive barriers for latecomers. On 
the other hand, the optimistic scenario is based on the 
assumption that the international technological system will 
in the EU and North America. Sales rose by 23 percent to Won 
1,429bn. 
731 ,- The common structural problems of the major Korean 
Electronics firms are illustrated by Chun Young-Wook and Yoon 
Dong-Jin in their research paper, p. 6 Assembly operation by OEM 
produces the following characteristics: 
1) The proportion of consumer electronics is much higher 
than that of industrial electronics; 
2) Heavy dependence on key technologies, component, and 
brandname as a result of low domestic supply of key 
components and the high ratio of OEM resulted in the 
firms' structural weakness in international 
competitiveness; 
3) Export-led growth strategy with concentration on a few 
items was conducted with price competitiveness; 
4) Expansion of assembly operation accompanied on 
oligopolistic market structure, while small & medium 
sized firms'backwardness impeded the growth of self- 
growth basis and efficiency; 
5) Foreign technology-licensing, component imports and 
export market heavily depended upon the US and Japan. 
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become more open and accessible to late comers. 73' For the 
optimistic view to be materialized into reality, the 
industrialized nations' government policies and firms' 
strategies should be substantially modified. From a long-term 
perspective, such policies would create substantial benefits for 
all the nations in the world. Unfortunately, however, the 
policies and strategies of the world's leading firms are more 
firmly rooted on the basis of short-sighted assessments of their 
own interests, even at the expense of jeopardizing those longer 
term gains. "' As a matter of fact, the rapid proliferation of 
high-tech neo-mercantilism has been spread all over the advanced 
group to such an extent that to reverse the trend is no easy 
task. In this sense, the insistence on a neo-liberal free 
market world economy, can not be guaranteed to produce 
fundamental changes required to reduce barriers to international 
technology diffusion. 
In order for Korean firms to secure a complementary 
relationship, where both partners would bring in their 
respective strong areas and which would create a new potential 
for expanding mutual flows of trade, investment and technology, 
multidimensional strategies in close collaboration between 
government and private sectors are greatly needed. South Korean 
firms, including Samsung Electronics, are today involved in a 
736 It is not safe to say that this is 100 percent right. 
Actually in some sectors like the Electronics, the deterrence 
strategies of the advanced firms in OECD group play a 
significant role in preventing Korean firms from acquiring state 
of the art technology. 
73' In cognitive context, this is based upon the soil of 
protectionism. 
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network of co-operation agreements"` with some of their major 
American and Japanese competitors, from. the range of sub- 
contracting arrangements to joint technology developments 
projects. South Korean firms' manufacturing prowess and speedy 
delivery are, in these agreements, complemented by these 
partners' product design and market success. The recent 
agreement between NEC, the Japanese electronics company and 
Samsung, South Korea's largest semiconductor manufacturer, to 
produce semiconductor chips jointly in Europe, is the latest 
example of what the Koreans call, according to the report of 
Michiyo Nakamoto and John Burton of The Financial Times, 
"sleeping with the enemy" and the Japanese call "helping each 
other out. " NEC's agreement to provide Samsung Electronics with 
100,000 chips a month will enable Samsung to avoid high European 
Union tariffs on semiconductor imports. "' 
The world economic outlook depicted in the table gives 
Samsung both challenges and opportunities. World trade is 
expected to increase at a rate of from 3.5 percent to 5.5 
738. See the tables in this chapter, major Korean firms' FDI 
into the EU 
"' The dominance of Japanese and Korean companies in the 
memory chip market has encouraged co-operation between the two 
countries' industries in production, as well as where soaring 
costs have made investments in new facilities prohibitively 
expensive for many companies to commit on their own. One reason is to disperse risks associated with these projects which involve huge amounts of cash and are subject to market 
volatility. The Korean-Japanese alliance is designed to take 
advantage of each other's strength for their mutual benefit. The 
Japanese are advanced in chip design, while the Koreans excel in 
the production process. Anther reason Samsung has attracted 
alliances is its financial strength. It reported net profit of 
$1 billion for 1994 because of its fast growing exports of its 
D-Ram chips. Samsung expects the Japanese alliance to help it 
acquire the semiconductor technology it lacks. 
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percent. The industrial restructuring of the OECD group, low 
interest rates, other nations' reinvigoration in investment, are 
helping this favourable trend to be expanded. The conclusion of 
the Uruguay Round is giving an indefinite dimension to 
competition and world regional economic trend will determine the 
major trend of economic patterns in the future. The ever- 
intensifying restrictive measures of the OECD group against the 
developing nations' desperate efforts to technology acquisition 
are giving hard time to Samsung. 
Table 8.5: Japanese/Korean Electronics Cooperation 
Agreement from 1989 to August 1995 
year Agreement Content 
1989 Hitachi/Goldstar Electron: supply of Hitachi 
memory chip design 
1992 Toshiba/Samsung Electronics: joint development 
of flash memory chip technology 
1993 Oki Electric/Samsung Electronics: co-operation 
in 16-megabit D-Ram development 
NEC/Samsung Electronics: exchange of 
information on development of 256- 
megabit D-Ram chips 
Fujitsu/Hyundai Electronics: cooperation in 
memory chip development 
1994 Alps Electric/Goldstar: co-operation in 
development of advanced liquid crystal 
display technology 
1995 Toshiba-Samsung Electronics: co-development of 
manufacturing processes for integrated 
circuits used in consumer electronics 
NEC/Samsung Electronics: co-production of 4- 
megabit and 16-megabit D-Ram chips in 
Europe 
Source: Financial Times 
In addition, the debate on the activation of the Green 
Round and Blue Round, open up some new dimensions for Samsung to 
consider in its future business strategies. 
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Table 8.6: Prospects for Economic Growth Rate( unit: ) 
'87-'92 2-'97 7-2002 
The World Total 2.0 3.1 3.7 
Us 1.9 2.9 2.8 
Japan 4.3 3.5 3.5 
EU 2.9 2.2 2.6 
NIEs+ASEAN 7.6 7.1 6.6 
Central and Southern 
America and Latin 
America 1.9 3.7 4.7 
Quoted in Samsung's Report, Internationalization Strategies, 
Samsung Group Secretary Board, Planning Section. 
b) FDI as Strategic Responses to NTBs(Anti-Dumping) of the EU 
As a specific response of regionalism to the European Union 
and as part of the active globalization strategy of the Korean 
firms, FDI has increased tremendously during the last six years. 
Samsung has carried out 129 investments in all, of which 57 were 
for the main function of sales, 42 for production, 17 for 
research and development, 7 for resource development. In case 
of production investments, 18 have gone to the ASEAN region, 7 
to Europe, and 6 to People's Republic of China. The 
classification according to the Groups subsidiaries is 18 to 
Samsung Corporation, 15 to Samsung and 8 to electronics-relevant 
subsidiaries. Three investments have exceeded $ 50 million. 
Out of total investments, Samsung Corporation invested 48 cases, 
Samsung Electronics 43 cases and 12 cases went to the 
electronics-relevant subsidiaries within Samsung 
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Corporation. "' 
Looking into the EU region with more specificity, Samsung's 
response strategy toward European market shares common features 
with the group's general globalization strategies. This means 
the deepening and widening of insiderization into the EU 
territories. Samsung Electronics' FDI into the EU in the 1980s 
was strongly motivated by the shift of the community trade 
policy away from tariff to non-tariff barriers, and from common 
policy-making to more national discretion. ". 
Table 8.7: General Situation of the Samsung's Overseas 
Businesses($ 100 million, person) 
till the end of '87 '93 increase rate 
No. of bases 120 307 260% 
No. of nations 42 59 140% 
Total output 188 500 270% 
Overseas output 45 125 280% 
Exports 43 106 250% 
Local Production 
in overseas 1 9 900% 
Amount of Total 
Investment 
overseas 0.7 11 1,600% 
No. of Investments 29 129 440% 
No. of Overseas 
local workers 1. 950 19,970 1,000% 
Samsung men in 
overseas 440 940 210% 
Source: Samsung Group's Report on the Internationalization 
Strategy 
Samsung Electronics was more affected by the non-tariff 
barriers as the EC trade protectionist measures have become more 
"°. Samsung Group's Report on Internationalization 
Strategy. 
741, Han, Sun-Taik, 1992, p. 27. 
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selective and discriminatory among products and countries of 
origin. The EC's selective, intensified. application of non- 
tariff barriers against Korea's colour TVs, VCRs, and computers, 
presented ever more stiff competition. The proliferation of the 
EU NTBs to Korean electronics product exports resulted in 
continuous decline in the comparison ratio of 1992/1993.72 
Table 8.8: Korea's Export to the EU 
Equipment, Components and 
1992/1993(unit: US $1000) 
in Industrial 
Consumer Equipment in 
1992 1993 Growth Rate % 
Belgium 124198 96641 -22.2 
Denmark 31352 32843 4.8 
France 359635 362986 0.9 
Germany 1139458 1061748 -6.8 
Greece 21543 27014 25.4 
Ireland 27974 24988 -10.7 
Italy 195789 178492 -8.8 
Luxembourg 755 1044 38.3 
Netherlands 332983 334439 0.4 
Portugal 34803 23440 -32.8 
Spain 168965 187322 10.9 
U. K 639712 708480 10.7 
Austria 119548 115102 -3.7 
Finland 28286 31748 12.2 
Sweden 77406 97955 26.5 
Note: Simplified from EIAK statistics 
Source: EIAK, 1994 
Concerning the arbitrariness and nationalistic 
discrimination in applying the local content rules, two points 
need mentioning: 1 )regarding product-qualification: given the 
situation that many EU companies, e. g., Philips and Thomson, are 
producing consumer electronics using parts and components or 
even ready-made appliances supplied on an OEM basis by Japanese 
72. Electronics Industries Association of Korea(EIAK), 
Statistics of Electronic & Electrical Industries in 1993, 
section on export by commodity and country, pp. 49-256, Seoul, 
April, 1994. 
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and ANIE companies, a strict application of the rules to all 
products regardless of their national origins or ownership would 
disqualify many products of European companies as European. 
Table 8.9: Korea's Imports from the EU in Industrial 
Equipment, Components, and Consumer Equipment, 
1992/1993(unit: US$ 1000) 
1992 1993 Growth Rate 
Belgium 82353 31980 -61.2 
Denmark 12660 8764 -30.8 
France 151539 104038 -31.3 
Germany 262099 331347 26.4 
Greece 27 60 122.2 
Ireland 13312 30738 55.8 
Italy 39452 47160 19.5 
Netherlands 0 1003 0.0 
Portugal 668 1090 63.2 
Spain 5014 7179 40.7 
UK 125899 146307 16.2 
Austria 14228 15361 7.5 
Finland 35052 62100 77.2 
Sweden 36001 26801 -36.0 
Source: EIAK, 1994 
In particular, when it comes to multi-sourced products, 
identification procedures may prove to be very complicated or 
even impossible in some cases and may result in highly arbitrary 
decisions; 2) regarding national origins: because of increasing 
cross investments and strategic alliances among Multinational 
Corporations (MNCs), traditional ownership-based classifications 
of national origins may become even more obsolete, not to 
mention violating the OECD's national treatment rules. "' 
The basis for the EU to employ arbitrariness in application 
of the EU non-tariff barriers is Korea's trade surpluses vis-a- 
Vis the EU. Though South Korea is pushing rapid liberalization 
in imports policies, the bilateral trade balance will not be 
743 Han, Sun-Taik, 1992, p. 37. 
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easily restored because of traditional high savings propensities 
and export-oriented industrial structures. 
Table 8.10: Korean Exports of Consumer Electronics to the 
EC, Effect of Anti-Dumping Measures(US$ 
million) 
Colour-TV* VCR** MWO*** 
1987 198.5 318.2 168.1 
1988 173.4 232.9 243.3 
1989 117.5 92.9 193.3 
1988/1989 in % 67.7 39.9 79.5 
Note: * countervailing duties on Colour-TV(14") as of December 
24,1988(Daewoo; 10.2%, Goldstar; 10.4%, Samsung; 10.4%, 
others; 19.6%) 
** minimum price undertaking at 215 ECU/VCR on February 
28,1989. When increases in unit price after the minimum 
price undertaking are considered, decreases in export volume 
are likely to be even more drastic. See Table 9.6 which shows 
an example of a lots of market shares. 
*** VER at 31% of the EC market share for Korea and newly 
imposed safety and technical regulations in 1989. 
Source: Han, Sun-Taik's compiling from EIAK, 1990. 
Table 8.11 Effect of Anti-Dumping Measures on VCR Exports 
Company A Exports to France 
1987 1988 1989 
Volume(unit) 38,541 66,372 15,529 
Market Share(%) 3.50 4.02 0.80 
Source: Han, Sun-Taik's interview 
As a result, the EU's likelihood of the resorting to non-tariff 
measures to restrict imports from South Korea remains high. '" 
The legal foundation for use of restrictive measures, except 
tariff, is Article 19 of the White Paper(1985), which 
stipulates that "the commercial identity of the Community must 
'144 The Korean share of exports subject to the former EC 
NTBs expanded from 29.5 percent in 1985 to 43.5 percent in 1988, 
which clearly explains the concern of the EU to protect its industries from competitive Korean exports. 
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be consolidated so our trading partners will not be given the 
benefit of a wider market without themselves making similar 
concessions. " Grey area measures are used to impose the costs of 
adjustment on the non-members, in the name of unfair trade 
practices. 
In the specific case of anti-dumping, 19 cases were 
investigated during the period 1985-90, more than double the 
number of cases in the 1972-84. 
Table 8.12: Non-Tariff Barriers of the EC on Korean Exports 
as of April 1991 
Cases Examples 
Quantitative Restrictions 31 
. Inter-government agreement 10 MFA, shoes 
. Private sector agreement 9 microwave ovens CPT 
. Unilateral restrictions 12 canned mushrooms 
silverware 
Price Restrictions 15 
. Minimum price 8 CPT, VCR, Monosodium 
. Anti-dumping 7 polyester, CDP, Videotape 
shipping service 
Technical and quality regul ations 4 radios, Tvs, Pcs 
Cases Under Investigations 8 
. Anti-dumping 7 polyester, gas lighter 
car-radio, memory-chips 
. Safeguard 1 shoes 
Source: Economic Planning Board, ROK 
Why Samsung Electronics has been especially affected by 
this measure may be explained by Samsung's product shift from 
labour-intensive products such as textiles and footwear to 
technology and capital-intensive goods such as colour TVs, VCRs, 
MWOs, CD players, and memory chips as future strategic exporting 
items. Those technology, capital and knowledge-intensive items 
are major products of Samsung Electronics exports to the EU 
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market. "' 
The recent principal example of Samsung Group's response 
strategy to regionalism of the EU, specifically anti-dumping on 
Korean products is Samsung's decision to build a plant in 
Yorkshire, UK. 76 Following the announcement by Samsung 
Electronics in October 1995 of plans for a 450 million pounds 
electronics complex at Wynyard, Cleveland, "' Samsung heavy 
industries announced 10 million pounds investment in the 
Yorkshire and Humberside region, UK. The announcement to 
intention to build a factory to produce 21-tonne crawler 
excavators in the latter part of 1995, with an employment effect 
of 100 at the initial stage, to be increased to between 500 and 
600 by the year 2000, was a hasty defensive decision in response 
to anti-dumping actions imposed by the EU. The decision came 
little more than a month after a group of European excavator 
manufacturers filed a long-awaited anti-dumping complaint 
against their main Korean rivals. Chris Tighe and Andrew 
Baxter, reporters of The Financial Times, conclude that the 
complaint from the Europeans encouraged the Samsung Heavy 
745 According to the statistics of the Economic Planning 
Board of ROK, regional comparison of Korean exports under NTBS 
in 1988 was 43.5 percent of the EU, 19.3 percent of the US and 
finally 19.7 percent of Japan, a sharp increase from the 1985 
shares of 29.5,43.3, and 32.0 respectively. 
76. Financial Times, Tuesday 13 January 1995. 
"'. The major motives and expectations of the huge FDI by 
Samsung are well explored by A sub-Case Study of Samsung 
Electronics Factory in Billingham, through direct interview with 
Project & Maintenance Manager, H. G. Noh of Samsung Electronics 
Manufacturing UK LTD.. The interview was done in the reception 
room of the factory, from 11 a. m to 12: 30 p. m, on the 26th, July 
1995. This study is in Appendix. 
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Industry to accelerate plans for setting up excavator factories 
within the EU. 748 
As H. G. Roh, Project and Maintenance Manger of Samsung 
Electronics Manufacturing UK LTD., clearly suggested in a direct 
interview, that future active responses against the 
proliferation of NTBs in the EU would be made through continuous 
development of differentiated products, strategic alliances and 
joint ventures. Samsung Electronics shares common 
characteristics with other Chabols in their motivations to 
launch FDI in the EU region. European governments have recently 
stepped up their efforts to win a bigger share of Korea's global 
spending spree. They are increasingly courting investment with 
high-level trade missions and offers of generous financial 
incentives. 749 
Another underlying motive of Korean Chabols' FDI into the 
EU is that, unlike Japanese manufacturers which enjoyed 
commanding superiority in quality, productivity and technology 
when they started moving abroad, many Korean companies including 
Samsung Electronics are attracted to Europe by chances to 
7°. The effectiveness of anti-dumping measures has induced 
Korean FDI into the EU to create more jobs for local people. 
The speediness of the proceedings as well as the investigating 
rules that are set up to generally produce positive results 
encourage the Commission to resort to anti-dumping procedures 
more frequently than it would otherwise. However, the Agreement 
of the Uruguay Round to shorten the period of the investigations 
and to define the terms of dumping based on multilateral rules, 
to a certain degree, will deter the arbitrariness of EU anti- 
dumping regime. The basic effect is likely to remain even when 
more transparency and clarity is applied in the process of 
investigations and judgement on dumping. 
"'. Guy De Jonquieres and John Burton, "Big Gamble on a 
European Thrust, " Financial Times, February 10 1995. 
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acquire industrial know-how. 75° Korean FDIs have been induced 
to set up in Europe. According to John Burton and Guy De 
Jonquieres, "the keenest spur has been a succession of anti- 
dumping cases brought by the European manufacturers which claim 
they are being injured by Korean exports sold at artificially 
low prices. " So sensitive have Korean manufacturers become to 
such complaints that they have sometimes chosen to sidestep them 
by setting up plants in Europe even before Brussels has opened 
formal anti-dumping procedures. 7' 
Table: 8.13: Korea's Overseas Direct Investment by Region 
1985-the end of November 1994(unit: $ million) 
Asia Latin America North America Europe others 
4,191 312 3,002 1,290 929 
Source: Bank of Korea 
Table 8.14: Korea's Main Investment Project in Europe 
Samsung 
" $700m consumer electronics complex, Wynyard, UK, 1994-2000 
" $16m excavator plant in Harrogate, UK 1995 
" $15m colour TV factory at Billinghamm UK, 1990 
" $30m with Texas Instrument, semiconductor assembly plant, 
Oporto, Portugal, 1994. 
" $120m colour picture tube factory, Berlin, Germany, 1994-1997 
750. Samsung wants to buy Rollei, a German camera maker, and 
Nouville Piquerez, a Swiss clock company. In particular, 
Samsung Electronics, with its ambition to become one of the 
world top five electronics companies by 2000 is planning to 
build large consumer electronics production complexes in the 
UK, Mexico, China and Thailand. The Group recently unveiled 
plans to build semiconductor plants in Europe, the US and South- 
East Asia, at a cost of $1 Billion each, by 1997. On March 
1995, Samsung Electronics paid $387 million for a 40 percent 
stake in US-based AST Research, the world sixth largest personal 
computer maker, to improve the performance of its computer 
business. 
751, A recent such case is the Samsung 's decision to invest 
to build an excavator factory in Yorkshire, UK. Similarly, 
Hyudai Heavy Industries decided to invest $ 10-15 million in an 
excavator factory in Geel, Belgium, in 1995. 
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Daewoo 
" $42m VCR plant, Antrim, Northern Ireland, 1988 
" $23m microwave oven plant, Longwy, France, 1988 
" $37m colour TV plant, Fameck, France, 1993 
" $150m colour tube factory, Longwy, France, 1993-1995 
" $138m cathode ray tube factory, Lorraine, France, 1993 
" $10m excavator plant, Frameries, Belgium, 1990 
" $759m car factory, Craiora, Romania, 1994-1995 
LG(Lucky-Goldstar) 
" $40m colour TV and microwave oven factory, Newcastle, UK, 
1994-1995 
" $40m VCR factory, Worms, Germany, 1986 
" $10m refrigerator/freezer plant, Naples, Italy, 1990 
Hyundai 
. $10-415m excavator factory, Geel, Belgium, 1995 
Source: Financial Times, February 10 1995. 
Some lessons could be drawn from the overseas investments. 
By the end of 1993, the number of overseas investments reached 
307, in 59 different nations. However, the size of the 
investments has been very small and their management 
capabilities very low. Thus, they have been unable to meet the 
qualification for international competitiveness. In particular, 
the lack of strategic alliances or merger and acquisition is 
very critical to the internationalization strategy. The lack of 
experience in local business was not the main consideration in 
either joint or single investments. 
Also, in its strategy to seek production bases in overseas 
markets, the underlying motive was to seek low labour costs, and 
to avoid anti-dumping in the short-term. Thus, the whole picture 
was rather defensive-. Sudden changes in local market forced the 
investments to be withdrawn in 3-4 years in some extreme 
negative examples. The intervention of the Samsung headquarters 
in Seoul, in local management, in the main areas of important 
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decision-making, resulted in delay in establishing a local 
management responsibility system. 
During the last four years, the total overseas production 
and sales recorded a rapid expansion rate of 17 percent 
annually. According to the annual estimation of 1994, the total 
overseas production and sales occupied 31 percent out of the 
group's total output. The proportion of the electronics 
industry's output was extraordinarily high. 
Table 8.15: Sectoral Overseas Export, Production and 
Sales of Samsung Group(unit: $100 million) 
'91(%) '92 '93 '94 Average Annual 
Growth Rate 
Electronics 49.9(57) 58.6 81.0 100.6(71) 26% 
Trade 18.6(21) 22.3 22.1 19.7(14) 2% 
Engineering 9.5(11) 11.2 10.7 10.9(8) 5% 
Textiles 7.9(9) 7.7 7.9 6.0(4) -9% 
Source: Samsung Group's Report 
* Total Overseas Output includes Exports, Overseas Production, 
Trade Between the third nations. 
c) Samsung Electronics Active Globalization Strategy 
in the World of Interdependence 
Samsung Group reorganized its management, aiming to reduce 
the number of subsidiaries to shift business focus to more 
future-oriented sector as part of its corporate strategy for the 
next century. 752 To that end, Samsung reorganized its 
affiliates into four core business sub-groups- electronics, 
machinery, chemicals; and finance and insurance. Another 
management innovation is to let heads of each sub-group take 
752. Korean News Review, November 5,1994, p. 23. 
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responsibility for their management. "' This programme is in 
line with the Kim, Young Sam government's "segyehwaºº 
programme. '"' Samsung should overcome the negative image of 
the Korean government reform programme, which a Financial Times 
Survey on South Korea, called " reform with a nationalistic 
tinge", by stipulating that Korea has decided to jump into the 
mainstream of free trade and economic liberalization-but intends 
to do so in its own fashion. *"' 
What the main trading partners-the US, Japan, and the EU- 
expect is greater access to Korea's financial market and the 
lowering of importing barriers. The EU's trade restrictive 
measures of NTBs against Samsung Electronics exports are 
partially based upon the concept of reciprocity in that Seoul's 
programme for trade and financial liberalization in their scope 
and pace fall short of the EU demand. 75" The lowering of trade 
753. The goal of the plan is to push ahead with Samsung's 
management strategies in preparation for the coming century. 
The restructuring plan is seen as unusual in the country where 
business groups, chabols, are keen on expanding their business 
areas. Under the plan, 16 subsidiaries will be separated from 
the group and 10 affiliates will be merged into other Samsung 
firms by at least 1998. 
75` It means globalization. The Korean government and the 
media over the past year have debated what to call the policy of 
economic liberalization and market opening. 
Internationalization was rejected because it implied that the 
changes would be primarily internal and guided by foreign 
influences, whereas globalization mainly focuses on increasing 
Korea's presence abroad, e. g. by establishing more manufacturing 
plants. 
'gs Financial Times Survey on South Korea, Monday June 26 
1995. 
756 Article 19 of the White Paper in 1985- The commercial 
identity of the Community must be consolidated so our trading 
partners will not be given the benefit of a wider market without 
themselves making similar concessions. 
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barriers poses another difficulty to Samsung Electronics, which 
relies on a protected domestic market for earnings since exports 
usually offer only slim profit margins; ""' thus, opening up to 
the imports of consumer electronics is a challenging task. "' 
Korean government efforts to meet the demand of the 
industrialized group like the EU were revealed under the name of 
the Five-Year Investment Liberalization Plan in June 1993.75' 
In order to liberalize 132 of the total 224 foreign investment 
restricted businesses, 113 restricted businesses will 
liberalized, in 19 business will be newly established or 
expanded. In 1997, among a total of 1,148 projects, 35 projects 
will be partially liberalized and 1,037 projects will be 
completely open to foreign investment. """ 
75' However, the strength of Samsung Electronics is shown in the memory chip market. The recent surge in memory chips 
exports enabled the Samsung Electronics to record a 296 percent jump in net profits to won 1,130bn($1.49bn) for the first half 
of the 1995. As the largest producer of D-Ram memory chips with 
a 15 percent global market share, it has benefitted from a 
supply shortage that has enabled it to raise prices. According 
to the report of John Burton in Seoul, Financial Times Tuesday 
August 15 1995, Semiconductor sales account for 90 percent of 
the net earnings of Samsung Electronics, which also produces 
consumer electronics, and telecommunications and computer 
equipment. Analysts predict that full net earnings are likely to exceed $2bn, which would give Samsung the highest profits for 
any Korean company for a second consecutive year. Samsung 
reported net earnings of $1.2bn for 1994. 
758 Financial Times Survey, Monday June 26 1995 on South 
Korea. 
759. Ministry of Finance, Republic of Korea, The Guide to Foreign Investment in Korea, 1995, pp. 97-97. 
760. According to the Ministry of Finance's Five-Year 
Investment Liberalization Plan, the foreign investment 
liberalization ratio will be increased from 83 percent in the first half of 1993 to 93.4 percent in 1997. Quoted in Ibid., 
P"96. 
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By revising the 1993 Plan, plan for acceleration of foreign 
investment liberalization was announced. in June 1994. The 
acceleration programme was aimed at advancing the liberalization 
schedule or preparing additional liberalization plans for 
businesses which no OECD member countries are restricting and 
aimed at upgrading domestic industrial competitiveness and 
public welfare. Of the businesses included or postponed in the 
current Five-Year Foreign Investment Liberalization Plan, 57 
businesses will be eligible for early or additional 
liberalization. 761 
Table 8.16: Korea's Five-Year Foreign Investment Liberalization 
Plan(1993-1997) 
Industries Restricted No. of Businesses to be liberalized by 
year 
Businesses Jul. Jan. Jan. Jan. Jan. Total 
1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 
Agriculture, Fishery 
and Mining 35 55139 23 
Manufacturing 14 2--259 
Services 175 9 22 34 13 22 100 
Total 224 16 27 35 18 36 132 
Liberalization Ratio 83.0% 85.1 86.9 89.6 90.9 93.4 - 
Source: Ministry of Finance, Korea, The Guide to Foreign Investment 
in Korea, 1995, p. 96. 
The group reorganization has larger implications when we 
note the fact that the government wants to reduce the Chabol's 
dependence on bank credits obtained by government favours. 
Samsung's globalization strategy is an active effort to 
accommodate the wave of free trade and economic liberalization 
under the WTO framework. For Samsung's specific insiderization 
'61. For more detailed schedule and businesses, see Ibid., 
pp. 99-120. 
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strategy into the EU to bear fruit, total flow of business from 
production, sales, after service to advertisements should be 
managed by the local management bases without heavy intervention 
of central headquarters in Korea. To upgrade Samsung's own 
brand name to the level of THOMSON, and PHILIPS has been one of 
the major tasks if the company is to survive in the ever- 
competitive world market. The localization and insiderization of 
the whole manufacturing business should be practiced and 
expanded to every corner of business activities. ""' 
In a micro-response strategy, specialization of the items 
and setting up of local production base in the EU is likely to 
boost the market share. To take advantages of the special 
status of the tariff favour which central Eastern European 
nations, including the Czech and Hungarian Republics are 
entitled to receive from the EU, Samsung will have production 
bases in those Eastern and Central European nations. The special 
tariff favour ranges from 3 percent to 14 percent. A pan- 
European distribution centre, supported by enhanced distribution 
networks in addition to the five already-existing sales 
subsidiaries and two distributor systems, is required. 
To a considerable degree, the decision-making powers of the 
Seoul Headquarters are to be decentralized to the European 
763. As a response strategy of Samsung Electronics against 
the regionalism and globalization of the world trend, Yun-Hwan 
Kim mentioned the insiderization concept on which many other 
company managers completely agree as a future electronics 
businesses. The interview with Yun-Hwan Kim, Assistant Manager, 
Marketing & Regional Strategy Team, International Operations 
Office, Samsung Electronics, was done at Samsung Electronics Co. 
LTD. Meeting Room, Joong-Ang Daily News Bldg, Seoul, Korea, on 16 August 1994. 
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headquarters, giving more autonomy. The establishment of a 
Euroservice centre and its management aided by integrated, pan- 
European advertisement is required. The financial centre needs 
to be more substantially upgraded and supported. ""' 
Environmental regulation measures emerge as the main potential 
obstacle to the expansion of business there. Information on 
further integration is to be monitored through the information 
centre in Brussels. ""' 
The inter-connected networking of production and sales 
requires the foundation of a pan-European logistics system. The 
long-term development picture of European operations should 
again be focused on the following sub-tasks: 
1. Enlargement and restructuring of local design, R and D 
function capability; 
2. Upgrading of local test LAB function; 
3. Best strategy in service in Europe; 
4. More intensified collaboration with other pan-European 
distribution companies; 
5. Establishment of European holding company; 
6. The aggressive expansion of strategic alliances with 
local firms; 
7. The continuous push for insiderization of all the 
business sectors; 
8. Proper programmes to contribute to the local 
communities. 
The success of Samsung's business strategy depends 
strongly on the successful implementation of an 
internationalization strategy in both practical and cultural 
dimensions. Domestic political changes in Korea are geared 
763. The Strategies are outlined in Samsung Group's Report. 
764. To aid understanding of Samsung's international 
strategy, Yong Suk Cho, Manager, International strategy, 
Corporate Planning office, Samsung Electronics, gave me valuable 
comments and answers in an exclusive interview with him in 
Summer, 1994. 
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toward deregulation, liberalization, and internationalization. 
Consumers' tastes are becoming assimilated due to the 
development of the Mass Media, telecommunications and 
information technologies. National boundaries do not have much 
significance in business strategy. 
Figure 8.1: Internationalization Vision of Samsung in the 
21st century 
Corporation to contribute to the local region 
based upon the concept of global responsibilit 
2000 yearl Worldwide 10th largest Group 
. overseas output $30 billion 
. total output 100 trillion Won 
T 
Leader of 10 business The second Samsung overseas Global 
sectors production base management 
system 
Total Strengths of Single Samsu 
By - Strategic support for strategic business 
- Establishment of whole production bases in the local 
markets 
- Adoption of specified regional strategies 
- Adoption of overseas local headquarter management 
system 
- Strengthening of infrastructure for 
internationalization 
In an age of infinite competition, firms need continuous 
innovation and creative response to meet the new challenges and 
overcome the constraints. 
Despite its large overseas output, amounting to $1416 
million by 1994, Samsung has only a middle-level brand image. 
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The creation of its own brand name with high value-added product 
is absolutely necessary. Management in production planning, 
product design, and sales forecasting needs to be decentralized 
to the local production base headquarters. The strengthening of 
an independently viable distribution network is much needed. 
Table 8.17 : Classification of Intangible Investments 
A. Developing knowledge and competence base 
" Research and Development including R&D for software design 
" Technology acquisition(patents & licenses) 
" Technology Monitoring and Search 
" Design 
" Adaptive engineering based on feedback from shop floor 
" Training 
B. Complementary Support Activities 
" organizational restructuring 
" Continuous level-up of human resources development 
" Sophistication of information system and implementation 
" Software maintenance 
" System engineering 
C. Market-relevant Activities 
" Market intelligence and marketing 
" Distribution networks and sales channels 
. Customer services 
Quoted in OECD Development Centre, Competing in the Electronics 
Industry, the Experience of Newly Industrializing Economies, 
p. 34. 
As a programme to consolidate the infrastructure for 
internationalization, systematic recruitment, training and 
proper human resources management are important factors. 
International management specialists are in short supply. By 
intensive efforts to recruit local people, language and cultural 
barriers will be alleviated. Information management is another 
important criterion. systematic networking for collecting, 
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analysing and utilizing information is a decisive factor in 
business. Because Samsung Electronics' goal is to be the 5th 
largest maker in 2000, Samsung needs more than anything else 
systematic networks to interconnect worldwide five production 
bases, centring around Korea as a general headquarter, the 
South-East Asian nations, North America, Europe and Mainland 
China. It will enlarge the overseas production of components 
and industrial electronics like semiconductors, CPT, FBT, DY, 
TDX etc. 
In order to achieve efficient overseas production, Samsung 
needs to establish an integrated system of global logistics, and 
to extend its R and D bases and design centres. '65 
The distinction of the region will be determined by the 
trend of the economic bloc, economies of scale, the industrial 
structure and the level of economic development. In addition to 
political system changes, cultural trends, and geographic 
proximity are the main criteria for classification of the world 
market into four large regions with 10 sub-regional 
classifications. The EU market is designated as an advanced 
market. 
* Advanced markets: North America, Western Europe, Japan; 
these markets account for the 60 percent of the world GDP. The 
strategic importance of these markets is that the success of 
business in these region will be critical to the linking success 
of business in the less developed markets. Key strategic items 
should achieve a market share of at least 5 percent by 
prioritization in resource allocation. The electronics industry 
will challenge this potential with all out efforts. More 
investments are required in the electronics sector to 
consolidate the whole production base system, and the sales base 
in Spain, UK, Ireland and so on. 
765_ Suggestions on business strategies are based upon the 
Samsung Group's Report. 
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The importance of intangible investment is more than ever 
emphasized. Developing knowledge and competence base, and 
activating complementary support activities are regarded as 
basic principles to determine the international competitiveness 
of Samsung. In this vein, the regional strategy for relevant 
sector group business, the plan to secure the world first class 
product, the running of customer centres in major regions, and 
the upgrading of Samsung's brand image are important factors to 
be consolidated. The establishment of regional headquarters and 
the whole production base supported by international human 
resources are also crucial areas for Samsung. The overseas 
information management system is to be strengthened by the 
setting up of a data bank on a regional bases, and the use of 
the diplomatic corporate Ambassador system. "' 
Investments in the electronics industry have been 
increasing rapidly. By 1991, the total overseas output of the 
electronics sector reached $ 5,000 million with $ 4,644 million 
exported from domestic markets and with $ 356 million locally 
produced and sold. The figure for total overseas output 
increased tremendously to $ 10,074 million with $ 8,608 million 
exported from the domestic production and $ 1,466 million 
produced and sold locally. The average annual growth rate of 
exports and local production recorded 23 percent and 60 percent 
respectively from 1991 to 1994, with a general total growth rate 
of 26 percent. 
766. The policy suggestions are based upon the Samsung 
Group's Special Report for Globalization. 
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Table 8.18 : Samsung's Overseas Production, Sales, 
Management bases 
Functional Classification 
Sales Production R&D Others 
Asia 78 25 12 13 
North America 39 2 11 12 
Latin America 15 7- - Europe 46 73 9 
Middle East 27 1- - 
Total 205 42 26 34 
Industry Sectoral Classification 
Electronics Heavy Industry Chemistry Trade Others 
Asia 49 16 2 40 21 
North America 31 4 - 10 19 Latin America 6 - - 16 - Europe 28 5 - 18 14 Middle East 10 2 - 16 - 
Total 124 27 2 100 54 
Source: Samsung Group's Report 
This rapid increase was led by the tremendous expansion of 
semiconductor exports, recording an average growth rate of 50 
percent, while the consumer electronics sectors recorded a 
general growth rate of 12 percent during the same period. 
Table 8.19: Samsung Overseas Investment(No. of investment, 
$ million)by the end of the 1993. 
Functional Classification 
Sales Production R&D Others Total 
No. of investments 57 42 17 13 129 
Amount of investment 212 775 31 81 1,099 
Regional Classification 
Asia America Europe Middle East 
Latin North 
No. of Investments 58 8 29 32 2 
No. of amount 436 8 187 414 54 
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Source: Samsung Group's Report 
In the total group overseas output, in 1991 $ 8,748 million 
was achieved with the export amount of $ 8,311, and local 
production of $ 437 million. This figure increased to $ 14,150 
million with $ 12,528 million recorded exports and $ 1,622 
million local production respectively. The overall growth rate 
of overseas output 17 percent with 15 percent in exports and 55 
percent in local overseas production. The rapid expansion of 
electronics industry exports is leading Samsung's globalization 
strategy. 
Table 8.20: Total Overseas Sectoral Sales of Samsung(unit: 
million, %) 
sectors 1994 average annual growth rate 
export local subtotal export local subtotal 
production production 
electronics 8,608 1,466 10,074 23 60 26 
consumer 2,318 984 3,302 5 40 2 
semi- 
conductor 3,827 - 3,827 50 - 50 
Engineering 1,093 - 1,093 5-5 
Heavy 
industry 895 - 895 55 
aerospace 197 - 197 20 - 20 
chemistry 416 - 416 40 - 40 
textiles 440 156 596 -15 24 -9 
corporation 
(trade) 1,971 - 1,971 2- 2 
-export 1,067 - 1,067 -8 - -8 
-trade 
between 
the 
third 
nations 904 - 904 24 - 24 
Total 12,528 1,622 14,150 15 55 17 
Source: Samsung Group's Report 
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8.2.2 LG Electronics Focus on a Globalization 
Plan 
In this sub-chapter, the main focus is on the future 
dimension of LG Electronics' active globalization plans. Of 
course, these plans include strategies to tackle the regionalism 
of the EU. 
By a comprehensive analysis of globalization plan of the 
LG, implications for specific detailed measures against 
specific restrictive measures of the EU import, trade regimes 
are broadly covered. The case study of Korean electronics firms 
in the context of the regionalization and globalization of the 
world economy reveals the urgent task of the Korean firms to 
push ahead with technological innovation and the business 
strategy of insiderization to adapt to the rapidly-changing 
world business environment. The ever-intensified economic 
interdependence of the world economy has shifted the underlying 
forces to create a new dimension of competition. The epicenter 
of competition has shifted today beyond the sphere of production 
to research and development and other forms of intangible 
investment and to the coordination of increasingly complex 
network transactions with component suppliers, customers and 
external technology sources. '6' 
76'. About the new international competitiveness dimension 
and its implications after the Uruguay Round on the Korean 
Electronics industry, see Ministry of Trade and Industry, Korea, 
Agreements of the Uruguay Round Negotiations and Korea's 
Response Strategies, Policy Reference Material, 1994-1, Seoul, 
pp. 65-73. In Korean. 
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Table 8.21 : The Ratio of Firm's own Brand Exports in Major 
Items 
1989 1990 1991 
Colour-TV 46.0 54.0 60.3 
VTR 38.7 40.9 45.5 
Micro Oven 29.1 30.5 34.3 
Source: Ministry of Trade and Industry, Republic of Korea 
Table 8.22 : The Ratio of Domestic Consumption of 
Major Items(ö) 
Classification domestic consumption ratio 
Consumer electronics 45.2 
Industrial electronics 45.2 
Computer 29.3 
Telecommunications equipment 57.0 
Electronic components 32.9 
Semiconductor 11.5 
other components 56.4 
Electronics Industry Total 41.6 
Source: Electronics Industry Association of Korea, Statistics of 
Electronic & Electrical Industries, Seoul, Korea, April, 1994. 
Furthermore, competition increasingly centres on the 
capacity to define the rules of the game through standards and 
other forms of regulatory barriers. Simultaneously, new and 
increasingly severe entry barriers have emerged in related 
areas, such as the securing of key components and software; and 
the huge costs involved in setting up global distribution and 
marketing networks. 76$ 
a) Dilemmas of LG Electronics 
'68. OECD Development Centre Studies, Competing in the 
Electronics industry: the experience of newly industrialized 
economies, Paris: OECD Publication, 1992, pp. 263-64. 
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The basic dilemmas of the LG Electronics are almost the 
same as those facing Samsung Electronics has. One of the adverse 
changes affecting Korean electronic companies like LG 
Electronics76' is to be found in the changed situation of the 
international technology market. Technology acquisition has 
become much more harder. 770 Demand for development in Korea 
has been increasingly strong. Difficulties of technology 
acquisition add troubles to the original problems of market 
access to the EU. Most ANIEs continue to rely predominantly on 
the US, Japanese and the EU. Much more important, the majority 
of their exports are channelled through the old formula of OEM 
arrangements. A small range of shift to higher value-added, more 
skill-intensive products and services has been achieved. In 
addition to that, the heavy dependence for core components on 
Japanese and foreign exchange constraints may restrict the 
future growth prospects. 71 
Xs Time, July 31,1995, Wendy Cole and K. C. Whang writes 
in article, "A Case of Remote Control, " by saying that The LG 
Group became South Korea's first Chabol to establish a major 
beachhead in American consumer electronics. The firm, whose 
Goldstar TV sets account for just 1.7 percent of the US sales, 
could hardly restrain its glee, proclaiming that the $351 
million deal thrust it into "the same league as other top-class 
markers. " 
7O. On the difficulties of technology acquisition, see the 
general technological development in the World Bank publication, 
Developing the Electronics Industry, 1993. 
71. The negative development of the three closely 
interrelated changes in international technology 
market are as follows: 
- the growing importance of soaring external technology 
and the spread of private international technology 
networks; 
-a shift from buyers' to sellers' market in important 
segments of the international technology market; 
- and changes in the prevailing techno-economic paradigm. 
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R. Boyer72 insists, "the main thrust of current 
management approaches attempts to reconcile economies of scale 
with economies of scope and to reap the interactive learning 
economies inherent to closer-producer links. " A number of 
important sectors of this industry are currently experiencing 
insufficient growth of demand from a homogeneous, rapidly- 
growing mass-market to a growing variety of highly 
differentiated market segments. As a result, competitive 
strategies have to cope with much more complex and often 
contradictory requirements, where price and non-price forms of 
competitions are closely intertwined. The great changes in 
techno-economic paradigm suggest that Korean firms including LG 
Electronics should experiment with new strategies and 
organizational structures. In the past, electronics companies 
in Korea, Taiwan, Singapore and Hong Kong could avoid the huge 
costs burdens and risks involved in research and development and 
in establishing international distribution and marketing 
networks, mainly through judicious, creative imitation of 
foreign technology and by integrating into the global supply 
networks of American, Japanese, and European companies. "' 
LG Electronics has not fully met expectations regarding 
OECD, Competing in the Electronics Industry: The 
Experience of NIES, 1992, p. 264- 
772 . R. Boyer, " New Directions in Management Practices and work organization: general principles and National trajections", 
paper presented to the OECD-TEP conference on Technological 
Change as a social process, Helsinki, December 1989. 
773 . Ibid. p. 266 
439 
upgrading its technological capabilities and organizational 
competencies in accordance with the requirements of the 
competitive environment, though the new firm's long term 
strategies continue to include innovative measures to catch up 
with the new techno-economic paradigm. So far, many firms in 
the ANIEs have not fully achieved the expected viable strategic 
responses enabling them to cope with the new dynamics of entry 
barriers. "' 
Korean electronic firms, including LG Electronics, are in 
desperate need of radical change. Local-based research, 
technology and market development capacities need to be 
fundamentally strengthened. When the technology market remained 
fairly open, technology capability formation was geared 
primarily toward the rapid diffusion of existing technology 
rather than the creation of new technology. During the initial 
follow-up era, assimilating the rich stock of available 
technological knowledge was, thus, the main concern. The 
imitation approaches adopted enabled firms to improve upon and 
incrementally upgrade the imported technology. That kind of 
situation put little emphasis on marketing intelligence and 
design capabilities. In the past they followed the design 
paradigm and market development patterns achieved by the 
forerunners in market shares, so long as they could achieve 
production at lower costs and with comparable quality, and if 
there was no restriction on access to markets and distribution 
"` See the part of Newly Industrializing Countries 
development situation in electronics in D. Todd, The World 
Electronics Industry, Routledge, 1990. 
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networks. "" Consequently the strategy of LG Electronics 
mainly focused on an emphasis that would lead to this kind of 
policy being maintained in the changing international 
competitive market. 
Ernst and O'Connor7" say that first-tier Asian NIEs 
including Korea have to cope with much more difficult 
requirements in a much more hostile international environment. 
The proliferation of "high-tech neomercantilism" creates much 
greater hardship in coping with restrictions imposed upon 
international trade, investment and technology flows, in sharp 
contrast to Japanese, American and European firms. "' Korean 
firms including LG Electronics are still not comparatively 
qualified to be in the forefront of bringing new products to the 
market, to commercialize technology ahead of one's competitors. 
To a great degree, this is detrimental to competitive 
success. 78 
In the same broad context as the firms in the first-tier 
"S Ibid, p. 268. 
76. D. Ernst and D. O'connor, Technology and Competition: 
The Challenge for Newly Industrializing Economies, Paris: OECD 
Development Center Studies, 1989. 
77" - On the European Electronics industry in Consumer field, see BIS Mackintosh, The Competitiveness of the European Consumer 
Electronics Industry, May 1990; Commission of the European 
Communities, Improving the Functioning of Consumer Electronics 
Industry, 1991; and on the U. S. situation, see Committee on 
Technology and International Economic and Trade Issues, USA, The 
Competitive Status of the U. S. Electronics Industry, National 
Academy Press, 1984. 
"g. The structural weaknesses of the electronics sector are 
well described by T. W. Kang in his essay, "The High-Tech Push 
into Electronics, " Is Korea Next Japan?: Understanding the 
Structure, Strategy, and Tactics of America's Next Competitor, 
New York: The Free Press, 1989, pp. 85-111. 
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Asian NIEs, Korean electronic firms have also striven in 
collaboration with government to address these new competitive 
requirements. As a result, Korean firms have reached a 
relatively high technology level. Technological capabilities 
are recognizable. Despite this progress, major uncertainties 
are lying ahead. LG Electronics has also made great efforts to 
adjust to intensifying costs and other competitive pressures 
since the early 1980s. They have made efforts to promote 
product quality into new markets as well as to diversify in new 
markets. A gradual shift has been made from the labour-intensive 
assembly of low-cost components and consumer devices to much 
more integrated forms of production of sophisticated and 
specialized products. This improvement is illustrated in the 
recent announcement that Zenith, the last American TV maker, had 
succumbed to its losses and sold out to its South Korean 
competitor, LG Electronics . 779 The last US-owned manufacturer 
of television sets had given up its independence. "0 LG 
Electronics is to pay more than $350 million(pounds 220m) to 
increase its small minority stake in Zenith to create the 
largest consumer electronics group in North America. 791 
779 
. Time, July 31,1995, p. 27. 
780. Richard Tomkins, "Last US-owned TV maker falls to Seoul: 
Loss-making Zenith Electronics surrenders independence to the 
South Korean LG Group, " Financial Times, July 18,1995. 
781 Zenith, based in Glenview, Illinois, is a relatively 
small television manufacturer in a worldwide market dominated by 
companies such as Sony, Matsushita, Philips and Thompson. Beset 
by intense price competition, it has failed to gain a net profit 
since 1988. According to Richard Tomkins in New York, Financial 
Times Reporter, it has been the only US-based television set 
manufacturer since France's Thompson paid $ 800m cash and its 
medical equipment division for General Electric's GE and RCA 
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Efforts have been made to acquire capabilities now for the 
design and fabrication of integrated circuits. Along with this 
strenuous efforts, the increased importance of industrial 
electronics in personal computers and peripheral equipment has 
been recognized. 782 J. Fayerberg783 defines international 
competitiveness by describing that the main factors influencing 
differences in international competitiveness and growth across 
countries are technological competitiveness; and ability on 
delivery-cost competitiveness also affect competitiveness and 
growth to some extent, but less so than many seem to believe. 
Since the late 1980s, Korean firms have faced many hardships in 
promoting competitiveness. Their export competitiveness has 
eroded substantially, primarily because of upsurging labour 
costs and appreciation of the Korean Won. However, in addition 
to these traditional factors, there are more elements to be 
considered. As Fayerberg defines competitiveness, technological 
and delivery competitiveness affected the erosion of export 
competitiveness. Firm-level technological capabilities and 
national-level innovation ability helped erode the 
competitiveness. 
One of the major problem of Korean firms lies in their 
television brands in 1988. Thompson followed the move by 
pouring $ 300m of investment into its US plants. 
782. Korean firms ran ahead in pursuing indirect entry 
strategies that focus on niche markets relevant to specialized 
needs and capabilities. They tried to implement "quick follower" 
or "fast second" strategies for a few high-end applications, 
such as laptop computers, and a new generation of colour TV sets 
and video cassette recorders. 
783 J. Fayerberg, "International Competitiveness", The 
European Journal, vol. 98, June 1988, pp. 370-71. 
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failure to reduce their dependence on Japanese components. On 
the other hand, firms in Taiwan and Singapore have achieved some 
success where both firms and government have experimented with 
new organizational approaches, allowing the pooling of scarce 
resources and the reduction of costs involved in technology 
acquisition, product design and market development. Traditional 
patterns of industrial organization should be abolished. In 
Korea, size and economies of scale have been the major 
frameworks of their strategies. Partial success has been 
achieved in pooling domestic resources. Fortunately, Korean 
firms like Samsung Electronics and LG Electronics which are 
parts of extremely powerful conglomerates, may possess 
capability to deal with these barriers with relative ease in 
comparison with most of the local electronic companies. '°` 
b) LG Electronics Strategies on Regionalism and Globalization 
Still, LG is in a hard transitional process of shifting 
the balance in favour of its own brand name sales versus OEM 
sales. The setting up of global marketing intelligence and 
distribution network is crucial, apart from huge and increasing 
investment in research and product development. '85 The core 
784 KDI, A Study on improving the International 
Competitiveness of Consumer Electronics Industry, September, 
1990. In Korean. 
785 See M. D. H. Bloom, Technological Change and Korean " 
Electronics Industry, Paris: OECD Development Centre 
Studies, 1992; Kim, Ilyong and Chung, Sunyang, "R &D 
Cooperation between large Manufacturing Companies and 
suppliers", mimeo, Centre for Science and Technology 
Policy, Korea Advanced Institute of Science and 
Technology, Seoul, 1991; Kim, Ilyong and Kim Chiyong, '" 
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defects lies in the predominance of technology decisions shaped 
by the strategies of the leading oligopolist. Apart from a 
strong external technology acquisition strategy, organizational 
innovation demand within firms leaves much for scope for 
reorganization and productivity improvements. Korean firms' 
organizational conservatism, with a centralized research and 
development model, is in sharp contrast with the progressive 
decentralization of research and development(R and D) in 
Japanese, US and European firms. In the recent past, the 
leading electronics companies in Korea were still centralizing 
research and development laboratories in Korea for the purpose 
of concentrating scarce R and D resources. The 1990s have been 
making this picture rather different with the active pursuit of 
a globalization strategy. The rigidity caused by centralization 
of management and decision-making is unhelpful to active market 
interactions and feedbacks among various economic actors. The 
centralization of R and D critically lacks the complex 
requirements of innovation. ""' 
The Korea's centralized R and D structure are basic 
Comparison of Korean to Western R& D- Project 
selection factors for new product development", mimeo, 
Seoul: Science and Technology Policy Institute, Korea 
Advanced Institute for Science and Technology, 1991. 
Kim, Linsu, " National System of Industrial 
Innovation: Dynamics of Capability Building in Korea", 
working paper 91-1, Business Management Research 
Center, Korea University, Seoul, 1991. 
"6. Actually Korea was in a limited situation forced to 
adopt a quite extreme form of centralization for the purpose of in -house technology generation as the international market had 
become increasingly restricted. 
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reasons for the weak status of technology networks among the 
different actors involved in the process of technology 
generation and diffusion. Also excessive vertical integration 
between the large electronics manufacturing firms and their 
suppliers of parts and components produces high fixed costs 
burdens and limited flexibility. 
One more weakness of the innovation system is that the 
education system of has been mainly targeted at the training of 
mid-level managers, engineers and technicians. Today, the 
education system must be focused upon training special human 
resources who are devoted to research and product design, and 
market development. The poor investment in higher educational 
institutions have resulted in the undercapacity to provide 
necessary human research capital. As a consequence, Korea 
including the LG Electronics has failed to develop a stock of 
highly trained scientists and engineers, which are greatly 
needed in the 1990s to upgrade Korea's international 
competitiveness. However, public research and development 
laboratories in Korea have played an important role in 
strengthening technology acquisition capabilities and in 
overcoming constraints to the diffusion of new information 
technologies. Despite the relative advancement of the system of 
innovation, Korea has not reached a stage of advanced level in 
firm organization, product design and market development 
capabilities; nor in the level of development of supplier 
networks and related industries. 
In the larger context of economic neo-liberalism, we need 
proper government intervention and new patterns of interaction 
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between the private sector and government. In some senses, the 
role of government in the electronics industry is becoming more 
and more important in networking strategies, strategic 
partnering and business-government consortia. Technological 
development and diffusion is not left solely to the invisible 
hands of the market. Korea has more constraining factors in 
technology diffusion, which naturally requires government 
intervention and the spread of network transactions. 
In general summary, the present global economic environment 
is considerably more hostile than in the past. The World 
electronics industry is still dominated by a privileged small 
group of advanced firms in US, Japan and Europe. However, 
Korean firms have made considerable progress and have become 
involved in international competition, though with 
vulnerability. New competitive requirements imposed by the 
world economic globalization trend create more difficulties for 
Korean firms. However, Korean firms have steadily accumulated 
financial strength and technological capabilities to implement 
their restructuring strategies. "' 
c) LG Electronics Globalization Plans 
The definition of globalization by LG Electronics is firmly 
based upon the three categories. The first category is 
localization. 7" All managerial activities could be performed 
78' Electronics Korea, May 1993. 
788 This section is based mainly upon the future plan 
document, Globalization Directions of G Company, done by 
Strategic Planning Room of the LG in July 1994. 
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in the local market where local customers live, with 
localization of management resources and know-how. ""' In order 
to achieve this target, the firm must be rooted in local soil as 
a genuine insider in the local market. 
The second category is detailed reflection on the 
characteristics of the local market. Full understanding of the 
local people's culture is the foundation to meet genuine needs 
for the production of differentiated products and provision of 
services. In this strategy, what is utmost importance is the 
firm's capability to interpret the customer's real tastes and 
needs; and to reflect these in actual productions and designs. 
The differentiation of products, and a marketing strategy 
derived from the correct reading of local customers' needs, 
would be critical in this plan. 
The third category is networking. Synergetic effects will 
be created through active communication and efficient management 
of internal networks. The active exchanges of management 
resources, system skill and know-how among firm's local bases 
would provide a chance to maximize the utilization of firm's 
resources. The co-sharing of new information, skill and know- 
how would function smoothly through the networking system. 790 
789. With regard to Korean firms' strategy, I interviewed 
many relevant government officials and research fellows in the 
research institute. Among them, AN, Jae-Dong, middle-ranking 
official in electronic machinery industry division, Ministry of 
Trade, Industry & Energy of Republic of Korea, and specifically 
on Goldstar's general situation and strategies, Kang, Seon-Gu, 
Analyst, Economic Research Division, Lucky-Goldstar Economic 
Research Institute have been indispensable for this writing. 
70 The major content of LG Electronics response 
strategies is based on LG Group's Report on "Directions of 
Globalization, "by Strategic Planning Section of LG Group, April 
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As a forerunner among Korea's electronic firms, LG 
Electronics needs to meet the new requirements in the new 
international environment. In order to be a first class firm in 
the coming 21st century, globalization and localization are two 
axes to be pursued by LG Electronics in the rapidly changing 
international politico-economic order, with ever fiercer market- 
sharing competition. The macroenvironment is characterized by 
conflicting structure of the world economy. After the Cold War 
with the arrival of a borderless, indefinite cooperation age; 
and with the regionalization of the world economy to produce 
continuous trade frictions, the new competitive environment is 
usually classified as follows: 71 
a) Maturization of the existing consumer markets and 
consequent intensification of market-sharing 
competition; 
b) Fierce competition in newly-opening markets for 
predominant market share; 
c) Completion of the international technological 
acquisition in high-tech future-oriented areas; 
d) Liberalization of the Korean markets and the 
inevitability of the global competition even in the 
Korean local market. 
The new competitive environment creates new needs for 
LG Electronics to push ahead with : 792 
a) Becoming a first class firm in the 21st 
century; 
b) Stable consolidation of the already existing 
overseas management bases; 
c) Creation of differentiated competitiveness; 
d) Continuous search for finding growth opportunities. 
By the pursuit of an active globalization strategy, by the 
1994. 
7121, The Report's Analysis, April 1994. 
72 The Group Report, April 1994, p. 2. 
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year 2000, LG Electronics plans to be one of the world's first 
class electronic firms. A rough picture of the grand strategy 
could be summarized by the following. 793 
The big dimension of localization of the managerial 
activities and management system of global networking is also 
very significant. 
The proper 
utilization 
of world-wide 
management 
resources 
INTERNAL PROCESS 
The realization of 
internal networking 
of information for 
resources, skills on 
the global base 
OUTPUT 
profit maximization 
by the world-wide 
LG brand 
The setting-up of five world-wide five production bases in 
demand for local consumption is covered by local production and 
the utilization of a world-wide networking system to supply 
those goods produced in the local production bases. The EU's 
non-tariff barriers will only be erased by these localization 
efforts. 
The five production networks will be located in the Korean 
local market, People's Republic of China, the South-East Asian 
nations, the US, and finally in Europe. Production planning or 
product designing will be accomplished in the local markets to 
meet the peculiar local situation on the demand side. In 
addition to the production networks, the component supply 
network should be a global connection-based system. Each 
production base had better have its own components supply base. 
793. 
The Group's Report, April 1994, p. 3. 
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Strategic key components are to be supplied from the domestic 
production base to other world-wide production bases. Firms 
concerned with the supply of components had better follow the 
setting up of the overseas production affiliates. Subsidiary 
component firms and cooperative subcontracting small and medium- 
sized firms should join the globalization strategy by moving 
their production bases into the same local areas in which the 
major production firms are operating. 
Technological change can not be separated from market 
structures, patterns of competition and social regulation, and 
from the quality of the education system and of the labour 
force. "" Korean electronic firms' world status is still 
unstable. In order for LG Electronics to globalize successfully, 
the government should play a certain role in helping it to 
develop a structural competitive edge against its rivals. 
Figure 9.2: The Realization of Vision 
- intensified business activities 
with LG brand 
- the localization of managerial 
R&D activities 
- the differentiation of strategies HIT product to meet different various markets 
- the utilization of strategic alliances 
with foreign firms 
Organization 
Innovation 
Human Resource Management 
Establishment of Information Network 
794 OECD Development Centre, Technology and Global 
Competition: The Challenge for Newly Industrializing Economies, 
Paris: OECD Publication, 1989, p. 20. 
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Table 8.23: The Position of Korean Electronics Industry in 
the World (unit: 100 million dollars) 
1980 1990 
electronics consumer industrial component 
general(a) (b) (c) (d) abcd 
World 2,615 383 1,610 622 7,549 1,477 4,428 1,644 
domestic 29 11 4 14 331 111 71 149 
ratio 1.1 2.9 0.2 0.2 4.4 7.5 1.6 9.1 
Source: World Electronics Data, 1992 
The recent upsurge of aggressive high-tech neo- 
mercantilism75 treating science and technology primarily as 
weapons in international competition has become prevalent 
worldwide. The firm's success is determined by multidimensional 
factors . 7'6 As LG electronics is aware of the importance of R 
and D, capital equipment and distribution network in the firm's 
strategy, it will put much focus on the concentration of the 
growing fixed capital cost burden of these elements. "' 
We live in an era in which comparative advantage, 
international competitiveness and the international division of 
labour results, in large measure, from corporate strategies and 
75. The basic definition of this term is based upon the 
revival of the protectionist trend in which advanced firm try to 
deter the late entry of rival firms from developing countries. 
796_ F. Fajnzylber, " Technical Change and Economic 
Development-Issues for a Research Agenda", Santiago de Chile, 1988, p. 2-Quoted in Ibid, p. 26. 
79' See D. Ernst, The Global Race in Microelectronics 
Innovation and Corporate Strategies in a period of crisis, 
campus, Frankfurt and New York, 1983. Chap. 4 "The Interaction between Recent Technological Breakthroughs and Industrial Restructuring". 
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national policies rather than from natural endowments. "" It is 
still true that vertically integrated multinational corporations 
are the dominant form of business organization. New forms of 
inter-firm cooperation have emerged which are commonly subsumed 
under the headline of "strategic alliance". "' Strategic 
799 For more information, See, G. Dosin and L. 
Soete, "Technological Change and International Trade", in G. Dosi 
et. el., (eds. ), Technical Change and Economic Theory, London 
and New York, 1988; Henry K. Kierzkowski (ed), Monopolistic 
Competition and International Trade, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 
1984; Robert G. Gilpin, "Implications for the changing Trade 
Regime for US-Japanese Relations", in Inoguchi et. al., (eds. ), 
The Political Economy of Japan : The Changing International 
Context, vol. 2, Stanford University Press, 1988, p. 164. 
799 Pucik says in his article, V. Pucik, " Strategic 
alliances, organizational learning, and competitive advantage: 
the HRM agenda", Human Resource Management, Spring, 27(1), 77- 
93, that in the past alliances were mainly concerned with 
reducing capital investment needs and lowering the risk of entry 
to new markets, but that the current emphasis is mainly 
concerned with taking advantage of the increased speed of 
technological change and adjusting to the rapidly growing 
competitiveness of global markets. The types of alliance in 
Pucik's classification are : 
1. Alliances for technological change, e. g. cross-licensing 
2. Co-production and OEM agreement 
3. Sales and distribution ties 
4. Joint product development programmes 
5. The creation of joint ventures 
Professor Kanter takes a similar view in frank language: 
"Getting the benefits of what another organization offers 
without the risks and responsibility of owning it, is the 
ultimate form of leverage" She identifies three fundamental 
types of alliance in her book, R. M. Kanter, When Giants Learn 
to Dance, London: Simon & Schuster, 1989, as follows: 
1. Multi-company service consortia, e. g. for R&D 
2. Opportunistic alliances set up to take advantage of 
specific situations, e. g. most joint ventures 
3. Stakeholder alliances, referred to by other researchers 
as vertical alliances, or alliances between companies at 
difficult parts of the value chain, e. g. supply/producer 
complementary coalitions. 
Quoted in David Faulkner, International Strategic Alliances, 
London: McGRAW-Hill Book company, 1995, pp. 24-25. 
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alliances are a new reflection of the changed economic 
environment. This does not mean that classified forms of inter- 
firm cooperation have disappeared. The changed world economic 
order requires changed global business strategies. 
In the case of LG electronics as a relative latecomer in 
the international electronics industry, the problem is that 
global competition is still predominantly formulated by 
rivalries among the US, Japan and Western Europe. They usually 
determine product standards and paradigms for technological and 
organizational innovations and consequently they set up rules 
for competition. In this unfavourable situation, Korea and 
Taiwan's exports and out-going direct investment flows have 
stimulated those advanced nations to lead to a panoply of 
countervailing protectionist measures. 80° The differentiation 
of strategies according to the different local markets and the 
intensification of strategic inter-firm alliances are crucial 
tools for the success of LG Electronics' global strategy-1101 
800For example, in semiconductors, the active investment 
of Korean firms like Samsung, Hyundai, Daewoo, Lucky-Goldstar 
into computer memories posed a challenge to the leading Japanese 
producers who dominate this largest segment of the semiconductor 
industry. From the zero-base in 1985, Korea's share of the 
world market in 256 D-RAMs increased to 6% in 1986 to 9% in 
1987. And in 1988 we witnessed a four-fold larger increase than 
in 1987 as far as the sales to the US were concerned. The 
problem is will it be possible to continue to increase the share 
of the market, particularly in higher-value-added segments. 
801. The formulation and implementation of strategies are 
and will be continuously influenced by the complex web of interplay among the four dimensions. I have uttered these 
factors several times since the start of this thesis. In Samsung 
and LG's response strategies, firm level factors like 
technology, organizational capacity have been emphasized very 
much. However, the other factors such as cognitive factors, international systems factor, and domestic factors, influence 
, to a considerable degree, business of those firms. 
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d) Organizational Reforms of the LG Electronics 
LG Electronics has engineered a striking reversal in 
fortunes. It has regained its lead in consumer electronics from 
Samsung, while net profit soared from 15.3 million pounds in 
1991 to Won104.6bn in 1994. The chief financial officer at the 
firm says that the biggest reason for the growth in profits is 
management reforms. t*1 In the 1980s, Goldstar was burdened 
with ills that plagued Korean companies, such as authoritarian 
management structure and an emphasis on economies of scale 
rather tharr product quality. LG scrapped loss-making operations 
and cut its labour force by 20 percent to 29,000 workers. 
Employees were also given greater responsibility in managing 
assembly lines. "°' Management structure was also reformed. LG 
had suffered from a rigid bureaucracy and a concentration of 
decision-making at the top, which impeded the flexible corporate 
response to changing market conditions. As a remedy, LG 
performed a business restructuring in 1992 that included 
decentralized decision-making and an effort to reflect consumer 
orientation. Furthermore, professional managers were promoted 
to senior positions and replaced executives from the Koo family, 
i02. John Burton, "Changes at South Korea's LG Electronics 
have led to a sharp reversal in fortunes, " Financial Times, 
Monday 25 September 1995. 
803 According to a Management Survey of the Financial 
Times, improved production efficiency was proved by the fact 
that while it used to take 33 workers to make 1,000 TV sets, it 
now takes 20 workers to produce 2,000. The number of defective 
products has fallen sharply, with the ratio of consumer 
electronic items needing after-sales repairs dropping from 20 
percent to 4 percent. 
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owner of the LG Group. Management reform resulted in successful 
development of new popular products that enabled LG Electronics 
to regain its leading market position. 804 
Chang Byung Woo, a senior managing director at LG 
International who supervises consumer product exports, says that 
the reforms contributed to the breaking down of artificial 
barriers between divisions, such as R and D, production and 
marketing. 805 John Burton also hypothesizes in his article 
that the true test of management reforms may come as LG 
Electronics expands in scale in the foreseeable future, by 
combining with LG Group's semiconductor division and moreover 
telecommunications equipment subsidiary, which will create an 
electronics giant comparable in size to Samsung Electronics and 
such Japanese rivals as Hitachi, Toshiba, and Mitsubishi 
Electric. 
804. Analysts blame the strict top-down hierarchical 
structure of Korean companies for the lack of product innovation 
since it hinders communication between senior managers and staff 
who deal directly with consumers. Quoted in Financial Times, 
September 25 1995. 
805. Quoted in Ibid. 
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CHAPTER NINE. Conclusion: Regionalism. and Globalization of 
the World Economy and Its Implication for the 
ROK-EU Economic Relationship 
9.1 Regionalism and Globalization: the Need for Korea's 
Trade Liberalization and the EU's Commitment to 
Multilateral ism 
Due to the scarcity of natural resources and limited size 
of the domestic market, foreign trade has played a leading role 
in Korea's rapid industrialization process. Consequently, the 
maintenance of an open economy, heavy control on importing 
notwithstanding, has been a consistent policy. It is also 
comparatively recently that Korea has been regarded as an 
important trading entity in the world economy. In 1990, Korea's 
most important trading partners were Japan(export to Korea 6.1 
percent out of Japan's total exports amount and import from 
Korea 5.0 percent), the US(export to Korea 3.7 percent and 
imports from Korea 3.7 percent) and Australia(exports to Korea 
5.7 percent and imports from Korea 2.4 percent). Korea's share 
of trade with EU rapidly increased from 0.5 percent and 0.6 
percent of export and import respectively in 1990 to an 
approximate level of 2.0 percent for each export and import at 
the end of the 1993. 
In the study of international political economy in 
general, and in the analysis of the EU-Korean economic relations 
in particular, the development of the potentially influential 
trends of regionalism and globalization is of great importance 
in the world trading system. In this context, this thesis is a 
small contribution to the understanding of the international 
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political economy of regionalism and globalization. 
Many problems have arisen as a consequence of the end of 
the Bretton Woods system and the redefinition of the leadership 
role of the US. It may be a multipolar or tripolar world, but 
the problem is that mechanisms such as the Group of Seven 
industrialized nations (G-7), and OECD are not yet powerful 
enough to handle major trade problems. The globalization and 
regionalization of the world economy is accelerated by the 
active role of the multinationals. However, in the policy-making 
dimension, the rise of the international political economy is a 
problem because political economy has traditionally been focused 
on the state as the key actor in international economic 
relations. The theoretical review of International Political 
Economy clearly reveals the limitation of the existent 
theoretical paradigms, because they do not accommodate 
regionalism and globalization in the world trading system. 
For trade policy makers, multinationals present a problem 
because whilst the companies are the major beneficiaries and the 
major forces behind international trade and the demands for ever 
greater liberalization and globalization of trade, it is 
Politicians and governments that are responsible for negotiating 
trade policies. There are at least two, possibly contradictory 
responses to developments in today's global economy. The first 
is the demand for increased liberalization of world trade. The 
demand principally arises from multinationals and from 
governments of highly competitive and export-dependent 
economies. The increased liberalization of the world trade 
requires the ROK and the EU to abandon the protectionist 
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policies that have protected their domestic economies and 
enabled their economies to industrialize. rapidly. The most 
obvious manifestation of the move towards liberalization of 
world trade on a global basis is the completion of the Uruguay 
Round of the GATT and the establishment of the World Trade 
Organization. The second response is the growth of regional 
trade blocs, i. e. the European Union, NAFTA, and APEC. Not only 
is there a problem because these are very different patterns of 
economic organization of the management; there is also the 
possibility that these blocs will be used to undermine and 
contradict the reduction of tariffs and the NTBs inherent in the 
establishment of the WTO. 
Korea regards the EU as an increasingly valuable and 
reliable partner in its search to diversify its export markets 
and to increase its technological prowess. The EU also needs the 
potential partnership of Korea in trade as the ROK is gaining 
more and more importance as the third largest economy, after 
only Japan and the People's Republic of China, in the Asian 
region. Korea has been benefitted by the EU Generalized System 
of Preference (GSP) scheme. The future benefit is expected to be 
eroded to a considerable degree by the adoption of the new 
guidelines in the EU. The ROK is the priority group to be 
reviewed as a newly industrialized nation. The spread of 
regionalism is in much sense caused by the fear that reciprocal 
access to markets among trading-partners is unstable. Frequent 
use of contingent protection creates barriers for the ROK's 
exports into the EU. 
As the biggest influencer in the international trading 
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system, protectionism of the EU continues to exert an influence 
on the Common Commercial Policy (CCP), despite the liberal 
rhetoric. The Community repeatedly claims to adhere to the GATT 
rules, but at the same time its commercial policy measures have 
a complex preferential bias because it is not yet fully 
operational at the Community level. Though there exists general 
EEC framework to prevent protectionism from spreading and to 
help the growth of the developing nations in the world market, 
social and political pressures to reduce the growth of 
competitive imports have had a protectionist impact on the 
sectoral trade policy positions of the Community. 
South Korea has been concerned about the possibility that 
the EU will be tempted to downgrade competitive forces, to the 
detriment of third countries. Sung Lin Na and Kyttack Hong's 
research on the possible effect of a Single European Market 
(SEM) toward the ROK estimated the ex-ante effect of the EC 1992 
Project on Korean exports to the EU. The usage of the 
traditional methodology of customs union predicts that the EU's 
market integration effect (price effect) would reduce Korean 
exports to the EC by 2.42 percent in the short-term and by 5.45- 
5.82 percent in the long term. The short-term here means the 
immediate static effect, that is, the cost and price reduction 
effect caused by the removal of all internal barriers. The long 
term means the further cost and price reduction effect with some 
economies of scale and strengthened competition within the 
community. What really worries Korean business circles, is non- 
price effects of EC integration, such as the external non-tariff 
barriers imposed by individual member countries' at EC level. 
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In 1992, among the East Asian nations, Korea ranked the 
second in its export and import trade, next to Japan. 
Complementarity has been partially replaced by competition in 
mutual trade. A very high level of commercial dynamism is 
occurring toward Europe, and among Asian nations, Korea has been 
at the core of this dynamism as a newly successful economy with 
export-led growth. 
Among the major mechanisms to restrict the ROK's exports 
into the EU, anti-dumping duty has been employed most 
frequently. The proliferation of regional groupings coincided 
with the rapid rise of anti-dumping cases. As a legitimate form 
of discriminatory protection more restrictive in new EC 
legislation, the use of this tool rose sharply in the 1980s. In 
the five year period of 1988-1992, the EC launched 169 anti- 
dumping investigations, involving 40 nations. South Korean 
exports were impeded by 14 such investigations. The majority 
of the cases were against Japan and ANIEs, the recent ones 
largely on the ANIEs. Korea has been one of the most frequent 
targets of the anti-dumping impositions. The anti-dumping policy 
of the EU has been closely related with its industrial policy. 
The EU does not just react to sectoral pressures for protection, 
but clearly is identifying certain key sectors, such as consumer 
electronics, in areas where the EU wishes to retain a commercial 
and industrial presence. 
It is clear that declining international competitiveness of 
the EU industries have been forcing the Commission and national 
governments to employ NTBs, including minimum price regulations, 
countervailing duties and VERS against various items of Korean 
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exports to the region. It is intended under the new GSP scheme 
of the EU to withdraw all GSP schemes from most newly developed 
nations including the ROK from 1998, on the basis of criteria to 
be drawn up in 1997. Under the new policy of graduation, the 
competitiveness of a beneficiary is measured in terms, not of a 
specific product as before, but of an entire industrial sector, 
such as clothing, footwear, and consumer electronics. GSP 
benefits are thus withdrawn for the sector as a whole in the 
case where nations are considered to be sufficiently competitive 
to have no further need of them. Korea belongs to the priority 
group for graduation. 
In the development of the ROK's industrial policy, the 
government-business relationship has been at the core of its 
policy effects. Lee, Kye-uk, Edward Chen, and Milton and Rose 
Friedman share the view that Korea is one of the successful 
economies which has extensively relied on private markets. In a 
similar vein, John Fei further argues that the major stance of 
the East Asian NICs on the policy front, has been the "lessening 
of government interferences" in the market economy during the 
export-oriented phase. On the contrary, Bronwen Dalton put more 
weight on the role of government. Dalton is supported by 
academic arguments such as the Capitalist Development State 
(CDS) thesis. The CDS gives special attention on the role of 
state planning. Parvez Hasen argues that the Korean economy 
depended in large measure on private enterprises operating under 
highly centralized government guidance. Kim Kwang-suk and 
Michael Roemer also concluded that political factors have always 
played a crucial role in promoting or discouraging 
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entrepreneurial ventures in Korea. 
The recent economic deregulation and liberalization which 
are gradually dismantling the close government-business 
relations pose new threats to the Korean economy. Although the 
Chabols are being compelled to rely on financial markets for 
credit as the government adopts measures to gradually phase out 
their preferential access to bank loans and state-supported 
policy loans, the Korean conglomerates are also partially 
benefitted since the past heavy government intervention is 
removed. The reason why they welcome deregulation is partially 
to be found in the belief of corporate executives that Chabols, 
with their great economy of scale and resources, could emerge 
stronger in a market-oriented economy. 
On sixth December 1995, President Kim Young Sam of the ROK 
showed strong will to break with the past corruptions by 
changing the name of the ruling Democratic Liberal Party to the 
New Korea party, after ex-president Roh Tae Woo was charged on 
fifth December 1995 with taking $369 million in bribes from 
businessmen while he was in presidential office. The ruling 
Democratic Liberal party was founded in 1990 through a merger of 
Mr Roh's party and two opposition groups, one led by Kim Young 
Sam himself. This is a clear indication of a government 
intention to create a new government-Chabol linkage. 
Of course, it is true that Chabols' intimate relations with 
government allowed them to become a source of South Korea's 
rapid growth, backed by cheap loans. It remains to be seen 
whether Chabols, autonomous from government intervention, will 
stand to gain as much economic benefit as they did when 
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supported by strong government intervention in the past. 
The Korean government's recent efforts to deregulate and 
further open the market in response to the demands of the 
advanced nations gives both challenges and chances to the 
Chabols. The recent slush fund scandal of a ex-president Roh in 
late October forced business groups to make changes to clean up 
their corrupt image. Ex-president Roh had collected a staggering 
$650 million in corporate contributions during his five-year 
tenure, under a long-held custom of amassing "governing funds. " 
Seven heads of Korea's largest Chabols, such as Samsung and 
Daewoo, were later indicted without detention. This slush fund 
scandal proved the close and shady relationship between Korea's 
powerful conglomerates and bureaucrats. The Chabol's subsequent 
image-cleaning drives, after the scandal, included Hyundai 
Group, the biggest Chabol of Korea, undertaking massive 
reshuffling of executives and delegating more management power, 
and expected schedules for reducing owners' personal stakes in 
companies. Daewoo Group, Dong Ah Business Group and Samsung took 
similar measures. 
The Chabols' innovating measures are a boosting factor for 
more government deregulation. The past government regulation was 
the prime reason for bribery, as businesses needed government 
favours to enter new commercial markets, to obtain profitable 
projects, and to secure credit. Korean business's international 
competitiveness will be strengthened in the long term by more 
deregulation of the Korean economy and stepped-up market 
liberalization. Deregulation and market opening poses 
constraints and challenges to the Korean companies. However, by 
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following market principles, Korean businesses will be given 
more chances of enhancing their competitiveness. Of course, some 
degree of government intervention is required to ensure 
compliance with economic rules such as regulating the flow of 
corporate funds. Nevertheless, the slush fund scandal has 
confirmed the position of a noninterventionist approach to 
eradicate old malpractices. 
In contrast to internal pressures for change, pressure for 
change from outside seems to have a stronger impact on Chabols. 
The external pressures to open more market by removing non- 
tariff barriers and the domestic deregulation and liberalization 
measures to open more foreign competition, are causing chabols 
to establish their presence in developed countries by 
establishing manufacturing facilities, distribution networks and 
by marketing products under their own brand names. If a firm is 
a already global market player and very competitive in the 
international market, as in the semiconductor sector of Korean 
Chabols, government intervention is very small because these 
firms have little need of government favours. Their major 
concern is to upgrade their international competitiveness. 
Globalization and regionalization of the world economy as 
external pressures for change, are strong intervening variables 
to determine the industrial policy of the Korean government in 
general and the Chabols' new business strategies in particular. 
Since 1980, Korea has rapidly implemented market 
liberalization policies. The government liberalized the 
importation of 95 products on 1 January 1990 as one of a series 
of import liberalization measures. The import liberalization 
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ratio grew to 97.2 percent in 1991 from 68.6 percent in 1980. 
The liberalization of FDI, foreign exchange transactions and 
capital markets are also very important steps towards the 
internationalization and globalization of the Korean economy. 
In order to accommodate domestic and external challenges 
and to achieve sustained growth in the 1990s, the seventh five- 
year plan (1992-1996) aimed to strengthen competitiveness of 
industry, to enhance equity and balanced development, and to 
pursue internationalization and liberalization. Through the 
deregulation of interest rate, foreign exchange, and foreign 
investment in the capital market to liberalize the financial 
system and by reducing government control in private sectors, 
the Korean government has responded to the demand of the 
advanced nations for market opening. The rising regionalism and 
protectionism make Foreign Direct Investment(FDI) one of the 
popular options in business globalization strategy. The export- 
oriented development strategy of Korea and the new demand to 
diversity its exporting markets, require further cooperation and 
promotion of bilateral economic relations between the ROK and 
the EU. 
Korea's shift from labour-intensive industries to less 
labour-intensive sectors based on comparative advantage, has 
given rise to concern to protect strategic sectors of the EU. 
The EU's response to South Korea has been much more specific, 
enough to produce sectoral protectionism. The Multi-Fibre 
Agreement (MFA) in textiles and clothing, Voluntary Export 
Restraints (VERS) in steel, certain consumer electronics, 
footwear and a protectionist tilt in anti-dumping cases have 
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brought perhaps a third of EU-NICs trade under restrictive 
provisions. The 1992 Programme has brought the revitalization of 
EU business and Member States' confidence. The analysis of 
Joyce Tan and Jacques Pelkmans and Ji Hong Kim came to the 
conclusion that the protection of the EU market against Korea's 
export is prevalent in all major import-competing products. Kim 
argues that in 1988,33.7 percent of all Korean exports to the 
EC ran up against non-tariff barriers, declining from 41 percent 
in 1987. Textiles alone suffered 72 percent of Korea's exports 
under MFA restrictions. Anti-dumping policy of the EC has been 
a major concern to Korean trade policy markers who regard this 
as the highest priority issue in bilateral relations. 
Korea also has trading barriers against EC exports such as 
the social campaigns against consumption of luxury items, and 
the difficulty of the importing process. There are. two 
structural problems. One is the access of finance to deferral of 
import payments. The other is formal and informal economic 
entries to distribution. Entry into the Korean market is more 
difficult than into the EU. However, Korea's efforts to 
liberalize its market should not be ignored. The Korean Assembly 
passed the "new tariff schedule" in December 1988, to be 
conducted over a five year period of 1989-1993. The simple 
arithmetic basic tariff rate for manufactured products was 
scheduled to fall from 16.9 percent in 1988 to 11.2 percent in 
1989, and to 6.2 percent in 1993. During the successful 
conclusion of the Uruguay Round of the GATT, more reduction was 
agreed for the future. In import liberalization in items ratio 
(Automatic Approval) reached 97.7 percent in 1992. The inward 
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FDI in the manufacturing sector has increased tremendously. This 
shows that liberalization efforts have already borne fruit. In 
November 1992, the overall liberalization ratio reached 81.7 
percent and in manufacturing specifically, 97.8 percent. More 
than 40 percent of total FDI flows, or 58 percent of the FDI 
cases from 1962 to 1991, came from Japan, and about 30 percent 
of FDI originated in the US. However, in recent years, the 
European share of FDI into the Korean market has increased 
rapidly as the Korean economy gradually becomes more and more 
integrated with the European economies. In 1991 alone Europe 
occupied 59 percent, though the average ratio of 1962-1991 was 
only 22 percent. 
A sectoral case study of the electronics industry has 
demonstrated the manner in which the rapid expansion of Korea's 
exports to the European Union have caused severe trade 
frictions. Korea has become a competitor with OECD nations. The 
key to success has been provided by a coherent and co-ordinated 
strategy. The Korean electronics industry is regarded as one of 
the most successful examples of industrial latecomer strategies. 
One of its distinctive features is that it has relied 
historically more heavily on foreign investment than any other 
sector. In the promotion of the electronics industry, the Korean 
government has provided the most successful exporters with a 
range of incentives- including preferential access to loans at 
subsidized interest rate, exemption from certain taxes, 
discounts on power and freight costs, and access to import 
licences for machinery and components. 
Pressures and constraints are forcing both the Korean 
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government and the electronics industry to respond to the 
internal and external pressures in certain ways which require 
modification of Korea's traditional industrialization and 
adjustment strategy. Market accessibility of the Korean markets 
is recognized as a core dispute point by manufacturers and 
businessmen. Liberalization of Korea's trade regime was also 
demanded in the Uruguay Round negotiations of the GATT. Korea is 
faced with the task of liberalizing imports fast enough to 
satisfy the US and European demands. 
In an effort to avoid external pressures, major companies 
have set up assembly operations in the US and Europe to seek 
more market access. The second type of investment is to build 
overseas factories to overcome the high costs of labour in the 
local market, as had been done in Southeast Asia. The larger 
companies also have set up or acquired overseas design or 
research operations bases to help them in semiconductor, 
telecommunications and industrial electronics fields. The 
Chabols are in the best position to secure chances to reduce the 
level of dependence on foreign technology and imported 
components. 
With Korea's exports to the EU markets in the sector, the 
EU lost competitiveness in comparison with Japan and the US1 
except in the communication equipment sector. As a result of its 
low competitiveness, the EU frequently resorted to non-tariff 
measures of anti-dumping, quota restrictions and other import 
restriction measures. The EU's reciprocal demand for Korea's 
import liberalization after 1988 presents Korean firms with both 
challenges and risks. Korea is in the position of a sandwich 
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between the highly sophisticated products and low and middle 
range products manufactured by ASEAN, China and Mexico, whose 
cheap labour creates price competitiveness. 
The internationalization of Korea's electronics industry is 
somewhat impeded by the lack of business management capability 
in the foreign local market to promote comparative advantages 
and to change the industrial structure into a sophisticated one, 
suitable for the local environments. Another task of Korea's 
electronics industry is to restructure the industry and 
management to concentrate on technology and knowledge-intensive 
products. 
In consideration of the EU's gradually eroded- 
competitiveness in the consumer electronics sector, the EU was 
predicted to suspend its extension of Generalized System of 
Preferences (GSP) favours to Korean made cars, electronics, 
footwear and textile products from 1996. Korean made electronics 
products are likely to face serious difficulties in their 
exports of such products to the EU in the future. The 
export/import amount with South Korea in the consumer 
electronics sector alone is heavily unbalanced, with 788 million 
ECU trade surplus recorded on the Korean side. To tackle this 
imbalance, the EU frequently adopts anti-dumping measures. 
By examining the specific development of Samsung 
Electronics and LG Electronics and how they have been affected 
by changing trade policies in the world dimension, the 
implications of regionalism and globalization have been tested. 
The leading Korean Electronics firms have in common a history of 
rapid growth aided by active government intervention. As 
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subsidiaries of large Korean Chabols, Samsung and the Lucky- 
Goldstar Group, they account for about 45 percent share of 
Korea's electronics and telecommunication industry production 
and employ well over half of all research human resources in 
this sector. The 1995 agreement between Samsung Electronics 
and NEC of Japan to produce semiconductors jointly in Europe is 
the example of how successful Samsung has been in technology 
development and its internationalization strategy. Samsung 
Electronics's response strategy toward European market has been 
based upon globalization and insiderization plans. In 
particular, Samsung Electronics FDI into the EU in the 1980s was 
strongly motivated by the shift of the Community policy away 
from tariff to NTBs. The EC's selective, intensified application 
of NTBs against Korean-made colour TVs, VCRs and computers, 
presented Samsung with more burdens. This trade friction has 
been aggravated more as Samsung shifted its export items from 
labour-intensive products such as textiles and footwear to 
technology, knowledge and capital-intensive goods. Samsung needs 
to tackle the EU's NTBs through continuous sophistication of 
differentiated products, strategic alliances and joint ventures. 
Samsung's globalization strategy is an active efforts to 
accommodate the wave of free trade and economic liberalization 
under the WTO framework. For Samsung's insiderization strategy 
into the EU to bear fruit, total flow of business from 
production, sales, after service to advertisements should be 
managed by foreign local management bases, without heavy 
intervention of central headquarters in Korea. 
LG Electronics' dilemma is found in the changed situation 
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of the international technology market because technology 
acquisition has become much harder. Thanks to vigorous efforts 
to promote product quality in new markets, a gradual shift has 
been made from the labour-intensive assembly of low-cost 
components and consumer devices to much more integrated forms of 
production of sophisticated and specialized products. The 
setting up of global marketing intelligence and distribution 
network is crucial. The definition of globalization by the LG 
Electronics is based on three categories: a)localization; 
b)complete understanding on the characteristics of local 
markets; c)networking. The EU's non-tariff barriers will be 
alleviated by the localization of the managerial activities and 
management system of global-networking. The setting-up of five 
world-wide production bases will cover demand for local 
consumption. The recent upsurge of aggressive high-tech neo- 
mercantilism which treats science and technology primarily as 
weapons in international competition, which has become prevalent 
worldwide, necessitates more active globalization schemes on the 
part of LG. 
No other power bloc or power seems able or prepared to 
become a dominant power in providing international public goods, 
as the US had been since the end of the Second World War. Free 
trade is not a politically stable policy in a dynamic economic 
world, in the absence of such leadership. Fortunately, however, 
the WTO is likely to expand world free trade regimes with the 
implication that EU-Korean economic exchanges will rapidly 
expand. Nations are unlikely to be able to stop market forces 
from preventing the decline in employment. General protectionism 
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is also not a politically stable policy in a rapidly changing 
economic environment. Moreover, politically important strategic 
industries will be pressing for the opening of the markets and 
they will recognize the need to open domestic markets to achieve 
results. 
The new protectionism threatening the international 
trading regime is related to significant structural changes in 
world production that have brought about a decline in the 
dominant economic position of the US, and a concomitant rise of 
the EU and Japan to international prominence and the emergence 
of a highly competitive group of newly industrializing 
countries. 806 
Korea, being a forerunner of the ANIEs, faces a difficult 
adjustment period, which has implications for trade relations 
with the EU. In the extreme negative dimension, the evolving 
world-wide trading regimes are increasingly characterized by 
more government control and private cartelization than 
throughout most of the postwar period, which gives little 
leverage to Korea's external trade policies. The recent trend of 
non-tariff protectionism at the specific industry level is 
expected to continue in the EU, US and Japan, inflicting more 
burdens on Korean exporters. 
Given the needs of export-dependent and multinational 
806. About the Western world view of the public good, 
Charles P. Kindlberger addressed the 98th meeting of the 
American Economic Association in New York, 29 December 1985, 
under the title of "International Public Goods without 
International Government. " In his speech, by any forms or 
provisions, the international public good is a prerequisite for 
a stable world trading system. 
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firms, as well as their greater importance to the state, strong 
domestic pressures for liberal trade policies may co-exist with 
important protectionist pressures. Contrary to this view, 
despite the optimistic prediction, industrialized countries are 
predicted to seek short-term economic reciprocity. And the 
developing nations with particular political relationships with 
certain trading powers will continue to be exempt from the full- 
reciprocity requirement. Instead, great weight will be placed on 
bilateral trade relations to reduce non-tariff trade 
distortions. The WTO will provide broad framework for the 
negotiations. The various and discriminatory nature of non- 
tariff barriers will make true multilateral negotiations too 
vulnerable. 
Along with the launching of the WTO, the long-term benefit 
of the trade rules will be publicized for the promotion of the 
trade between the two regions. 
Table 9.1: The Coming Boom(Real GDP Growth and annual 
average 
Nation Group 1974-1993 1994-2003 
Rich Industrial Nations 2.9 2.7 
Developing Nations 3.0 4.8 
of Which 
East Asia 7.5 7.6 
South Asia 4.8 5.3 
Latin America 2.6 3.4 
Eastern Europe and former 
Soviet Union 2.0 3.9 
Middle East and North Africa 1.2 3.8 
Source: World Bank 
The WTO is, hopefully, to be developed into a strong, 
independent body like IMF and World Bank for the smooth 
functioning of the world free trading system. It should help 
474 
settle trade disputes by giving greater predictability and 
transparency to the world trading system.. New protectionism 
should be eroded by the effective management of the multilateral 
framework. To expand the category of free trade to the utmost, 
rule and norm-based practices of international trade supported 
by stable security environment are a prerequisite. 
According to the World Bank statistics based upon GDPs at 
PPP (purchasing power parity) in 1992, Korea ranked 15th 
largest, and by 2020, is expected to upgrade its status to the 
7th largest. This kind of conspicuous achievement will be 
achieved when free trade and multilateralism take precedence 
over protectionism, unilateralism, and bilateralism. Korea 
should bear in mind that so long as rich OECD nations have 
higher education standards, and better management with superior 
infrastructure, their productivity will be higher than that of 
Korea. Aggressive investment in education and infrastructure 
should be undertaken to meet the level of leading nations. As 
the role of multinationals is ever-increasing, the Korean 
Chabols have many advantages to compete in the international 
markets. 
The case studies of Korea's electronic firms' 
internationalization and globalization strategy indicate the 
ever-increasing inter-dependence of the world economy. 
Multilateralism and open regionalism are the best options for 
EU-Korea trade expansion in the future. As the electronics 
industry takes the lead in Korea's future business strategies, 
the active responses to trade protectionism based upon 
regionalism, will bear fruit by active pursuit of 
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internationalization and globalization. Free trade and opening 
of the market based upon multilateral ism will be the major 
agenda of future trade negotiations. Reciprocal and mutually 
advantageous development will only be achieved through 
multilateral ism. In the short term, the EU may find it more 
profitable to engage in bilateral negotiations with its external 
trade partners. But such bilateralism or unilateralism may 
break away from the even-handed principle of multilateral trade 
rules embodied in the Article of the GATT under the WTO. 
9.2 Suggestions for the Korean Government and Business Circle 
Regarding the policy implications for the Korean government 
and business circle in the future, the conclusions of this study 
provide several proposals. The stage of extensive growth has 
gone. Korea needs a much more liberal approach with respect to 
international trade and investment. Korea has to overcome any 
barriers in achieving its national goal of becoming an advanced 
nation. In order to achieve the target, Korea needs to adhere to 
the principles of a free and multilateral trading system. 
Korea has not yet established a firm institutional basis 
for the long-term prosperity of its domestic capitalism. The 
government's recent efforts to deregulate and privatize the 
Korean economy have almost achieved a free and competitive 
system. A symbol of Korea's embracing of the new world trade 
order was her wish for a Korean candidate, Kim, Chul Soo, to 
become the head of the new World Trade organization, which later 
resulted in him gaining the position of a deputy-head. Another 
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was its application for membership of the OECD. Bethan Hutton 
describes Korea's approach to free trade as cautious. °O7 Hutton 
may be right in saying that in some sections of Korean society, 
the desire of the outside world to open up to import of foreign 
products and investments is still considered as a threat. 
However, the phrase ""segyehwa", which means globalization, 
symbolizes Korea's stance towards the foreign world. Korea's 
main trading partners- the US, the EU and Japan, constantly call 
for easier access to Korea's financial market and lowering of 
trade barriers. 
Despite the constant calls, full-scale economic 
liberalization is unlikely to happen in the foreseeable future. 
However, the Kim Young Sam Government's reforms to unravel the 
close links between the state and big business are a clear 
symptom of a tilt toward market principles. Strong state 
intervention through a government-controlled financial system 
has created economic discrepancies between Chabols and small 
businesses. John Burton argues that the lowering of trade 
barriers poses a big threat to the Chabols, which depended 
heavily upon the protected domestic market. "' 
The Chabol issue is characterized by the public's sense of 
unfairness in the process of their rapid growth and by the 
concentration of economic power. They used to get privileged 
access to bank loans and real estate holdings. Growth was 
achieved at the expense of others-the weak and the poor. 
807 . Financial Times, Monday June 26 1995. 
SOS. Financial Times, Monday June 26 1995. 
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Sometimes, wealth was sought by means of socially unproductive, 
rent-seeking businesses. The ever-growing wealth has been 
concentrated in the ownership of a few family members. For both 
legitimacy and distributional equity reasons, according to 
SaKong I1, the measures of inducing Chabols to distribute their 
equity shares widely must be continuously adopted. From an 
international competitiveness perspective, support for the 
principle of growth and diversification should be encouraged, 
provided they grow and become diversified with their own funds. 
The readjustment of close government-business linkages 
should, in a broad context, be based on the basic assumption 
that Korean firms should promote their competitiveness to 
compete with international businesses and affiliated firms of 
larger international conglomerates. As a part of this programme, 
the Korean government has encouraged the Chabols to specialize 
in a few industrial sectors by granting unlimited bank loans to 
two or three core industries selected by the Chabol with state 
approval. For example, Samsung Groups' core business sectors 
approved by the Korean government are electronics, machinery and 
chemicals; Hyundai's are motor vehicles, electronics and energy; 
LG's are electronics, chemicals and energy; and Daewoo's are 
motor vehicles, machinery and distribution. For the core sector 
scheme to be successful, anti-trust and fair trade laws should 
be strictly applied while eliminating the past special favours 
such as privileged access to cheaper financial resources and 
fiscal subsidies. The new government-business relationship will 
be more based upon the concept of economic efficiency. Of 
course, a strong role of government should be maintained in 
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creating a stable macroeconomic environment and a microeconomic 
environment conducive to productive and future-oriented business 
activities. 
In January 1995, the Korean government adopted measures to 
allow the Chabols to expand further if the family owners reduced 
their shareholdings to less than 20 percent. This marked a 
retreat from the past position of the government which tried to 
reduce the economic power of the thirty largest chabols. The 
hierarchical system and the monolithic line of command have to 
be restructured into a system of cooperation with 
specialization. To promote the long-term productivity of the 
Korean economy, the Korean conglomerates' social 
responsibilities and their efforts to contribute to the 
development of society by fair distribution of their benefits, 
are prerequisites. The merger of the Economic Planning Board 
and Finance Ministry into the Board of Finance and Economy in 
December 1994 was a clear attempt to push economic deregulation. 
Deregulation based upon market discipline will make the Chabols 
invest more money in product research and development, thus 
making the Korean economy more efficient. Korea's commercial 
diplomacy will be enhanced, according to the assistant minister 
for planning and management of the Ministry of Trade, Industry 
and Energy (MOITE), by actively participating in the WTO's Trade 
Policy Review Body, in the sectoral boards and committees of the 
global trade policy. The MOITE, in an advancement of trade- 
related rules and practices, will liberalize the export 
licensing system by approving potential trading firms, and 
gradually reduce the number of items subjected to import 
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restrictions. The creation of a finance and economy board was 
seen as an attempt to revitalize the economic liberalization 
programme. The government restructuring in December 1994 was 
targeted at reducing the power of bureaucrats who are 
conservative to reforms. The prime minister's office take-over 
of the Fair Trade Commission (FTC) from the former Economic 
Planning Board has been efficient in controlling the Chabols. 
The most important responsibility of those in charge of the 
economic management of a developing nation is to set up 
institutions that conform economic activity to the long-term 
development of a nation. The Korean economy has been managed by 
an authoritarian government during the last four decades, with 
a set of strong bureaucratic institutions geared only toward 
growth-oriented economic policies. The new civilian government 
has adopted several measures to achieve economic democratization 
since 1992. An authoritarian government is no longer appropriate 
in a new order where it is necessary to embrace diverse needs of 
the world trading system. A new government structure with a new 
philosophy to accommodate the changed realities is strongly 
demanded. A "truly strong government" should be referred to as 
one which is able to maximize the national potential by deriving 
a broad national consensus through a rational and democratic 
procedure. Only a legitimate one, with rational and democratic 
features, could successfully accomplish its grand responsibility 
to lead the nation towards accomplishing people's aspirations. 
As the world economic integration deepens, the deepening of 
mutual interdependence by world economic integration inevitably 
creates the need for a new relationship between Korea and the 
480 
rest of the world. in the past four decades, Korea has been 
fully geared toward mobilizing all available resources for 
industrialization, aided by a set of mercantilist policies in 
trade, investment, and industry. At the initial stages of 
development, this policy was justified. 
Nowadays, the situation exposes Korea to a new dimension of 
international competition. In order to have the trade policy 
instrument to play by international norms and rules, the 
political economy of Korea requires rather steady structural 
adjustment and more liberalization in every sector. 8O9 The major 
economic agents of Korea need to be equipped with new attitudes 
and values to tackle the new challenges. 
Structural adjustment and liberalization810 based on 
reciprocity are posing both challenges and opportunities for the 
Korean people. The concept of globalism in Korea's new diplomacy 
is that Korea will actively take part in global affairs and 
intensify the degree of inter-dependence among nations in the 
world. The concept of diplomacy diversification is also rooted 
in a multilateral context. Multidimensionalism refers to 
"comprehensive cooperation in every interaction including 
809. On the transitional characteristics of the economy, see 
SaKong I1, " Korea at Crossroads, " International Economic 
Insights, November/December: 10-14, Washington D. C.: Institute 
for International Economics, 1990. 
810. With regard to EU-Korean economic interaction, the 
liberalization of the Korea's financial market is the major 
concern. On the liberalization of the Korea's financial market, 
see Nam, Chong-Hyun, "Liberalization of Korean Financial Market, " 
Seoul: Korea Development Institute, 1992 Mimeo. 
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security, economy, environment, and culture. ""' Also, by 
enhancing the diplomacy of regional cooperation, Korea will be 
pursuing the open regionalism which contribute to building a 
common community in the world. It is only by liberalizing its 
own domestic economy that South Korea will be able to command 
the political and moral authority to persuade the European Union 
and other major trade partners to adopt a similar agenda in 
their trade regimes. 
s". Han, Sung-Joo, "Fundamental of Korean New Diplomacy: 
New Korea's Diplomacy toward the World and the Future", Korea 
and World Affairs, vol. 17, No. 2, Summer 1993, pp. 227-245. 
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APPENDIX I. A sub-Case Study of Samsung Electronics Factory 
in Billingham, UK through direct Interview with 
Project & Maintenance Manager, H. G. Noh of 
Samsung Electronics Manufacturing UK LTD., 
Billingham factory, at the reception room of 
the factory, from 11 a. m to 12: 30 p. m, on the 
26th, July 1995 
a) A Short Overview of birth of the Factory and its Future 
Plans: 
The Samsung Group is the World's 18th largest company 
with 27 businesses ranging from electronics, engineering 
and chemicals to financial and information services. 
Founded in 1938 in Taegu, Korea by the late Chairman 
Lee, Byung-Chull, Samsung has accomplished remarkable 
growth, achieving 1994 up to date opening 307 offices in 
59 nations. Samsung Electronics was founded in 1969 and 
started making black and white TVs in 1972. The company 
has grown to be one of the most advanced level firms, 
including everything from simple household consumer 
products to the most technologically sophisticated 
semiconductors. Samsung Electronics 
Manufacturing U. K. Ltd. (S. E. M. U. K. ) was established in 
1987 and is the only manufacturing site for Samsung in 
the UK. At the beginning stage SEMUK produced MWO, 
followed in May 1988 with VCR and then in November 1991 
we also started to produce Fax machines 1992 saw many 
changes. SEMUK applied for and were successful with 
an application to Samsung to concentrate on Colour 
Television manufacture. CTV production continues to 
increase and two more lines opened in 1994. The 
workforce at SEMUK has increased from 85 in January 
1992 to the current figure of 420 and is soon to be 
increased to about 1,000, to open the 2nd factory in the 
Billingham. These are further plans to recruit up to 
3,000 people in 1997. Samsung faces many changes and 
challenges as the regionalization and globalization of 
the world economy deepens. Only by creating products and 
services that are both competitive and of the highest 
quality, will Samsung successfully accomplish the task 
of internationalization and globalization. As part of 
this scheme, this factory will serve as the combined 
electronics manufacturing, R&D, design, and 
distribution base for all Europe. ' 
1. This short introduction to Samsung is based upon the interviews and SEMUK, No. 1, March 1995. 
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b) Questionnaire for Interviews to Investigate the underlying 
Motives of FDI in the EU 
Q. 1] Why was it established here, -in Billingham, UK? 
A. of Noh] Three considerations were important. The 
first one is the easiness of abundant labour with 
relatively cheap labour costs caused by high- 
unemployment rate in the UK. The second one is 
that the Cleveland area as an industrial complex, 
occupies almost 30 percent of the UK manufacturing 
output. Thirdly, sea transportation has been an 
been important condition to export products 
through nearby ports like Newcastle. 
Q. 2] Have you felt any particular impact of SEM for the 
management of this factory or future business 
strategy? 
A. N] So far, not so much. One thing to mention is the 
local content rule, e. g., to use Phillips 
components. 
Q. 3] Was the FDI of this factory a part of Samsung 
Group's Globalization Plan? 
A. N] The regionalization of the world economy requires 
the combined know-how of management for 
internationalization and for the creation of the 
synergy effects. This is a part of a project to 
realize the vision of a European market. 
Q. 4) Did NTB play any particular role in the further 4.6 
billion pounds investment? 
A. N] At the initial stage of Korea's FDI into Europe, 
the NTB factor was the major concern. However, the 
major concern for FDI seems to have shifted 
to the combined programme of insiderization to 
secure locally adapted products through local- 
specific design and technology. 
Q. 5] What could be the role of this factory for 
Samsung's future European business strategies? 
A. N] This factory will serve as the combined European 
production base as Samsung tries to realize the 7 
world bloc approach by the division of North 
America, Europe, China, ASEAN, Southeast Africa, 
and South America. 
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Q. 6] Does Samsung have any particular response 
strategies for the regionalization of the EU 
economy? 
A. N] Technological development and active insiderization 
could be a typical example. 
Q. 7] In the setting up process of this factory, the 
factor of technological capacity and the 
internationalization of the consumer taste, which 
out of the four dimensions (cognitive, international 
system, domestic politics, and firm's level), plays 
the biggest role as a motivating source to more 
investment for future business? 
A. N] On the technological side, it is possible to seek 
close cooperation with engineers of UK and Germany. 
Local-designing capacity will be more strengthened 
up to 100 percent completion stage in the future by 
comprehensive recruitment of relevant personnel. 
Q. 8] As a manager of the 2nd largest electronics 
manufacturing factory in Europe, what do you think 
the trade regimes of the EU will be in the 
future? 
A. N] It will produce both challenges and chances for 
Samsung. 
Q. 9] For the stable management of this factory, how do 
you guess the multilateralism under the WTO would 
help to remove business restrictions and 
constraints not only toward Europe, but also for 
the world market? 
A. N] As long as we have high technological capacity and 
good distribution system, and information network, 
multilateralism co-existing with regionalism does 
help to expand business with more rapidity. 
Q. 10] What is the ratio of your R&D expenditures to 
your total sales? 
A. N] As far as this factory is concerned, it is at the 
initial stage. 
Q. ll] Was the motive for this FDI based upon the 
following factors? (many of them are based upon 
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Hong- Gue Lee's questions in "Korea's Direct 
Investment in the EC, "" contained in KDI's Single 
European Market and Its Implications for Korea as 
an NIE 
a. high production costs at home 
A. N] It was one of several factors to be considered. 
b. new market development in the EU 
A. N] Sales subsidiaries in Europe in cooperation with 
our factory makes strategies. And regional 
allocation is usually done in Seoul Headquarters. 
c. for export to another country, especially to 
eastern bloc nations 
A. N] In the future, the Hungarian factory will be in 
charge of that. 
d. For the protection of the existing market in the EU 
and to increase the market shares 
A. N] Of course, in case of TV, 100 percent Samsung 
brand image will be promoted by this factory 
production, for the expansion of the market. 
e. For circumvention of tariffs and quotas imposition 
by the EU 
A. N] That was one of the major reasons to seek FDI 
into this region. 
f. for acquisition of new technologies in the EU 
A. N] It is true that the technological level of Europe 
in advanced firms is a little higher than that of 
Samsung except for a few items, which means that R 
&D base in London will play an important part to 
realize Samsung's insiderization of Europe 
market. 
g. for access to new materials developed in the EU 
A. N) Probably some, but I do not have detailed 
knowledge of that. 
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h. to deal with an uncertain world economic 
environment coming from growing protectionism, 
fluctuating exchange rates and interest rates, and 
possible recession 
A. N] I think so. 
i. to secure a favourable position in the world 
financial market resulting from the 
internationalization of the production 
A. N] A UK government's favourable response, if we 
ask, is expected in the future. 
j. to consolidate home market position by utilizing 
economies of scope, scale, or technological 
information ensuing internationalization 
A. N] We could not ignore the image of UK as the birth 
nation of industrial revolution in the middle of 
the 19th century. " Made in UK" would upgrade 
Samsung's brand image and could suit specific 
local demand. 
k. to extend production lines by using common 
production facilities, sales, and distribution 
systems, and brand names 
A. N] We did consider that. 
new production, sales 
capacities in Europe. 
The main plan was to create 
and distribution 
Q. 12] Any particular reasons for the selection of this 
host nation? 
A. N] Infrastructure in the Cleveland area are good. 
Domestic political factors of the UK in terms of 
labour policy, employment policy will influence 
the operation of the factory. However, the 
potential of the UK market growth did not look so 
bright; rather this factory was mainly aimed at 
expanding the whole European market. 
Q. 13] Are your subsidiaries in the EU mostly joint 
ventures or wholly owned operation? 
A. N] 100 percent Samsung capital 
Q. 14] What is the ratio of sales in the EU, the 
amount of exports to third nations, the local 
production of the EU to total production? 
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A. N] I do not have data, but I do know that it is 
increasing every year. 
Q. 15] What is the percentage of local employment in 
your subsidiaries in labour and technical and 
managerial staff? 
A. N] Only 8 Korean managers are in charge of the 
workforce of 450 and 500 two factories, as of 
now. 
Q. 16] Where do you place the quality of your product? 
A. N] I think Samsung have the same level of 
functioning technology, but fall a little 
behind in designing capacity and in a few 
highly sophisticated products like 
grandvisions. 
Q. 17) What is the ratio of exporting back to Korea 
from this factory? 
A. N] 0 percent 
Q. 18] Did the local content rule play a big role in 
establishing this factory? 
A. N] We currently have a local content ratio of 76 
percent. The future task will be 100 percent 
localization to accommodate Samsung's vision of 
internationalization and localization. 
Q. 19] As the manager of the 2nd largest electronics 
manufacturing factory in Europe, what do you 
think of the future electronics industry's 
prospects in Europe? 
A. N] I foresee a steady growth of 2-3 percent 
annually. Sophisticated products will be more 
widespread in the existing market. 
Q. 20] Will the domestic politics of Korea have a 
certain impact on the future electronics 
industry of Korea as a high-tech sector? 
A. N] In case of the electronics industry, the 
current industrial policy of the Korean 
government will not be changing for the 
foreseeable future. The active government 
support for R&D in basic science is becoming 
all the more crucial for ultimate 
competitiveness. 
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Q. 21] How will the further integration of the EU in 
terms of deepening and enlargement shape the 
future business strategy of Samsung electronics 
in the future? 
A. N] I do not think there will be any radical 
changes. Just steady growth in market share 
is expected, as it is going on. But the 
unification of regulations on business by more 
deepening of the business interdependence among 
member nations will change the pattern of 
business and we will seek various response 
strategies according to the issues. 
Q. 22] Does Samsung have any other specific plans 
against the regionalization and globalization 
of the world economy? 
A. N] Considering the importance of high-level human 
resources, Samsung will invest in education and 
training. The productivity of Samsung depends 
upon the quality of manpower Samsung produces 
in the future. In collaboration with the 
government, much attention should be paid for 
the future hollow phenomenon in Korea's 
manufacturing sector because of aggressively 
moving production bases to other local 
territories. 
Q. 23] In the EU-Korean economic relation, what will 
be the most important thing for both of the two 
entities to bear in mind for the strenuous 
expansion of mutual trade? 
A. N] Korea needs to advertise more in the European 
region. Despite tremendous growth and 
affirmative factors to be known, I can see 
some negative image of Korea embedded in 
people's minds, based on slight knowledge of 
the backward Korea of the 1950s and 1960s. 
The new image of Korea should be promoted by 
active public relations and advertisement 
activities. Secondly, too fierce competition 
among Korean domestic firms in the electronics 
sector does not create a good countermeasure 
to tackle the EU regionalism; some 
coordination efforts need to be 
made on this point. What is most important of 
all could be the credibility between the 
Korean government and EU member nations for 
long-term development of more enhanced ties. 
Q. 24] If the former Eastern European nations 
become full members of the EU, what are the 
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challenges and opportunities for the Samsung 
Electronics? 
A. N] I don't expect any big changes in our 
business. 
Q. 25] Could close regionalism prevail in Europe 
against the rapid expansion of ANIE's 
exports? 
A. N] only through continuous sophistication of 
differentiated products, strategic alliances 
and joint ventures, the firm, ' scompetitiveness 
could be maintained even against close 
regionalism. 
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APPENDIX II. INTERVIEWS 
Oh, Seung Koo, Senior Economist, American & European Studies 
Section, Samsung Economic Research Institute, Seoul, Korea, 
on 11 Major Challenges and Constraints of Samsung 
Electronics, ", 23 July 1994 at the Research Institute. 
Noh, H. G., Manager of Project & Maintenance, Samsung 
Electronics Factory in Billingham, U. K., on, "Future Prospect 
of Samsung's Business as a Foreign Subsidiary, " at the 
Reception Room of the factory on the 26th, July 1995. 
Woo, Kook-Bin, Deputy-Director, International Cooperation 
Department, Korea Productivity Center, Seoul, Korea, August, 
1994. This interview was an informal chat. 
Kim, Yun-Hwan, Assistant Manager, Marketing & Regional 
Strategy Team, International operations office, Samsung 
Electronics CO., LTD, on "Proper Response Strategies of 
Samsung Electronics against the Regionalism and 
Globalization of the World Economy, " at Meeting Room, 
Joong-Ang Daily News Building, on 17 August, 1994 
An, Jae-Dong, Electronic Machinery Industry Division, Ministry 
of Trade, Industry & Energy of Republic of Korea, on"Korean 
Electronics Firms Strategies on Regionalism and 
Globalization, " in 25 June, 1994, at the Ministry Office. 
Kang, Seon-Gu, Analyst, Economic Research Division, Lucky- 
Goldstar Economic Research Institute, on "LG Electronics 
Strategies on Globalism, " on 24 July 1994, at the Research 
Institute. 
Cho, Yong-Suk, Manager, Internationalization Strategy 
Corporate Planning Office, Samsung Electronics, on "Samsung 
Electronics Internationalization Strategy, " on 26 July 1994, 
at his working office. 
Yoon, Seung-Ro, Assistant Manager, Marketing & Regional 
Strategy Team for Europe, International operations office, 
Samsung Electronics, "On Samsung Electronics Business 
Strategies in the Future, " on 25 July, 1994, at the Samsung 
Office. 
Nah, Chang-Yup, Euro Division, Area Research Dept., Korean 
Trade Promotion Corporation(KOTRA), "On General EU-Korean 
Economic Relations, " on 3 August, 1994, at the KOTRA Office. 
Park, Ki-Jong and Shin, Ki-Sung, Reporters, The Electronic 
Times, Seoul, "On the General Problems of the Korean 
Electronics Industry, " on 24 July, 1994, at the newspaper 
office. 
Lee, Sang-Keun, Manager, Planning Dept. Electronics Industries 
Association of Korea, " On the New Strategies of the Korean 
Electronics Industry in the Future in an era of regionalism 
and globalization, " on 27 June, 1994, at the EIAK Office. 
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APPENDIX III 
TREATY ESTABLISHING THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC COMMUNITY(Article 110-6) 
Commercial Policy 
Article 110- By establishing a customs union between themselves 
the Member States intend to contribute, in conformity with the 
common interest, to the harmonious development of world trade, 
the progressive abolition of restrictions on international 
exchange and the lowering of customs barriers. The common 
commercial policy shall take into account the favorable 
incidence which the abolition of customs duties as between 
Member States may have on the increase of the competitive 
strength of the enterprises in those States. 
Article 111- In the course of the transitional period and 
without prejudice to Articles 115 and 116, the following 
provisions shall apply: 
1. Member States shall co-ordinate their commercial relations 
with third countries in such a way as to bring about, not later 
than at the expiry of the transitional period, for the 
establishment of the common action and regarding the achievement 
of a uniform commercial policy. 
The Commission shall submit to the Council Proposals 
regarding the procedure to be applied, in the course of the 
transitional period, for the establishment of common action and 
regarding the achievement of a uniform commercial policy. 
2. The Commission shall submit to the Council recommendations 
with a view to tariff negotiations with third countries 
concerning the common customs tariff. 
The Council shall authorize the Commission to open such 
negotiations. 
The commission shall conduct these negotiations in 
consultation with a special committee appointed by the Council 
to assist the Commission in this task and within the framework 
of such directives as the Council may issue to it. 
3. The Council shall, when exercising the power conferred upon it under this Article, act during the firs two stages by means 
of a unanimous vote and subsequently by means of a qualified 
majority vote. 
4. Member States shall, in consultation with the Commission take 
all necessary measures with the object, in particular, of 
adjusting their tariff agreements in force with third countries in order that the entry into force of the common customs tariff 
may not be delayed. 
5. Member states shall aim at securing uniformity between 
themselves at as high a level as possible of their lists of 
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liberalization in regard to third countries or groups of third 
countries. For this purpose the commission shall make any 
appropriate recommendations to Member States. 
If Member States abolish or reduce quantitative 
restrictions in regard to third countries they shall inform the 
Commission beforehand and shall accord identical treatment to 
the other Member States. 
Article 112- Without prejudice to obligations undertaken by 
Member States within the framework of other international 
organizations, their measures to aid exports to third countries 
shall be progressively harmonized before the end of the 
transitional period to the extent necessary to ensure that 
competition between enterprises within the community shall not 
be distorted. 
On a proposal of the Commission, the Council, acting until 
the end of the second stage by means of a unanimous vote and 
subsequently by means of a qualified majority vote, shall issue 
the directives necessary for this purpose. 
2. The preceding provisions shall not apply to such drawbacks on 
customs duties or charges with equivalent effect nor to such 
refunds of indirect charges including turnover taxes, excise 
duties, and other indirect taxes as are accorded in connection 
with exports of goods from a Member State to a third country, to 
the extent that such drawbacks or refunds do not exceed the 
charges which have been imposed, directly or indirectly, on the 
products exported. 
Article 113- After the expiry of the transitional period, the 
common commercial policy shall be based on uniform principles, 
particularly in regard to tariff amendments, the conclusion of 
tariff or trade agreements, the alignment of measures of 
liberalization export policy and protective commercial measures 
including measures to be taken in cases of dumping or subsidies. 
2. The commission shall submit proposals to the Council for the 
putting into effect of this common commercial policy. 
3. Where agreements with third countries require to be 
negotiated, the Commission shall make recommendations to the 
Council, which will authorize the Commission to open the 
necessary negotiations. 
The Commission shall conduct these negotiations in 
consultation with a special Committee appointed by the Council 
to assist the Commission in this task and within the framework 
of such directives as the Council may issue to it. 
4. The Council, shall, when exercising the powers conferred upon it by this Article, act by means of a qualified majority vote. 
Article 114- The agreement referred to in Article 111, paragraph 
2, and in Article 113 shall be concluded on behalf of the 
community by the Council acting during the first two stages by 
means of a unanimous vote and subsequently by means of a 
qualified majority vote. 
Article 115- In order to ensure that the execution of measures 
of commercial policy taken in conformity with this Treaty by any 
Member State shall not be prevented by diversions of commercial traffic, or where disparities between such measures lead to 
economic difficulties in one or more of the Member States, the 
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Commission shall recommend the methods whereby the other Member 
States provides the necessary co-operation. Failing this, the 
Commission shall authorize the Member States to take the 
necessary protective measures of which it shall determine the 
conditions and particulars. 
In case of emergency and during the transitional period, 
Member States may themselves take such necessary measures and 
shall notify them to the other Member States and also to the 
Commission which may decide that the State concerned shall amend 
or revoke such measures. 
In choosing such measures, policy shall be given to those 
which cause the least disturbance to the functioning of the 
Common Market and which take due account of the necessicity for 
expediting, as far as possible, the introduction of the common 
customs tariff. 
Article 116- As from the end of the transitional period, Member 
States shall in respect of all matters of particular interest in 
regard to the Common Market, within the framework of any 
international organizations of an economic character, only 
proceed by way of common action. The Commission for this purpose 
submit to the Council, which shall act by means of a qualified 
majority vote, proposals concerning the scope and implementation 
of such common action. 
During the transitional period, Member states shall consult 
with each other with a view to concerting their action and as 
far as possible, adopting uniform attitude. 
494 
APPENDIX Iv, THE GENERA1, AGREEMENT ON 
TARIFFS AND TRADE 
Article I 
General A1ost-Favoured-Nation Treatment 
I. With respect to customs duties and charges of any kind imposed on or in 
connection with importation or exportation or imposed on the international transfer 
of payments for imports or exports, and with respect to the method of levying 
such duties and charges, and with respect to all rules and for tnalities in connection 
with importation and exportation, and with respect to all matters referred to in 
paragraphs 2 and 4 of Article Ill, * any advantage, favour, privilege or immunity 
granted by any contracting party to any product originating in or destined for any 
other country shall be accorded immediately and unconditionally to the like 
product originating in or destined for the territories of all other contracting par tics. 
2. The provisions of paragraph I of this Article shall not require the elinrin- 
atioi of any preferences in respect of import duties or charges which do not 
exceed the levels provided for in paragraph 4 of this Article and which fall within 
the following descriptions: 
(a) l'iefeicnces in force exclusively between two or more of the tciri- 
tories listed in Annex A. subject to the conditions set foitli therein; 
(h) f iefeiences in force exclusively between two or more territories 
which on July 1.1939, were connected by common sovereignty ur 
relations of protection or suzerainty and which are listed in Annexes 
B, C and D. subject to the conditions set foith tlierein; 
(e) I'iefeiences in force exclusively between the Unitod Slates of 
America and the Republic of Cuba; 
(d) Preferences in lot cc exclusively heiwecn neighbouring countries 
listed in Annexes F and F. 
3. The piovisions of paragraph I shall not apply to preferences between the 
countries formerly a part of the Ottoman Empire and detached from it on July 24, 
1923, provided such preferences are approved under paragraph 5' of Article XXV. 
which shall be applied in this respect in the light of paragraph I of Article XXIX. 
4. The mal-gin of preference* on any product in respect of which a preference 
is permitted under paragraph 2 of this Article but is not specifically set forth as 
a maximum margin of preference in the appropriate Schedule annexed to this 
Agreement shall not exceed: 
(a) in respect of duties or charges on any product described in such 
Schedule. the difference between the most-favoured-nation and 
preferential rates provided for therein, if no preferential rate is 
provided for, the preferential rate shall for the purposes of this 
paragraph he taken to be that in force on April 10.1947, and, if no 
most-favoured-nation rate is provided for, the margin shall not 
exceed the difference between the most-favoured-nation and prefer- 
ential rates existing on April 10,1947; 
(b) in respect of duties or charges on any product not described in the 
appropriate Schedule. the difference between the most-favoured- 
nation and ptefetential rates existing on April 10,1947. 
In the case of the contracting pal ties named in Annex G, the date of April 1O. 
1947, referred to in subparagraph ((r) and (b) of this paragraph shall be replaced 
by the respective dates set forth in that Annex. 
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origin, and shall he computed on the basis ofscrcen tine Irr iheatre 
per year or the equivalent thereof; 
(h) With the exception of screen tine reserved for films of national 
origin under a screen quota, screen time including that released by 
administiative action from screen time reserved for films of national 
origin, shall not be allocated formally or in effect among sources 
of supply; 
(c) Notwithstanding the provisions of'suhparagrahh (h) of this Article, 
any contacting party may maintain screen quotas confotwing to the 
requirements of suhpatagraph (a) of this Article which reserve a 
minimum proportion of screen time for films of a specified origin 
other than that of the contracting party imposing such screen quotas; 
Provided that no such m ininium proportion of screen time shall he 
increased above the level in effect on April 10,19.47; 
(d) Screen quotas shall be subject to negotiation for their limitation, 
liherali7ation or elimination. 
Article VI 
Anti-dumping and Countervailing Uuºies 
1. The contracting parties recognize that dumping, by "hich products of one 
country are introduced into the commerce of another country at less than the 
normal value of the products, is to he condemned if it causes or threatens material 
injury to an established industry in the territory of a contracting party or materially 
retards the establishment of a domestic industry. For the purposes of this 
Article. 
a product is to be considered as being introduced into the commerce of an 
importing country at less than its normal value, if the price of the product 
exported from one country to another 
(a) is less than the comparable price, in the ordinary course of trade. 
for the like product when destined for consumption in the exporting 
country, or, 
(b) in the absence of such domestic price, is less than either 
(i) the highest comparable price for the like product for export 
to any third country in the ordinary course of trade, or 
(ii) the cost of production of the product in the country of origin 
plus a reasonable addition for selling cost and profit. 
Due allowance shall be made in each case for differences in conditions and terms 
of sale, for differences in taxation. and for other differences affecting price 
comparability. * 
2. In order to offset or prevent dumping, a contracting parly may levy on any 
dumped product an anti-dumping duty not greater in amount than the margin of 
dumping in respect of such product. For the purposes of this Article, the margin 
of dumping is the price difference determined in accordance with the provisions 
of paragraph I. * 
3. No countervailing duty shall be levied on any product of the territory of 
any contracting party imported into the territory of another contracting party in 
excess of an amount equal to the estimated bounty or subsidy determined to have 
been granted, directly or indirectly, on the manufacture, production or export of 
such product in the country of origin or exportation, including any special subsidy 
to the transportation of a particular product. The term "countervailing duty" shall 
be understood to mean a special duty levied for the purpose of offsetting any 
bounty or subsidy bestowed, directly, or indirectly, upon the manufacture, 
production or export of any merchandise. * 
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4. No product of the territory of any contracting pasty imported into the 
territory of any other contracting party shall be subject to anti-dumping or 
countervailing duty by reason of the exemption of such product from duties or 
taxes borne by the like product when destined for consumption in the country 
of origin or exportation. or by reason of the refund of such duties or taxes. 
5. No product of the territory of any contracting party imported into the 
territory of any other contracting party shall be subject to both anti-dumping and 
countervailing duties to compensate for the same situation of dumping or export 
subsidization. 
6. (a) No contracting party shall levy any anti-dumping or countervailing 
duty on the importation of any product of the territory of another contracting party 
unless it determines that the effect of the dumping or subsidization, as the case 
may be, is such as to cause or threaten material injury to an established domestic 
industry, or is such as to retard materially the establishment of a domestic 
industry. 
(h) The CONTRACTING PARTIES may waive the requirement of 
subparagraph (a) of this paragraph so as to permit a contracting party to levy an 
anti-dumping or countervailing duty on the importation of any product for the 
purpose of offsetting dumping or subsidization which causes or threatens mates ial 
injury to an industry in the territory of another contracting party exporting the 
product concerned to the territory of the importing contracting party. The CON- 
TRACTING PARTIES shall waive the requirements of subparagraph (a) of this 
paragraph. so as to permit the levying of a countervailing duty, in cases in which 
they find that a subsidy is causing or threatening material injury to in industry 
in the territory of another contracting party exporting the product concerned to 
the territory of the importing contracting party. * 
(c) In exceptional circumstances, however, where delay might cause 
damage which would he difficult to repair, a contracting party may levy a 
countervailing duty for the purpose referred to in subparagraph (b) of this para- 
graph without the prior approval of the CON'T'RACTING PARTIES; Provided 
that such action shall h' reported immediately to the ('ONTIRA('TIN(i PARTIES 
and that the countervailing duty shall be withdrawn promptly if the CON'I'RAC'I'- 
ING PARTIES disapprove. 
7. A system for the stabilization of the domestic price or of the return to 
domestic producers of a primary commodity, independently of the movements 
of export pt ices, which results at times in the sale of the commodity for export 
at a price lower than the comparable price charged for the like commodity to 
buyers in the domestic market, shall be presumed not to result in material injury 
within the moaning of paragraph 6 if it is determined by consultation among the 
contracting parties substantially interested in the commodity concerned that: 
(a) the system has also resulted in the sale of the commodity for export 
at a price higher than the comparable price charged for the like 
commodity to buyers in the domestic market. and 
(b) the system is so operated, either because of the effective regulation 
of production, or otherwise, as not to stimulate exports unduly or 
otherwise seriously prejudice the interests of other contracting 
parties. 
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Article " 11* 
( 'ii« irýl 1.3i! rtillatiurt of Quantitative Restrictions 
I. No prohibitions (H restrictions other Ih, rn duties. taxes car Other charges, 
wvhelher made effective tht(nigh quotas. import or export licences o (ithcr 
measures, shall be instituted or maintained by any contracting patty on the im- 
Imitation of any product of the territory of any other contracting early or on the 
exportation 0r sale for exhort of any product destined for the ten itory of any oilier 
contiacting patty. 
?. The poviSiOnS of paragraph I of this Article shall not extend to the Iol- 
lu, cing: 
(n) Erholt prohibitions or rests icIions temporal ily applied to }'revert or 
relieve critical shortages of foodstuffs or other products essential to 
the exporting contracting palI%,: 
(h) Import and export prohibitions or Iesuictions necessary to the 
application of standards or regulations for the classification, grading 
or matketiii of commodities in international trade; 
(c) Import restrictions on ally agricultural or fisheries product. impftted 
in any form. '" necessary to the enforcement of governmental 
rneasutes which operate: 
(i) to restrict the quantities of the like domestic product per- 
tnitted to be matketed or produced. or. if there is no substan- 
tial domestic production of the like product, of a domestic 
product for which the imported product can he directly sub- 
stituted; or 
(ii) to temove a temporary surplus of the like domestic product, 
or, if theºe is no substantial domestic production of the like 
product, of a domestic product for which the imported prod- 
uct can be directly substituted, by making the surplus avail- 
able to certain groups of domestic consumers lice of change 
or at ht ices below the current tnai ket level: or 
(iii) to restrict the quantities permitted to be produced of any 
animal product the production of which is directly dependent. 
wholly or mainly, on the impoºted commodity, if the (Ionic. "- 
tic production of that commodity is relatively negligible. 
Any contracting party applying restrictions on the importation of any product 
pursuant to subparagraph (c) of this paragraph shall give public notice of the total 
quantity or value of the product permitted to he imported during a specified future 
period and of any change in such quantity or value. Moreover, any restrictions 
applied under (i) above shall not be such as will reduce the total of impoits 
relative to the total of domestic production, as compared with the proportion 
Which might reasonably he expected to rule between the (WO in the , rharuce. of' 
I(Strictions. In determining this proportion, the contracting party shall pay due 
tegaid to the Proportion prevailing dining a previous representative period and 
to any special factors'h which may have affected or may be affecting the trade 
in the product concerned. 
498 
Article X11'" 
Restrictions to Safeguard the Balance of Payments 
I. Notwithstanding the provisions of paragraph I of Article XI, any contract- 
ing patty, in order to safeguard its external financial position and its balance of 
payments. may restrict the quantity or value of merchandise permitted to be 
imported. subject- to the provisions of the following paragraphs of this Article. 
2. (a) Inipoit restrictions instituted, maintained or intensified by a con- 
tracting party under this Article shall not exceed those necessary: 
(i) to forestall the imminent threat of, or to stop, a serious 
decline in its monetary reserves. or 
(ii) in the case of a contracting party with very low monetary 
reserves, to achieve a reasonable rate of increase in its 
reserves. 
Due regard shall he paid in either case to any special factors which may be 
affecting the reserves of such contracting party or its need for reserves, including, 
where special external credits or other resources are available to it, the need to 
provide for the approptiate use of such credits or resources. 
(b) Contracting parties applying restrictions under sub-paragraph (11) of' 
this paragraph shall piogressively relax them as such conditions improve, main- 
taining them only to the extent that the coAditions specified in that sub-paragtaph 
still justify their application. They shall eliminate the restrictions when conditions 
would no longer justify their institution or maintenance under that subparagraph. 
3. (a) Contracting parties undertake, in carrying out their domestic policies, 
to pay due regard to the need for maintaining or restoring equilibrium in their 
balance of payments on a sound and lasting basis and to the desirability of 
avoiding an uneconomic employment of productive resources. They recognize 
that, in order to achieve these ends, it is desirable so far as possible to adopt 
measures which expand rather than contract international trade. 
(h) Contracting parties applying restrictions under this Article may 
determine the incidence of the restrictions on imports of different products or 
classes of products in such a way as to give priority to the importation of those 
products which are more essential. 
(c) Contracting parties applying restrictions under this Article undertake: 
(i) to avoid unnecessary damage tu the commercial or c commie interests of any other contracting patty; * 
(ii) not to apply restrictions so as to prevent unreasonably the impoºtation of any description of goods in minimum com- 
metcial quantities the exclusion of which would impair 
regular channels of trade; and 
(iii) not to apply restrictions which would prevent the importations 
of commercial samples or prevent compliance with patent, 
trade mat k, copyright, or similar procedures. 
(d) The contracting parties recognize that, as a result of domestic policies directed towards the achievement and maintenance of full and productive 
employment or towards the development of economic resources, a contracting 
party may experience a high level of demand for imports involving a threat to its monetary reserves of the Sort referred to in paragraph 2 (a) of" this Article. 
Accordingly, a contracting, patty otherwise complying with the piovisions of this Article shall not be required to withdraw or modify restrictions on the ground 
that a change in those policies would rende1 unnecessary restrictions which it is 
applying under this Anicle. 
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4. (a) Any contractinsg patty applying new restrictions or raising the general 
level of its existinc restrictions by a suhsiantial intensification of the measures 
applied under this Article shall immediately after instituting or intensifying such 
restrictions (or, in circumstances in which prirrrconsultaticott is practicable, befuge 
doing so) consult with the CONTRACTING PARTIES as to the stature of* its 
balance of' payrnents clifticuities. alternative corrective measures which may he 
available, and tire possible effect of' the restrictions on the economies of' other 
contracting parties. 
Ih) On it (late to he determined by them, -'' the CONTRA('I'INO 
PARTIES shall review all restrictions still applied under this Article can that elate. 
Beginning one year after that elate. contracting parties applyitºc import resit ietinns 
uncles this Article Shall enter into ccrosultaticros of tire type provided lot in 
subparagraph ((i) of this paragraph with the CON'FRACI'ING PARTIES annually'. 
(e) (i) If. in the corrrsc ol'cemsttltations with a contracting party rtncler 
subparagraph (u) or (b) above, the CON"I'RAC'I'ING PARTIES find that the re- 
strictions are not consistent with provisions cif this Ar ticle car with those of Article 
XIII (subject to the provisions of Article XIV), They shall indicate tine nature Of 
tile inconsistency and may advise that the restrictions be suitably modified. 
(ii) If, however, as a result of the consultations, the CONTRAC'I'- 
ING PARTIES determine that the restrictions are being applied in a manner 
involving an inconsistency of a serious nature \t, ith the provisions cif this Article 
or with those of Article XIII (subject to the provisions of Article XIV) and that 
damage to the trade of alle contracting i my is caused or thieatetlecl Iheieby. they 
shall so inform the contracting party applying the restrictions and shall slake 
approl, t iate recommendations lot secttrinacon101111ity With such provisions Witlltll 
Ilse specified period of time. If such contracting party does not comply with these 
recommendations within the specified period, the CONTRACTING PART lI: S 
uiia release any contracting patty the trade cif which is adversely affected by Ilte 
restrictions from such obligation` under this Agreement towai s the cotitiaclin; g 
h, nly applying the restrictions as they detcrnline Io he approllºiate in the citcunl 
stances. 
(d) The CONTRACTING PARTIES shall invite any contracting Imtty 
which is applying restrictions under this Article to enter into consultations with 
them at the request of any contracting patty which can establish a prima /u ie 
case that the restrictions are inconsistent with the provisions cif tlºis Article or will) 
those of Atticle \III (subject to the provisions of Article XIV) and that its Itade 
is adversely affected thereby. I lowever, 110 SUCII invitation Shall be issued unless 
the CONTRACTING PARTIES have ascertained that direct discussions between 
the contracting pat tics concerned have not been successful. If, as a result of the 
consultations with the CONTRACTING PARTIES, no agreement is reached and 
they determine that the restrictions ate being applied inconsistently with such 
provisions, and that damage to the trade of the contracting Patty initiating the pro- 
cedtire is caused or threatened thereby, they shall recommend the withdrawal or 
modification of the restrictions. If the restrictions are not withdrawn or modified 
within such time as the CONTRACTING PARTIES may prescribe, they may 
tclease the contracting party initiating the procedure frone such obligations under 
this Agreement towards the contracting party applying the restrictions as they 
determine toi he appropriate ill the circunºst, ºnces. 
, 
(e) In proceeding under this paragraph. the C(. )NTRAC] ING PARTIES 
shall have due regard to any special external factors adversely affectitug the ex pot t 
trade of the contiacting party applying the testtictions. '` 
(f) Oeterminatioils under this paragraph shall he rendered expeditiously 
and. it' possible. Within sixty days of the initiation of the consultations. 
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5. If there is a persistent and widespread application of import restrictions 
under this Article, indicating the existence of a general diseyuilibrium which is 
restricting international trade, the CONTRACTING PARTIES shall initiate 
discussions to consider whether other measures might be taken, either by those 
contracting parties the balance of payments of which are under pressure or by 
those the balance of payments of which are tending to be exceptionally favourable, 
or by any appropriate intergovernmental organization, to remove the underlying 
causes of the disequilibrium. On the invitation of the CONTRACTING PARTIES, 
contracting parties shall participate in such discussions. 
Article XIII* 
Nor, -disrriminato, ' Administration of Quantitative Re. c! º"icvion, c 
I. No prohibition or restriction shall he applied by any conliacting party on 
the importation of any product of the territory of any other contracting party or 
on the expoºtation of any product destined for the termitory of any other contract- 
ing party, unless the importation of the like product of all third countries or the 
exportation of the like product to all third countries is similarly prohibited or 
restricted. 
2. In applying impott tests ictions to any product, contracting parties shall aim 
at a dish ibution of trade in such product approaching as closely as possible the 
shares which the various contracting parties might be expected to obtain in the 
absence of such restrictions and to this end shall observe the following provisions: 
(a) Wheiever practicable, quotas representing the total amount of per- 
mitted imports (whether allocated among supplying countries or not) 
shall he lixed, and notice given of their amount in accordance with 
paragraph 3 (h) of this Article: 
(h) In cases in which quotas are not practicable, the restrictions may 
be applied by means of import licences or permits without a quota; 
(c) Contracting parties shall not, except for purposes of operating quotas 
allocated in accordance with subparagraph ((I) of this paragraph, 
require that impot t licences or permits he utilized for the importation 
of the product concerned from a particular country or source: 
(d) In cases in which a quota is allocated among supplying countries 
the contracting party applying the restrictions may seek agreement 
with respect to the allocation of shares in the quota with all other 
contracting parties having a substantial interest in supplying the 
product concerned. In cases in which this method is not reasonably 
practicable, the contracting party concerned shall allot to contracting 
parties having a substantial interest in supplying the product shares 
based upon the proportions, supplied by such contracting parties 
during a previous representative period, of the total quantity or value 
of imports of the product, due account being taken of any special 
factors which may have affected or may be affecting the trade in 
the product. No conditions or formalities shall be imposed which 
would prevent any contracting party from utilizing fully the share 
of any such total quantity or value which has been allotted to it. 
subject to importation being made within any prescribed period to 
which the quota may relate. * 
501 
3. (a) In cases in which irnprnl licences are. issued in connection with 
import restrictions, the contracting party applying the restrictions shall provide. 
upon the request of any contracting party having an interest in the trade in the 
product concerned, all relevant information concerning the administration of the 
resttictious, the import licences granted over a recent period and the distribution 
of such licences among Supplying crntntries; I'rori(lecl that there shall be no 
obligation to supply information as to the names of importing or supplying 
enterpr ices. 
(h) In the ease of import Iestrlctlons involving the fixing of quotas, the 
contracting party applying the resltictions shall give public notice of the total 
(Irt, rntity or value of' the product or products which will be permitted to be 
imported doting a specified future period and of any change in such quantity or 
value. Any supplies of the product in question which wete en prügle at the tithe 
at which public nnrice was given shall not he excluded fron entry: Provided that 
they nlay he counted so far as practicable. against the quantity permitted to be 
ittlpotted in the. period in question. and also, where necessity. against the quan- 
tities permitted to he imported in the next following period or periods: and 
1'rovielc"cl further that if any contracting party cuslonuuily exempts Flom such 
restrictions products entered for consumption or withdrawn from warehouse for 
consumption during a period of thirty clays after the day of such public notice. 
such practice shall he considered full compliance with this subparagraph. 
(c) In the case of quotas allocated among supplying countries. the 
contracting party applying the restrictions shall promptly inform all other con- 
tracting fiat ties having an interest in supplying the product concerned of the shares 
in the quota currently allocated, by quantity or value, to the various supplying 
countries and shall dive public notice thereof. 
4. With regard to restrictions applied in accordance with paragraph 2 (d) of 
this Article or under paragraph 2 (e) of Article XI, the selection of a representative 
period for any product and the appraisal of any special factors" affecting the trade 
in the product shall be made initially by the contracting party applying the 
restriction: Provided that such contracting party shall, upon the request of any 
other contracting party having a substantial interest in supplying that product or 
upon the request of the CONTRACTING PARTIES, consult promptly with the 
other contracting party or the CONTRACTING PARTIES regarding the need for 
an adjustment of the proportion determined or of the base period selected, or for 
the t eappraisal of the special factors involved, or for the elimination of conditions, 
formalities or any other provisions established unilaterally relating to the allocation 
of an adequate quota or its unrestricted utilization. 
5. The provisions of this Article shall apply to any tariff quota instituted or 
ºnaintained by any contracting party, and, in so far as applicable, the principles 
of this Article shall also extend to export restrictions. 
Article XIV'! 
/". U'(y, liO11S (0 ! /reg Rule 
A contracting patty which applies ºeSttictious antler Article XII or under Sectiotº 11 of Article XVIII ttiay. in the application of such restrictions, deviate 
fºOOºn the piovisiotis of Aºlicle XIII in a manner having equivalent effect to 
restrictions on payments and transfers for current international transactions which 
that contracting party may at that time apply under Auticle Vill or XIV or the Articles of Agreement of the International Monetary Fund. OF antler analogous 
pt0Visicros ofa Special excltanue a, rectnent cnteicd into pursuant to pataguapIi 6 
of, Article X\'. '. 
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2. A contracting party which is applying import restrictions under Article XII 
or under Section B of Article XVIII may. with the consent of the CONTRACT- 
ING PARTIES, temporarily deviate from the provisions of Article XIII in respect 
of a small part of its external trade where the benefits to the contracting party 
or contracting parties conceºned substantially outweigh any injury which may 
result to the trade of other contracting parties. '! ` 
3. The provisions of Article XIII shall not preclude a grouj) of territories 
having a common quota in the International Monetary fund from applying against 
imports fioni other countries, but not among themselves, restrictions in accordance 
with the provisions of Article XII or of Section B of Article XVIII on condition 
that such restrictions are in all other respects consistent with the provisions of 
Article XIII. 
4. A Contracting party applying import restrictions under Atticle XII or under 
Section B of Article XVIII shall not be precluded by Articles XIto XV or Section 
13 of Article XVIII of this , \vreenient from applying measures to direct its exports 
in such a manner as to increase its earnings of currencies which it can use without 
deviation from the provisions of Article XIII. 
5. A contracting patty shall not be precluded by Articles XI to XV, inclusive. 
or by Section B of Article XVIII, of this Agreement from applying quantitative 
restrictions: 
(a) having equivalent effect to exchange restrictions authorized under 
Section 3 (h) of Article VII of the Articles of Agreement of the 
International Monetary Fund, or 
(b) under the preferential arrangements provided for in Annex A of this 
Agreement, pending the outcome of the negotiations referred to 
therein. 
Article X VP * 
Subsidies 
Section A- Subsidies in General 
I. If any contracting party grants or maintains any subsidy, including any form 
of income or price support, which operates directly or indirectly to increase 
exports of any product from, or to reduce impoºts of any product into, its territory, 
it shall notify the CONTRACTING PARTIES in writing of the extent and nature 
of the subsidization, of the estimated effect of (lie subsidization on the quantity 
of the affected product or products impoºted into or exported from its territory 
and of the circumstances making the subsidization necessary. In any case in which 
it is determined that serious prejudice to the interests of any other contracting 
party is caused or threatened by any such subsidization, the contracting party 
granting the subsidy shall, upon request, discuss with the other contracting patty 
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or parties concerned, or with the CONTRACTING PARTIES, the possibility of 
limiting the subsidization. 
Section 11 - Additional Provisions on f: x xnt SubsiIics* 
2. The contracting patties recognize that the granting by a contracting party 
of a subsidy on the export of any product may have harmful effects for other 
contracting patties, both inºhoºling and exporting, may cause undue disturbance 
to their normal conitnetcial interests. and may hinder the achievement of the 
objectives of this Agreentcnt. 
3. Accordingly, contracting parties should seek to avoid the use of subsidies 
on the export of primary products. If. however, a contracting party grants directly 
or indirectly any form of subsidy, which operates to increase the export of any 
primary product from its teºtitoty. such subsidy shall not he applied in a rntunner 
which results in that contracting patty having more than an equitable share of 
world export trade in that product. account being taken of the shares of the 
contracting parties in such trade in the product during a previous representative 
period, and any special factors which may have affected or may lie affecting such 
trade in the product. "-* 
-1. Further, as from I January 1955 or the earliest practicable date thereafter. 
contracting parties shall cease to grant either directly or indirectly any for in of 
subsidy on the export of any product other than a primary product which subsidy 
results in the sale of such product for export at a price lower than the comparable 
price charged for the like product to buyers in the domestic market. Until 31 
December 1957 no contracting party shall extend the scope of any such subsidiz- 
ation beyond that existing on I January 1955 by the introduction of new, or the 
extension of existing, subsidies. * 
5. The CONTRACTING PARTIES shall review the operation of the provi- 
sions of this Article from time to time with a view to examining its effectiveness. 
in the light of actual experience, in promoting the objectives of this Agreement 
and avoiding subsidization seriously prejudicial to the trade or interests of 
contracting parties. 
Article XIX 
Emergency Action on Imports of Particular Products 
I. (a) If, as a result of unforeseen developments and of the effect of the 
obligations incurred by a contracting party under this Agreement, including tariff 
concessions, any product is being imported into the territory of that contracting 
party in such increased quantities and under such conditions as to cause or 
threaten serious injury to domestic producers in that territory of like or directly 
competitive products, the contracting party shall be free, in respect of such 
product, and to the extent and for such time as may be necessary to prevent or 
remedy such injury, to suspend the obligation in whole or in part or to withdraw 
or modify the concession. 
(h) If any product, which is the subject of a concession with respect to 
a preference, is being imported into the territory of a contracting party in the 
circumstances set forth in subparagraph (a) of this paragraph, so as to cause or 
threaten serious injury to domestic producers of like or directly competitive 
products in the territory of a contracting party which receives or received such 
preference, the importing contracting party shall be free, if that other contracting 
party so requests, to suspend the relevant obligation in whole or in part or to 
withdraw or modify the concession in respect of the product, to the extent and 
for such time as may he necessary to prevent or remedy such injury. 
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2. Before any contracting party shall take action pursuant to the provisions 
of paragraph i of this Article, it shall give notice in writing to the 
CONTRACT- 
ING f AR'[IES as far in advance is may he practicable and shall afford the 
CONTRACTING PARTIES and those contracting parties having a substantial 
interest as exporters of the product concerned an opportunity to consult with 
it 
in respect of the proposed action. When such notice is given in relation to a 
concession with respect to a prefeºence, the notice shall name the contacting natty 
which has requested the action. In critical circumstances, where delay would cause 
damage which it would he difficult to repair, action under paragraph 
I of this 
Article may he taken provisionally without prior consultation, on the condition 
that consultation shall be effected immediately after taking such action. 
3. (a) If agreement among the interested contracting parties with respect 
to the action is lint reached, the contracting party which proposes to take or 
continue the action shall, neveriheless, be free too Flo so, and if such action is taken 
or continued, the affected contracting parties shall then be free, not later than 
ninety days after such action is taken, to suspend, upon the expiration of thirty 
days from the day on which written notice of such suspension is received by the 
CONTRACTING PARTIES, the application to the trade of the contracting party 
taking such action, or, in the case envisaged in paragraph I (b) of this 
Article. 
to the trade of the contracting party requesting such action, of such substantially 
equivalent concessions or other obligations under this Agreement the suspension 
of which the CONTRACTING PARTIES do not disapprove. 
(b) Notwithstanding the provisions of subparagraph (a) of this paragraph. 
where action is taken under patagraph 2 of this Atticle without prior consultation 
and causes or threatens serious injury in the territory of a contracting laity to the 
domestic producers of products affected by the action, that contracting party shall. 
where delay would cause damage difficult to repair, be free to suspend. upon the 
taking of the action and throughout the period of consultation, such concessions 
or other obligations as may be necessary to prevent or remedy the 
injury. 
it rlicle XXI V 
7r'rrilrrri(rl Application - Fron er Tru%fic - Crrslr»ns Unions cult/ 
Free-grade Areas 
I. The provisions of this Agreement shall apply to the metropolitan customs 
ten itories of the contracting parties and to any other customs territories in respect 
of which this Agreement has been accepted under Article XXVI or is being 
applied under Article XXXIII or pursuant to the Protocol of Provisional Applica- 
tion. Each such customs territory shall, exclusively for the purposes of the 
tenitorial application of this Agreement, be treated as though it were a contracting 
party; Provided that the provisions of this paragraph shall not be construed to 
create any rights or obligations as between two or more customs territories in 
respect of which this Agreement has been accepted under Article XXVI or is 
being applied under Article XXXIII or pursuant to the Protocol of Provisional 
Application by a single contracting party. 
2. For the purposes of this Agreement a customs territory shall be understood 
to mean any territory with respect to which separate tariffs or other regulations 
of commerce are maintained for a substantial part of the trade of such territory 
with other territories. 
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3. The provisions of this Agreement shall not be construed to prevent: 
(n) Advantages accorded by any contracting ratty to adjacent countries 
in order to facilitate frontier traffic; 
(b) Advantages accorded to the trade with the Free Territory of Trieste 
by countries contiguous to that territory, provided that such advan- 
tages are not in conflict with the Treaties of [ eace arising out of the 
Second World War. 
4. The contracting parties recognize the desirability of increasing freedom of 
trade by the development, through voluntary agreements, of closer integration 
between the economies of the countries parties to such agreements. They also 
iccognize that the purpose of a customs union or of a free-trade area should he 
to facilitate trade between the constituent lertitories and not to raise harriers to 
the trade of other contracting pat tics with such teiritmies. 
5. Accordingly. the povisions oftltis A, gicement shall not pt event, as he iween 
the territories ofrontracting parties, the formation ofa customs imi01I Or c, f a free- 
trade area or the adoption of an interim agreement necessary for the fr un: ition 
of a customs union or of a fiee-trade area; Provided that: 
(eil with iespect to a customs tinicm, or an interim agicement leading 
to a formation of a customs union, the duties and outer iegnlalions 
of comnºeºce imposed at the institution of any such union or interim 
agreement in respect of trade with contracting patties not parties to 
such union or agreement shall not on the whole be higher or more 
restrictive than the general incidence of the duties and regulations 
of commerce applicable in the constituent territories piior to the 
foi station of such union or the adoption of Such interim agreement, 
at- the case may be: 
(h) with respect to a free-trade area. or an interim agreement leading 
to the formation of a free-trade area, the duties and other regulations 
of commerce maintained in each if the constituent territories and 
applicable at the formation of such free-trade area or the adoption 
of such interim agreement to the trade of contracting parties not 
included in such area or not parties to such agreement shall not he 
higher or mote restrictive than the corresponding duties and other 
regulations of commerce existing in the same constituent territories 
prior to the formation of the free-trade area, or interim agreement 
as the case may be; and 
(r) any interim agreement referred to in subparagraphs (a) and (b) sha11 
include a plan and schedule for the formation of such a customs 
union or of such a free-trade area within a reasonable length of time. 
6. If, in fulfilling the requirements of subparagraph 5 (a), a contracting party 
proposes to increase any rate of duty inconsistently with the provisions of Article 
11. the procedure set forth in Article XXVIII shall apply. In providing for com- 
pensatory adjustment. due account shall be taken of the compensation aheady 
afforded by the reduction brought about in the corresponding duty of the other 
constituents of the union. 
7. (a) Any contracting party deciding to enter into a customs union or free- 
trade area, or an interim agreement leading to the formation of such a union or 
area, shall promptly notify the CONTRACTING PARTIES and shall make 
available to them such information regarding the proposed union or area as will 
enable them to make such repoits and recommendations to contracting, patties 
as they may der, appropriate. 
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M If, after having studied the plan attcl schedule included in an interi1 
agrccmcnt referred to in Imagiahir 5 in consultation with [lie patties tu th; tt 
agtcetnenI and taking drye acecurnl cif die infcmrmaticm tuacle available in accordance 
with the provisions of srihparagflph (n), the C'ON"I P°: ' LING PARTIES find that 
stich agreement is not likely to result in the 1,01111: 11106 of a customs or of 
a Tice-trade area within the hericul contemplated by the parties to the sigicenjellt 
or That such period is not a reasonable one, the CONTRACTING PARTIES shall 
make recOnrrnendalioils to the patties to the agreement. The Patties shall tint 
maintain or put into force, as the case mai' he, such agreement if they aie not 
prepared to modify it in accot(lance with these reccmtmendations. 
(e) Any suhttarrtial change in the plan or schedule referred to in para- 
graph 5 (c) shall be corn, nunicated to the CONTRAC'T'ING PARTIES. which may 
request the ccmtracting hau ties concerned to consult with there if the chance seems 
likely to jeopardize or delay unduly the formation cif the customs union or of the 
free-trade area. 
S. For flit ulposct of this i\gtecment: 
(n) A customs union shall he understood to mean the substitution of a 
single customs ten itory for two or more customs territories. so that 
(i) duties ýuul other restrictive regulations of commerce (except. 
where necessary. those hetmitted under Articles Xl. XII, XIII. 
XIV. XV and XX) are eliminated with respect to substantially 
all the trade between the constituent territories of the union 
or at least with respect to substantially all the trade in prod 
acts originating in such territotics, and, 
(ii) subject to the provisions of paragraph 9, substantially the 
same ditties and other regulations of commerce are applied 
by each of the members of the union to the trade of ten itories 
not included in the union: 
(b) A free-trade area shall be understood to mean a group of twos OF 
more customs territories in which the duties and other rests i: ON c 
regulations of commerce (except, where necessary, those permiltcd 
under Articles X1, XII, XII1, XIV, XV and XX) are eliminated on 
substantially all the trade between the constituent lerritoriec in 
products originating in such territories. 
9. The preferences referred to in paragraph 2 of Article I shall not be al lee",, u 
by the formation of a customs union or of a free-trade arra but may hP eliminated 
or adjusted by means of negotiations with contracth par'-,.: Paffected. * This 
procedure of negotiations with affected contracting raities shall, in particular, 
apply to the elimination of preferences required ,u conform with the provisions 
of paragraph 8 (a)(i) and paragraph 8 (b). 
10. The CONTRACTING PARTIES may by a two-thirds majority ahpiove 
proposals which do not fully comply with the requirements of paragraphs 5 to 
9 inclusive, provided that such proposals lead to the formation of a customs union 
or a free-trade area in the sense of this Article. 
If. Taking into account the exceptional circumstances arising out of the 
estahlishntrnt of India and Pakistan as iiulepenclenl States and iecognizin,,, tile 
tat-; that they have km: ' -111stitntcd an economic unit, the contracting parties agiee 
that the hroVisrcmz or this Agreement shall not prevent the two countries from 
entering into special arrangements with respect to the trade between them, pending 
the establishment of their mutual trade relations on a definitive basis. * 
12. Fach contracting party shall take such reasonable measures as may he 
available to it to ensure observance of the provisions rid' this Agreement by the 
regional and local `government. and authorities within its territories. 
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Understanding on the Interpretation of Article XXIV of the 
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994 
Afeinherc. 
Flaring regard to the provisions of Article XX! V of GAY! ' 1994: 
Recognizing that customs unions and free-trade areas have greatly 
increased in number and importance since the establishment of GATI' 1947 and 
today cover a significant propoition of world trade; 
Recognizing the contribution to the expansion of wotId trade that may be 
made by closer integtation between the economics of the parties to such aptee- 
ntents: 
Rec 
. ggnizin, g also that such contribution 
is increased if the elimination het- 
ween the constituent tetºitories of duties and other ºestiictive regulations of com- 
merce extends to all trade. and diminished if any major sector of wade is 
excluded: 
Reaffirming that the purpose of such agreements should be to facilitate 
trade between the constituent territories and not to raise barriers to the trade of 
other Members with such territories: and that in their formation or enlatmenient 
the parties to them should to the greatest possible extent avoid creating adverse 
effects on the trade of other Members: 
Convinced also of the need to reinforce the effectiveness of the role of 
the Council for Trade in Goods in reviewing agreements notified under Article 
XXIV, by clarifying the criteria and procedures for the assessment of new or 
enlarged agreements. and improving the transparency of all Article XXIV agtee- 
ments: 
Recognizing the need for a common understanding of the obligations of 
Members under paragraph 12 of Article XXIV; 
Hereby agree as follows: 
1. Customs unions, free-trade areas, and interim agreements leading to the 
formation of a customs union or free-trade area, to be consistent with Article 
XXIV, must satisfy, inter ilia. the provisions of paragraphs 5,6,7 and 8 of that 
Article. 
Article XXIV: 5 
2. The evaluation under paragraph 5(a) of Article XXIV of the ¬eneral 
incidence of the duties sind other regulations of commerce applicable before and 
after the formation of a customs union shall in respect of duties and charges tic 
based upon all overall assessment (if weighted average tariff rates and of cuctunts 
duties collected. This assessment shall be based on import statistics for a previ- 
ous representative period to be supplied by the customs union, on a tariff-line 
basis and in values and quantities, broken down by WT() country of origin. The 
Secretariat shall compute the weighted average tariff' tales and customS duties 
collected in accordance with (lie methodology used in the assessment of tai iii 
offers in the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations. For this pur- 
pose, the duties and charges to be taken into consideration shall be the applied 
rates of duty. It is recognized that for the purpose of the overall assessment of 
the incidence of other regulations of commerce for which quantification and 
aggregation are difficult, the examination of individual measures, regulations. 
products covered and trade flows affected may he required. 
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? The "reasonable Iernth of lime" Ieferrcd to in I)aiagraf)h 5(c) of 
Article XXIV should exceed 10 years 01)1y in exceptional cases. In cases where 
Members parties to an interim agreement believe that 10 years %%oulcl he insuffi- 
cient they shall provide a full explanation try the Council for Trade in Gods of 
the need for a longer period. 
Article XX'Il': G 
4. Paragraph 6 of Article XXIV establishes the hracedure'to be followed 
when a Member forming a customs union proposes to increase a bound rate of 
duty. In this regard Members reaffirm that the procedure set folth ill 
Article XXVIII, as elaborated in the guidelines adopted on I(1 November I9S0 
IIUISI) 27S/26-28) and in the Understanding on the Interhrelation cat 
Article XXVIII of GATT 1994, must he coinimcncecl before tariff concession, 
are modified or withdrawn upon the formation of a customs union or an interim 
agreement leading to the fortnation of a customs union. 
5. These negotiations will be entered into in good faith with a view to 
achieving mutually satisfactory compensatory adjustment. In such negotiations. 
as required by paragraph 6 of Article XXIV, clue account shall he taken of 
reductions of duties on the same tariff Iine made by other constituents or the 
customs union upon iv; formation. Should such reductions not he sufficient to 
provide the necessary compensatory adjustment, the customs union would offer 
compensation, which may take the form of reductions of duties on other tariff 
lines. Such an offer shall be taken into consideration by the Members having 
negotiating rights in the binding being modified or withdrawn. Should the cont- 
pensatomy adjustment remain unacceptable, negotiations should be continuedl. 
"'here. despite such efforts, aýýreemcnt in neýzotiaticros on coil, pcnsatory adjust 
rnent under nrlicle XXVIII as elaborated by the tfrtclerstandinzz on the Interpieta- 
tiem of Article XXVIII of (; AVY 199.1 cannot he reached within a rreaticmahle 
pciiocl from the initial ion of negotiations. the customs onion shall, nevertheless. 
he free to tnoclity or withdraw the concessions: affected Mcmheis shall then he 
flee tu wit lid raw %uhstantially equivalent concessions in accoicl; utcc with 
Article XXVIII. 
6. GATT I994 imposes no obligation on Members benefiting from a ledt! c- 
ticm of' duties consequent upon the formation of a customs union. 01 an interim 
agreement leading to the Iol nl, ltion oI il Cl1Slo1115 Un O 1. lo pros iiI' cotiIpef1SiUonv 
adjuýlnlcllt to its ccrostituctlls. 
tr'ri(t of ('uu, cuums Unions (111(1 Free-Trade. 1rr'us 
7. All notifications made under paragraph 7(a) of Article XXIV shall he 
examined by a working party in the light of the relevant provisions of 
GiVFT 1994 and of patagraph I of this Understanding. The working patty shall 
submit a report to the Council for Trade in Goods on its findings in this recant. 
The Council for Trade in (roods may make such recommendations to Members 
as it deems appropriate. 
8. In regard to interim agreements. the working part)- may in its report make 
appropriate recommendations on the proposed time-frame and on measures 
required 10 complete the fornration of the customs union or free-trade area. It 
may if necessary Provide fur further IC\iew of the auzrrernent. 
509 
9. Members parties to an interim agreement shall notify substantial changes 
in the plan and schedule included in that agreement to the Council for Trade in 
Goods and, if so requested, the Council shall examine the changes. 
10. Should an interim agreement notified under paragraph 7(a) of Article 
XXIV not include a plan and schedule, contrary to paragraph 5(c) of Article 
XXIV, the working party shall in its report recommend such a plan and sched- 
ule. The parties shall not maintain or put into force, as the case may be, such 
agreement if they are not prepared to modify it in accordance with these recom- 
mendations. Provision shall be made for subsequent review of the implementa- 
tion of the recommendations. 
1 1. Customs unions and constituents of free-trade areas shall report period- 
ically to the Council for Trade in Goods, as envisaged by the CONTRACTING 
PARTIES to GATT 1947 in their instruction to the GATT 1947 Council con- 
cerning reports on regional agreements (BISD 18S/38), on the operation of the 
relevant agreement. Any significant changes and/or developments in the agree- 
ments should be reported as they occur. 
Dispute Seiiki, ient 
12. The lnovisions of Articles XXII and XXIII of GAIT 1994 as elaborated 
and applied by the. Dispute Seulcment Understanding may b& invoked with respect to any matters arising from the application of those provisions of Article XXIV relating to customs unions, free-trade areas or interim agreements leading to the formation of a customs union or free-trade area. 
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